## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE:

: MDL-07-1871

AVANDIA MARKETING, SALES : Philadelphia, Pennsylvania PRACTICES and PRODUCTS : April 23, 2014 LIABILITY LITIGATION : 10:37 a.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF REMAND HEARINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE CYNTHIA M. RUFE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

## APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiffs: BARRETT BEASLEY, ESQUIRE

Salim-Beasley LLC 1901 Texas Street

Natchitoches, LA 71457

JOHN M. RESTAINO, ESQUIRE

Restaino Siler Law 1700 Lincoln Street

Suite 2920

Denver, CO 80203

W. STEVEN BERMAN, ESQUIRE

Napoli Bern Ripka Shkolnik LLP

350 5th Avenue

New York, NY 10118

Transcribers Limited

17 Rickland Drive Sewell, NJ 08080 856-589-6100 • 856-589-9005

|     |                                   |   | 2 |
|-----|-----------------------------------|---|---|
| 1   | APPEARANCES:                      |   | 2 |
| 2   | For the Defendants:               | NINA GUSSACK, ESQUIRE                                   |   |
| 3   |                                   | SEAN FAHEY, ESQUIRE<br>Pepper Hamilton LLP              |   |
| 4   |                                   | 3000 Two Logan Square Eighteenth & Arch Streets         |   |
| 5   |                                   | Philadelphia, PA 19103                                  |   |
| 6   |                                   | RAYMOND A. CARDOZO, ESQUIRE<br>Reed Smith               |   |
| 7   |                                   | Three Logan Square 17th and Arch Street                 |   |
| 8   |                                   | Suite 3100<br>Philadelphia, PA 19103                    |   |
| 9   |                                   | <u> </u>  |   |
| 10  | Audio Operator:                   | Erica Pratt   |   |
| 12  | Transcribed By:                   | Michael Keating   |   |
| 13  |                                   | <u> </u>  |   |
| 14  | Proceedings recording: transcript | recorded by electronic sound produced by computer-aided |   |
| 15  | transcription service.            | ·   |   |
| 16  |                                   |   |   |
| 17  |                                   |   |   |
| 18  |                                   |   |   |
| 19  |                                   |   |   |
| 20  |                                   |   |   |
| 21  |                                   |   |   |
| 22  |                                   |   | j |
| 23  |                                   |   |   |
| 24  |                                   |   |   |
| 25  |                                   |   |   |
|     |                                   |   |   |
| - 1 |                                   |   |   |

(The following was heard in open court at

3

1

2 10:37 a.m.) 3 THE COURT: Good morning. 4 MR. RESTAINO: Good morning, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Please be seated, everyone. All 6 Here we are with multiple motions to remand 7 Avandia cases that three different groups, grouped by 8 law firms by this Court. 9 We're addressing these motions, which all add 10 a defendant, that is McKesson, a distributor in 11 California, and the allegation common to these motions 12 is that the Foreign Defendant Rule should apply because 13 McKesson is a California resident and destroys 14 diversity. We need to address this. 15 This has be handled in like motions in the 16 Avandia MDL before several years ago, early in the 17 MDL's existence. Some of this territory is not new. 18 What is being raised now are two primary issues. 19 One being when GSK continued to remove these 20 cases that McKesson is fraudulently joined. Pure and 21 simple, the allegation is that nobody, that means 22 McKesson, does anything about moving forward to 23 prosecute those claims against McKesson, however they 24 may be filed and, however, they may be framed in the 25 complaints.

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

4 1 The other is a violation of CAFA. There are 2 circuits that are looking at that issue. One has 3 already opined on it, the Eighth. I think the Ninth 4 has a case right now. We did not rule on that issue. 5 That was raised by GSK in the earlier opinion because 6 it we thought had been abandoned, but that doesn't mean 7 it had been ruled on. So we will deal with that if 8 it's appropriate. But I really think that our focus 9 has got to be on the fraudulent joinder issue, and I 10 would like to begin there. 11 So let me first find out exactly who is here. 12 On behalf of the Restaino Siler motions, who is here? 13 MR. RESTAINO: Good morning, Your Honor, John 14 Restaino. 15 THE COURT: Good morning. Nice to meet you. 16 MR. RESTAINO: Nice to meet you.

THE COURT: And you have two such motions but with multi-plaintiff cases?

MR. RESTAINO: That is correct.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Restaino. We'll get to that in a moment. I'm looking at those numbers trying to go somewhat numerically. I don't think I have anybody here from Napoli Bern. What would be the problem? We certainly filed notice in that case as well as the others. Have you heard anything addressing

MR. FAHEY: Your Honor, I had a brief

5

1

2

GSK?

Mr. Fahey?

3 conversation with Mr. Shkolnik when we had a hearing in 4 California maybe three weeks ago, and we were talking 5 about the fact that this argument was coming up. 6 know he started a trial in another matter in Chicago, 7 but I assume he has people from his firm that's going 8 to cover this argument. 9 THE COURT: We've received no correspondence 10 or inquiries and we know of no filing. Do you? 11 MS. BEASLEY: Well, actually, last week they 12 did file a notice of supplemental authority on a Tenth 13 Circuit case, the <a href="Parson">Parson</a> case. So, I mean obviously 14 are aware --15 THE COURT: But they have to be here. 16 MR. RESTAINO: Right. 17 MS. BEASLEY: Right. 18 THE COURT: I mean even when you're in 19 transit and your plane is late you contact the Court. 20 I don't wish to make any judgments about their ignoring 21 my court order, I don't think they are. 22 They know that this is an active briefing and 23 argument and hearing. This is actually a hearing. 24 It's not just oral argument. So we need to hear 25 evidence, and they would be losing their opportunity to

1 do that. But we'll check into that until we know more. 2 And we will then address Sail (ph) and Beasley motions, 3 and you are here on behalf of? MS. BEASLEY: Barrett Beasley, yes. 5 THE COURT: Yes, thank you. All right. 6 think that in terms of filing dates, Mr. Restaino, I 7 think we're going to ask you to address these first. 8 You have earlier dates, not that that really means 9 anything except I have to have some kind of order. So 10 we'll address your motions first. 11 MR. RESTAINO: Sure. 12 THE COURT: All right. And you did refile 13 your motions to remand that had been stayed in the 14 other district court? 15 MR. RESTAINO: Yes, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Okay. What would you like to 17 present today? 18 MR. RESTAINO: Well, Your Honor, I think 19 taking the lead of the Court, the seminal question is 20 the issue of the fraudulent joinder of McKesson. 21 Restaino Siler cannot truly comment upon what was done 22 nor not done before we filed our cases regarding 23 discovery of McKesson. 24 But, now that we are involved and actively 25 involved in litigation, as others have done, we will be

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 conducting discovery of McKesson. I know such 2 discovery, in fact, has been done in other matters, and 3 my previous law firm of Lopez, Hodes, Restaino, Milman 4 & Sikos in Newport Beach, my ex-partner and good 5 friend, Ramon Lopez, has recently taken a deposition of 6 individuals from McKesson in another matter. It might 7 be the Predoxa (ph) matter, but I'm not 100 percent 8 sure it's Predoxa MDL. 9 So pending upon the ruling of the Court, it 10 is our intention to actively conduct discovery against 11 McKesson regarding what was known, when it was known, 12 what was shared and what was not shared. So we feel at 13 a little bit of a disadvantage in coming to the party 14 late and there being the --15 THE COURT: That happens. 16 MR. RESTAINO: Yes. 17 THE COURT: The drinks are gone, you know,

the candy is decimated.

MR. RESTAINO: And in that situation, forgiving the language, but someone has to make an extra run to the liquor store. And I quess that, you know, we are the late ones to the party, so if I have to drive to get the fresh beer, then I will do that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I admire good intentions.

24

25

for --

MS. BEASLEY:

Okay.

1 GSK doesn't believe this because they have been told 2 that so many times. They have never seen it happen in 3 these cases where the McKesson entities are held to any 4 accountability as it is alleged in all of the 5 plaintiffs' complaints that come out of California. 6 know that they're -- you know, California's permissive 7 Rules of Civil Procedure certainly permit that. We 8 have reviewed that thoroughly and opined on it a long 9 time ago. 10 But how old is this litigation? 2007 the MDL 11 was formed. Avandia cases existed prior to the fall of 12 2007 when we were appointed. We got things running in 13 early 2008 and now it's 2014, we still don't see 14 evidence of it. So you're saying that they're doing it 15 in California, but I don't know that. 16 MS. BEASLEY: Could I --17 THE COURT: Not in the MDL. 18 MS. BEASLEY: Could I add something, Your 19 Actually, discovery has been propounded by 20 Napoli Bern in the JCCP recently. 21 THE COURT: Well, they're not here. Okay? 22 MS. BEASLEY: Okay. I'm just saying that --23 THE COURT: I don't really want you to argue

```
1
              THE COURT: -- your brethren.
2
              MS. BEASLEY:
                            I apologize.
3
              THE COURT: There may come a time when that's
4
    appropriate, Ms. Beasley, but not right now. And I
5
    think I know who just walked in.
6
              MR. BERMAN: Yes, I'm very sorry, Your Honor,
7
    for being late. I got, unfortunately stuck on the
8
    bridge and I couldn't call the port. My name is Steve
9
    Berman. I'm from Napoli Bern Ripka & Shkolnik, and my
10
    colleague is correct. We have not only propounded
11
    discovery in the California litigation, but there's a
12
    pending discovery motion before the Court to compel
13
    production because McKesson has refused to respond to
14
    our interrogatories and document demand and request for
15
    admissions.
16
              THE COURT: Well, that's very nice.
                                                    Now I'm
17
    going to let Mr. Restaino get back to arguing his own
18
    cases, okay?
19
              MR. BERMAN: Thank you. I'm sorry, Your
20
    Honor.
21
              THE COURT: Why don't you have a seat? And
22
    I'm glad you're here.
23
              MR. BERMAN: Thank you.
              THE COURT: So is it a question of good
24
25
    intentions or is it a question of late filers who
```

expect to reap -- let me be perfectly clear here. GSK holds the position, as I read their papers and as I have listened to these arguments before, if you expect to reap the benefits of prior discovery and walk yourselves into a trial here or in California -- well, we wouldn't be trying your case without a lexicon problem.

I'm just saying, how do you expect to proceed? Since I've heard this evidence now, filing interrogatories and propounding discovery doesn't answer that because that can be prophylactic only and that could be superficial. Nobody has settled with McKesson and McKesson has not been held liable in any court, have they, on any Avandia case?

MR. RESTAINO: I do not --

THE COURT: Right, Mr. Restaino?

MR. RESTAINO: I believe you are correct. I do not believe there's been a trial, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And there hasn't been a settlement involving them either, has there?

MR. RESTAINO: I don't know that.

