IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE:

: MDL-07-1871

AVANDIA MARKETING, SALES : Philadelphia, Pennsylvania PRACTICES and PRODUCTS : December 6, 2013 LIABILITY LITIGATION

: 10:15 a.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS CONFERENCE BEFORE THE HONORABLE CYNTHIA M. RUFE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiffs:

TRACY REZVANI, ESQUIRE PAUL R. KIESEL, ESQUIRE SHAYNA SACKS, ESQUIRE LEO PAUL DECUIR, JR. ESQUIRE MARCUS L. STEVENSON, ESQUIRE MATTHEW HAMILTON, ESQUIRE SALIM BEASELY, ESQUIRE DIANE M. NAST, ESQUIRE STEVEN CORR, ESQUIRE RUSSELL PEARCE, ESQUIRE FRANK D. JOHNSON, Pro Se THOMAS ENRIGHT, ESQUIRE MATTHEW DAMERON, ESQUIRE REYANNE KONAN, ESQUIRE MARC LEVITT, ESQUIRE DAVID TRAWICK, ESQUIRE CURTIS BRUEHL, ESQUIRE LUTHER SUTTER, ESQUIRE JEFFREY THORN, ESQUIRE GARY ROBERTS, ESQUIRE

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(The following was heard in open court at 10:15 a.m.)

THE COURT: Good morning, everyone.

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ALL: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Please be seated, and welcome to a hot courtroom. That is the temperature. All right. It's a pleasure to see many of your familiar faces and many new faces.

We're happy to engage counsel on behalf of their respective clients in moving the remaining cases in the Avandia MDL-1871, to resolution one way or another, meaning by that in case it's not understood, that it is our function to case manage these matters and move cases through discovery, decide motions, set rulings, and provide quidance for the resolution of cases, in addition to trying cases that cannot resolve by any other means.

So there's three ways to resolve a case, and you are all attorneys that know this. You either try it, you settle it, or you are decided on motions, and we are prepared to do all of the above in the appropriate case for the remainder of the cases that are left here.

To start out, I would like to address the status of the number of cases that are left here, and

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I'm going to ask GSK, Ms. Gussack, if you would address that first.

MS. GUSSACK: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MS. GUSSACK: Thank you. We have, as you know, had a recent increase in the number of cases in the MDL as a result of the transfer of cases removed from California and, therefore, the current number of cases is hovering around 3,200 cases in the MDL.

Although the number of cases in discovery group D and E are decidedly fewer, as I think the Court is aware. In fact, in discovery group B there is only one case that has been advanced for trial, the Bork (ph) case.

THE COURT: Just let me clarify this. When you say 3,200 cases in the MDL, do you mean plaintiffs or cases? Because the way they're filed in the California and Illinois and some other jurisdictions, they are multiple parties.

MS. GUSSACK: Correct, Your Honor, it's 3,264 plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Much fewer cases.

MS. GUSSACK: Correct. I believe they are 65 total cases in the non-discovery group settings. 3,011 of those plaintiffs, 54 of the cases, are cases from California, in which the Napoli, Restaino, Lu (ph)

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8 9 10 11 12 that I referenced from Saleem, Kuato. 13 14 15 16 17 MS. GUSSACK: With one --18 19 20 21 (Pause in proceedings.) 22 MS. GUSSACK: Oh, I'm sorry. Yes, Your 23 Honor, let me clarify that. I think that the Napoli 24

filings and I think there's one pro se amongst them. There are four cases, or 246 plaintiffs that have been transferred from Illinois, the Saleem, Kuato (ph) cases. (Pause in proceedings.) MS. GUSSACK: So the remand motion, just to turn to, you know, what is the status of those cases that have been recently transferred, there are remand motions pending, and I think that's an item on the agenda that's described at some length, as to the cases transferred from California. There is no remand motion pending as to the Illinois cases, the 246 plaintiffs THE COURT: And the California cases surrounding the McKesson issue is now fully briefed except for the possible plaintiff's response to the supplemental authority that GSK has provided --THE COURT: -- last week I believe. MS. GUSSACK: With one addition, Your Honor. I don't believe that the Restaino -- I'm sorry.

filings, the 837 plaintiffs, have not refiled in this

 court the remand briefs that they had previously filed.

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But Your Honor is correct, that the last filing made here was GSK supplemental submission, and there's been no response to that. And if Your Honor is interested at this point, Mr. Fahey can give a report on the discussion of those transfers, having attended Judge Burrow's status conference in California just two days ago.

THE COURT: All right. We can do that now.

MR. FAHEY: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. FAHEY: As Ms. Gussack said, the majority of the cases that will have a remand motion in this court originating in California, Judge Burrow was aware of those. We told those -- told Judge Burrow when those cases were first filed.

We also told him that we were going to remove them, both on Kappa (ph) grounds and also based on what we believed was a fraudulent joinder of McKesson, and reminded him and told him that the reason why we were doing the McKesson removal was because for four years in this court --

A SPEAKER: Excuse me. I can't hear anything that's going it. It sounds like some people are

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talking, but I can't pick it up.
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              MR. FAHEY: Is that better? Well, I'll do --
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    oh, you want it -- okay, sure.
               (Pause in proceedings.)
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              THE COURT: Who is speaking on the telephone?
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    This is Judge Rufe. I don't think they can hear me.
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               (Pause in proceedings.)
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              A SPEAKER: Your Honor, we can hear some of
    what you're saying but by no means 100 percent.
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              THE COURT: Well, I can't account for the
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             I think we have it up as far as we can get it.
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    volume.
              A SPEAKER: Okay.
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              THE COURT: So whatever you can do on your
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          We will all be speaking into the microphone
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    because we do have a number of attorneys on the
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    telephone. We haven't gone through the roll yet, but I
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    did want to get a status report in. Can you hear me
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    now?
              A SPEAKER: That's much better, Your Honor.
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    Thank you very much.
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              THE COURT: All right. Well, we'll address
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    our comments directly to the microphone right in front
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    of our mouths.
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              MR. FAHEY:
                          Okay.
                                  I'll continue.
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    Sean Fahey for those on the phone. So we told Judge
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Burrow that we were going to remove the cases both on Kappa and on McKesson, McKesson because in the four years that we were in California there was no discussion of McKesson after you remanded the cases four years ago. And so obviously we're very conscious of that decision you made four years ago, but we believe there's reasons for taking a fresh look at that based on what's happened in the past four years.

So Judge Burrow is aware of that decision.

He was anxious to get a report of the proceedings here.

I'll just maybe broaden the report to just talk about some of the things he's just recently done to try to marry his procedures with Your Honor's procedures because there was a concern that if the procedures weren't uniform, there would be an incentive for people to, frankly, dump cases that wouldn't survive here in California.

THE COURT: And Judge Burrow had coordinated with this Court for years --

MR. FAHEY: Yes. And he --

THE COURT: -- in this matter.

MR. FAHEY: -- was very clear on Wednesday that he would like that to continue. I think he would welcome a call, you know, in whatever normal format that Your Honor discusses these issues with Judge

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I think he was very appreciative of those discussions and ---

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THE COURT: Just to be clear on this record because there are a lot of people involved in today's proceeding that have not been involved in case --

> MR. FAHEY: Sure.

THE COURT: -- management of the MDL before. And when we speak about coordination with a state court judge we're not talking about substantive rulings.

MR. FAHEY: Correct.

THE COURT: He's talking about coordinating discovery and timing of discovery and cross-noticing and all the things we do in preparation for resolution of the cases.

MR. FAHEY: Exactly, Your Honor. And so, as Ms. Gussack said, there were three sets of cases removed from California. The first set is being led up The second I believe by Ms. Beasely who is here today. group is by the Restaino firm. The briefing or the majority of the briefing in those two cases has largely been complete with the exception of the potential response to our supplemental notice.

The Napoli group of cases, for reasons that are not entirely clear to us yet, they have not refiled the remand motion that they previously filed in

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California. And so at some point, I think Your Honor will have the briefing completed in all three sets of those cases. The issues are identical in all of them, frankly, and so when that briefing is completed we would be happy to have oral argument on those issues so we can go into much more detail about why we think these removals are appropriate and valid.
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THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Fahey. I really do want to give the Beasely and Restaino representatives a chance to talk. Right now, we're still working on status. We won't go into merits. And if the parties agree, later on we can hear oral argument on the fully briefed cases, but I don't wish to chop the similar issues one from another. So we probably will not do that today. But just so that I can learn who you are. Ms. Beasely?

MS. BEASELY: Yes, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Good morning. I just wanted to see who you were. And who is here from the Restaino firm?

MS. RESTAINO: Lauri Restaino from Restaino

THE COURT: Nice to meet you, too. Thank you.

MS. RESTAINO: Thank you, Your Honor.

Law.

THE COURT: All right. Any more on the status of cases? You talked about, Ms. Gussack, 65 cases in the non-discovery pool, that is outside of what is currently being worked through to trial?

MS. GUSSACK: Let me put it this way, Judge, and let's see if they add up. I think we have one discovery group D trial case, one discovery group D that's not a trial case, pro se.

There are 17 discovery group E cases that are proceedings through discovery towards expert reports, and then there are the 65 non-discovery group cases that account for the 3,264 plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Okay. I tend to look at the as filed California cases and Illinois cases as one massive case for now because that's how it's filed and transferred to the MDL. It is actually helpful to know how many actual plaintiffs there are.

But, it's my understanding, if I recollect this correctly, that in California not all of them need to be residents of California. So, potentially, I'm not sure where those cases would eventually be tried.

MR. FAHEY: All 50 states, Your Honor.

MS. GUSSACK: You're quite right, Your Honor, that most of them, in fact, are not California-based plaintiffs, and the only other caveat I would point out

is that of those 3,264 plaintiffs recently transferred, those Illinois cases, four of them, are not subject to removal challenges, remand challenges, 246 plaintiffs. So those are separate from the California transfer filings.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Kiesel, let me turn to you. Good morning.

MR. KIESEL: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have any -- on that limited issue, on the numbers of cases, status of cases, do you have any additional information?

MR. KIESEL: Your Honor, Paul Kiesel, plaintiffs' liaison counsel in this litigation. I think that our numbers are fairly accurate. It tends to be a moving target, so when we get to discovery group D and we had six cases, now we are down to one case and discovery group E is a moving target. I actually had ten discovery group E. But, I think in total you have a pretty good perspective on what the numbers are nationally, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you. I would like to address the joint report and agenda that was provided, and I'd also like to note that also in attendance at this morning's status conference is the special master, Mr. Merenstein. Good morning.

MR. MERENSTEIN: Good morning, Your Honor.

and R concerning Santa Clara County. So we will talk about that later. And the first matter on the joint report and agenda is presented as oral argument for Santa Clara versus GSK. We know that we set that definitely for 11:30 so that the California parties can be video conferenced in. So we will move on to discuss other matters on the agenda.

MR. MERENSTEIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I did see counsel in the back of the courtroom stand earlier.

MR. SACKS: Yes, Your Honor, this is Shayna Sacks from Napoli (inaudible). My understanding is we did file the remands for the California cases. I'm going to look into that right now and --

THE COURT: No, the question is whether it was refiled here in the MDL.

MS. SACKS: I believe it was. My records say it was done on October 15th I believe. Sorry, November 15th.

THE COURT: Well, everyone's going to have to check on that.

MS. SACKS: Okay, no problem.

THE COURT: Good.

MS. SACKS: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Perhaps you can look on your ECF and see what the docket number is.

MS. SACKS: I will. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right. The identification of who is present is very helpful to this Court because there are a number of you that are here on behalf of your own cases and not necessarily MDL-wide purposes.

And this is becoming I think with some of the issues that I see being raised an interesting issue for the Court because, as you know, some time ago when this Avandia MDL was seriously winding down except for some class actions and third party payor cases, we saw no further need for a plaintiff steering committee to do the work of the MDL and, therefore, disbanded it retaining an advisory committee for common fund issues and the like.

And I see today that we have two representatives here. Of course, Mr. Kiesel, you are also on that committee, but Ms. Nast is here, Mr. Corr is here, and I appreciate you being here.

We are looking at the FDA announcement, the safety announcement most recently released in the press, and that's about all I have the information of

on it. It's a New York Times article. But I think it's becoming more publicized. And I'm looking at the belief that GSK has to ask this Court to give all plaintiffs 60 days to submit supplemental expert reports. That's one way of doing it in light of that. We have to talk about this, and now is as good a time as any, because we don't really have a clarified plaintiffs' position because it would be you, Mr. Kiesel, who are the plaintiff.

But I think that we need a lot of input here.

And I'm also looking at this and saying if we go a

certain route, and I'm addressing this on a case

management level, not a substantive level at this time,

but I think it would be problematic to have too many

individual positions on this.

We did do general science on MI a long time ago, and does this impact on that? We see that there are issues here to address substantively. But how to do it is my case management role, and I'd like to hear the parties out on that.

MR. KIESEL: If I might, Your Honor, Paul Kiesel for plaintiffs. Initially, I think that although this has been out about a week, November 25th is when the FDA issued this bulletin.

THE COURT: That's right.

MR. KIESEL: I don't believe, Your Honor, that it's going to be necessary for you to have general causation Daubert-type motion practice again. I think you've got the science. It's been argued the Court's made it's rulings.

There may be specific causation questions, which would be the individual lawyers who would be responding to those issues and not a general causation Daubert-type hearing again.

should the Court want to do that, I'd be fully prepared on behalf of the plaintiff community to put on general Daubert arguments one more time. I don't think that's necessary. I want to brief that issue if the Court thought it was appropriate, but if it's necessary, we could certainly have a point person.

Mr. Rosamond (ph) who is here and has been working with me for the last four years on this litigation, he's gone to London with me on depositions involving the record study, is fully capable and experienced in arguing before this Court that general causation motion, should it be necessary.

But, again, I don't think, given where we are in this litigation, that reopening general causation is an appropriate way to proceed, and should the Court

feel it necessary, T would handle that on a case by case basis. We'll provide to all plaintiffs' counsel the experts that we've utilized in the underlying MDL. They're welcome to the reports and they're welcome to use them as their own individual experts should it be necessary, Your Honor.

necessary, what is the plaintiff's position on the additional supplemental expert reports. Wouldn't plaintiffs want to have the opportunity to produce a supplemental report to make sure that after all the work they do to get discovery completed and get to summary judgment on those they wish they had done so, because wouldn't that be beneficial to some, maybe not all, but to some?