THE COURT: Well, I'm sure that would be a matter of record in California if nowhere else. I think that would be very telling as to how valid a defendant they really are to most people that are

23

24

25

1 filing against them in multiple cases in California. 2 MR. RESTAINO: Well, Your Honor --3 THE COURT: Not just limited to this MDL? 4 MR. RESTAINO: Yes, and there are -- there 5 have been many, many cases filed previously, as the 6 Court has just gone through the chronology. And those 7 cases have either been dispensed with in one form or 8 another or they're still all pending. And it's not our 9 belief that they're all pending. So if they've been 10 dispensed with in some form, then either they have all 11 been just dismissed or they've been settled. 12 THE COURT: Right. And I'm not aware. 13 MR. RESTAINO: And --14 THE COURT: I'm simply saying I'm not aware, 15 so if anybody has any evidence about how that they were 16 resolved, I'd like to hear it because this is the time 17 for me to not only hear your good intentions, Mr. 18 Restaino, and I accept that, but also what practical 19 steps are being taken to make your cases different from 20 every other one that this MDL has witnessed in the last 21 eight years.

MR. RESTAINO: Again, all I can really do is reiterate, Your Honor, that there has been discovery propounded, as Mr. Berman has shared. I know there have been depositions taken in the past, and I am

FORM 2034 🊯 PENGAD • 1.600-631-6983 • www.pengad.com

24

25

12 1 meeting with that individual who took those depositions next week. It is our intention to drive to that 3 4 proverbial liquor store and bring back enough for the 5 party to continue in order for us to show our belief 6 that, in fact, there is still scientific evidence for 7 these cases to go forward. 8 THE COURT: I will give GSK the opportunity 9 to respond to each of these motions in a moment. I did 10 want to cover that there are certain of your plaintiffs that have been identified as Delaware citizens? 11 12 MR. RESTAINO: I don't have first-hand 13 knowledge of that. 14 THE COURT: Oh, no plaintiffs have been 15 identified as citizens of Delaware. Okay. So all of 16 your plaintiffs are --17 MR. RESTAINO: In various --18 THE COURT: -- citizens of California? 19 MR. RESTAINO: In various jurisdictions. THE COURT: Or two plaintiffs? 20 MR. RESTAINO: Some are in California. 21 22 THE COURT: You have two motions? MR. RESTAINO: Yes, Your Honor. 23

THE COURT: And in each motion you have one

plaintiff that's a citizen of California?

```
13
1
              MR. RESTAINO: Yes, Your Honor.
 2
              THE COURT: Okay. But the rest are citizens
 3
    of where?
 4
              MR. RESTAINO: Various different
 5
    jurisdictions, but I don't believe there are any in
 6
    Delaware.
7
              THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you address the
8
    class action argument now?
9
              MR. RESTAINO: Well, Your Honor, as has been
10
    handled many times in the past, these are the type of
11
    cases that can be remanded back. The Class Action
12
    Fairness Act has its specific requirements that we
13
    don't feel and completely met with in this particular
14
    case.
15
              That has been raised and argued against, and
16
    cases have been remanded back indicating that mass
17
    torts like this do not necessarily fall under that. We
18
    believe that, as put in our papers, that the Class
19
    Action Fairness Act does not apply in this particular
20
    case and these kind of cases do, in fact, belong in
21
    California.
22
              THE COURT: Well, when you file multiple
23
    plaintiff cases in the numbers that you have --
24
              MR. RESTAINO: Yes.
```

THE COURT: -- how are those cases actually

tried? How do they proceed to trial? Whether I remand them en masse to California state court or whether I don't, how are they tried, because in the MDL they would be severed and proceed individually. But as you filed it, the objective is apparently to proceed together in discovery, together in motions, and at some point how do you proceed to trial? What's the mechanics of that?

MR. RESTAINO: The process in California, which typically leads to a consolidation of cases, is very much akin to what we see in the various MDLs in which we've read, and that is the selection of a bellwether process by which both sides can present representative cases to the jury, to the judge, and the decision can be made as to which one or more would go forward first.

THE COURT: So you're saying that there are mini MDLs created in California and they treat them as organized state groups of trial?

MR. RESTAINO: That is correct. The acronym is JCCP over the joint commission for the consolidation. And the process works very, very similar to the MDL process.

For example, in the recently concluding DePuy ASR hip process we worked with the MDL and were

 involved with the development there of which bellwether cases were selected.

At the same time, on a similar track in San Francisco there was the consolidated process for those cases and cases were selected for trial and, in fact, the trial process was begun. That has happened throughout the history.

As I recall, going back to the mid-1990s there was a separate track in California for the diet pill litigation. Again, a JCCP was formed while some of us worked in the MDL, including Diane and myself. I won't say it in front of the -- Your Honor and say in every case but -- gees, I'm hard pressed to find a case where there was not a concurrent track in California or elsewhere, but specifically in California, involving the consolidation with a very similar process, not Daubert per se, but Frye hearings, and then the bellwether selection. Invariably, that has led to the cases going away.

THE COURT: Yes, cases proceeding en masse often end that way. However, the class action is a slightly different animal, and collecting cases and filing them together, collecting plaintiffs and filing them together, looks like one thing but can be another. And GSK is saying that this should be considered as a

potential class action, and thus must meet the criteria.

MR. RESTAINO: And most courts have begun to look with disfavor against class actions involving personal injury because, putting aside numerosity, the similarity of the injuries and/or damages is often held to be so different in each particular case, therefore, there are the two different legal animals, the classic class action and the recognized mass tort, which would lead to, as Your Honor understands, the multi-district litigation. But they are very different.

In the mass tort world we do not have a representative whose case is being tried that would then lead to a settlement involving others with those similar types of damages.

THE COURT: But how do you separate your cases, because you only have one California resident per motion. Per group --

MR. RESTAINO: Yes.

THE COURT: -- when you file you have one California resident. How do you sever them out and still maintain jurisdiction?

MR. RESTAINO: Well, under the Rules of Procedure in California, we are allowed to file and bundle the cases as we did.

THE COURT: To file it. But how do you try those cases?

MR. RESTAINO: Again, with the judge during the process of discovery and leading up to the hearings, evidentiary hearings, and the trial selection, then the group typically of plaintiff lawyers and defense lawyers pick and select bellwether cases that we submit to the judge and the judge then makes the decision of how many will be tried at one time, who shall go first, and then specific, case specific discovery is conducted on that case as it gets ready to go forward to trial. And a schedule can be put forth, the first one would be July 1st. The next bellwether will be September 1st with the various Daubert-like Frye hearings, as it's referred to in California, scheduled.

THE COURT: Well, I'm pretty familiar with California in the Avandia MDL because Judge Burrell, and before him, Judge Carolyn Kull, did coordinate with my MDL and me in particular quite often. So, we know the communication and the coordination issues, and we felt that we worked very well together.

But, this is a separate issue that I'm talking to you about. And I really do want to close this particular argument by asking if you have any

```
1
    documents or witnesses or any evidence you would like
2
    to present at this time, Mr. Restaino.
3
              MR. RESTAINO: I do not, Your Honor.
4
              THE COURT: All right, Thank you very much.
5
    Is there anything else you would like to tell me?
6
              MR. RESTAINO: Not at this moment.
7
              THE COURT: All right. I'll give you a
8
    rebuttal after I hear from GSK. Thank you.
9
              MR. RESTAINO: Thank you.
10
              THE COURT: Mr. Fahey?
11
              MR. FAHEY: Your Honor, I think we can
12
    proceed in any way you wish. We put together a
13
    PowerPoint just to organize our thoughts and it
14
    addresses all of the plaintiffs' arguments together.
15
    And so if it's okay with you, maybe they can all finish
16
    and then we can speak and then they can do rebuttal?
17
              THE COURT: That's probably very sensible.
18
              MR. FAHEY: Okay.
19
              THE COURT: Unless there's something in
20
    particular you need to respond to now.
21
              MR. FAHEY: I think we have all the issues
22
    Mr. Restaino covered --
23
              THE COURT: Okay.
24
              MR. FAHEY: -- in our response already.
25
              THE COURT: Would counsel agree?
```

COUNSEL: Fine.

THE COURT: All right. And as I repeated, you will be given rebuttal time if you desire it. So, Ms. Beasley, why don't you address your cases and your motion?

MS. BEASLEY: Okay. Well, I'll just answer the questions you had asked Mr. Restaino since obviously those are issues that you find important.

For the fraudulent joinder, like Mr.

Restaino, I can't really speak to the strategy of the

JCCP leadership in the last few years. They might have
a legitimate reason for not doing discovery against

McKesson, I don't know. Their trial pool was rather

small. I think it was six. And maybe the plaintiffs
that were involved in those six trials did not have

Avandia that was distributed by McKesson. So I don't

know --

THE COURT: But McKesson was named in those cases.

MS. BEASLEY: Right. But even at the time in 2009 when the motions to remand were in front of you there was the possibility, because that was just the pleading stage, that evidence would come out that Avandia was not the distributor for every single plaintiff and that was not reason enough to deny the

```
motion to remand.
```

†

So, out of the 12,000 plus plaintiffs that had been involved in the Avandia JCCP, maybe not all of them, and I don't know, I'm just speculating. I'm trying to find a legitimate reason for the leadership in the JCCP to not have done discovery against McKesson. I don't know.

THE COURT: Well --

MS. BEASLEY: We have a JCCP in Plavix pending in San Francisco Superior Court right now.

McKesson was named as a distributor. We're already doing discovery on them. We're doing discovery on them at the same time we're doing discovery on the manufacturer.

THE COURT: But, that is a separate MDL and has a separate course or a separate life, and each MDL is very, very unique. And in Avandia we have a track record. So we actually have to deal with Avandia here. It's interesting to hear about other MDLs and some of them going after McKesson aggressively early, but not here. It simply hasn't happened here.

MS. BEASLEY: And I don't know why.

THE COURT: There's got to be a reason for that.

MS. BEASLEY: I don't know why because I

```
wasn't involved. I wasn't in leadership. Personally,
I would have asked the same question if I was a
plaintiff attorney involved in the JCCP because
California law does permit products liability,
culpability for every entity in the chain of
distribution, including distributors. So, for strict
liability and negligence, so I'm baffled.

THE COURT: Well, it allows them to be named
as a defendant. It doesn't allow them to be scooped up
```

THE COURT: Well, it allows them to be named as a defendant. It doesn't allow them to be scooped up on and named in every single product liability pharmaceutical. There's got to be a time when the truth be told. And we don't sit here and defend McKesson, we just wonder why other than a pleading arrangement, it is done.

MS. BEASLEY: Well, I'm wondering why
McKesson hasn't responded to the discovery from Napoli
Bern. Why is there a motion to compel? I mean if
they're not liable --

THE COURT: Well --

MS. BEASLEY: -- you know, if --

THE COURT: -- there might be a good many reasons why.

MS. BEASLEY: Okay.

THE COURT: Possibly, one of those could be a similar question as to what I'm asking. Are they a

25

1

```
real defendant? Do they have to go through the
2
    expense --
3
              MS. BEASLEY: Well, they can prove it.
4
              THE COURT: -- or do they have to pretend,
5
    along with other plaintiffs who have named them?
6
              MS. BEASLEY: They why haven't they got it
7
    dismissed?
8
              THE COURT: Now, really we have to get to it.
9
    We have to get to that issue.
10
              MS. BEASLEY: Right.
11
              THE COURT: Is this a convenient way to stay
12
    in your choice of forum? I don't know that this is
13
    necessarily each individual plaintiff's choice of forum
14
    because you grouped your cases. You have 33
15
    multi-plaintiff cases filed in 2013 for the most part,
16
    right?
17
              MS. BEASLEY: Yes, ma'am. But if there is a
18
    choice of forums, the plaintiff is entitled under the
19
    law to choose. I mean we do have a choice. We are the
20
    masters of the complaint. And under the California
21
    joinder rules, all the plaintiffs that were in there
    and all their claims to and as well as both defendants
22
    were properly joined under California Code of Civil
23
24
    Procedure, as you yourself determined in 2009.
```

THE COURT: But as I started out this today,

we have to bring 2009 and the record that was developed there up to the present, and that is not something that plaintiffs today can hang their hat on unless they can show me a change and show me that it is not a fraudulent joinder, as I saw no evidence of that before.

But, as I said, I'm looking at the progress of this litigation as a whole, not necessarily holding

of this litigation as a whole, not necessarily holding any one of you attorneys and your law firms to the same strategies, but we understand the right. We've held that way. Then it gets to be a question of is this real or is this just rotations or rote. I think that's the proper road.

MS. BEASLEY: I agree with you and I'm just asking that you give us a chance to find out through discovery.

THE COURT: Thank you. Do you have any evidence you would like to present today?

MS. BEASLEY: No, Ma'am.

THE COURT: Okay. And I did not see in your particular --

MS. BEASLEY: Misjoinder? Are you about to ask about --

THE COURT: No. No. How do you respond to the GSK argument involving the class actions?

MS. BEASLEY: Well, our argument is actually pretty narrow. It comes down to the numerosity requirement of the Class Action Fairness Act. The definition of mass action requires that the plaintiffs request a joint trial of more than 100 claimants, and that just hasn't occurred here.

You know, all we did is file our complaints

You know, all we did is file our complaints in San Francisco Superior Court with fewer than 100 claimants each. It's the road map that Congress gave us when they enacted CAFA.

Basically, they said if you to deal with the hassle of filing multiple complaints, as long as there are fewer than 100 claimants, then you can avoid federal jurisdiction under CAFA.

So we did that. And we haven't -- we didn't file anything since then, we haven't moved to consolidate, you know, nothing has been filed to show our intent, request, or proposal to jointly try any of our cases together in more than 100. So the plain language of the act hasn't been met.

THE COURT: Well, the Eighth Circuit didn't seem to think that was very important --

MS. BEASLEY: The Eighth --

THE COURT: -- did they?

MS. BEASLEY: The Eighth Circuit and also the

Seventh Circuit in <u>Abbott</u> are factually completely distinguishable because in those cases the exact opposite happened. You had several plaintiffs filing complaints of fewer than 100 claimants each.

THE COURT: 99.

MS. BEASLEY: Right. Then all of those plaintiffs involved in all those cases moved for a motion to consolidate in one county and they specifically requested through trial. So that's why.

It's not that they filed the complaints that triggered CAFA. It's their subsequent motion to consolidate through trial that triggered CAFA, and that meets the plain languages of the mass action provision. That hasn't happened here.

So, basically, what the defendant is saying is that just filing cases, even if there's fewer than 100 plaintiffs in them, in a state where the JCCP is pending, just your knowledge that a JCCP happens to be pending in that state, that triggers CAFA. But that's not what the act says.

THE COURT: I thought the larger part of the defendant's argument was that in your case you filed 33 multi-plaintiff cases. You broke them out.

MS. BEASLEY: Well --

THE COURT: And is that a strategy to defeat

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

PENGAD • 1-800-631-6989 • www.pengad.com

⊕

FORM 2034

MS. BEASLEY: That is a strategy that They said Congress allowed us when they enacted CAFA. if you file a complaint with fewer than 100 plaintiffs, you can avoid this trigger of federal jurisdiction. And if you look at the new Tenth Circuit case that was just noticed by Napoli Bern, Parson Simone, the Eleventh Circuit case, there's also Anderson, that was out of the Seventh Circuit, and it's the opposite of the Abbott Case, and Tano, the Ninth Circuit case. That's a little bit older, but it's still good law in the Ninth Circuit, which is where we filed. the Third Circuit case, Abramson. We cited it in our brief. It's 503 Federal Appendix 157. unpublished, but it's also on point.

It's saying that just because you filed the complaints, if there are fewer than 100 plaintiffs, you know, you can avoid triggering federal jurisdiction under CAFA.

The defendants, they specifically exclude the defendants from being able to file a motion or aggregate separate complaints to get the numerosity requirement, and that's what they're trying to do.

They're saying yeah, but if you put all those 33 cases together, it's more than 100. But I'm saying well, we

didn't file them together. They're separate complaints.

THE COURT: Well, it is an interesting development of case law decisions in the appellate courts that I think you're getting your cases involved in by filing this way, regardless of whether California permits it or not.

And the class action doesn't necessarily equal mass action, but for practical purposes, they're handled very similarly and similarly to an MDL. So I think that there is a reason why there is developing law here, and I haven't decided yet how your case falls into it or your cases fall into it.

But, it always seems to me when you see multi-plaintiff cases filed, and they usually come from limited jurisdictions where that's permitted, and we've seen a number of those, but not a lot. When you have them it is very interesting to see how they are parsed into separate case filings. Usually, it's a strategy that I don't always have the opportunity or even interest to look into, but I think I have to now. I think I'm being asked to do that, which means that you have been required automatically to respond. I understand your argument on that.

MS. BEASLEY: Okay.

f

THE COURT: I won't be ruling on the cuff today, but I do think that we cannot ignore the growing body of case law that is looking at this type of multi-plaintiff filing as a mass action which could actually qualify as a class action, even though that's not how any of you intended it.

MS. BEASLEY: Well, just one more thing. The Tenth Circuit case that just came out this month is right on point, and they analyze exactly the issue that you're talking about and they do it very well and it's favorable to our position that --

THE COURT: Well, if I decide the same way or differently, the Third Circuit is going to opine on this one way or another.

MS. BEASLEY: I understand.

THE COURT: So I better know everything that's out there. And then maybe the U.S. Supreme Court will accept cert and try to define this because this is where it's going. So we have to have a full record here. And on the CAFA claims I think the record will speak for itself. The arguments are necessary and the case law that we can review is all very helpful, although not dispositive.

MS. BEASLEY: There is the <u>Abramson</u> case from the Third Circuit.

```
29
1
              THE COURT: Well, not exactly the same.
2
              MS. BEASLEY: Well, there is no exact.
3
              THE COURT: So --
4
              MS. BEASLEY: There never is it seems.
5
              THE COURT: Well, that's the lovely nature of
6
    being in law, isn't it, to be judges and lawyers, to
7
    always --
8
              MS. BEASLEY: Sometimes.
9
              THE COURT: -- find something different.
10
    First impressions are an opportunity to put our
11
    thinking caps on and see where we are, but I want to do
12
    what's right here, so I will consider your arguments.
13
    Thank you.
14
              MS. BEASLEY: Thank you. I don't have any
15
    evidence.
16
              THE COURT: All right. And Mr. Berman.
17
              MR. BERMAN: Thank you. It is always a
18
    pleasure to be here, Your Honor, and I, unfortunately,
19
    was attempting to print some of the California
20
    discovery and the motion pending in California to be
21
    able to hand it up to the Court which, unfortunately, I
22
    only found out about last night in preparation for
23
    today's oral argument, and I would request permission
24
    to be able --
25
              THE COURT: Because that's not your motion,
```

```
it's someone else's?
```

MR. BERMAN: It's my firm's motion. My office is in California and sometimes the right hand, which I'll refer to as myself, being from the east coast, doesn't necessarily know in time what the left hand in California is doing. But I don't think it can be disputed that discovery in these 2013 --

THE COURT: Don't they know how important you are? I mean your firm.

MR. BERMAN: I wish they knew. But, more to the point, Your Honor, our cases were filed in 2013, but then the cases that are in state court in California, there were procedural attempts to get them to this jurisdiction through the MDL. Some succeeded, some did not, and so we propounded discovery in those litigations.

McKesson has refused to respond to it and there is a pending motion, and I would respectfully request permission by the end of today, before the end of today, to supplement the record with copies of those documents so that the Court can consider those.

THE COURT: I think I could give you longer than the end of today. As soon as you can is fine with me.

MR. BERMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. I

appreciate the Court's graciousness. With regard to the Delaware plaintiff, that is my case. It was in the <a href="Alaimalo">Alaimalo</a> case, and I'm sorry for destroying the Spanish name.

THE COURT: A-L-A-I-M-A-L-O?

MR. BERMAN: That's correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BERMAN: And there is no difference between that plaintiff and any other plaintiff. The allegations are the same, that my client consumed Avandia, and there's no reason why they should be stricken from the California pleading in which they are a party.

In my cases we have at a maximum of 84 I believe plaintiffs. Some are much less. And we have anywhere from two to six California plaintiffs in each of our cases that we have pending.

I will not repeat the arguments of counsel with regard to our intent, but I believe that our actions speak louder than words, and the fact that we are litigating these cases is evidence of our intent, specifically at this procedural stage.

I don't know what else we can do. We were not involved in the litigation prior to 2013. I do not believe that whether or not McKesson actually paid

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

money in prior previously filed cases is evidence of an intent to seriously pursue, generally, as the Court is well aware.

32

THE COURT: I don't think that was my inquiry.

I understood that McKesson was MR. BERMAN: arguing that because the previously filed cases in California resolved without McKesson paying anything in settlement --

THE COURT: You mean GSK's argument?

MR. BERMAN: Yes, GSK's argument. That there was no serious intent to proceed against McKesson, and I would respectfully submit that's simply not true, In any product liability litigation, and certainly within my experience over several decades both as a defendant and plaintiff's attorney, it is normal for all defendants within the chain of distribution to be sued.

It is also normal or usual that it is the upstream defendants who may end up paying money, but that's a different issue as to whether the downstream defendants can be liable and are proper parties at the time that a suit is filed, which is the inquiry here.

As the Court well knows, and I'm not going to

preach to the Court the standards that it is well-familiar with. But at this particular point in a remand proceeding where the statutes are to be construed narrowly, and here it overlaps into CAFA a little bit, but where the statutes are to be construed narrowly in favor of remand, then our actions in proceeding against this defendant pursuant to California law as we have and demonstrate affirmatively our intent to proceed as legitimately pled defendants in the California litigation.

THE COURT: I understand your argument. What about GSK's argument that this Court should just sever that one suit into separate actions under the theory of fraudulent misjoinder and remand your one case where the Delaware citizen is the plaintiff?

MR. BERMAN: Well, I'm sure that counsel for the defendants would love to rewrite our complaints. But we, as counsel has said, are masters of our complaint.

The plaintiff has properly pled within the complaint pursuant to California law, as this Court has previously held, and there is no reason to sever a defendant from a case where they have been properly included simply to create or to destroy non-diversity jurisdiction so that -- for remand purposes.

THE COURT: All right. Back to your other argument, Mr. Berman. Do you think that when the California rules were written to permit a strict liability, negligence, secondary defendant, such as a drug distributor, to be sued despite the lack of residence of multiple plaintiffs, do you think that when that was permitted in the consumer rights era that California adopted some time ago that they meant for this to happen, name McKesson in everything and then just forget about it, because that's the history of this litigation.