MR. KIESEL: I guess the question is -- the pre-condition to that question is that, in fact, the FDA's recent announcement has impact on this litigation with respect to the MI claims or the other causation issues that are being presented by the plaintiffs, and I'm not certain, Your Honor, that it actually does.

A record was completed at the time that Joe Zonies and Tom Cartmell argued the underlying Daubert motions. The science was there, the experts relied on it, so I think that this alleged readjudication of the

endpoint for heart attack with this drug doesn't really change the underlying issues the Court has already addressed.

If you felt it appropriate, we certainly can and we have the experts available. Once we do the due diligence on the FDA's announcement to provide supplemental expert reports, we can certainly do that, but I'm not sure it's necessary, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, what's very interesting here is I have GSK's position on this and their request. I don't have a briefing. I don't have anything more in my intellectual arsenal than a New York Times press release. So I need more, and if it were to be fully briefed, I would give each side an opportunity to tell me what it's really based on.

MR. KIESEL: Correct, Your Honor. And I think our response in the status conference statement is we have just learned of this information ourselves, we are evaluating it just as the Court is, and we need to really dig into it.

There are certain things we need to do fundamentally to look at the foundation of the basis for this release and whether or not it's a political release or it really is a substantive medical opinion that's being offered by the FDA here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I'm sure that in some regards there has to be an alignment of the fact that the FDA never really fully pulled Avandia from the market, and now they're eliminating the restrictions that they -- the warnings that they put on it. So I think that that bears some substantive discussion on possibly revisiting Daubert, even if it is in a specific causation way.

MR. KIESEL: Again, if the Court felt it appropriate, we would be certainly willing to and my firm would be happy to take on the responsibility of presenting that issue to this court.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Gussack, would you like to respond? Thank you, Mr. Kiesel.

MS. GUSSACK: Thank you, Your Honor. I can't think of anything I would rather talk about than the recent FDA announcement. And I would simply correct Mr. Kiesel, there is no alleged readjudication of record.

There was by the Duke Cardiac Research

Institute a readjudication of all of the data that was in record, and FDA's conclusion announced, and I would like to hand up to the Court so that you are relying or at least --

THE COURT: Something more than the New York

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. GUSSACK: -- the FDA's decisional memo and their safety alert, and certainly we will brief this for the Court as the Court directs.

But, most critically, what FDA said is that the data currently available to FDA, which includes record and the readjudication by the Duke Cardiac Research Institute and all of the analysis that it has done, including over the last three years since this Court held daubert proceedings, has caused it to conclude that there is no increased risk of cardiovascular death or heart attacks or major cardiovascular adverse outcomes associated with Avandia in comparison to any other routinely used oral anti-diabetic, citing to Metformin and SU.

Most critically, for the purpose that we raise this today, the FDA directed that it doesn't want the meta analysis, which was the heart of the plaintiffs' Daubert argument, that the meta analysis was sufficient to show an increased risk of Avandia and heart attack, that that meta analysis is not probative and should not be contained in the warnings going

forward with Avandia, and as the Court already pointed out, restrictions on its use will be lifted.

It is the province, I think, of this Court to look at the quality of the science as it exists. And it's, therefore, our view that the plaintiffs should be given an opportunity to supplement their reports, but that it is appropriate in the individual cases coming before the Court for trial, including the Bork case most -- I think soonest, but in other cases, to look at the science as presented with current information. And there is ample support in Daubert proceedings where new important information is available that Daubert gets revisited to reflect the current views of the science.

THE COURT: Of course, I think you will agree that in Daubert we dealt with not conclusions on the science, but the methodology.

MS. GUSSACK: Absolutely, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And that methodology is either reasonable and accepted in the legal sense or not. And how does this record -- what do you call it?

MS. GUSSACK: The --

THE COURT: Readjudication of the record trial, how does it impact on that limitation of what a court does in Daubert?

MS. GUSSACK: I believe, Your Honor, when you

were addressing Daubert originally, concluded that there was no question that having a randomized clinical trial was the best quality evidence one could have about whether there was, in fact, causation.

And you were presented during hearings with questions about the record clinical trial and questions about its methodology, and those questions have been addressed. The Duke readjudication was an effort to take that data and to alleviate the questions about the methodology employed in that clinical trial, and was so persuasive in its analysis that the advisory committee to the FDA and then, subsequently, the FDA itself concluded that it is probative, reliable, and far more meaningful than the meta analysis, which is what the Court was, I think, focused on as of the time January of --

THE COURT: Well, the Court's focus on any particular factor had to impact and be relevant to the methodology that the experts were using to formulate their opinions. And, of course, that methodology calculation is based on what did they use to formulate their opinions, which is I think where you're going.

MS. GUSSACK: Exactly.

THE COURT: But I don't necessarily know where an expert who may have reached a conclusion

before this would change their position and/or how they would change their position if the methodology was the same. So I guess that's the -- I'm trying to crystalize the issue here that would have to be addressed in a general Daubert regurgitation, or does it slip into the specific science issues of individual cases now?

MS. GUSSACK: Fair enough, Your Honor. I think there are several kinds of general causation challenges that remain to be had. The initial one was with respect to heart attacks solely. So there are cases that are coming before Your Honor that -- and, in fact, the Bork case is not a heart attack, it is a sudden cardiac death, and there has been no Daubert challenge as to the opinions offered both generally and specifically as to that. So that is a case in which a Daubert challenge would be appropriate regardless of what happened before.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. GUSSACK: There are stroke cases coming in discovery group E that we have no had subject to a Daubert challenge, and I'm not even sure as I last looked at the discovery group E cases if there are any heart attack cases in which we would urge a revisiting of the prior Daubert ruling.

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But we certainly believe that it's appropriate because with additional data shouldn't plaintiffs' experts want to evaluate whether that, in fact, affects their judgment about the quality of the evidence and the methodology with which they credit the data? You would expect, I would think, that any reputable scientist would want to look at the totality of the evidence and determine whether it affects their judgment.

Certainly, our view is and buttressed by FDA's recently conclusion, that the meta analysis is insufficient poor quality data in the face of the robust kind of clinical trial data that record and the readjudication provides.

THE COURT: So it can be done in a general and specific sense, but in case-specific matters that are in line --

> Exactly. MS. GUSSACK:

THE COURT: -- for --

MS. GUSSACK: Which will have far reaching implications for other cases similarly situated.

THE COURT: Well, for the consolidated plaintiffs' positions, which an MDL is responsible to allow, it seems to me I'm faced with a case management decision to reconstitute on a limited basis a plaintiff

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steering committee, giving Mr. Kiesel full reign to put together a group of attorneys to deal with this issue.

I would hate to see this being litigated piecemeal all over the country in various forms and piecemeal here. I would not want that. I do want a comprehensive approach. But it's still going to be absolutely relevant to specific causation in any one of the claimed injuries.

MS. GUSSACK: Absolutely. In any of the cases coming up there will be specific causation challenges that will need to be addressed. But there is in the cases coming up as well and these are, of course,

non-MI cases, a need to look at the general causation opinion that supports those specific causation issues.

We raise this only, Your Honor, so that we could one, give the plaintiffs the opportunity to supplement their reports if they want, and we could arrange with the help of the special master case management that would allow for the corresponding response from GSK.

But more critically, I think if we met and conferred about what an appropriate process is for raising this issue and then, ultimately, if we can't find consensus, brief for Your Honor the reasons for a

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renewed Daubert challenge as to MI. But I think probably more likely, the initial renewed -- the initial challenge will not be a renewed one, but a new one as to the issues coming up, for instance, in the Bork case and then in the stroke cases that follow.
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THE COURT: Okay. And the 60-day supplemental expert report request that you're making, is that on all cases or is that only on those cases that are now in a position to be in one of the discovery pools and a trial pool?

MS. GUSSACK: Only the discovery group cases in D and E, which are a defined number.

THE COURT: You're not considering any revised Lone Pine one or two response?

MS. GUSSACK: Well, Your Honor, we actually are considering that. But we thought first that we should address the issues coming up on the discovery, the fact and expert discovery that's in discovery group D and E. The Lone Pine issues, which are I think the subject of another item on the agenda we do want to address more completely.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr.

Kiesel, I saw you stand up so I know you want to reply.

MR. KIESEL: Okay. I think we're not far

off. THE COURT: I agree.

MR. KIESEL: If the Court feels it's appropriate, then we would ask that there be briefing on why we ought to revisit the issue of general causation for MI based upon the readjudication of record. So I don't think we need to do anything more than if the Court wants to brief that.

THE COURT: But if Ms. Gussack has just said it wouldn't be on general Daubert, it probably is not a relitigation, if I have that correctly. But I think everybody should be briefing their positions on this to clarify --

MR. KIESEL: I agree.

THE COURT: -- what exactly it is that defendants may be seeking here. I know it will. this release of information, this readjudication out of Duke, will impact any plaintiffs' and defendant's expert opinion. As to what and how I cannot predict, but it needs to be considered.

MR. KIESEL: There's no question that it will be a factor at some point in time with some expert opinion. He'll have to respond to what this readjudication means in any individual case, I agree. To the extent that we have to go beyond that and the Court is looking at a wholesale reevaluation of an already heard general Daubert challenge, then I think

we can approach that, and as I say, I'm not happy to, but I am pleased to take on the responsibility should the Court wish me to, to respond to that for the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Well, I would appreciate it if you would think about how in your status on this issue how you would go about that because I really do have to consider reconstituting, as I said, on a limited basis, plaintiffs' steering committee members.

I want them to be funded out of, you know, whatever expense fund there is, to be able to do this appropriately in whatever division of injuries is claimed. Yet at the same time, we're left with so few cases other than the newly removed ones here that I don't know about the resources available, so we have to look at all of that.

MR. KIESEL: And I've carried on my role with respect to all of the plaintiff attorneys the same way I did two years ago when I was lead. I work with every plaintiff lawyer, whether they're a pro se litigant, most importantly the pro se litigants, or their attorneys who have one or 2,000 cases, to coordinate with them, to keep them informed, and ultimately to develop a strategy that brings this MDL to a close in a reasoned way so that plaintiffs who have claims have

them heard and GSK at the certain point can have this matter resolved, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I appreciate that, too.

Sometimes I think leaving you alone is not fair of me, but I know that you have resources.

MS. GUSSACK: Your Honor, let me just clarify because I think Mr. Kiesel probably appreciates the following. Both plaintiffs and defendants at the time of the Daubert proceedings agreed on what the quality and hierarchy of evidence was.

Both plaintiff and defendant's experts agreed that the gold standard for quality evidence as to causation was randomized clinical trials. It was true at that time of the Daubert hearing that the plaintiffs' experts had criticisms of GSK's clinical trial, the record trial. It is the readjudication by Duke that validates and confirms the reliability of that.

So if both parties understand and agree about the hierarchy of that evidence, it's hard to imagine that plaintiffs' experts wouldn't want an opportunity to acknowledge that additional data and consider it in offering their opinions, which is why we have offered this revised proposed schedule.

I raise this point only because I think it

goes critically to the general causation challenge that we need to make, regardless of whether it's a stroke case or a sudden cardiac death case or, in fact, and MI case that may come forward.

But, I appreciate that Your Honor wants to have some kind of integrated coordinated presentation of these issues. We had anticipated that we would be making a Daubert challenge in the first case that is scheduled to advance to trial. But we will confer with Mr. Kiesel about whether there should be a broader based challenge in which we look at all of the issues or whether it's best to do it in individual cases on a general and specific basis.

THE COURT: I think that there's much to chisel away at in addressing how to actually consider this issue, which we know at some point was going to have to be considered. It should be.

And it also occurred to me as I was reviewing the agenda item that it would be unfair if this Court did not allow plaintiffs' experts to review this readjudication and opine on it in some way. It has got to be valid in terms of cross-examination. It would be valid in terms of reconsideration of their own position, and all of that could only strengthen plaintiffs' case in some cases and weaken it in others.

But that's why I think it would be preferable, and this is a musing, it is not -- I don't mean amusing, A-M-U-S-I-N-G, it is the musing of this Court that plaintiffs should be granted leave to do this. I mean I could just as well see plaintiffs wanting to ask the Court for leave to file a supplemental expert opinion to address this.

MR. KIESEL: And I would just simply say,
Your Honor, that to the extent that the experts'
opinions would change as a result of the actions of the
FDA, there's no question that the plaintiffs' experts
would want to supplement their reports.

I did the depositions of Professors Holme and Pocock (ph), the designer of this record study and the lead statistician on the study. So we've heavily looked at record, its design, its power.

The experts, our experts, already have all that information to the extent -- and we haven't reviewed the FDA's recent findings -- they changed their opinions, we certainly would like the opportunity to supplement our reports that are consistent with this opinion.

THE COURT: Then why don't the parties do what you do so well, meet and confer, and I'll refer this part of it, a schedule, to our special master, to

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 work out how you wish to approach this, because I have on problems at all with granting leave to any plaintiffs that want to revise or supplement their expert opinions based on the readjudication.

where it takes us I'm not absolutely clear on, although it should be considered and it will be. Let's make it less chaotic and let's make it a matter of creating a record here in this MDL that is clear for purposes of review, clear for courts who are trying these cases when they are ready to be tried, and if I need to revise a ruling, I have to be receptive to that possibility, and I certainly will make rulings if they are presented to me. Right now, I don't have a motion. We have a discussion. This is what the status conference is for, and I do appreciate this. And we will be anxious to hear from counsel.

If you could possibly within 30 days give me a report if you have a joint report as to how you wish to proceed on this, either by motion or granting leave by stipulated order to have plaintiffs' experts, if the plaintiffs choose, to file supplemental expert reports based on this. It doesn't open the door to everything else I don't think. It's just this readjudication. So let's keep it confined to that unless there's reason otherwise, which I'm not aware of.

MR. KIESEL: Well, do you want us to work with the special master --

THE COURT: I do.

MR. KIESEL: -- in coming up with that report and recommendation?

THE COURT: I do.

MS. GUSSACK: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. KIESEL: On another point, you touched on it, Your Honor, I might as well approach it now, it deals with the issue, of course, of costs and withheld funds and the work that we have done.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. KIESEL: Most importantly, with respect to costs we have incurred, and the easiest think for me to do, which I have been doing, is simply writing checks, whether it's at times to the special master, although we got that straightened out, or it's to the document repository which is running at about \$10,000 a month. And so it's a process where we have, the Kiesel firm has been funding the litigation in part because my respect for Mr. Corr and Ms. Nast and not wanting to disturb the fund that's been set aside from the underlying litigation that we set aside for use of future administrative costs. But to the extent we have

on this?

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34
    these ongoing issues, and there are cases --
              THE COURT: Aren't you now incurring
2
3
    administrative costs?
              MR. KIESEL: Yes, Your Honor.
4
              THE COURT: Okay. The future is now.
5
              MR. KIESEL: It is and that's why it's a good
6
    time to have this conversation.
7
8
              THE COURT: Okay.
              MR. KIESEL: So what would the Court like me
9
    to do with respect to presenting. I can certainly send
10
    to the special master or to Andy --
11
              THE COURT: Well, it's really the accountant
12
    that reviews that.
13
              MR. KIESEL -- Andy Churles.
14
              THE COURT: No, he only does the payment.
15
              MR. KIESEL: Allen Winniker (ph).
16
              THE COURT: Allen Winniker. But I think that
17
    we should be addressing a procedure for you. Now, the
18
    old procedure set by PTO for the payment of cost is the
19
    common fund expenses are certainly appropriate, but I
20
    would like to hear from the protectors of the common
21
    fund.
22
              MR. KIESEL: Perfect.
23
              THE COURT: Ms. Nast, do you have a position
24
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MS. NAST: I haven't thought about it. I mean we've talked about it in the past. I haven't thought about it. But, the money that's in the common fund was put there by assessing cases that are gone, and they put that money in the common fund to fund what had gone up to the point where when Your Honor awarded the counsel fees.

So we are accumulating, as you know, from continued pay ins from those settled cases, we continue to accumulate funds which Andy Churles is paying out quarterly to comply with your orders.

I haven't talked to my colleagues about this at all. I do think that there's a dividing line between what's happened to create that common benefit fund and what's happening here. I don't know what that dividing line means. We need to talk about it among ourselves.

But, I can understand the argument that I know will be made that the common benefit fund is and was to cover the cases that are settled, that they raised -- that that's how the fund was raised. I don't know where that leaves us.

THE COURT: All right. You do need to talk to the --

MS. NAST: Yes.