I don't care about another type of pharmaceutical right now, but I do think that's the history and the reality. And because I believe that, because I find that is so up until now, how does the filing of a motion to compel or serving interrogatories against McKesson change that?

MR. BERMAN: It changes it because we have to approach this step-by-step. I mean one can't come in to a general conclusion and do so by skipping the individual factual predicates.

In this litigation in California, which has been pending for eight years, as the Court has said, it has it's own rhythms and methods. I can't speculate specifically on it.

We have only been involved since 2013. But certainly there's been no evidence other than counsel's ipsa dixit representations that there has been no significant or serious effort to litigate against McKesson in that litigation.

THE COURT: Well, when --

MR. BERMAN: I know that in --

THE COURT: Wouldn't the defendant know precisely what has happened before in this MDL since this particular defendant and this particular law firm has represented in every case this issue?

MR. BERMAN: One would think that they do, and I don't doubt that they do not in this MDL. My reference is, of course, to the California litigation and the implication that because something didn't happen in the prior cases in California, that we are to be somehow tarred and feathered.

THE COURT: Well, that's a different issue and that's a different argument, but if anybody's going to know what happened in California State cases involving GSK and Avandia, it's those people sitting at the table next to you.

MR. BERMAN: As well as -- they would be among those, Your Honor, as well as the Court and as well as counsel who were involved, including the

leadership on the plaintiff's side.

However, we are proceeding, we have been proceeding against McKesson in that litigation. Where it will lead I don't know yet. But, I do know that at least for CAFA purposes, motions can be made closer to trial. We're at a specific stage now. We're in the pleading stage.

And the analysis of the Court must be to what is not before the record at this procedural stage. And as the recent court decisions have said, if something happens later to trigger the potential right to remove under CAFA, then it might give counsel and the defendants a right to remove at that particular point in time, but we're not there now.

Now, we are at the stage of simply analyzing the pleadings, and under the pleadings we have established well pled facts, as this Court has previously found, and the plaintiffs are appropriate in terms of the purposes of California law.

I mean if counsel wants to argue before a California court that these cases are not proper -- that these plaintiffs are not properly joined in a single proceeding or the proceeding for the cases that are now before this Court, they're certainly free to do so.

But, that analysis ought not to determine whether or not we properly pled those pleadings -- those plaintiffs within the complaints for purposes of remand now.

THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you this because it has to do with, again, that thing called attorney strategy.

When the briefing was completed you had not addressed GSK's argument that in the 412 plaintiffs' cases you had already proceeding in California you hadn't yet done anything about discovery requests.

So is this late filing because of this motion? Is the late propounding or the motion to compel not concurrent, it's consecutive to this issue being raised by the MDL?

MR. BERMAN: Well, I can only, quite frankly, speculate to some extent because I didn't file that discovery. It's being litigated by my firm's counsel in California, but I can say several things.

One, the cases in California that were not removed ultimately to federal court and transferred here were in a different procedural state because of the procedural litigation that was ongoing.

So, whether or not the discovery was propounded at the earliest possible time under the

California rules based upon the remand that occurred in California, or whether or not it was propounded during the course of the discovery at a later point, I can't specifically say or speculate on.

However, even if for the sake of argument we propounded the discovery during the six or seven months that these motions were first made, it does not de-legitimatize it in any way. And even if it was influenced by the arguments, then it's still fair game. It doesn't -- it's not untoward on our part to propound the discovery.

THE COURT: But, you didn't respond to this argument in your briefing. So I have to ask the question why not?

MR. BERMAN: I understand, Your Honor. But the discovery was made and whether or not it was made -- I seriously doubt that it was made simply because a motion is pending before this Court to remand.

Whether or not the discovery was propounded with a mind to the fact that there was a motion to remand pending does not de-legitimatize in any way or make untoward our discovery request. In other words, I can't be in the position where I'm damned if I do and damned if I don't.

THE COURT: Yes, you can.

MR. BERMAN: Well, hopefully not in this courtroom, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No, not in this courtroom.

MR. BERMAN: So we certainly proceeded in good faith. And we have proceeded in good faith, and we are proceeding in good faith, and we are doing what litigants have to do and should do in the discovery process, and I think that speaks louder than any supposed or hypothetical intent argued by the defendants.

THE COURT: So you're not quite ready to concede that the prior history of not pursuing claims against a named defendant, in California cases, McKesson, is detrimental to your position?

MR. BERMAN: I don't know that there was no proceeding against McKesson. I can only state that my position is that they are a legitimate defendant in the litigation pursuant to California law and that looking to an ultimate result is not an appropriate analysis of whether a party is fraudulently joined or not and whether remand should be granted or not.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. BERMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And you may submit that documentation as evidence supplementing the record and