25

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THE COURT: -- rest of the committee --
1
              MS. NAST: Yes.
2
3
              THE COURT: -- that you chair and address
    this with Mr. Kiesel. It seems to me though that as
4
    settlements keep pouring in and common fund assessments
5
6
    keep adding to that coffer, whatever the balance is I
    do not remember, but I do qet reports from Mr. Churles,
7
    who is the trustee of that, it seems to me that this is
8
    ongoing litigation that requires substantial resources.
9
              And, again, if it's common -- if it is -- if
10
11
    it is appropriate to find that it is unfair to have Mr.
    Kiesel's firm fund the entire plaintiffs' litigation,
12
    and --
13
              MS. NAST: With that I totally agree.
14
              THE COURT: -- I believe that is, and no one
15
    should be, you know, in opposition to that, then we
16
    have to look for an alternative.
17
                         I agree with --
              MS. NAST:
18
              THE COURT: And that alternative --
19
              MS. NAST: -- that as well, Your Honor,
20
              THE COURT: -- may very well be me
21
    reconstituting now with the newly found litigation, not
22
    the individual cases litigation, but the common
23
    interests that are being presented, we might have to
```

reconstitute the PSC, and then that's another matter.

MS. NAST: Well, that's an interesting point because I mean, as I said, I totally agree Mr. Kiesel should not be funding this litigation. When we -- with the first half or three-quarters or whatever we want to call it, the first part of the case, the steering committee each put up a considerable amount of money --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. NAST: -- and that amount of money was used to fund the litigation. And right now, there's no mechanism in place to fund, so we need to discuss that.

THE COURT: Yes, not without the Court adding new persons --

MS. NAST: Right.

THE COURT: -- to a plaintiff steering committee for a limited purpose or not. But it seems to me that we're reacting. It's the tail wagging the dog here. We're reacting to this because of new issues that have just developed, and I think that's our role, to deal with what is going on right now.

MS. NAST: Yes, and those issues, new Daubert or a new round of Daubert hearings, Daubert hearings are incredibly expensive.

THE COURT: Expensive and time --

MS. NAST: Time consuming.

THE COURT: -- consuming and very intensive.

We know how much time even this Court spent on it, and
that was nothing compared to what the attorneys did for
their clients. So we --

MS. NAST: Anyway, I will consult with my -THE COURT: -- don't want anyone being in a
position, such as you, Mr. Kiesel, or anyone else, to
be funding that alone. That's not what our intention
ever was, so we have to revise.

MS. NAST: I will confer with my colleagues, including Mr. Kiesel, of course, and we'll maybe come up with a suggestion.

THE COURT: All right. I appreciate that.

MS. NAST: Okay.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Moving down the agenda, we now get to Roman numeral III I believe, motions ripe for decision, ripe or not, they are motions that are outstanding. And there are motions to dismiss in discovery group E.

GSK has posed those motions on a variety of grounds. There is the Salim Beasely cases, which we are going to address, but have oral argument separately. The Restaino cases where I think that those refiled motions to remand are not quite fully briefed. And Kuato, Salim cases, which is GSK's

motions for orders to show cause.

So let's address the discovery group E cases, and which of GSK's team would like to do that?

MS. GUSSACK: Thank you for giving us the option. Your Honor, I think you'll see from the item on the agenda that we have identified the Blumenfeld, Decuir, Douglas, Rodriguez, and Sanchez cases as all motions to dismiss that are fully briefed or in which plaintiffs did not file a response, and we're simply flagging for the Court that they are ready to be addressed.

If the Court would like to hear argument or has a question about any of the bases for the motions, we're happy to provide it. I don't even know if counsel for each of these actions is present today.

THE COURT: Some of them are not, some of them are. As far as the Blumenfeld case, I don't think counsel is here.

(Pause in proceedings.)

THE COURT: No.

MR. KIESEL: Your Honor, might it be worthwhile to just identify -- have the folks identify if they're here, on what case they're here on so we can get a sense of counsel either --

THE COURT: Yes, I have three lists of

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40
    counsel here and I can't put them all together on the
 1
    spot.
 2
            So on ~~
               (Pause in proceedings.)
 3
               THE COURT:
                           Is Robin Switzenbaum (ph) here?
 4
    I didn't think so.
 5
 6
               (Pause in proceedings.)
 7
               THE COURT: Do we have a status report on
    that case?
 8
               (Pause in proceedings.)
               THE COURT: I do not know who is representing
10
11
    the Blumenfeld plaintiff in this matter if they are
    here. But I don't have any response to my call. Of
12
    course, the plaintiff did not file a response either.
13
               MS. GUSSACK: Right, which was due two months
14
    ago from now, or almost two months I think.
15
                                                   This was
    about substituting of a party, and the plaintiffs have
16
    no responded.
17
               THE COURT: Because of an estate issue,
18
    correct?
19
              MS. GUSSACK: Exactly.
20
              THE COURT: All right. We will table that
21
    for the moment. And then the next on your list, is
22
    that Decuir?
23
              MS. GUSSACK: Yes.
                                   I believe plaintiffs'
24
    counsel is Lisa Jones.
25
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check the docket.

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THE COURT: Is Lisa Jones present?
 1
 2
              MR. DECUIR: Your Honor, I am co-counsel on
 3
    that case. I am Mr. Decuir, Your Honor, and I'm --
              THE COURT: Hello.
 4
 5
              MR. DECUIR: -- presently on that case.
 6
              THE COURT:
                          I thought the name was familiar,
 7
    counsel.
              And you are the plaintiff as well?
 8
              MR. DECUIR: Yes, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: And you're representing yourself?
 9
              MR. DECUIR: Yes, Your Honor.
10
11
              THE COURT: Okay. Then I don't think we got
12
    a response to the motion.
13
              MR. DECUIR: I've never received a copy of
14
    the motion, Your Honor. The attorneys for GSK have
    chosen to avoid me, although I was designated to
15
    receive the motion, I have never received a copy of the
16
17
    motion.
              THE COURT: But you are represented by
18
    co-counsel.
19
              MR. DECUIR: Yes, Your Honor.
20
              THE COURT: And what is the status of that,
21
    because every motion is listed on ECF, and whether
22
    you're pro se or you're your own attorney or not,
23
24
    there's no way you cannot get notice of a motion if you
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I don't know what happened here, but personal service, it has been months since this has been pending. The response was due to the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 12(b)(5) and 9(b) on August 16th, three months ago, four months ago.

MR. DECUIR: I have not seen a motion, Your Honor. I apologize to the Court. I thought Ms. Jones was handling it. She came up with some personal physical problems, and I had to take over, and she forwarded me some a lot of stuff, but not a motion to dismiss.

THE COURT: Well, there's a problem there between you and your attorney, and I would like to have a response before I rule on a substantive motion.

MR. DECUIR: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So you need to address it. And

I'm glad you're here because I'm not sure you would

know this. But if you're co-counsel, and you just told

me you were and you're in the docket --

MR. DECUIR: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- because I saw your docket, you need to, sir, you need to be responsible for yourself.

MR. DECUIR: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay?

MR. DECUIR: All right.

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THE COURT: I'll give you that opportunity, but I need to figure out --

MR. DECUIR: We will respond --
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THE COURT: -- how this is -- how this is going to move forward because if Ms. Jones is not actively representing you, she really should not be responsible on the docket. But I would prefer that you had counsel other than yourself. It's not easy to represent yourself, even if you know and are trained as a lawyer.

MR. DECUIR: I understand that, Your Honor.

I just was forced -- kind of forced into the situation because of her medical condition and problem.

THE COURT: Well, okay. You might want to contact her, and I'm sorry to hear that she's ill, and tell her that the Judge wants to know if she's going to be able to continue or whether you want to seek new counsel, and then we can figure out where we're going with this.

MS. GUSSACK: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Ms. Gussack?

MS. GUSSACK: -- we're sympathetic to the circumstances described. May we seek a deadline by which this has to happen so that we can determine whether the case is moving forward?

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THE COURT: I think that a two-week deadline
1
    to notify the Court and GSK as to whether or not Ms.
2
3
    Jones is going to be representing you.
              MR. DECUIR: Yes, Your Honor.
4
              THE COURT: She should be withdrawing her
5
    appearance. You still remain as counsel of record, but
6
7
    you have 30 days to get new counsel --
              MR. DECUIR: Thank you, Your Honor.
8
              THE COURT: -- if that's the situation.
9
    right? And then we will decide who is responsible to
10
11
    respond to this motion. Without a response I am within
    my rights to grant the motion as unopposed, but I have
12
    to also review the merits. I need a response.
13
14
              MR. DECUIR: Yes, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: Okay?
15
              MR. DECUIR: Within 30 days.
16
              THE COURT: Yes, but she has to notify the
17
    Court within 14 days.
18
              MR. DECUIR: Within 14 days.
19
              THE COURT: Thank you. All right. We'll
20
    move on?
21
              MS. GUSSACK: The Douglas case, Your Honor, I
22
    believe plaintiffs' counsel is the Stevenson Law Firm.
23
              MR. STEVENSON: Good morning, Your Honor,
24
    Marcus Stevenson.
25
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45
              THE COURT: Good morning. Now, this is fully
1
    briefed and it's a motion to dismiss for failure to
2
    comply with several pretrial orders. What's the
3
    problem?
4
                              The certification wasn't
5
              MR. STEVENSON:
            The records that I thought we needed in order
    filed.
6
    to comply with that we didn't have. We placed an order
7
    for them. They weren't in within the time period to
8
    allow a physician to provide the certification.
    fact, the remaining records came into my office on
10
    Wednesday.
11
              THE COURT: Do you have the records?
12
              MR. STEVENSON: I have them in electronic
13
    form, yes.
14
              THE COURT: And you filed these in this year,
15
    2013.
16
              MR. STEVENSON:
                              I did.
17
              THE COURT: And -- well, the certification,
18
    meaning Lone Pine two, is that what you're referring to
19
20
              MR. STEVENSON: The physician --
21
              THE COURT: -- or Lone Pine one?
22
              MR. STEVENSON: -- certifications.
23
              MR. HAMILTON: Lone Pine one, Your Honor.
24
              THE COURT: It's Lone Pine one.
25
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really early in the stage. I think that we need to set a deadline for you, too. That's the only way to evaluate the substance of a claim, it's the only way GSK knows how to respond to your claims.

MR. STEVENSON: Don't disagree, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STEVENSON: And in all fairness, my response to the motion was I understand that there are deadlines, I don't have the information, I cannot file -- I can't provide it if I don't have the information. I understand the Court has got to make a ruling and my client is aware.

THE COURT: If I make a ruling and say that you are out of time, that could have dire consequences for your clients.

MR. STEVENSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I refrain from making decisions for expediency. That's not how I do things, and GSK doesn't even make motions in the history of this MDL, they don't make motions on that basis unless they've tried repeatedly to get these particular documents.

Now, how does it take you so long? You filed the claims. You filed the complaint. Don't you have those lined up before you file?

MR. STEVENSON: I do not have all the records that I thought the physicians would need in order to be able to provide the certification in the time that the Court has ordered.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know how long your physicians need to finalize, but we have to -- we have to hear from GSK on this. How long have you been at this?

MS. GUSSACK: Your Honor, we have been seeking this information since March of 2013. We have been engaged in numerous correspondence, meet and confers, and advising counsel that they have failed to meet their obligations.

And I must say, and I think that because this has significant implications for the 3,200 additional plaintiffs who are before this Court, to not have these records before you file a lawsuit to bring to this Court a claim, to cause a defendant to incur expenses in defense, and not have the basic medical records that support your claim, is really unconscionable in our view. And given this amount of time and effort and expense, we really cannot see why we are -- why GSK is being forced in this position to be un -- beyond reasonable.

I think Your Honor quite correctly points out

that GSK has been extremely reasonable in its overtures to plaintiffs' counsel about deficiencies and bringing motions. And here we sit well over six months in the push/pull of trying to get the basic factual information we are entitled to in order to evaluate the claim.

MR. STEVENSON: May I respond, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, in a moment. Are you including in this lack of information plaintiffs' fact sheet?

MS. GUSSACK: Yes, Your Honor. We have not received a fact sheet, basic medical records, a physician certification, and we have not -- the plaintiff, despite our many overtures, has not cured any of the deficiencies.

MR. STEVENSON: May I respond, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes, you may.

MR. STEVENSON: They were just served in July. I haven't had any conversations with defense counsel in March of this year or any other communications by them. I served a plaintiff fact sheet in a timely manner. There are deficiencies for which we received memos. We responded. We supplemented the information.

I actually had a conversation with one of the

defense counsel. Our certificate wasn't filed in time.

I haven't -- contrary to the motion, I haven't ignored their responses. In fact, each time they have sent me something I have either called them, e-mailed them, or had a conversation about it.

So while I am understanding the defense's position as it relates to the totality of cases in this matter, as it relates to Ms. Douglas it's a simple issue. There were records, additional records that I would need for a physician to provide a certification. I could not get those records, and although I tried, they came in after the deadline for me to respond to the motion, which is why my response is what it is.

I have told the Court in full candor I understand and so does my client what that means. But the representation that they have tried over the course of the last six months is not accurate as it relates to this particular patient.

MS. GUSSACK: Your Honor, the case was filed in February of 2013, and promptly thereafter GSK informed the plaintiffs of their obligations to meet all of the obligations with respect to plaintiff fact sheets, basic medical records, and physician certifications.

I do stand corrected. We did receive a fact

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sheet at some point and we identified numerous
1
    deficiencies, and that has also been the subject of
2
3
    ongoing discussion with plaintiffs' counsel.
              THE COURT: So we're up to the missing
4
5
    certification?
              MS. GUSSACK: Yes, Your Honor.
6
              THE COURT: That's what's missing?
7
              MS. GUSSACK: And the medical records.
8
              THE COURT: And the medical records --
9
              MS. GUSSACK: And the deficiencies that
10
11
    haven't been cured.
              THE COURT: Okay. The medical records that
12
    were recently received that you now have digital
13
    medical records, right?
14
              MR. STEVENSON: Yes, Your Honor.
15
              THE COURT: And those can be given over
16
    forthwith and your expert can be reviewing them and you
17
    can have a report in 30 days, can't you?
18
              MR. STEVENSON: Yes, Your Honor.
19
              THE COURT: The certification?
20
              MR. STEVENSON:
                              Yes.
21
              THE COURT: I would hate to think that when
22
    someone files a lawsuit they do so on a bare bones
23
    allegation that their client at some point ingested
24
    Avandia. We have a lot of cases that are general, too
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25

originally?

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general to withstand scrutiny and review by this Court.
1
    But, how you get passed that generality if it exists is
2
3
    to provide backup. It's all about proof and the
    plaintiff --
4
              MR. STEVENSON:
                              I understand.
5
              THE COURT: -- has the burden. And in the
6
    MDL, regardless of whether -- because you said two
7
    things, counsel. You said that they didn't contact
8
    you, but then you said well, I have been every time I
9
    was contacted giving them more and talking to somebody
10
    or writing an e-mail, so there has been communication
11
    between these --
12
              MR. STEVENSON:
                               I don't --
13
              THE COURT: -- parties.
14
                              I don't disagree. There were
              MR. STEVENSON:
15
    communications beginning in July. I was trying to
16
    serve the defendant. I could not serve the defendant.
17
    It wasn't until the end of July that I had any
18
    communication from defense counsel regarding this case
19
    and that, in fact, is when our communications began.
20
              THE COURT: And where was --
21
              MR. STEVENSON: I didn't mean to misrepresent
22
23
              THE COURT: Where was the Douglas case filed
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MR. STEVENSON: Originally in the Northern
 1
    District of Texas.
2
3
              THE COURT: And when was it transferred to
    the MDL?
4
              MR. STEVENSON: It was refiled in February I
5
6
    believe of this year, in the beginning of the year.
7
              THE COURT: Okay. Once you're in the MDL,
    counsel, you're on notice to follow the procedures.
8
              MR. STEVENSON: Understood.
9
              THE COURT: Okay? You don't sit and wait --
10
              MR. STEVENSON: Understood.
11
              THE COURT: -- because anybody who thinks
12
    they're sitting and waiting, and you're just the
13
    unlucky example right now, so that one day you can
14
    hopefully get remanded to try your case in state court,
15
    you have got to pass muster here first.
16
              MR. STEVENSON: Yes, Your Honor.
17
              THE COURT: And 30 days is it, no extensions.
18
              MR. STEVENSON:
                              Thank you, Your Honor.
19
              THE COURT: You're welcome. We'll commit
20
    that to a written order. And that's not only to
21
    provide the necessary physician certification, but to
22
    cure the deficiencies that have been noted by GSK.
23
              MR. STEVENSON: Yes, Your Honor.
24
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THE COURT: Very good. Thank you.

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Thank you.
              MR. STEVENSON:
1
              THE COURT: I think it was a good idea that
2
    you were here. All right, the Rodriguez matter.
3
              MS. GUSSACK: I believe plaintiffs' counsel
4
                              There's a motion, Your Honor,
5
    is from Fears Nachawati.
    in which plaintiffs have not filed a response as of the
6
    due date of October 22nd.
7
              THE COURT: Is there anyone here on behalf of
8
    Benito Rodriquez? All right, we will pass on that.
9
    And GSK's motion to dismiss for failure to comply with
10
    PTO-786 and 121, Yolanda Sanchez.
11
              MS. GUSSACK: Same counsel, Your Honor, from
12
    Fears Nachawati. In this case, it was -- it was
13
    responded to and the briefing is complete before the
14
    Court.
15
              THE COURT:
                          Is Attorney Garnett Hendricks or
16
    Nabeel Nachavatti (ph) here?
17
              (Pause in proceedings.)
18
              THE COURT: All right. We will decide that
19
    on the breaks.
20
              (Pause in proceedings.)
21
              THE COURT: That also goes for Rodriguez and
22
    Blumenfeld. All right. What else needs to be
23
    addressed today on the Salim Beasely cases that
24
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implicate the refiled motions to remand?

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54
              MS. BEASELY: I have something to add, Your
            May I --
2
    Honor.
              THE COURT: Yes, please come forward.
3
              MS. BEASELY: I did think the motions to
4
5
    remand --
6
              THE COURT: We're not going to be able to
    hear you unless you're at the microphone, please.
7
8
              MS. BEASELY: Just some background on me.
    Out of 37 cases, 33 of our cases are up for motion to
9
             I thought that it was fully briefed until they
10
    filed a supplemental authority earlier this week. I
11
    intend to reply to that, so I would ask that you not
12
    have oral argument or decide until I get a chance to do
13
14
    that.
              THE COURT: You may apply.
15
16
              MS. BEASELY: Okay.
              THE COURT: How long do you think you need?
17
              MS. BEASELY: Next week. I was going to C
18
    plead and attach the brief.
19
              THE COURT: All right. So within 14 days --
20
              MS. BEASELY: 14 days, okay.
21
              THE COURT: -- you can reply.
22
              MS. BEASELY: Okay. And then while I'm up
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    here, our other four cases also have a motion that's
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    pending. It's a motion that was filed by the defense.
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It's a motion for an order to show cause.

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The plaintiffs' position on the agenda is more of a procedural summary because at the time that I was inserting that information, they were saying our brief was untimely.

But, substantively, our position is that it's the defendant's burden to establish affirmative defense, such as statute of limitations. We briefed They haven't replied, so I would say that that motion is fully briefed.

THE COURT: You do need to talk about the motion for order to show cause. Let me just put that aside for a minute --

MS. BEASELY: Okay.

THE COURT: -- until I get through the remand I think it's an interesting situation. that's implicated in another matter as well.

> MS. BEASELY: The motion to remand? THE COURT: No. Your cases are also

implicated in the failure to submit required materials.

MS. BEASELY: Right. You know, that was a surprise to me. I've met and conferred repeatedly with defense counsel about the rolling production that started this month and that we would produce in the cases at a rate of 200 a month, and we had a choice of

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what cases to choose from, whether it was the 200 that were not up for remand or the 2,000 that were up for remand, because it was getting difficult administratively to focus on just a tenth of our cases in a different way than the rest of the docket.

And so they agreed that we could do -- for now at least that we could do -- we could choose any of our cases to do the production. And I thought production meant production, plaintiff fact sheet, basic medical records, and if it was one of the cases that wasn't up for remand, we would get a physician certification setup for that. We have a cardiologist. And the reason that we didn't do it is I didn't -- is that not all of our Illinois cases were in that first batch of 200. Does that make sense?

THE COURT: Somewhat.

MS. BEASELY: Okay.

THE COURT: I'd like to hear from GSK on this.

MS. BEASELY: Okay.

THE COURT: Mr. Fahey?

MR. FAHEY: Your Honor, there is a piece of agreement here and a piece of disagreement, so let me just talk about what we agreed on. We agreed that they were having problems collecting medical records and

completing fact sheets in a timely way.

And as Your Honor mentioned earlier, we agreed to, in a spirit of cooperation, allow them to stagger those productions so that there were 200 per week. This only related to the fact sheet and basic medical record requirement. They then asked -- the original -- the first 200 were going to come from Illinois.

They then called and said we can't get all of the Illinois so can we stagger them across jurisdictions. I don't think it had anything to do with the way they administer it. It was a question of whether they have the records or not, and I think what we're seeing early in this set of cases is the same thing that you just discussed with other counsel. People are filing cases before they have the backup to support them.

But we were very clear through all of those discussions that the Lone Pine certification requirements would not be altered in any way because for the Illinois cases that are not going to be remanded because the remand was already rejected by the Illinois courts, they're here for good. There's 250 roughly plaintiffs that are here for good. Those Lone Pine certifications need to be submitted on time, as

well as the Lone Pine two certifications to the extent that they were required.

THE COURT: So if there's a rolling production of 200 at a time, that is separate and apart now from the cases that are here not subject to removal?

MR. FAHEY: Your Honor, we could have taken that position, but out of respect for the difficulty that they appeared to be having, we said you have 250 that are here. They're not going anywhere. Those should be the first 200 that you provide. We'll give you credit and say rather than start producing from California yet, you can use those first 253 to fill out that first month of 200. But then they came back and said we can't do that. And so then we allowed them to also include some California plaintiffs in that first 200 for the fact sheet and basic medical records.

But we made it very clear, we have the emails that I could not have been clearer, I mean this
does not change your Lone Pine certification
requirements because we know those need to be done on a
timely way, and those are really going to help decide
whether theses cases move forward.

Now, what they're presenting now is a practical problem with their agreement that we -- or

their request that we agreed to, which is they don't have records to support those Illinois cases.

Now, I can't help them with that. I mean they -- we were very clear about what they could get an extension for and what we wanted to keep on a pattern.

And I think what you're seeing now is just the difficulty in supporting and living up to the obligations in the MDL.

THE COURT: So, there are actions with multiple plaintiffs, some of which have supporting documentation or allowed to be produced on a rolling basis, and some of which those plaintiffs do not. I can't dismiss a case and now down to dismissing a name.

MR. FAHEY: No, and, Your Honor, I think probably the best path forward for these cases is to come up with some process that either they are voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff, who to Ms. Beasely's credit, understands that she is not intending to move forward with cases that she can't find support. I think the only quarrel we have is that analysis should have been done before they were filed.

But I think we're in agreement when there's no records that the cases are going to be dismissed. But it's just a question of whether we're going to need to file motions to, frankly, allow the plaintiffs to

have an opportunity to respond to that and for Ms.

Beasely to show that she was unable to get the records.

You know, sometimes that's important for a plaintiff's lawyer to say that they had the opportunity to respond and the plaintiff was unable to give them the records.

So I'm not sure the ultimate path this will take, but I do think that there is going to be a large number of those 3,000 plaintiffs, not just with Ms. Beasely, but with all the other two groups that are not going to be able to survive the basic requirements, either here or in other jurisdictions.

THE COURT: Well, it's always important to the Court to cull out the wheat from the chaff.

MR. FAHEY: Right.

THE COURT: And this is an example of why it must be done. And the example of how it must be done is set out in multiple pretrial orders already established. I can't start changing those orders because of late filed difficulties.

So we need an approach here that is fair, and I have no doubt that counsel is being diligent and in a predicament here. But one of the problems is the way the cases are allowed to be filed in other jurisdictions is not how the MDL recognizes them and can act on them. And if these cases, any of them, are

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not subject to remand any longer, I am more inclined to enter a severance order and require that they be refiled separately by individual plaintiffs and/or families.

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MR. FAHEY: Yes, and, Your Honor -- I'm sorry.

THE COURT: And I have done that repeatedly over the history of this MDL by pretrial order, and it is something that I do when I'm sure it's no longer subject to remand. Otherwise, it would be a wasted effort and an expensive effort.

And in the alternative, the cases either get voluntarily dismissed within a certain time period or they're severed and refiled. And that gives you time to get the records and see what you have, Ms. Beasely.

MS. BEASELY: We would appreciate that.

THE COURT: Could you do that in 30 days, at

MS. BEASELY: For all of them?

THE COURT: -- those cases that are not

MS. BEASELY: I could try really hard.

THE COURT: 45 days?

MS. BEASELY: 60 would be nice.

THE COURT: Well, it depends on how

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productive this little exercise is. But I have to
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    straighten out our roles here and know which cases
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    we're pulling from to discover and to --
              MS. BEASELY: Absolutely.
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              THE COURT: -- move forward to trial.
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              MS. BEASELY: We have the same objective.
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              THE COURT: All right.
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              MS. BEASELY: We're culling.
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              THE COURT: 60 days all right?
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              MR. FAHEY: I think that's fine, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: All right. That's the
    alternatives to the non-remanded cases. Now, as to the
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    others, I think you have to keep moving on that rolling
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    production.
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              MS. BEASELY: Absolutely. That's our
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    agreement.
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              THE COURT: All right. We'll commit that to
    writing.