1

```
any other case that you wish, and I guess if there are
   any, you can submit them by Friday, and that is
2
3
   extended to all three counsel.
              MR. BERMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
4
5
              MS. BEASLEY: Thank you, Your Honor.
6
              MR. RESTAINO: Thank you, Your Honor.
7
              THE COURT: All right. Now it's GSK's turn.
              MS. GUSSACK: Good morning, Your Honor.
8
9
              THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Gussack.
              MS. GUSSACK: Thank you for having us this
10
              First, let me clarify and confirm what Your
11
12
    Honor has already stated. Pepper Hamilton has been
    counsel to GSK since the outset of the Avandia
13
    litigation and counsel to McKesson. And so the
14
    representations that we make to the Court this morning,
15
    Your Honor, are based on our knowledge from that early
16
17
    date of 2007.
              Mr. Fahey can address the fraudulent joinder
18
             I want to introduce to the Court our colleague
19
20
    Ray Cardozo from Reed Smith who has --
              THE COURT: Hello.
21
              MS. GUSSACK: -- and Reed Smith has been
22
    involved in the California litigation along with Pepper
23
    Hamilton so that we can both accurately and
24
    comprehensively represent to the Court today all of the
25
```

```
41
   information and activity that has occurred with respect
1
   to McKesson from the outset both in the MDL and the
2
3
   California proceedings.
              THE COURT: And I do note that your client is
4
             Mr. Bill Reale and Ms. Diaz are here for GSK.
5
   present.
              THE COURT: Nice to see you again.
6
7
   you. All right, Mr. Fahey?
              MR. FAHEY: Good morning, Your Honor. I have
8
   copies of this PowerPoint presentation so everyone
9
10
    can --
              THE COURT: That will be very helpful.
11
              MR. FAHEY: I'll just distribute them before
12
13
    we start.
              THE COURT: I found after two weeks of
14
   Daubert in the Zoloft cases that the five screens in
15
16
    the room, including --
17
              MR. FAHEY: Yeah.
              THE COURT: -- my iPhone and iPad and three
18
    others really made me go home with a headache.
19
              MS. GUSSACK: I noted in the record --
20
              THE COURT: I don't know how I drover on 95.
21
              MS. GUSSACK: -- that you mentioned you were
22
    using an iPad and I was impressed that you were
23
    navigating. Is that new technology for the Court?
24
              THE COURT: Very new. But I started to
25
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

utilize it instead of getting another backache because the paperwork in these cases is amazing.

42

MS. GUSSACK: Well done.

THE COURT: So thank you. I'm feeling a little less old.

MR. FAHEY: Your Honor, I just want to pick up on something Mr. Berman said because I think we all agree and it really is what this -- at least my portion of the argument comes down to, it's that actions speak louder than words.

I think if you look at the actions that have occurred with regard to McKesson, it really only leads to one conclusion, and that is that they were fraudulently joined in 2007 based on the record that developed after Your Honor's ruling, and they have been fraudulently joined again now.

We have some additional evidence that we wanted to give Your Honor to provide you with some background of what these firms have been doing in the time that they've been involved in litigation.

We do think it's highly instructive to what their true intent is, which is what the Third Circuit has told us to look at. Is there a true intent to prosecute a claim against the defendant?

THE COURT: So what is the true intent here

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

and can this Court assess that true intent by incorporating other attorneys' or firms' actions, and that is a real "if" to me.

So, to bridge that gap, I cannot ascribe, and I think they're right, I cannot necessarily ascribe the same motives and the same behavior and the same result. I am concerned about that, so perhaps you can address it.

MR. FAHEY: Yes and, Your Honor, I think we have enough evidence with respect to these defendants themselves that we don't necessarily need to look at the past history. Although I think that when you look at their complaints they are following the same model that has been followed since 2007 in the allegations that they're bringing against GSK. They, in fact, probably have even more parsimonious claims against McKesson than have been made in the past, and we'll go through some of that record. But I do think that they are building on the evidence that has been developed for seven years here.

Frankly, with all the discovery against GSK done through the good work that this Court has done and that Judge Burrell has done, there really should be nothing other than to pursue the claims against McKesson.

24 25

Yet when you look at what they've done for various times in this litigation, they haven't really pursued McKesson at all until Your Honor issued your order on February 20th saying you wanted to see evidence that they really meant to go forward. That's the first time after that order came out that discovery came out from the Napoli Firm., and I'll get into that issue. And I think that really is a very good insight into their true intent, what their actions were, not what their words are today.

So, again, Your Honor, I think briefly talked about these numbers before at the beginning of the argument, but there is the Napoli firm, which has 837 plaintiffs with 18 complaints, the Restaino Group with 165 plaintiffs, two complaints, and then the Salim-Beasley group, which has over 2000 plaintiffs in 33 complaints.

There are two separate and independent grounds why we believe the removal is appropriate. Either one of those would support the cases remaining here in the MDL.

I will be addressing the issue relating to McKesson, which is the first issue, as Ms. Gussack and Mr. Cardozo will be addressing the CAFA issue.

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. FAHEY: And so why do we think that

McKesson was fraudulently joined? There's basically

two reasons. And we're looking at the Third Circuit

guidance in the Boyer case. And they said -- and the

plaintiff's briefing largely focused on whether a

McKesson argument could be theoretically made, which

was similar to the argument that we had in 2008. But

our argument, as you properly noted here, is different.

We're saying the second part of that Third Circuit test, whether there's a true intent to prosecute a defendant, we don't think that prong has been met here because there is no real intention if you look at the plaintiff's conduct to pursue a claim against McKesson.

And we'll get to at the very end of my argument some additional information that may cause Your Honor to potentially reexamine the issue of whether a valid claim can even be made against McKesson, even in a theoretical way. But, certainly our intent today is to focus on whether there's a true intention to pursue a claim.

So, when you look at the evidence that the Court has there's a couple of things that are present. First, is the bare bones allegations that are void of any factual support whatsoever relating to McKesson,

and we'll show you those.

-20

There's also a failure to develop any evidence connecting any individual plaintiff to McKesson to demonstrate that, as Ms. Beasley said, maybe they didn't distribute it.

There's been no effort by the plaintiffs since they have been in this litigation to come forward with the simple kind of product ID information that you should have before you pursue a claim if you really intend to pursue a real defendant.

The product ID thing that I'm talking about with regard to McKesson is similar to the plaintiffs having to come forward at the earliest opportunity and prove that they ingested Avandia.

Here, the same issue with product ID for McKesson is to show that McKesson distributed it. And as we'll show you, some of these firms have been involved in this litigation for 18 months and they're still saying they have no evidence that McKesson distributed the product to the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Mr. Fahey, have any of these cases that are instant here filed any type of fact sheet, California or MDL?

MR. FAHEY: I'm glad you asked that question, Your Honor, yes, they did. And we think that -- and

I'd be happy to hand this up to you. We're going to introduce this as an exhibit as part of the evidence that we believe shows there's no true intent to prosecute McKesson. And I'll mark this as Defendant's 1, Your Honor, and offer it into evidence. Do you have any objection?

COUNSEL: No.

THE COURT: Thank you.

(Pause in proceedings.)

MR. FAHEY: Your Honor, what you're looking at here is a printout from our database. And I'll pop ahead in the slides just to focus you on the numbers. There have been -- well, actually, let me take one step back because I think it's important to figure out how long each of these defendants -- or plaintiffs have been in the litigation.

The Napoli firm first filed a case against McKesson in California in October of 2012, so that was 18 months ago. We did not remove that case because, frankly, based on Your Honor's past ruling, we expected a similar result.

But, when we saw absolutely no activity with McKesson, just the way we saw the first time around when the Napoli firm filed the next batch of cases followed quickly by the Restaino and Beasley group, we

decided that we had a sufficient record to demonstrate no true intent.

Those cases from Napoli-Bern had been sitting in California for 18 months, almost two years. And so there's fact sheets that they've provided, and if you look at the column, the last column, the question is asking the defendants to tell us -- I'm sorry -- the plaintiffs to say, "Please identify and attach all documents you claim establish that McKesson was the distributor for the Avandia that you ingested."

And if Your Honor looks at that column, many of the answers are, "I don't now," or they object or they say, "I don't have any records," or one of the most common one is a vague, "See attached records" or "See pharmacy records."

So when we go and look at those pharmacy records all they do is demonstrate that a prescription was made. There's no reference at all to a distributor of the product.

And so we were expecting, frankly, for some evidence to come forward to say here is the evidence showing McKesson distributed my plaintiff's product, but plaintiffs put on no evidence of that at all.

And you look at what they've said in their responses to over 400 fact sheets, there's no a single

piece of evidence demonstrating that the plaintiffs have done anything to establish that product ID that you should have, frankly, before you filed suit, but if you didn't have it before you filed suit, you should certainly get it very quickly once you file suit. And some of these cases have been pending, as we said, for 18 months without any product ID with regard to McKesson.

And that's true of all the firms. We have no evidence from any of the firms that they have established that McKesson is the distributor with regard to any single one of the plaintiffs.

The Restaino group has had their case on file in one court or another for ten months. We've seen no evidence in that ten months, even though they're putting forward fact sheets to demonstrate that they've made any connection between McKesson and the plaintiffs. And Salim-Beasley has also had their cases here on file for ten months. And, again, no evidence that they've done anything to connect McKesson to Avandia.

So the last thing that I wanted to talk about, and I'll get to that in a second, is the failure to really pursue claims against McKesson. Then that --

THE COURT: Before you go there --

24

25

1 MR. FAHEY: Sure. THE COURT: -- as it relates to these cases 2 not producing basic fact sheets against this defendant, 3 basic information, do you happen to know what was 4 requested by this later filed discovery against 5 McKesson, which now has engendered a motion to compel? 6 MR. FAHEY: Yes, I do, Your Honor. 7 they're asking for is information about certain 8 programs that McKesson may have run, certain broad 9 questions about what did you know and when did you know 10 it kinds of questions. It is not at least --11 THE COURT: Not related to identification 12 13 of --MR. FAHEY: I mean I think Mr --14 THE COURT: -- their own clients' history. 15 MR. FAHEY: -- Mr. Berman -- we didn't -- we 16 didn't see that being the focus of that discovery. 17 was certainly more of a trying to make out a warnings 18 claim against a distributor, frankly, that has no 19 ability to change the warning. But that's what we saw 20 the discovery related to. And so let me just hop into 21 22 the argument.

If you look at the bare bones allegations that the various firms made, there really is no true intent to pursue a claim. I mean in the Beasley

complaints there's three paragraphs out of hundreds of paragraphs that specifically reference McKesson in any way.

The first paragraph says at all times defendant, McKesson, distributed to the plaintiffs as a factual allegation that they, in fact, distributed. The second paragraph is McKesson distributes to a lot of people. And then the third paragraph is upon information and belief, we think they distributed to our plaintiff.

So the first and the third paragraph, one of them is with certainty, the other one is upon information and believe. But, frankly, there's really no evidence whatsoever, at all, supporting any of these allegations in this complaint and certainly nothing that's come forward since the complaint was made. They're the bare bones, enough to squeak by so they can say that they have a claim against McKesson, but it certainly is not evidence and a true intent to pursue McKesson as a real defendant in the case.

Same is true with regard to the Restaino complaints. In fact, their reference to McKesson is actually the second part of a clause. And so it's talking about McKesson was engaged in the business of marketing, distributing, promoting, advertising, and

selling Avandia nationwide and in the State of California. They don't even make an allegation that we could see that McKesson actually distributed to their plaintiffs in those cases.

But, they do very quickly at that last sentence, which is designed to try to prevent us from removing the case, they seem to be more focused their efforts to prevent us from removing rather than to demonstrate that they really, truly intend to pursue McKesson in the case.

The Napoli-Bern plaintiffs, again, very, very bare bones allegations, no factual support whatsoever for the allegations, just that we marketed, sold, and distributed, that's actually a half a sentence, Your Honor. I mean it's about six words that they've alleged against McKesson. If they truly had an intent to pursue the defendant as a real defendant in the case, I think you would see more allegations there.

So as I said to Your Honor before, no plaintiffs have identified any specific documents proving McKesson distributed their Avandia. That's these plaintiffs. We're not even talking about what happened in the past. That's these plaintiffs here.

Also, this is the data that I've just described for you with regard to the chart. 404

plaintiffs responded, 193 did not answer or objected to that question, 58 claimed to have no information, and 153 referred us to attached medical records, which, after review, our associates could not find any reference to a distributor. It was simply a printout from a pharmacy demonstrating that Avandia was filled but did not say how that Avandia got to the pharmacy before the plaintiff picked it up.

So we see this kind of conduct as very similar to the conduct we saw before in 2007 and '08. And at that time, Your Honor, it had a much different record.

And this is not a motion that we are bringing in the first week of an MDL. This is a motion that we're bringing eight years after litigation has started where there's a true track record that is evidence to Your Honor that really on points in one direction, which has been carried forward by these new group of plaintiffs' lawyers. So no matter how much they want to kind of walk away from the past, they are continuing in the past in their conduct.

The only thing that changed, Your Honor, it wasn't even our brief where we put this issue squarely at the center of our argument, which was we don't really think they truly intend to pursue McKesson. It

wasn't until Your Honor issued your February 20th order that said I want to see evidence. Forget about arguments, you know, forget about words. I want to see action. What action do you have that you're going to really pursue a claim against McKesson?

Then after that order came out, then the McKesson discovery came in. But the case -- there is really no explanation other than a reaction to you order as to why that discovery came out within a short time after your order when the litigation had been pending for 18 months in California with no such discovery against McKesson.

So, before Your Honor's order came out this was record, and I think this is the true record of the parties' intent, not only these plaintiffs, but the plaintiffs before them. There were never any depositions of anyone from McKesson.

And so when Mr. Restaino was talking about depositions Predaxa or Plavix it's certainly nothing that happened here in Avandia. And you can look on the left-hand column, GSK. That's what people do when they have a true intent to prosecute a claim against a defendant. You see 50 depositions on the right-hand side with McKesson this year.

There were never any requests for production

before Your Honor's order against McKesson. There were never any interrogatories issued against McKesson by these plaintiffs or by any other plaintiff. There was never any request for admission.

Millions and millions of pages, as Your Honor know, have been produced. That number doesn't even include the databases that GSK produced. Not a single document in eight years has ever been produced by McKesson.

Multiple expert reports that have been reused and used, as Your Honor knows, imported into California, none of them contain any allegations against McKesson.

And, as Your Honor asked before in terms of settlements, no one ever approached McKesson. Ms. Gussack is here and can verify this. No one ever approached McKesson about settlement. McKesson never contributed to any settlement, whether the cases were here or in California or any other jurisdiction.

In fact, the only time they treat McKesson like a defendant is when they filed a complaint and they're trying to keep it out of the federal court. But with that exception there's really no evidence that they truly intend to prosecute McKesson in these cases.

And, you know, Your Honor, there is a case

that's very similar to this with Judge Bartle. Again, we're asking for a very narrow ruling here. We're not saying forever more McKesson can't be sued, although we, frankly, think that would be a good development of the law. That's not what we're asking you today.

What we're asking you today is looking at the history that is before you and the evidence we've brought and, frankly, the lack of evidence that plaintiffs have brought about their true intent, it really leads to one unescapable vision, which is the conclusion Judge Bartle reached. They don't really have a true intent to prosecute this defendant. The Third Circuit says you have to have that or it's a fraudulent joinder.

And so we believe in this case the evidence supports that McKesson has been fraudulently joined.

Now, unless Your Honor has questions, I'll turn it over to Mr. Cardozo.

THE COURT: Do you think that this is on all fours with Judge Bartle's phentermine decision in diet drugs?

MR. FAHEY: I do think that it is because what Judge Bartle was seeing was evidence of a lack of real intent to prosecute. There was the constant joining of the phentermine defendants, all this talk

about wanting to truly consider them to be real defendants.

But when he kind of pulled back the curtain and looked at the reality there was really no intent that the plaintiffs demonstrated when they had the opportunity, not when they're, you know, flying by a police officer at 100 miles an hour and, you know, hit the brakes and skid passed the cop, which is what this discovery really is.

I mean they see the cop on the side of the road, which is you, you issue the order saying I got a radar gun, and then they go by at 100 miles an hour and they slap the brakes on and say I wasn't speeding.

And so before Your Honor's February 20th order that's what the real true intent. Everything else is window dressing since then. It's hitting the brakes when you see the cop. That's not -- you know, the true intent was the person was speeding, and the cop knows that and everybody knows that. And so that's really what I think Judge Bartle saw and I think what the evidence shows here.

I did want to just touch very, very briefly on the second part of the legal plausibility argument because -- and I know Your Honor addressed this in the recent Zoloft decision, so I'm not trying to reargue

I do -- I do want to just brief one issue that -- and present it for consideration, which is that after Mensing came down, it is true that preemption is an affirmative defense. We're not going to quarrel with that, and I know you said that was important for Your Honor's ruling.

In this particular case though, and this is true of all real preemption defenses, you know, you see them in the medical device side, post-Regal, you see it in Mensing, post-Mensing, it adds some pleading requirements to the plaintiffs to demonstrate that they have a non-preemptive claim.

It's true it's a defense, but the plaintiffs have a pleadings requirement at the beginning of the case to say yes, I understand preemption is an issue here. Here's how I'm pleading a non-preemptive claim. As you saw it from the allegation the plaintiffs made, they made no attempt to plead a non-preemptive claim.

No California case since <u>Mensing</u> has said that a pharmacy claim is still valid post-<u>Mensing</u>. And the plaintiffs have not made any effort to plead an non-preemptive claim and, frankly, no attempt to plead a non-statute of limitations barred claim, which is a whole other issue that we haven't really even got into

with these cases, but certainly is present and underlying, perhaps the motivation to go away.

THE COURT: Well, you relate that to motivation or intent, and I'm also seeing that you are revealing that if these cases remain or even if they go back to California, you'll be filing additional motions to dismiss on those grounds, which is probably the best use of them, although I think they are appropriate to consider here as well.

MR. FAHEY: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

(Pause in proceedings.)

MR. CARDOZO: Thank you, Your Honor. On the CAFA issue I want to start with the question you led with because it puts the heart on this argument here. How are these cases going to be tried?

Now, Mr. Restains made a very interesting admission that, frankly, the intent here is to follow the JCCP's established procedure and proceed with bellwether trials. That's what's going to happen here. There's no debate about that.

That is what makes this a clearer case than all of the cases that are bubbling up in the circuit court right now on CAFA, because in this case, unlike in any of the others, there was an established up and

running California coordinated proceeding in which bellwether trial procedures are already in place, and these plaintiffs gathered up 3,000 plaintiffs, more than 90 percent who do not live in the State of California, and consciously chose to file in California, where that existing JCCP was established.

The other cases are all grappling with the question about where this case is headed. Is it headed for a consolidated or coordinated trial? You don't have to grapple with that question in this case because there is no doubt that that's where it's headed because the California law dictates that.

Here's the California statute that governs the criteria for coordination. This is what you have to show to get this thing up and running in the first place, what their predecessors had to show, that a single judge hearing all of the actions for all purposes will promote the ends of justice for, among other things, the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments.

So, to establish the coordination, Avandia plaintiffs needed to show that a single judge should hear all of the cases through trials. And once the Court made the ruling that that criteria was met, that meant that any case filed in California had to be