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              MR. FAHEY:
                          Thank you, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Thank you.
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                          I did note or update the Court on
              MR. FAHEY:
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    one question relating to the Napoli remand filings.
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    did comb the -- I think the issue was they were not
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    filed in the MDL docket, they were filed -- I think the
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    process was to file in the MDL docket and
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simultaneously in an individual docket when they were
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    re-filed.
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              They were not filed in the MDL docket, so we
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    just found them in some individual dockets. We'll get
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    in our response, which is going to be similar to our
    responses in the other two sets of remand cases.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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              MR. FAHEY: I'm not sure for a fact yet that
    they we're refiled in all the individual cases, but we
9
    can run that down and just confer with the Napoli firm
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    to make sure that we --
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              THE COURT: That they do a file --
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              MR. FAHEY: -- get that briefing completed
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    and get them also filed on the MDL master --
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              THE COURT:
                          That's also --
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              MR. FAHEY:
                          -- master docket.
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              THE COURT:
                          -- a PTO requirement --
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              MR. FAHEY:
                          I know, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: -- that we found necessary to
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    impose about four years ago because of the confusion --
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              MR. FAHEY: Exactly.
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              THE COURT: -- and the notice issues that
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    counsel was talking about before. Everything is on
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    ECF.
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              MR. FAHEY: Okay.
                                 Thank you, Your Honor.
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    will confirm.
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                          Thank you. Anything else, Ms.
              THE COURT:
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    Beasely?
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              MS. BEASELY:
                             That's it.
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              THE COURT: All right, thank you. Yes,
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    counsel?
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              MS. SACKS: I can have the firm re-file it in
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    the MDL today if Your Honor would like.
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              THE COURT: I think you have to.
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              MS. SACKS: No problem. And they were filed
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    in all the individuals.
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              THE COURT: That's fine. But you should
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    understand that when you get through the large number
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    of cases, even though most of them are resolved, it is
    very hard to get through the dockets, and it's the main
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    docket, 1871 that is required, as well as the
    individuals.
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              MS. SACKS: Absolutely. It appears to be an
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    oversight, but I'll speak to attorney.
19
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              THE COURT:
                          I'm glad that that mystery is
    solved.
21
              MS. SACKS:
                          Thank you.
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              THE COURT:
                          Thank you. All right. We know
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    that we said 11:30 for a certain oral argument, and we
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will have to break our status discussion on everything

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    else, take a brief recess, and setup the Santa Clara
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    motion for argument on video.
                         Thank you, Your Honor. I know the
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              MR. VALE:
    clients are standing by, so I think we need just the IT
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 5
    people here to dial into them. I don't know how to do
    it, but we're ready to go.
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              THE COURT: Okay. Well, since I'm not
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    productive and helpful in such a process, I will take a
    moment.
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               (Recess, 11:33 a.m. to 11:50 a.m.)
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11
              THE COURT: Are you ready?
              MR. VALE: We are ready.
12
              THE COURT:
                          The part of the proceeding now to
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    address oral argument on GSK's motion for partial
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    summary judgment, that is to limit the scope of Santa
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    Clara County's claims in their respective action is
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    ready to begin, and we have on the screen
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    representatives of Santa Clara County. Welcome.
    think I --
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              SPEAKER 1: Thank you.
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              SPEAKER 2:
                          Thank you.
21
                          I think you may have participated
              THE COURT:
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    before in another circumstance here in court, and I am
23
    still Judge Rufe.
24
              SPEAKER 1: And thank you, Your Honor, for
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accommodating us by video conference.
               THE COURT: It is our pleasure. Thank you.
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    Mr. Vale, you will proceed on behalf of the defendant.
              MR. VALE:
                          Thank you very much, Your Honor.
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    Anthony Vale on behalf of GlaxoSmithKline. As Your
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    Honor knows, this is an action in which the County of
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    Santa Clara has filed a one count complaint against GSK
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    under California's false advertising law.
              The county is bringing this action on behalf
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    of the people of the State of California, and in that
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    capacity on behalf of the people of the State of
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    California, the county seeks restitution and civil
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    penalties.
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              Now, the attorney general of California --
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    sorry for pausing here, but we really -- it was working
15
    a minute ago.
16
               (Pause in proceedings.)
17
              MR. VALE:
                        I do have plan B, Your Honor,
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    which is I do have some --
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              THE COURT: Hard copy?
20
              MR. VALE: -- hard copy which I could put on
21
    the Elmo.
22
              THE COURT: But the --
23
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MR. VALE:

THE COURT:

Okay. No, it looks like we're --

I think you have it.

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MR. VALE: We've got it here. So, Your Honor, the attorney general of California also brought an action against GlaxoSmithKline also under the false advertising law and also in the name of the people of the State of California.

The people of the State of California represented by the attorney general of California settled and resolved those claims on behalf of the people a year ago, and the settlement is reflected in a state court judgment entered in San Diego County about a year ago on November 15, 2012. And pursuant to that judgment, we call it a final judgment, and it's attached to our moving papers, pursuant to that final judgment, GSK agreed to an injunction. It's called compliance provisions in the final judgment, and made a payment.

Now, I believe there's no dispute here that the judgment applies. So the question for the Court turns on the language of the final judgment, and it's the language of the final judgment by which the claims of the people of the State of California were settled with one relevant exception, which I'm going to get to.

And as we're going to see from the language of the judgment, I'm going to put that up in a minute, but the language of the judgment provides that the only

claims not released by the people of the State of California, in other words, the only claims that remain for the county to bring on behalf of the people of the State of California, are those claims seeking relief based, one, on exposure of county residents to alleged false advertising and, secondly, in favor of residents of the county.

And the slide, incidently, with the map there shows Your Honor where the County of Santa Clara is.

It's the county of which San Jose is the main city, just south of San Francisco.

So this slide illustrates the result of the judgment. In other words, it shows that the claims that are remaining are those claims that can be brought on behalf of residents of the county. It's a little hard to see it on the screen there, but, Your Honor, what we're trying to illustrate is that a payor in the county, and up there we've shown the Santa Clara family health plan and illustrated patients in the County of California.

So the county, on behalf of the people of California, can ask the Court to award restitution in favor of a payor in the county or in favor of residents of the county. But, and this is why we're here, the county's lawyers are trying to expand this action to

non-residents of the county.

In other words, the county is asserting that the exclusion in the final judgment allows the county to ask this Court, or the court in the Northern District of California if it's remanded, to award restitution in favor of non-residents.

So the next slide illustrates the difference, or the expansion that the county is arguing for.

(Pause in proceedings.)

MR. VALE: Sorry about that. I think it's just a lot slower when we've got the feed coming in from California.

THE COURT: I think so.

MR. VALE: Here we are, all right.

THE COURT: But, you know, I do have that relevant portion included in the briefing --

MR. VALE: Yes. So I'm --

THE COURT: -- so I can --

MR. VALE: -- going to go through that in a second, but I just wanted to illustrate why this is important.

So under the county's position, how they would want to expand this action is to expand it so that the county could ask the Court to award restitution in favor of persons, not just resident of

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outside the county in California, but payors way outside California. And we've illustrated that showing Humana based in Kentucky or Wellpoint in Chicago, United Health in Minnesota. So that's how this action would be greatly expanded were the Court to agree with the county's position.
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So let's turn to the language of the judgment, which is what controls here.

(Pause in proceedings.)

MR. VALE: I hesitate to press the button again in case I go two slides forward. Maybe I'll press it one more time.

(Pause in proceedings.)

MR. VALE: Okay. Oh, it did go two forward. I think the slide will come up, but let me tell you, Your Honor, what the structure of the judgment was because before we dive into the weeds of the exact language that's important, I see it's up on the screen now.

Here's the structure of it. The structure of it is that the people of the State of California, the very same plaintiff in this case, because the county is proceeding on behalf of the people of the State of California, the people released GSK from liability under the false advertising rule, and that's in

paragraph 10.

But the release has an exception, or an 2 3 exclusion as it's called. And there are some --

there's two or three of them, but there's only one that counts here, and it's in paragraph 11E of the final judgment, and we've put that up on the screen.

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So I'll read it and then I'll draw Your Honor's attention to the key words. So, "Excluded from the release are any claims that have been brought by the Santa Clara County council's office as of the date of the entry of judgment for violations of the false advertising law concerning all covered conduct" -that's relating to Avandia -- "as defined in this judgment." And here's the key language. "To which persons resident in the County of Santa Clara were exposed, this exclusion applies to and in favor of only

So there are two important limitations on the claims that have been left for the county to bring on behalf of the people. And the limitations are one, it must be based on exposure to persons resident in the county.

persons or entities resident in the county."

And, secondly, the exclusion from the release applies only to and in favor of only persons or entities resident in the county. So what that means is

that the claims the county can bring here in the name of the people, the claims not released, are claims for restitution for residents of the county. So the release did not allow the county to bring claims for restitution in favor of non-residents.

THE COURT: Mr. Vale, could I ask you --MR. VALE: Yes.

THE COURT: -- to throw in another term there that I think is relevant to our decision, "covered conduct."

MR. VALE: Okay. Covered conduct is conduct relating to the marketing of Avandia. So in other words, this talking about Avandia as opposed to some other medicine.

THE COURT: And where is that covered conduct allowed to be conducted? Where does it take place in the AG settlement because we're talking about promotional practices and dissemination of information, which is probably not mass marketing, but is probably going doctor to doctor.

MR. VALE: Yes.

THE COURT: But I don't know that.

MR. VALE: The conduct to which -- or under the false ad -- the false advertising law applies only to conduct in the State of California. In other words,

the State of California can't bring an action based on conduct that took place in Pennsylvania.

So the conduct must have occurred in the State of California for the false advertising law to apply, just as Pennsylvania's unfair trade practices and consumer protection law could apply only to conduct in Pennsylvania.

So despite this language of the final judgment, the county wants to expand the action so that the Court could award restitution to non-residents if based on prescriptions written in the county.

So, for example, if a prescription were written in the county but paid for by a payor like Humana in Kentucky or United Health in Minnesota, according to the county, that would be permissible. But to get there, the county needs to have the exclusion re-written and --

THE COURT: Are you actually arguing that the address of a payor, whether it's -- not an individual, but an insurance company, would negate a claim by a resident of Santa Clara County?

MR. VALE: I'm sorry, Your Honor, just state the question --

THE COURT: If Humana --

MR. VALE: Yes.

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              THE COURT: I don't know why you chose
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             Can we say Blue --
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    Humana.
              MR. VALE: Well ---
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              THE COURT: -- Cross Blue Shield?
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              MR. VALE: Yes.
              THE COURT: Maybe they don't operate in
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    California. Say someone that's not involved in
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    litigation in the MDL, okay?
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              MR. VALE: Yes.
9
              THE COURT: If Blue Cross Blue Shield,
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    registered state by state I think --
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              MR. VALE: Yes.
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              THE COURT: -- pays for the medicine
13
    Avandia --
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              MR. VALE: Yes.
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              THE COURT: -- for a resident of Santa Clara
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    County, wouldn't that be covered conduct, because they
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    didn't prescribe it. They didn't have anything to do
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    with citing that the patient living in California,
19
    Santa Clara County, California, would take it. They're
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    simply paying for it.
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              MR. VALE: Well, the language of the
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    judgment, Your Honor, says that the exclusion applies
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    only in favor of residents of the county. So what that
24
    means is where the people of California ask that the
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Court enter an order or restitution in favor of a person in interest, that's the language in the false advertising law, that person in interest must be a resident of the county under the language of the judgment. That's the only plausible meaning of the term "in favor of a resident of the county."

THE COURT: I understand, because you're trying to exclude third party payers and insurance companies and the like from the definition of "residents" because, of course, that's not what the attorney general's action was meant to cover. They excluded that as residents. The residents that I see are people and entities, residents and entities, of Santa Clara County that are excluded, not who pays the bill.

MR. VALE: Right. In other words, GSK and the people of the State of California represented by the attorney general of California settled all false advertising law claims for civil penalties --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. VALE: -- and for restitution except. So what's the except, or what's excluded from that release? And what's excluded from that release is an action brought on behalf of the people of the State of California by the County of Santa Clara with two

limitations based on exposure by residents of the county to alleged false advertising and for an order of restitution in favor of residents of the county. So you can't under the language of the judgment, you can't have an order of restitution in this action in favor of somebody outside the county.

Now, just to be clear, I don't think Your Honor is confused about this, but we're not saying a claim by Humana or anybody else is released by this judgment. What we're talking about is whether the people of the State of California under the false advertising law may seek an order of restitution in this action in favor of people outside the county.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. VALE: And so another way to look at this, which we illustrate on this slide, is that if the county's -- the county's view, what they are arguing is well, if it's a transaction in the county, if it's a prescription written in the county, well, then restitution can be awarded to people whether they are in the county or outside. But as we illustrate here, that would require a rewriting of the exclusion.

So in short, Your Honor, we believe that the plain language of the judgment governs our motion. A lot, or not a lot, some that's been written in the

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briefs about California law and exactly what the
    requirements are. We don't think that Your Honor needs
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    to delve into that because the plain language of this
    judgment is very clear.
              So unless Your Honor has any questions,
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    that's our position, and we're asking that Your Honor
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    grant partial summary judgment in favor of
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8
    GlaxoSmithKline in accordance with our motion.
              THE COURT: I would like to pose a question
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    to you as to the timing of this motion.
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              MR. VALE: Yes.
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              THE COURT: If, in fact, it were to be ruled
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13
    on now --
              MR. VALE: Yes.
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              THE COURT: -- as you're seeking, is it
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    because it would clarify discovery moving --
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              MR. VALE: Yes, Your Honor.
17
              THE COURT: -- forward?
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              MR. VALE: Yes. That's why we feel this is -
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    - I mean it's a legal issue, so it doesn't require any
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    discovery to decide it. But it is very important
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    really for two reasons, Your Honor.
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              Firstly, with respect to the scope of
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    discovery and, secondly, with respect to the size and
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    scope of the case which would have an effect on expert
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reports, for example.

So we believed when that judgment was entered a year ago that this case was now clearly confined to the county, exposure in the county, a possible order for restitution in favor of patients or payors in the county. That's what we believed.

But then in the course of discussion, shall I say, with the county's council, it turned out they had a different view of this and wanted to expand the action beyond the county.

So if they were right, yes, it certainly would change discovery and it certainly would change the overall scale of the case, which would have a significant effect. And that's why we brought this motion to Your Honor because we feel it's important to have it decided.

THE COURT: Do you think, Mr. Vale, that there is reason for this Court to recognize that in this day and age interstate commerce and internet advertising and everything that connects us internationally as well as transcontinentally have an impact on the identity of what is a resident, because if you're a resident, that is a taxpaying resident of Santa Clara County, for example, and you suffer from diabetes and your doctor recommends and prescribes for

you Avandia use, and you happen to be insured by a multi-national company that will cover your prescription costs in part or in whole, and they're not located in Santa Clara County, do you think that excludes that restitution claim?

MR. VALE: Yes, Your Honor, under the language of this judgment because under the language of the judgment the people of the State of California have settled all claims for restitution and GSK has agreed to an injunction and has paid money to settle those claims.

But the word "restitution" is used in the judgment, so our client paid money to settle claims for restitution on behalf of everybody except, this was the carve out so that the Court could still, if it found the case proved, and that it was equitable, it's an equitable cause of action, award restitution in favor of residents of their county.

THE COURT: All right. So are you saying also that the attorney general settlement with GSK, including other provisions other than 11 and 11E, that define residents qualifying payment of restitution as having to be physically located in the State of California, absent Santa Clara County?

MR. VALE: Your Honor, I'm not 100 percent

sure, but I don't think the final judgment had any provision for should we say the location or identity of the persons to whom the attorney general of California could make a restitutionary payment.

What the judgment said was that the money paid by GSK could be used by the attorney general of California for a number of different purposes including restitution.

THE COURT: Okay. So there was no such argument or definition in that agreement that said Blue Cross Blue Shield or any other coverage had to be paid by an entity within the state, which I think it would have to be registered there anyway, and to operate, to be licensed, to do insurance in a state because it goes state by state, even though it's a national company, that wasn't a qualification, that wasn't a further definition that --

MR. VALE: I don't think that --

THE COURT: -- restricted recovery.

MR. VALE: -- that was -- I did read the judgment again either last night or this morning and I know that there was a provision in there that allowed the money paid by Glaxo to be used for restitution, but I don't think there was anything in there that defined exactly how the California attorney general might spend

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    the money.
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                                  Thank you.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
              MR. VALE: Have I answered all Your Honor's
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    questions?
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              THE COURT: So far.
              MR. VALE: Okay.
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              THE COURT: Mr. Kiesel?
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              MR. KIESEL: Thank you very much, Your Honor.
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              (Pause in proceedings.)
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              THE COURT: Your clients have been there the
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    whole time, you know.
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              MR. KIESEL: Oh, I know.
                                         I've --
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              THE COURT: Okay.
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              MR. KIESEL: They're always there --
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              THE COURT: They're always there.
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              MR. KIESEL: -- sitting on the shoulder.
16
              THE COURT: And they're always in this court.
17
    See, it's just that little piece up at the top of the
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    courtroom.
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              MR. KIESEL: Precisely. Your Honor, when we
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    originally got GSK's motion it seemed to suggest that
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    the actual exposure needed to be in the county of Santa
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    Clara to the unfair marketing practice that we allege.
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    And, in fact, in our opposition we said there's nothing
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    that limits the source of the exposure to Santa Clara.
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And, in fact, in their reply they acknowledge that, in fact, the exposure need not be limited to just what is seen in Santa Clara because the campaign was not just a statewide, but a national campaign. And where an individual may have been exposed is a question, but one that we don't have to answer here because the exposure is simply one of a national perspective.

Covered claims, Your Honor, when they defined "covered conduct," it's paragraph D of the judgment, it says "Covered conduct shall mean promotional practices and dissemination of information by GlaxoSmithKline, LLC, regarding Avandia in the United States." It's the entire country. They defined it as not covered claims within Santa Clara, but the United States is the scope of what they are identifying as being covered conduct.

This is very simple, Your Honor, and I'm not altogether sure why this motion is being brought in the way it is. We are defining our people's claim as all residents and entities in the County of Santa Clara. How we're going to do that, Your Honor, is look at doctors who wrote prescriptions. We're going to look at pharmacies who filled prescriptions all in the County of Santa Clara, nowhere else. That's how we're going to do it. Doctors who wrote prescriptions that

are Santa Clara-based doctors and Santa
Clara-based pharmacies, it's for the benefit of the
residents of --

THE COURT: So you agree with GSK on that?
Well, they would call it a limitation, you would call
it a definition?

MR. KIESEL: I wouldn't even call it a limitation. I would simply say the scope of how are you going to identify who the residents are, how are you going to identify who to include in your restitution claim?

It's going to be based upon doctors writing prescriptions in Santa Clara, and it's going to be based upon pharmacies filling prescriptions in Santa Clara, nothing more. And that's for the benefit of the residents of the County of Santa Clara, for the people of the State of California.

So to try to go one step further and go yeah, but you know what, Mr. Kiesel, you're insured by Blue Cross and Blue Cross isn't a Santa Clara entity, it's a New Jersey-based insurance company who you've been playing premiums to, who has got an obligation contractually to cover your cost of medicine, so we're not going to reimburse you what Blue Cross paid because they're a New Jersey company, they're not a Santa Clara

 County resident.

But, Your Honor, the benefit is upon me. I'm the patient. I've received the medication. Perhaps my doctor is the one who is marketed. My doctor is the one who recommended Avandia. My doctor was the one who got the messaging from the company, and the mere fact that my insurer happens to be an out-of-state or out-of-county insurer doesn't take away from the fact that I receive the benefit. I'm the patient. That's the medicine I received and that's the loss I suffered. And, in fact, the benefit that GSK got was because of my residency in the County of Santa Clara.

THE COURT: All right. But, this claim is for restitution, and restitution is computed by how much was paid, and that usually leads to the next question who paid it, because if you are successful, who are you paying the restitution to?

MR. KIESEL: And the short answer is you're paying it back to the patient. The patient may have a contractual obligation to reimburse the insurer for monies that the patient receives for benefits that were provided in any third party case where there's a third party action against someone for injury.

But I don't believe the Court needs to get into the fine distinction of who actually paid for the

medication. It's for the residents. The benefit GSK got was from the residents, and we're only focusing on the residents of Santa Clara, nobody else.

And so I was a little surprised because there's nothing in the final judgment that limits the identity of the purchasers of the product only Santa Clara County residents or entities. It doesn't say that. It simply says it is -- it only includes residents and entities, and we are only residents or entities will be making a claim for restitution for goods that they actually purchased in the County of Santa Clara.

Where the source of funds came from, Your Honor, I don't really think that that's a necessary discussion. Maybe I'm a county resident and my parents paid for the medication for me, they sent a check from New Jersey or they paid it on a credit card in the county, but they cover my medical because I don't have the financial wherewithal to do it. That's not what this settlement deal was about.

The attorney general carved out the County of Santa Clara itself, a fairly unique effort on the part of our attorney general. I'm supposed to give a nod to the fact that the county had been litigating this case for many years before the attorney general came in and

settled the entire State of California's action for restitution of \$7.3 million. That number hadn't been mentioned, although it was on the slide.

The number of sales in the State of California exceed a half a billion dollars, if not perhaps a billion dollars in total sales that would be subject to restitution, and the resolution was for 7.3 million. I can't explain why that was done, but what I can say is the attorney general did the proper decision to allow the county to continue to pursue its individual claims for the people of the State of California who are residents of the County of Santa Clara.

And I think, Your Honor, there's nothing in the settlement agreement release, the judgment that was entered, that limits the source of funds for a county resident as having to come from the county itself. And certainly the drafters of this agreement could have said in there if they wanted to that the source of the funds must only come from a county resident or it's not subject to restitution.

And I would submit, since we are agreeing, to limit our claims only to county residents, only prescriptions written in the county and paid for in the county, that would be the scope of the claims that

would be eligible for restitution and, ultimately, the civil penalties will be based upon, Your Honor. And I'm happy to respond to any questions you might have.

THE COURT: It's an overall question that I have concerning the AG's settlement. And absent these discrepancies which I have to resolve on a legal basis, statutory construction, whatever is reasonably interpreted here, it causes concern to the Court that there would be at first blush competing actions that you filed first on behalf of not just Santa Clara, but everybody in California, and then the attorney general superimposed its will and filed or just agreed, as other attorney generals have done.

And where that left you -- and this carve out seems to be specifically written for the Santa Clara County litigation.

MR. KIESEL: It's the first time, Your Honor, at least in my history that the attorney general has resolved a claim either individually, for the state, or as a part of a multi-state settlement where a specific plaintiff, in this case, the County of Santa Clara, on behalf of the people of the county was carved out.

But I believe it was a nod that, essentially, the county residents should be entitled to restitution and civil penalties for the damages that occurred

within that venue, which is the County of Santa Clara.

THE COURT: Well, whatever their reasons, they carved it out.

MR. KIESEL: Correct.

THE COURT: And kudos to your negotiation skills, Mr. Kiesel. But does that mean that attorney generals state-wide agreements with the defendant to resolve all such claims, including your false advertising claim here, should be necessarily given less impact and less import because there is one county that moved forward earlier or at the same time, whatever occurred, and decided to assert its own rights?

I mean I could see on a policy level a precedential problem with this, the precedent that there would be no finality in an AG state-wide settlement.

MR. KIESEL: This is unique to California, Your Honor, and the reason why is the county itself, as you recall, is not a plaintiff because the county would have to show reliance and, therefore, with respect to our complaint, we did not go that route.

This is a public enforcement action which the State of California allows us to pursue through business and professions, but the county council is

called out as someone who can actually prosecute a claim on behalf of the people, which is precisely what we did and had been doing for three years before the attorney general, on behalf of the people she represented, chose to resolve the claims for in the manner that she did.

I don't think this is anything the Court needs to be concerned about, future precedential issues. It's a uniquely California claim, and one typically where the attorney general would come in, resolve it for the entire state. You wouldn't have a subsequent action filed by a county after the state has already resolved the claims because I would imagine there would be a full and final release of all claims.

In this case, the attorney general was aware of the fact the county had brought this action.

Now, the attorney general could have, thought it would have been fairly devastating to the client, could have resolved the entire state claim. The attorney general has the right on behalf of the people arguably to do that, but chose here not to, Your Honor.

And so I don't think the Court needs to be concerned about any impact of its decision here because the political entities have worked with each other and are not overlapping on each other but are, in fact,

providing discreet areas that they are litigating their claims in.

THE COURT: I understand that. Thank you.

MR. KIESEL: You're welcome, Your Honor. Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Vale, do you have a brief response?

MR. VALE: Very briefly, Your Honor. The basic principle that is important here is that GlaxoSmithKline bought peace from the people of the State of California pursuant to that judgment with a very limited exception.

And so we bought peace on restitution claims by everybody in the State of California even if they could theoretically exist, claims on behalf of people outside the State of California with a very limited exception, and the exception was for claims where there was to be an order or claims seeking an order of restitution in favor of residents of the county.

So that's what we left ourselves exposed to under this judgment, claims for restitution in favor of persons or entities, residents in the county. Under that agreement, that final judgment, we did not leave ourselves exposed to claims brought by the people of the State of California for restitution in favor of

residents of San Matteo County, San Diego County, Kentucky, Pennsylvania.

So, Your Honor, we ask that you enter an order along the lines that we have suggested in our motion. Thank you for listening to us this morning.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Vale. But, you know, I don't see a big final difference between your two positions except for who paid and where they may be located.

MR. VALE: Well, it's in whose favor any order of restitution can be made.

THE COURT: Well, if the cases filed on behalf of the people --

MR. VALE: Yes.

THE COURT: -- and the people are to be deemed residents of Santa Clara County or an entity in Santa Clara County, then the relief of restitution has to be to those same people, does it not?

MR. VALE: Well, the term "the people" of the State of California, in effect, means the state, so this action is brought in the name of the state. But pursuant to this exclusion, the only claims left that may be asserted or the only relief that can be requested is an order or restitution in favor of residents of the county.

THE COURT: And if it's a pleading or terminology problem that still exists in light of the AG contractual obligation that GSK has, and I believe the AG has, the reality is that it's the people of Santa Clara County under the rubric of the people of California that are left to do this. So it's a question of who is the plaintiff.

MR. VALE: Well, it's very clear who the plaintiff is here. The plaintiff is the County of Santa Clara suing in the name of the people of the State of California. So that much is clear, and as I say --

THE COURT: Well, it was initially. But now that --

MR. VALE: Well --

THE COURT: -- is no longer going forward by agreement.

MR. VALE: Well, the county's own claim Your Honor dismissed, but still under the false advertising law, this claim is being asserted in the name of the people of the State of California, which --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. VALE: -- is --

THE COURT: I know that.

MR. VALE: -- you know, the statute allows

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1 that.
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THE COURT: I know that, but --

MR, VALE: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- Mr. Kiesel is not even arguing that in his brief for today. He's saying residents of Santa Clara County, are you not?

MR. KIESEL: I am, Your Honor. It -- they actually brought it on behalf of the people, but the attorney general limited that to the County of Santa Clara.

THE COURT: And you're willing to abide by that limitation?

MR. KIESEL: Precisely, that's --

THE COURT: So aren't you closer together than you think?

MR. VALE: Well, I don't think so because I think what Mr. Kiesel would say is that in this case, the Court may enter an award of restitution in favor of somebody outside the county, because under the false advertising law, restitution has to be to a person in interest. That's the terminology in Section 17535 of the false advertising law. You can make an order to restore, that's the restitution part of it, to restore to a person in interest.

So the question here is -- the judgment, in

effect, says that a person in interest must be a resident of the county. You can't make an order of restitution sort of in the air. It has to be to a person in interest, and per the final judgment, a person in interest must be a resident of the county. That's how it fits together.

THE COURT: It sounds like we're debating the definition of a "class."

MR. VALE: Definition --

THE COURT: And I know this isn't a class action, but it sounds as if we're trying to define the class in a way that everyone can move forward on the discovery in a sensible, relevant way.

MR. VALE: Yes, Your Honor, Your Honor is correct. It's not a class action, but it is very important in the sense that, as I say, the false advertising law permits an order for restitution only in favor of a person in interest, and we say that person in interest must be a resident of the county, so that would necessarily exclude patients that live in San Matteo County, but it also excludes Humana or United Health or Cigna or Aetna or somebody else that --

THE COURT: But it shouldn't exclude a resident of Santa Clara County who had their script

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    filled on location --
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              MR. VALE: No, no --
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              THE COURT: -- in San Francisco.
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              MR. VALE: -- we're not saying that.
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              THE COURT: Where they purchase it, right?
              MR. VALE: If the resident of Santa Clara
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    County happened to be insured by Humana, we're not
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8
    saying that that patient's co-pay, whatever they paid,
    is not recoverable because that patient is a person in
9
    interest from whom money arguably has been taken by a
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11
    violation of the act.
              So if they paid $100 for the prescription,
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    whatever, then they would be a person in interest in
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    whose favor restitution could be ordered.
              THE COURT: And on that I know there is no
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                   So where does the next --
16
    disagreement.
              MR. VALE: Well, the disagreement --
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              THE COURT: -- step --
              MR. VALE: -- is like --
19
              THE COURT: -- lead.
20
              MR. VALE: -- if the prescription costs $300
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    and the resident of the county paid $100, but Humana
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    paid 200, well, Humana is not covered by this because
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    you cannot have an order of restitution in favor of
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    Humana here because they're not a resident of the
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So county residents are persons in interest
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    from whom, according to the County's theory, money has
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    been acquired by means of a violation of the act.
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              THE COURT: As opposed to the $300
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    prescription being the amount of sought restitution and
5
    Humana can assert its lien against its insured?
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              MR. VALE: Well, no, Your Honor, under the
7
8
    false advertising law the patient may recover the money
    that the patient has put out, in my example, $100.
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              THE COURT: Then why are we even talking
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    about insurance coverage? Why does it matter if it's
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              MR. VALE: Well, if
    only --
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              THE COURT: -- when the patient paid out of
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    pocket?
              MR. VALE: All right. Let me give you --
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              THE COURT: Which I'm not sure it is, but
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    I'll give you --
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              MR. VALE: Let me give Your Honor an example.
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              THE COURT: -- that for now.
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              MR. VALE:
                         If the patient was insured by the
20
    Santa Clara family health plan, which is a Santa
21
    Clara-based payor, and let's just say the prescription
22
    dosts 300 --
23
              THE COURT: And a resident of Santa Clara
24
    County, so you can't compare that to the Humana
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situation.
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MR. VALE: Well, I just want to be -- I'm going to make the -- so the prescription costs \$300. Let's say the patient pays \$100 and the Santa Clara Valley health plan pays 200. They are both, under the county's theory of violations of the false advertising law, a person in interest from whom money has been taken. So the order of restitution could be \$100 to the patient and \$200 to the Santa Clara family health plan.

If the insurer were say Humana -THE COURT: Or Blue Cross Blue Shield.

MR. VALE: -- under the same, or Blue Cross or anybody else outside the county, well, the patient could get the \$100 because that is money that the patient has lost, but the patient hasn't lost the \$200 that was paid by the insurer. So that's where the difference is. And the order of restitution, if any, has to be in favor of somebody from whom money has been taken. In this case, it's the patient, \$100, but they haven't lost the 200 that was paid by somebody from out of state.

THE COURT: Okay. So to test your theory I'm going to ask Mr. Kiesel, do you agree?

MR. KIESEL: That's where we disagree. And

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              THE COURT: Okay.
              MR. KIESEL: I will explain why, but that's
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    exactly the disagreement.
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              THE COURT: We've gotten down to it. Thank
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    you, Mr. Vale.
              MR. VALE: Well, at least I've clarified it,
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8
    but that -- yes, this is important because the language
    of the judgment fits exactly with the false advertising
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    law and this term, a "person in interest," and under
10
    the judgment, that person in interest must be a
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12
    resident of the county.
              THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
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              MR. KIESEL: Your Honor, I appreciate that
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    because I think you narrowed down precisely what the
15
    dispute is, and it's that one single key issue.
16
              The way we're going to determine what the
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    amount in restitution is is simply we'll be able to use
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    IMS data that aggregates all sales done in the County
19
    of Santa Clara. It looks at the doctors who wrote
20
    prescriptions and it looks at the sales that were made
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    and it's going to come up with a number.
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MR. KIESEL: 30 million, 40 million, it's 24 going to be a number. Now, defendant would say well, 25

THE COURT: Right.

wait a minute, that number of \$50 million, that's not really the number.

THE COURT: It has to be reduced.

MR. KIESEL: Right.

THE COURT: I know, the defense position would be that number has to be reduced by the amount that was paid by non-residents.

MR. KIESEL: Correct, so that your co-pay was really four dollars, so before we could ever get this done, we need to know what every single person's co-pay is. We need to know what that individual paid for that product.

But, Your Honor, the judgment itself doesn't go into that detail. And, quite frankly, the benefit conferred upon GSK for sales made in the County of Santa Clara for the benefit of residents is what the residents paid for their prescription of this drug in the county because their doctor wrote the prescription.

THE COURT: Well, then I'm going to need some precedent from the State of California's case law or relevant Ninth Circuit case law that says that the patient paid what its insurance company paid. Actual pay versus the price is two different numbers.

MR. KIESEL: Well, we have something called the collateral source rule in California, and the

collateral source rule is you can't look to insurance to give the wrongdoer the benefit of what the plaintiff incurred damages for.

The collateral source rule essentially does not allow the defendants to get the benefit of the fact that I have insurance. My insurance can never be mentioned in California, and the fact that I had insurance pay benefits is never to be considered when it comes to damages. What is considered and is important is what is the actual amount paid.

THE COURT: But what do you do with the excess? Do you give it to the individual residents even though they are not out-of-pocket?

MR. KIESEL: I would submit this, Your Honor, and, in fact, that's a question that courts struggled with. And the answer is this. If my insurance company paid, hypothetically, \$300 for that prescription and, hypothetically, my co-pay was four dollars so that my out-of-state insurer paid \$296, as an insured, I have a contract with my insurer that if I receive money back for something that they paid a benefit for that I had a third party claim on, I'm obligated under my contract with the insurer, whether it happens or not, to reimburse the insurer.

But the key is this on insurance. The

defendants may not get the benefit of the fact that the plaintiff was or was not insured. And we don't need to go to that level here, Your Honor, because we agree it's for residents of the County of Santa Clara for purchases made in the County of Santa Clara.

And to go to the next level of where was it purchased from is not a part of the equation with respect to restitution, nor is there anything in the judgment that was entered here that suggests, though they may have attempted to do that, that it has to be limited to specifically what the resident paid themselves.

If they wanted to say that, if they wanted to carve that out and say it's what the resident paid him or herself that's to be considered, they could have put that in the language at the final judgment. It's not there.

We agree on everything but the source of the funds used to purchase the drug for which we're entitled to restitution. And I would submit if the Court wants, we could certainly give you further briefing on what your obligations as an insured are to your insurer.

But, GSK should not get the benefit of the fact that someone does or does not have insurance

because they got the benefit of all the dollars from the County of Santa Clara residents, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't need extra briefing on that because we deal with that issue in multiple cases and we know what the obligation is. And there are cases within this MDL asserting that right. And those kinds of cases seem to duplicate what you're trying to do here in getting a larger number in your restitution based on the purchase price.

Even if that's allowed, I am also aware because I can't wear blinders in competing litigation they're going after the same amount of money. So it is a particularly interesting issue right now.

MR. KIESEL: But I'll point out one thing that's really important. These are not bodily injury claims. This is a civil enforcement action by the people of the State of California for individuals who purchased this drug. It may be that not a single one of these patients actually has a claim.

THE COURT: I'm not referring to bodily injury claims that are competing. I'm referring to the competing insurance claims.

MR. KIESEL: The third party payor kind of claims.

THE COURT: That kind, okay?

MR. KIESEL: Understood. Well, I think your Court -- Your Honor, you certainly have a handle on how we have narrowed down this issue. I think the facts are well before you and I think it's appropriate under the circumstances the way the settlement agreement and judgment was entered into here that all of the damages, all of the purchases made by residents of the County of Santa Clara be a part of the damages model for restitution from the defendants here.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. KIESEL: Thank you.

THE COURT: And thank you, counsel. Please come up again, Mr. Vale, because I feel that this oral argument has helped this Court clarify a few of its questions.

MR. VALE: Your Honor, I certainly don't -Your Honor has given us a lot of time. I just wanted
to let Your Honor know that we have addressed in our
briefs the basis for restitution, and I think we quote
a case here from the California Court of Appeals where
we say "The object of restitution is to restore the
status quo by returning to the plaintiff funds in which
he or she has an ownership interest."

So to get restitution, that's coming from the word "restore" that I referred, it has to be to a

person in interest, and that means somebody that had an ownership interest.

So in my example, the patient had an interest and a \$100 co-pay, but the patient didn't have an interest, an ownership interest in the \$200 that the insurer paid. So we addressed that.

THE COURT: And that also produces another set of complications because if you limit discovery to the actual amount paid by an individual resident consumer or patient, and then the insurance company contract demands payment of its lien, there's no way that that's equitable because they paid much more than what would be received by the resident. So it's first a discovery case management problem, and secondly, it's a real practical difficulty in assessing what is fair restitution.

MR. VALE: Yes. Just again to be really clear about this, Your Honor, I mean what we're talking about here is claims under one California statute, the false advertising law, brought by the people of California seeking an order for restitution.

So the fact that an out-of-state insurer may not be entitled to restitution doesn't say anything about whether that out-of-state insurer has a claim based on some other law or some other theory, and Your

this sort of equitable action under the false

So I think it's important to think here in

advertising law that the California courts have defined

fairly clearly a limited type of person that can get

Honor has referred to that.

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    restitution, and it's a person in interest, and that
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    means somebody that had an ownership interest in the
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    money that is to be restored.
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              THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you very much,
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    counsel.
              Let's see if your clients need any questions.
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              MR. KIESEL: Any questions from the peanut
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    gallery?
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              SPEAKER 1: No, we're fine here. Thank you.
14
              THE COURT:
                          Thank you very much.
15
              MR. KIESEL: Thank you so much, gang.
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              THE COURT: We're going to take this matter
    under advisement. Would there be additional briefing
17
    requests by either party?
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              MR. KIESEL: None from us, Your Honor.
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              MR. VALE: I think we've covered it, Your
21
    Honor.
              THE COURT:
                          I think you have. Thank you,
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              So we will take this under advisement. And
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    we no longer need the video conference. We still need
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the attorneys who asked to participate by telephone,

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some of whom have not addressed the Court yet.
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    will need to switch gears for a moment. Let's take a
    brief recess.
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               (Recess, 12:43 p.m. to 12:49 p.m.)
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               THE COURT: Counsel, we will go back on the
 6
    record, please.
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               (Pause in proceedings.)
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               THE COURT: I would like to be of some
    assistance to those attorneys who must leave, but until
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    you leave I would like to address as many of you and
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11
    your cases possible. And I think that it is important
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    that we not neglect those of you that came here from
    some distance to address any questions about your case.
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              So before I talk about some other overriding
    general issues, I would like to address any attorney
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    who would like to identify themselves, tell me what
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    case they are attorney of record on and representing,
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    and the status of that matter, and we'll start with
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    you, sir.
19
               (Pause in proceedings.)
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21
              MR. REILLY: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: Good afternoon.
22
              MR. REILLY: My name is Jeff Reilly from
23
    Dupris and Kimbro in Marietta, Georgia. We represent
24
    Hal Crawford and Gene Crawford in their claims against
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107 GlaxoSmithKline. Hal Crawford's claim stems from a 1 stroke he had resulting from taking Avandia, and his 2 wife's claim stems from loss of consortium. 3 We just got pulled onto this case, Judge, and 4 trying to get our head above water, and I'm going to be 5 stopping by the clerk's office to file my -- or get my 6 ECF registration. We'll be filing our entry of 7 appearance shortly thereafter. I just wanted to make 8 the Court aware that we are here today and that we're 9 going to move this process along and get caught up with 10 11 opposing counsel. THE COURT: When was the Crawford case filed? 12 MR. REILLY: It was filed in July of 2013 and 13 transferred here. I believe the exact date, don't 14 quote me on it, is August 8th, 2013. 15 THE COURT: That sounds right. 16 MR. REILLY: And then we got pulled onto the 17 case November 15th I believe of 2013. 18 THE COURT: All right. 19 MR. REILLY: And we've been -- we worked over 20 the holiday in trying to get caught up. 21 THE COURT: Do you know the status of the 22 case in terms of a plaintiff's fact sheet being 23

MR. REILLY: We provided the --

provided --

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THE COURT: -- or anything else?

MR. REILLY: -- plaintiff's -- well, the

plaintiff's face sheet was provided before we got on this case is our understanding, and we haven't heard differently from opposing counsel. We provided the physician certification of Avandia when we got into the case. We coordinated with Mr. Crawford's treating physician and sent that out to opposing counsel.

THE COURT: All right. So things are moving along just as they should be?

MR. REILLY: Yes, we're trying to get it moving along quick, but I believe discovery ends in their case on February 5th, 2013, and we're going to try not to have to extend that.

THE COURT: Good. Is there any question that the defense has concerning this case?

MS. GUSSACK: No, Your Honor. I believe that we do have information on the fact sheet and basic medical records from counsel.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, counsel.

MR. REILLY: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. CORR: Your Honor, before we go on, just as a general matter. I tried to talk to everybody, but there has to be an entry of appearance in some of these

cases, and the ECF is important, and I'm happy to stay and talk to everybody about what to do. I just want to want to make sure everybody knows to do that.

THE COURT: Well, I know you have another appointment --

MR. CORR: Yes.

THE COURT: -- but we can make a blanket statement here that any attorneys that are new to this process need to file their entry of appearance formally with the clerk of the court, which is just downstairs on the second floor, and you must be on ECF notification. So you must be registered to ECF.

And as far as this Court is concerned, you can tell the docketers that you don't have to pro hac vice in if you were already attorney of record. Now, if you're new attorneys, enter your appearance.

But I don't know if there's any problems with -- someone mentioned something about not being allowed to sign up for ECF, but I'm not sure why that is.

MR. CORR: There should be -- it's a simple form and it should be down in the clerk's office, but as I leave I'll actually stop down and I'll talk to Tom Dempsey about that and let him know that attorneys may be coming down. It's a simple form. You should stop in and fill it out.