```
placed into that JCP, had to be assigned to that same
judge through trial. And that's not only in the
statute, but it's in the California Rules of Court.

Rule 330 --
THE COURT: The case being a non-severed case
file en masse?
```

MR. CARDOZO: Right. When you file in San Francisco Superior Court it's just like an add on in the MDL. It doesn't get to stay there. The next thing you have to do under the rules of court is filing a notice of related case. That hasn't happened in some of these cases because of the removals. But the rules require it.

about well, did this motion -- is this motion sending the case towards a coordinated proceeding or did this step by the plaintiffs trigger that, you don't have to speculate in this case because the rules of court and the coordination statute in California are clear on this. There is no scenario that I'm aware of in which those cases could remain as stand alone, and no scenario has been identified in the plaintiffs briefing or evidence today. There's no scenario where it wouldn't end up in a coordinated proceeding.

Now, with 3,000 plaintiffs from all 50 states

they could have filed in any state court. They chose the state where the JCCP exists for the reason of the bellwether trials, the joint trial procedures.

I heard Ms. Beasley argue that Congress gave them the choice to choose their forum. It did, but it said if you choose the mass adjudication route, we're going to have a federal court supervise that because the intent of this statute, as stated by the unanimous Supreme Court decision in <u>Knowles</u> was to ensure federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance.

There was an argument referenced to well, this isn't really a class action. But Congress inserted this mass action provision to extend the reach of the statute beyond class actions to get these very type of cases because if you don't, it prevents plaintiffs' lawyers from making an egg run around CAFA.

Now, I'll take a moment with some of the other circuit court cases, but, like I said, the much muddier problem of early before a coordination proceeding is established and you're kind of speculating about where the case is headed, you don't have a California statute like the one here that dictates the cases land in the coordinated proceeding, and nor do you have the coordination proceeding already

♠ PENGAD • 1-800-631-6389 • www.pongad.com

FORM 2094

1 2

up and running with joint trial procedures already established.

Now, Your Honor already remarked <u>Abramson</u> isn't really on point, but it is interesting -- there is an interesting passage in the case that points out what was missing in that case that we now have here.

Despite the similarity of fair claims, plaintiffs did not propose to try their claims jointly. These plaintiffs did when they chose the state of the JCCP. As Mr. Restaino admitted, the ideas were going to go do bellwethers. That's the plan. And we don't have to speculate about what's going to happen. The law in California says that is exactly what's going to happen.

Now, take a look at these three, the Seventh, Eight, and pending en banc case in the Ninth Circuit, what they're all grappling with. In the Abbott Labs case we had a motion to consolidate the cases for all purposes through trial.

The Court is, again, at the front end speculating about what's going to happen from there. And they pointed out a joint trial proposal may be implicit, and when you're consolidating the case it's almost a certainty we're going to end up with bellwether or exemplar proceedings. It is a certainty

 in this case because those bellwethers and exemplar proceedings are already established and the California law dictates that that's what's going to happen.

In the en banc <u>Romo</u> case they did have a California coordination proceeding, but they had it at the petition stage before it was up and running. And so the majority in dissent were grappling about what does this coordination proceeding in California really mean? I think if you look at the statute I think it's fairly clear the thing is headed for a joint trial.

Judge Gould said look, the natural and probable consequences when you petition for a coordination is you're going to end up in an exemplar proceeding with bellwethers. Again, you have a much clearer case here because that's what's already happened in the JCCP and that's what's going to happen with these cases if Congress hadn't passed the statute that dictates the cases remain in this court.

Your Honor mentioned the <u>Atwell</u> case, and I think that's one of the most interesting and on point cases because there they simply asked the cases be assigned for a single judge. And like the plaintiffs in this case, they disclaimed any attempt to consolidate them for trial. The Eighth Circuit said we weren't born yesterday. The inevitable result of what

1 |

you've asked for is that they're going to be determined together. It's not only an inevitable result, it's a certainty under the California statute.

The other interesting thing about the <u>Atwell</u> case is the motion for consolidation was somewhat opaque. And so the defendants didn't remove the case until after during the oral argument on the motion. The plaintiffs' lawyers in that case made some additions, just like Mr. Restains made this morning. They made clear what their objective and intent was.

So, there was an issue about whether the defendants had timely removed because they only removed within 30 days of the hearing and not within the original motion. And the Eighth Circuit said those admissions trigger the CAFA jurisdiction.

So I don't think there's any doubt, based upon the California law, the established JCP, the record you have, but if there were any doubt, the admissions this morning seal the deal in my view.

It circles back to where we started. The objective of this statute, why did Congress enact the most significant expansion in the federal court's diversity jurisdiction in over a century?

The unanimous Supreme Court, in rejecting an attempt to stipulate around the jurisdictional minimum,

 said to hold otherwise would run directly contrary to CAFA for its primary objective, ensuring federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance.

There is no doubt that what you have before you is an interstate case of national importance. Mr. Fahey had the stats up there, the 3,000 plaintiffs from around the states, very little connection to California.

This case burdens and impacts interstate commerce, which is why Congress said we want the federal court supervising it. And why the Supreme Court said we're not going to permit this stipulation practice, which would have the effect of allowing the subdivision of a \$100 billion action into -- \$100 billion action, it's 21 different pieces.

That lines up here because if you think about how these cases -- Your Honor asked the question, how are they going to be tried? Does it make a difference in how the JCP administers these cases that they're in 33 different complaints instead of one?

The JCP is going to do the exact same thing with those 33 complaints as it would do with one. And it would entirely frustrate the statutory objective if a simple device of separating or reproducing the same

piece of paper 33 times is the difference between whether this federal court may exercise jurisdiction or not.

Which comes to my last point, this argument doesn't make any sense and has no basis in the law. They try to distance themselves from the existing JCP by saying we just filed in San Francisco Superior Court. We didn't ask to go into the JCCP. The law dictates they end up there.

I like the reference to the Tenth Circuit case. I also commend that to Your Honor because, again, the case recognized that -- the case -- there's a footnote in that case that's right on point in this case. It says "There's an ancient principle in law that a party is presumed to intend the necessary consequences of their action."

In this case the Court held it's too early to tell what the necessary consequence is of what the plaintiffs did. All they had done was file 12 complaints in one Oklahoma State court. It's not too early to tell in this case. You have seven years of this litigation and a long, long running JCCP, and the nub of the matter is you have a statute that says when they filed in the San Francisco Superior Court the case is going to be moved to the JCCP.

And in every one of these circuit court cases considering the CAFA issue they look at the local law involving consolidation and coordination to try to figure out what the plaintiffs' actions meant under the law. What did this motion to consolidate mean in Illinois in the Abbott case? What did this request for a single judge assignment mean in Missouri in the Eighth Circuit case?

In this case it's crystal clear what it means under California law. It means you're moving to a procedure with a joint trial. And I heard Mr. Berman say we're not there yet, if something happens, removal can happen later. That also makes no sense at all when it is a certain fact that these cases are going to the JCCP.

Think about that. That would mean you have to wait until they get transferred, then we re-remove them again. And this Court sound management and administration and the ability to finally wrap up this long, long running MDL would be further hindered and delayed.

Congress put a 30-day limitation on removal because they wanted the trigger to be at the earliest possible opportunity. Right now, that's right now when it is a fact certain that these cases are going to be

John

21

22

23

24

25

```
in the JCCP.
1
             This case is much easier than any of the
2
   cases bubbling around in the circuit courts because
3
   none of them have a long-running and established JCCP
4
   in which bellwether trial procedures are already the
5
6
   norm.
              THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cardozo.
7
              (Pause in proceedings.)
8
              THE COURT: Is there anything else in the way
9
   of evidence or argument from GSK on either issue?
10
              MR. FAHEY: No, Your Honor.
11
              THE COURT: All right. Then I will turn back
12
    to counsel for plaintiffs and ask if there is any
13
    additional rebuttal.
14
              MR. RESTAINO: Your Honor, if I may.
15
16
    Restaino.
              THE COURT: You may.
17
              MR. RESTAINO: And I would like to clarify
18
    what has been described as my mission.
19
20
```

I believe the record would denote that Your Honor and I were discussing the history of JCCPs and how they follow the MDLs with the similar evidentiary hearings before or following discovery and then bellwether trials.

So, I believe I was speaking in the abstract and not admitting to anything in this regard in

California. And, in addition, perhaps stepping on the argument that will be made, what is continually just being overlooked is the numerosity issue. And the slide states that by filing claims of thousands of non-Californians in state where JCCP with procedure for trying claims jointly already exists, with emphasis, plaintiffs explicitly "propose that the claim of 100 or more persons be tried jointly."

Now, that is the rule that we must operate under, and it is our right in California to file claims of less than 100 to avoid that argument. So one, it was not an admission as put forth. I believed I truly was speaking with the Court in the historical sense of the JCCP and MDLs.

Regardless of an interpretation, I mentioned when I think one of your colleagues was arguing that all three of you or your law firms have chosen to file multiple plaintiff cases, each under 100. But where does that land all your cases in California? That's the argument that's being posed here by GSK, because your cases will be consolidated. They will be bigger, and what does California do in that case? Do they take all of the cases together, en masse? I'm lead to believe that's true, in a consolidated way, similar to this MDL.

that chart?

24

25

```
However, your cases don't remain segregated.
1
   They don't sever. So, they can't go lower than you
2
   originally filed in each of the cases. They only go in
3
   a consolidated higher number. So, that I thought was
4
   where that argument was going.
5
              MR. RESTAINO: Well, if we're taking --
6
              THE COURT: By your total number of cases.
7
              MR. RESTAINO: Yes, Your Honor, I think I
8
   understand what the bench is asking. However, taking
9
    that to the next step, therefore, in each case where
10
    there are filings of consolidated matters in California
11
    that ultimately result in 100 or 101, then they should
12
    all be sucked up underneath the CAFA.
13
              And that, in fact, does not happen and has
14
    not been held to be the necessary process for it, that
15
    as long as the cases individually are filed with less
16
    than 100, that they do not fall under the CAFA ruling.
17
              THE COURT: Does it make any sense to do it
18
    that way? What is your purpose --
19
              MR. RESTAINO: Sense --
20
              THE COURT: -- in doing it that way?
21
                             I'm sorry?
              MR. RESTAINO:
22
              THE COURT: When you have how many? Where's
23
```

MR. FAHEY: It's I think the second slide of

25

```
our presentation, Your Honor.
1
             THE COURT: Yes, 165 plaintiffs, right?
2
             MR. RESTAINO: Yes.
3
             THE COURT: For your firm. 837 for
4
   Napoli-Bern, 837. 2,008 plaintiffs for
5
   Salim-Beasley. So break them up as you will, that's
6
   what one of the PowerPoint slides is pointing out, you
7
   can't get under the cap. You can't divide it up and
8
   say this is how we're going to proceed when you know
9
   that you're going to be consolidated in California
10
                  Isn't that the argument?
    State court.
11
              MR. FAHEY: Your Honor, can I just make one
12
    point for the record?
13
              THE COURT: Yes.
14
              MR. FAHEY: Mr. Restaino's original complaint
15
    was 165 plaintiffs. He then promptly amended it to
16
    bring it under the 100. And so the original complaint
17
    filed in this case had all of his plaintiffs in one
18
    complaint.
19
              MR. CARDOZO: And I would add, Your Honor,
20
    that is exactly the argument. All of the cases,
21
    Abbott, Atwell, exact thing, complaints individually
22
     have less.
 23
               But, it was clear from the motion to
 24
```

consolidate request for a single assignment judge that

FORM 2094

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

they would then be processed from there together, which is what's going to happen as a matter certainty in this JCCP. And the individual complaints are going to be irrelevant.

73

THE COURT: Because they could not proceed in California any other way.

MR. CARDOZO: Exactly.

THE COURT: Not these claims.

MR. CARDOZO: Exactly.

THE COURT: So, I guess that's one of the practical realities in terms of evidence of where this is going to be, that is I'm being asked to infer counsels' intent because when you file in California you know this is going to happen. You know this is going to happen if you have a product liability claim and you're filing multiple plaintiff complaints.

It's already been determined that this will be swept into the JCCP and you aren't asking for anything different. So you know you're going to be there. So, how is filing multiple similar complaints evidence that you don't intend to be there? You're going to proceed that way.

MR. RESTAINO: And it has been held as such for many, many years without CAFA coming in. California does establish or did establish its JCCP for

the same reason as the federal court system has the MDL, efficiency, moving the cases forward.

each particular case and decide what is the best interest of this particular plaintiff. Is it our best interest as we do 95 percent of the time of our work, to file within the MDL, or in this particular case is it in this particular plaintiff's interest to file it in a state jurisdiction?

And taking advantage of the rules that we did not establish, which exist in California, enables us to have state courts consolidated with all the efficiency that goes with that without it being sucked up by the Claims Act.

THE COURT: Well, one way to do that is to make sure you name McKesson so you can destroy diversity and not get swept up into the MDL. That's what most people have done. Most attorneys have done that --

MR. RESTAINO: As --

THE COURT: -- in the past in this MDL.

MR. RESTAINO: As is their right.

THE COURT: But, they haven't pursued it with the honest intent of pursuing a claim against McKesson. They have not. We heard that evidence. Do you have

any evidence contrary to that?

‡

MR. RESTAINO: I do not.

THE COURT: No. And I trust GSK's lawyers representing both entities that they know what they're talking about, like I said before. So, I see this as a right that is being utilized, but in contravention of GSK's right to have their clients treated fairly as well.

So, that's the context and the conflict, a balance of rights. And there are a number of circuits and district courts looking at this same issue right now in terms of CAFA. And I think we have to also.

Okay, thank you. Ms. Beasley, did you want to add anything?

MS. BEASLEY: Yes, I did. I just wanted to say again, you know, for the mass action provision, which is 28, USC 1332 D11, the first part of the definition of mass action is that plaintiffs must request the joint trial.

And, again, if you go back to removal rules, you take the complaint or the case as it was at the time that removal was noticed. So, at the time removal was noticed in these cases all we had done is filed separate complaints with fewer than 100 plaintiffs, as Congress allows us to do under CAFA to avoid federal.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

jurisdiction, nothing more. We did nothing more.

THE COURT: Are you saying that you were not going to be joined into the JCCP? Do you have --

76

MS. BEASLEY: Well --

THE COURT: -- an opt-out provision that is a matter of right in California when you file a matter with mass plaintiffs?

MS. BEASLEY: I don't know. If we did, we would probably lose. I'm sure we could object to their -- they are the ones in the four cases that were in the JCCP. They're the ones that filed a notice that it was related to the JCCP. And that's the whole point of having a JCCP. If you follow the logic --

THE COURT: But that's a strategic move on your part. That's only really an attempt to bolster your position that you really do have the right intent here. You know what's going to happen. We all know what's going to happen. How do you have a right to opt-out of the mass tort program in California?

MS. BEASLEY: But there's no provision in CAFA that says the inference or the knowledge that there's a JCCP pending in the state where you file your complaint is enough to trigger federal jurisdiction. It's very explicit.

And as I was saying before, if you follow

```
77
   defendant's logic, there would be no more JCCPs or
1
   consolidated actions in any state court because every
   time after one is filed, every time --
3
             THE COURT: You mean in California because
4
   they are one of the few states that allow non-residents
5
   to file as plaintiffs there connected to another
6
   plaintiff. That doesn't happen in Pennsylvania.
7
              MS. BEASLEY: It happens in Illinois.
8
9
   have --
              THE COURT: Well, yes, it does.
10
              MS. BEASLEY: So some states do --
11
              THE COURT: But that's not common.
12
                            It's --
              MS. BEASLEY:
13
              THE COURT: It is a breed unto itself.
14
    can't say that's the way it is all over the country.
15
              MS. BEASLEY: But it's practical and it
16
    functions and it's efficient the same way that the MDL
17
         And, in fact, my experience, the MDLs --
18
              THE COURT: Am I allowed to con --
19
              MS. BEASLEY: -- in the JCC --
20
              THE COURT: Am I allowed to consider that,
21
    Ms. Beasley, at all, how efficient it may be?
22
               MS. BEASLEY: Well, what's the point of
23
    having a JCCP if any case that a plaintiff files in the
24
     whole state of California would trigger CAFA?
25
```

```
78
             THE COURT: I can't answer that question.
                                                         Ι
1
2
   don't --
             MS. BEASLEY: No, but I --
3
             THE COURT: I'm not sure anybody would.
4
   don't understand it.
5
             MS. BEASLEY: But that's what defendant's
6
   saying. Defendant's saying simply because you file a
7
   case in a state where there is otherwise a coordinated
8
   proceeding, whether it's Illinois, California, or any
9
   other, that's there log, that's there argument, just
10
   because you file a case there CAFA will be triggered
11
    and you go to an MDL, an existing MDL.
12
              It requires no other action on our part,
13
    despite what that mass action provision says, that we
14
    must request joint trial, not we request recovery or we
15
    file a complaint. We have to, the plaintiffs, in those
16
    complaints, just like in Abbott, those plaintiffs that
17
    filed the complaints asked the court to consolidate
18
    through trial. So that's what that holding was based
19
20
    on.
              THE COURT: And you're doing the same.
21
              MS. BEASLEY: And that one is sometimes --
22
               THE COURT: You're doing the same.
23
               MS. BEASLEY: We haven't asked anything.
24
               THE COURT: That's why you want to remain in
```

FCHM 2094

24

25

79 California, so you can keep your cases together in the Í mass tort program there. You're doing that. 2 That's what MS. BEASLEY: We haven't asked. 3 I'm saying. We have -- we were not part of the motion 4 to consolidate. 5 THE COURT: That's really hard for me to 6 accept, that -- not that you haven't asked, but that 7 you weren't going to ask. That makes no sense to me 8 whatsoever, okay, because you herald the opportunity to 9 be there, and what is the premise, what is the statute, 10 what is the rule that says that once you do that you 11 can opt-out of a mass tort program? You're either in 12 or you're out, and it's the Court that decides that, 13 whether you ask or not. 14 MS. BEASLEY: All I'm saying is that their 15 interpretation expands federal jurisdiction, which is 16 supposed to be narrowly construed because they go 17 outside of the definition of mass action in CAFA. 18 I also would like to address --19 THE COURT: All right. 20 MS. BEASLEY: -- something Mr. Fahey said. 21 THE COURT: Yes. 22 MS. BEASLEY: He criticized our bare bones 23 complaints, which I would like to add comply with

California's notice pleading rules. They're -- you

know, we're allowed -- we don't have to plead ultimate facts. We are allowed to plead enough to put defendants on notice as to what the nature of our claims are, and there's obviously not doubt about that.

The other thing is they talk about product ID like it's something easy to find, you know, that's not part of our clients' medical records. We're not always able to track down that information. If we were, we would provide it.

That is the whole point of doing discovery, which is something we would want to ask McKesson in discovery because they have the information of what pharmacies that they distributed Avandia to. We would like to get that information from them, and that was --

THE COURT: Shouldn't you do that before you file a notice pleading or not? Shouldn't you have an idea before you file and name a defendant that you have a claim against them?

MS. BEASLEY: The basis of our claim against McKesson is that they're a nationwide distributor of Avandia. But, what I'm saying is the information to document whether a specific distributor distributed to a specific pharmacy is actually very hard information to get, especially from our clients or their medical records because it's not part of the records that are

generated from their healthcare.

Also, a lot of them, they don't know. That's all I'm saying is that we would like that information too, and it's something we should be entitled to get in discovery with McKesson, is what pharmacies did you distribute to. We provided them with the pharmacies where our clients got the Avandia from. They should be able to tell us did you distribute to that one.

THE COURT: Well, it seems to me that if you did provide the particular specific clients' information about where they got their Avandia, you already know where to go to find if McKesson distributed there. You already know that. So why do you need that from McKesson again?

MS. BEASLEY: That's -- that's -- I'm talking about --

THE COURT: Except to corroborate what you should already know?

MS. BEASLEY: Well, just because we found out -- we were able to track down the pharmacy records from where say one particular client got their Avandia filled, those records do not say oh, by the way, an asterisk, we got this distributed to us by McKesson?

THE COURT: Are you sure about that? Because I've seen McKesson's label on a number of --

MS. BEASLEY: Some --

THE COURT: -- scripts.

MS. BEASLEY: Sometimes. And in those situations then we know for those clients, but not always.

THE COURT: But you haven't put it -- well, you haven't put it down anywhere on a fact sheet?

MS. BEASLEY: When we have the information and we are asked for it we do provide it. That's all I'm saying is that we can't always get the information from a source other than the defendant themselves as to what pharmacies that they've distributed to.

THE COURT: And I'm going to go back to this. When you have a plaintiff, and I'm not speaking as if I've never been an attorney, when you have a client you get all your information in order before you file and name a defendant.

MS. BEASLEY: And I agree. And that's what we spend about --

THE COURT: Because you didn't just do it in McKesson. You named plaintiffs and included them in your complaints from all over the country.

MS. BEASLEY: Because --

THE COURT: So because they are national distributor doesn't necessarily mean that they