```
110
 1
               THE COURT: Okay.
 2
              MR. CORR:
                          Okay.
 3
               THE COURT: And then could you please
 4
    identify yourself for the record very quickly?
 5
               MR. PEARCE:
                           Good afternoon, Your Honor.
 6
    name is Russell Pearce and I represent William Rita who
 7
    represents the plaintiff, Flor (ph) Hernandez.
 8
               THE COURT: Hernandez.
 9
              MR. PEARCE:
                           Yes.
10
              THE COURT: Do you know the number of that
11
    case?
12
              MR. PEARCE: Sorry.
13
              THE COURT: If you have it.
14
              MR. PEARCE: No, I believe it's in --
              THE COURT:
                           Is that --
15
16
              MR. PEARCE: -- discovery group E.
17
              THE COURT: -- Flor Hernandez? Okay.
18
              MR. PEARCE: E, yes.
              THE COURT: Now, that was filed back in 2010.
19
              MR. PEARCE: Correct.
20
21
              THE COURT: And who is the pro se? William
    Rita?
22
              MR. PEARCE: He's not pro se. He is the
23
    attorney representing Flor Hernandez.
24
              THE COURT: And you are here for --
25
```

```
111
               MR. PEARCE: On his --
 1
 2
               THE COURT: -- Mr. Rita?
 3
               MR. PEARCE: -- behalf, yes.
               THE COURT:
                           Okay. Do you know the status of
 4
 5
    the discovery in that matter?
 6
               MR. PEARCE:
                            I know that authorizations have
    been provided as recently as December 5th, and
 7
 8
    furthermore, depositions have not been held of the
    plaintiff.
10
               THE COURT: All right. Is there anything
11
    that GSK requires in the Hernandez case that needs to
    be addressed?
12
13
              MS. GUSSACK:
                             No, Your Honor, I think that
14
    finally receiving authorizations last night will allow
    us to immediately initiate this getting records and
15
    taking depositions.
16
                          Thank you. Mr. Pearce, are you
17
              THE COURT:
    helping to facilitate that?
18
              MR. PEARCE: Yes, Your Honor.
19
20
              THE COURT:
                          Is your appearance in this matter
    the responsible act that has provided those records?
21
              MR. PEARCE: Well, I know that I am appearing
22
    today per diem for Mr. Rita.
23
              THE COURT: Well, you can see the kind of
24
```

expectations that this Court has --