```
distributed this Avandia in that case. So it seems to me --
```

MS. BEASLEY: But that's the information -THE COURT: -- that they're not being treated
like the equal or defendant that they should be. It
didn't matter. It just didn't matter because that
isn't prepared.

I've never seen a case in Avandia where it was, never, because nobody went after them. Nobody said we have proof here that McKesson is a distributor. That is why we named them. And I'm not aware that they did that in California either when I remanded those cases.

MS. BEASLEY: I'm not aware.

deter. You have that history to overcome. I think you have to. I don't think you can stand here and say you can't get that information except from McKesson or you would have done some sleuthing before. That's what attorneys are supposed to do, in my opinion, not just name parties because it's the way you choose to file. I think that's a serious flaw. And the conjuncture of the California rules and the MDL rules is an interesting one, but it's not in conflict.

Let's go back to basic filing against your

defendants on behalf of a client. You do your work up. You get your ducks in a row. That's the problem I see here because that is evidence of intent. And it's not just you, Ms. Beasley, and your firm's cases, it's everyone's. You're in the same position I think. So that really has to be answered, and it probably has to be answered now, not later, not after remand to California and then removal again.

When you end up having to, if the California court ever decides to make you, prove a case against McKesson, that's too late. So if I'm going to do justice here, if I'm going to follow the rules and make them sensible, I have to do it at the right moment. I'm not sure if this is the right moment, but it might have to be.

MS. BEASLEY: Well, I mean we didn't name McKesson because they were some random, (inaudible) distributor for Avandia. There's no doubt, there's no dispute, they're the nationwide distributor for Avandia, and that's why we named them.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. RESTAINO: Thank you, Your Honor

THE COURT: Mr. Berman.

MR. BERMAN: To get into a different aspect of this same argument that I'll begin with, we have to

remember that for purposes of remand and for the issue of whether a defendant has been fraudulently joined, which is the context within which this issue arises, it's the defendant who has the burden of proof, not the plaintiff. It is the defendant who has asserted fraudulent joinder who must prove a heavy burden to meet its obligation.

What they have not come forward with, other than speculation, and what we have not come forward yet with in the underlying California litigation, for instance, is they have not come forward with any evidence that any single plaintiff in any of the cases now before this Court and before this motion, could not have had a product distributed by McKesson. They have, as they have indicated in their chart El I think it is or Plaintiff 1 or Defendant 1, Exhibit 1 --

THE COURT: Twombly wouldn't allow that.

Twombly would not allow you to allege that they must have been the distributor. It's not enough. It's not good enough.

MR. BERMAN: I understand that allegation,
Your Honor, but this is the defendants' motion to prove
fraudulent joinder, and they have not come --

THE COURT: No, but you're mixing it in to a pleading and a notice -- just like Ms. Beasley did, a

24

25

1 2 3 There's nothing --4 chart. THE COURT: 5 D1. MR. BERMAN: 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 didn't do so. 17 18 19 20 21 the burden to prove certain --22 23

notice pleading right as in California. Go passed the pleadings and deal with the chart that was put up. MR. BERMAN: All right, let's deal with the The defendant has not come forward with any evidence saying that any evidence saying that any of the plaintiffs on their chart could not have had their product distributed or did not have their product distributed by McKesson. They have records in this chart showing, apparently the identification of pharmacies. They have records in their possession which could show that's not our product, we didn't distribute it, and they could have made that record here before this Court and they THE COURT: So you're saying they have to produce discovered facts because, obviously, that would put them in the position that they say you're supposed to be in the position, but you have the clients. MR. BERMAN: We have the clients and we have THE COURT: And they have to prove a negative of the entire case, the affirmative defense, on a removal? Is that what you're saying? I want to

understand this argument.

MR. BERMAN: What I'm saying is that while we have the underlying burden before the court in California to prove our case prior to trial, for purposes of this motion, to prove that we have fraudulently joined and thus cannot prove the case against this defendant, they have within their possession the documents that could or should show that we could not prove a case against any individual plaintiff.

THE COURT: Their documents would not necessarily show your intent or lack thereof.

MR. BERMAN: It may not necessarily show our intent, but it would show that we could not prove a case against any individual plaintiff by -- against any -- against McKesson.

THE COURT: Easier done -- easier said and easier done if you file individual plaintiff cases and not group them.

MR. BERMAN: Well, if you look at their argument, Your Honor, and as my colleague had said, it would be the death knell of mass tort litigation anywhere in the country because in California, as this Court knows, when the cases are consolidated for purposes of discovery they're really coordinated, they

don't lose their individual docket case-hood, so to speak.

THE COURT: Neither do they in the  $\mathtt{MDL}_{\mathtt{L}}$ .

MR. BERMAN: Neither do they in New Jersey or in the mass tort complex litigation center in Philadelphia.

However, if merely filing individual cases could somehow be conglomerated with the other cases that are being heard by a single mass tort judge, whether it's Judge New in Philadelphia or Judge Higbee, now with the appellate division temporarily, or of any of the judges in New Jersey or any other mass tort judge around the country, that would be the end of mass tort litigation, which clearly was not the congressional intent by putting a numerosity limit within the statute.

The fact that, as well, certain cases may be grouped together for bellwether purposes for trial does not necessarily confer CAFA jurisdiction either because it could be that the cases are grouped not from within the same mass tort filing group of say <u>Cruz versus</u>

McKesson where we have 60 plaintiffs. There is nothing that says that the cases that are being grouped are for bellwether purposes are from --

THE COURT: That's what I asked before.

MR. BERMAN: -- are from that group as opposed to all of the groups that are before the Court.

THE COURT: It's not the bellwether trial selection process that's at issue here.

MR. BERMAN: It was raised by counsel.

THE COURT: No, no, not in that context,

Counsel. It was raised to say that they would all be
grouped and move forward together and be tried

together. Nobody cares which case is the bellwether.

MR. BERMAN: I don't know that they would be -- there's nothing in what was presented to us in the filing and on the exhibits today that shows that all of the cases would be tried together.

What was presented to us indicates the opposite. When there is a request that a few cases be tried together for bellwether purposes that suggests that all of the other cases are not going to be tried together. It's on page I believe 25.

THE COURT: No, I don't go there, not when you're dealing with mass groupings. I do not think you can draw that conclusion. Either way, you can't draw that conclusion because you can't say because a couple of cases would be tried together as bellwethers that all the other ones are separate and single. It doesn't work.

22

23

24

25

MR. BERMAN: It simply depends upon 1 circumstances that we can't predict right now. 2 THE COURT: Right. I agree with that. 3 MR. BERMAN: So those decisions that were 4 cited as an indication that because they're going to be 5 removed to the JCCP, for instance --6 THE COURT: But you forgot something, 7 8 counsel. MR. BERMAN: I'm sorry. 9 THE COURT: There's no move to sever these 10 plaintiffs in any of the cases. You file them in 11 California jointly for a reason and it's not to sever 12 them for trial. So let's be clear. I know that. 13 MR. BERMAN: I understand that and I'm not 14 15 arquing that. THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. BERMAN: What I'm saying is the fact that 17 they're filed together, perhaps 60 plaintiffs in a 18 case, does not mean that the 60 plaintiffs go to one 19 20 single trial.

There are like -- there is likely to be individual trials or, as the Court may see fit, grouping some together or not. But, it cannot be implied, as counsel has suggested, that because cases are going into a JCCP even in large multi-plaintiff

14.

groups that they are all going to be tried together.

The suggestion from the exhibit on page 25 is that the opposite happens. That's my interpretation of their exhibit.

When there was indication of an application that certain numbers of cases be tried in a bellwether fashion indicates that all of them are not being tried together. At least that's my inference from that exhibit. And there is no evidence before this Court that they are all going to be tried together and, again, that's the defendant's burden. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. GUSSACK: Your Honor, briefly.

THE COURT: Ms. Gussack.

MS. GUSSACK: First of all, thank you for affording us this robust argument.

THE COURT: I'm really enjoying this. We've been at this for two hours and I didn't even look at the clock until just now --

MS. GUSSACK: Well, we appreciate --

THE COURT: -- because I'm getting hungry.

MS. GUSSACK: Well, then I'll be brief because I simply want to return to the comments the Court made at the outset of this argument because I'm

very troubled by something Ms. Beasley suggested.

There has been an unfortunate suggestion by plaintiffs' counsel and by conduct that the cost and burden should shift to the defendant to prove basic elements of plaintiffs' case. And the Court at the outset made the observation that that is an expensive and problematic proposition.

It is not GSK's job to fill in the gaps of plaintiffs' proof in basic issues like product identification or exposure or prescription records.

And yet that has been far too often the case with great cost to GSK.

Now, the plaintiff suggests that it is McKesson's burden to shift the burden to us to incur the cost to demonstrate what the plaintiffs have failed to do at the outset of their litigation, investigate the facts and make a showing and then act on it.

And I think the Court is well aware of our view that there has been an absence of evidence of any action intending to prosecute those claims. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Fahey? Mr. Cardozo, any sur-rebuttal?

MR. FAHEY: I have learned not to speak after Ms. Gussack does so I have nothing further, Your Honor.

MR. CARDOZO: And I'll concur unless you have any questions.

THE COURT: Very wise men. Okay. No, I don't have any more questions. I do appreciate the rigorous explanations and proffers of positions here. I think this is very serious a motion. I do think it has impact on mass actions, class actions, MDLs, and CCPs, JCCPs, all over the country.

However, it's not the only case that's doing that, so we're going to take all of your finely made arguments and evidence and submit what you want. But if you filed against McKesson, I believe that the discovery request or the motion to compel is known to or will be shortly known to the defendants, and I am the only one that doesn't know what it says. So please forward same, and I will take this under advisement. I do appreciate it very much.

You came from a long distance, many of you.

And the rest of you, I think I'll see you all again.

In one context or another I will. Thank you.

ALL: Thank you, Your Honor.

(Proceedings adjourned, 12:35 p.m.)

\* \* \*

CERTIFICATION

I, Michael Keating, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript from the electronic sound recordings of the proceedings in the above-captioned matter.

 $\frac{-27-44}{\text{ate}}$ 

Michael Keating