```
112
              MR. PEARCE: Yes.
 1
              THE COURT: -- and the MDL orders command.
 2
 3
    And I appreciate your involvement.
              MR. PEARCE: Okay.
 4
 5
              THE COURT: Thank you.
              MR. PEARCE: Thank you very much.
 6
               (Pause in proceedings.)
 7
8
              MR. ENRIGHT: Good morning, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: Good morning.
9
              MR. ENRIGHT:
                             Thomas Enright of Parrillo,
10
    Weiss & O'Halloran in Chicago. I represent Donald
11
    Mergener (ph). That case number originally was L --
12
    I'm sorry, 11-CV-1417.
13
              THE COURT: Yes, I have it.
14
              MR. ENRIGHT:
                            It's a group C case. We have
15
    done -- we've done the deposition of the plaintiff and
16
    his wife. We've done half of the deposition of his
17
    treating cardiologist. That was actually supposed to
18
    qo this morning, the second half. And there wasn't --
19
    and that would have been in Florida, which would have
20
    been preferable I guess. And we were also going to
21
    take his primary care physician yesterday, but those --
22
              THE COURT: Now, you said that's group C.
23
    have --
24
```

It was group --

MR. ENRIGHT:

```
113
 1
              THE COURT: -- it on a document here that
 2
    says it's group E.
 3
              MR. ENRIGHT:
                             I don't -- unless it was --
 4
              THE COURT: I --
 5
              MR. ENRIGHT: -- changed. I don't think --
6
              MR. KIESEL: I think C became E, Your Honor.
7
    MR. ENRIGHT: C became E? Oh, okay.
8
              THE COURT: Okay.
9
              MR. ENRIGHT:
                            Okay.
10
              THE COURT: That -- I just like to --
11
              MR. ENRIGHT: Sure.
12
              THE COURT: -- all of us to be on the same
13
    page.
14
              MR. ENRIGHT: And I think we've given GSK
    everything that they've needed so far to proceed with
15
16
    the deposition so --
              THE COURT: And you are proceeding in the
17
18
    middle of depositions.
              MR. ENRIGHT: We are in the middle of
19
    depositions.
20
              THE COURT: Anything more that's needed here?
21
              MS. GUSSACK: No, Your Honor, I think that's
22
    an accurate report.
23
              THE COURT:
                          Thank you.
24
                            Thank you, Your Honor.
              MR. ENRIGHT:
25
```

25

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THE COURT: And, you know, after you do this
1
    identification on the record, you are free to be
2
    excused.
              Enter your appearance and safe travels.
3
               (Pause in proceedings.)
4
5
              MR. DAMERON: Hi, good afternoon, Your Honor.
    Matthew Dameron from Stevie, Segal, Hanson in Kansas
6
    City, Missouri. We are counsel for Stacy Loreno in
7
    Loreno versus GSK, it's case number 12-3683. This is a
8
    consumer class action on behalf of Missouri residents,
9
    and it is referenced in paragraph 5C of the joint
10
    report and agenda.
11
              THE COURT: Yes.
12
              MR. DAMERON: We believe that that paragraph
13
    accurately represents the status of our case.
14
              THE COURT: Okay.
15
              MR. KIESEL: Your Honor, if you don't mind, I
16
    think what we want to do is have the individual lawyers
17
    who had cases come up first before we do the class
18
    action, if that would be okay.
19
              THE COURT: I would prefer that.
20
              MR. DAMERON: Okay, sorry, Your Honor.
21
              THE COURT: I do want you to hang in a little
22
    bit longer.
23
              MR. DAMERON:
                            Sure, of course.
24
```

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

```
MR. DAMERON: Thank you, Your Honor.
 1
              MR, KIESEL:
                            Thank you.
2
3
               (Pause in proceedings.)
                          Good morning, Your Honor.
              MR. KONAN:
4
              THE COURT: Good morning.
5
              MR. KONAN: Reyanne Konan from the Reyanne
6
    Konan Law Office, I represent Victor Bautista (ph),
7
    case numbers 13-CIV-5384.
8
              THE COURT: Yes.
9
              MR. KONAN: I submitted my fact sheet and
10
    there was some deficiency. I think I was -- I'm
11
    speaking right now with Nicole Aiken, Esquire, from
12
    GlaxoSmithKline, so she submitted everything I think
13
    December 4th, and I'm waiting for them to give me their
14
    okay to see if it's fine. I also submitted my
15
    physician certification, so that's where this case
16
    stands at this point.
17
              THE COURT: And that means that you're
18
    complying with the rules and the pretrial orders.
19
              MR. KONAN: Yes, Your Honor.
20
              THE COURT: And are you entered as your
21
    appearance?
22
              MR. KONAN: Not yet, Your Honor.
                                                 I will do
23
    it as of now on the second floor.
24
              THE COURT: I appreciate that.
25
```

```
116
              MR. KONAN: Thank you.
 1
              THE COURT: Does GSK have any other
 2
 3
    requirements?
              MS. GUSSACK: No, Your Honor.
 4
 5
              THE COURT: All right. So your case will
    move along as it should. Thank you.
 6
              MR. KONAN: Thank you. Have a good day, Your
7
8
    Honor.
              THE COURT: You, too.
9
               (Pause in proceedings.)
10
              MR. LEVITT: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
11
              THE COURT: Good afternoon.
12
              MR. LEVITT: My name is Mark Levitt. I'm
13
    here for the co-counsel with the Friday firm, Friday
14
    and Cox in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. We have one --
15
16
    well, two plaintiffs, Linda and John Shatz (ph).
    That's docket number 12-CV-148, Shatz versus
17
    GlaxoSmithKline. This is a bone case, osteoporosis
18
    case, and we have taken depositions and the case is
19
    moving forward. There are no issues that I know of.
20
              THE COURT: All right. And all of your
21
    documents, your client's documentation, have been
22
    provided?
23
              MR. LEVITT: Yes, Your Honor.
24
              THE COURT: Thank you. Is there anything
25
```

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else that GSK would add at this point?
 1
 2
              MS. GUSSACK: No, Your Honor.
               THE COURT: Thank you very much.
 3
              MR. LEVITT:
                            Thank you, Your Honor.
 4
 5
              THE COURT: Counsel?
              MR. JOHNSON: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
 6
    name is Frank Johnson. I'm pro se. My case number is
 7
8
    2:10-CV-02125. I have presently received a letter from
    Pepper Hamilton specifically stating that I needed to
9
    supply PTO-155 for them because they did not have a
10
    physician certification.
11
              However, I have a question because I have a
12
    physician certification that was supplied with my other
13
    forms on January 13th, 2011, and I wanted to know if
14
    they're referring to the same one or if there's a
15
    question --
16
              THE COURT: Perhaps counsel can review that
17
    document and see if it is the same, if there's --
18
              MR. HAMILTON: Yes, Your Honor.
19
              THE COURT: -- been a question.
20
              MR. HAMILTON: Let me clarify. Mr. Johnson
21
    recently informed us that he's now alleging that he
22
    suffered an MI, a myocardial infarction. Because of
23
    that he now qualifies under the Lone Pine two, and so
24
    we've requested that report, as opposed to the PTO-121,
25
```

```
118
    Lone Pine one, he's referring to.
 †
               THE COURT: All right. That would be
 2
 3
    confusing to a pro se. Are you trained in the law,
    sir?
 4
 5
               MR. JOHNSON: No, I am not, Your Honor.
 6
               THE COURT: Is it possible that you could
 7
    obtain counsel and retain them to represent you in this
 8
    matter?
              MR. JOHNSON: I'm working on it.
 9
                                                 I told him
    that I did reserve the right -- we did depositions
10
    midway through last month, and I'm working on someone
11
12
    picking up this case.
13
              THE COURT: All right.
14
              MR. JOHNSON: But I'm following up on it on
    my own right now.
15
16
              THE COURT: So do you understand why GSK
    asked for a new --
17
              MR. JOHNSON:
                             That's exactly the
18
    clarification --
19
              THE COURT: -- certification?
20
              MR. JOHNSON: -- that I was asking for --
21
              THE COURT: Good.
22
              MR. JOHNSON: -- that they were asking for
23
    one in addition to this. But you're saying that you do
24
    have this, correct?
25
```

```
119
               THE COURT: Well, he has to see that.
 1
 2
               MR. JOHNSON:
                             Okay.
 3
               THE COURT: What I think counsel just said is
 4
    that they had the first one.
 5
               MR. JOHNSON: Okay.
 6
               THE COURT: But then your claim of injury
    changed or added MI --
 7
8
               MR. JOHNSON: Understood.
9
               THE COURT: -- myocardial infarction, and
10
    that means you need to support that.
11
               MR. JOHNSON: Additional one because it
    wasn't supported in the previous certification.
12
13
               THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Johnson.
14
              MR. JOHNSON: That's all I wanted.
15
               THE COURT: Thank you, sir. And that's all
    that's needed right now, counsel?
16
17
              MS. GUSSACK: Yes, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: Very good. And back to the class
18
    action.
19
               (Pause in proceedings.)
20
              THE COURT: Traci Rezvani, I recognize you.
21
    I think counsel wanted to identify himself --
22
              MS. REZVANI: Yes.
23
              THE COURT: -- for the record. I don't think
24
    we were arguing any matter --
25
```

MS. REZVANI: No, and I think that the status report essentially states out everything Your Honor knows about these cases, and Mr. Dameron can add on to Marino if Your Honor has any questions.

I just wanted to let Your Honor know that in

I just wanted to let Your Honor know that in speaking with Mr. Vale during the break, on the third party payor 1292 motion, we've asked and GSK has agreed for an additional one-week extension, so we'd like to make a verbal motion on that. And we'll submit the requisite order for Your Honor's consideration.

THE COURT: All right. I would be happy to grant another week's extension on that.

MS. REZVANI: All right, thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. GUSSACK: Your Honor, I know there are counsel on the phone. I didn't know if there were any counsel for individual plaintiffs before you turned back to the --

THE COURT: Thank you. Is there anyone on the telephone that represents an individual case or cases that would like to address the Court at this time? This is the Judge speaking. Is there anybody left on the telephone? We know you're --

MR. TRAWICK: (Inaudible). This is David
Trawick representing (inaudible) Huggins. We don't

```
121
 1
    have anything to add. Thank you.
 2
               THE COURT: And what case is that again? Mr.
 3
    Huggins' case? All right.
 4
               MR. TRAWICK: That's correct.
 5
               THE COURT: And that's in -- I see it's filed
    in 2012. Anything that the defense is still requiring
 6
 7
    in that matter?
 8
               (Pause in proceedings.)
 9
               MR. TRAWICK: No, Your Honor. And I know --
10
    I think -- I believe, anyway, I saw a status report on
11
    Huggins.
              Did I not?
12
               MS. GUSSACK: Yes, Your Honor.
               THE COURT: Yes.
13
                                 Thank you. Thank you,
    counsel.
14
15
              MR. TRAWICK: Thank you, Your Honor.
16
               THE COURT: You may remain on the line, but
17
    if you have other things to do, you may also exit.
    Okay?
18
19
              MR. TRAWICK: Okay. Thank you very much,
20
    Your Honor, and thank you for your courtesy in
21
    permitting us to attend by phone as well.
              THE COURT: You're welcome. Is there anyone
22
    else on the telephone?
23
              MR. BRUEHL: Your Honor, this is Curtis
24
    Bruehl.
             I have the Lawson Bore (ph) case, which is
25
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item six on the agenda. I don't know if you're going
 1
 2
    to get to that or you would like to discuss it now.
 3
               THE COURT: We will be getting to that as an
    agenda item.
 4
 5
               MR. BRUEHL: Okay.
 6
               THE COURT: Is there another individual case
 7
    that is not listed as an agenda item?
 8
               MR. BRUEHL: Your Honor, I have four other
 9
    cases and there are no special issues with those.
10
               THE COURT: Okay.
11
               (Pause in proceedings.)
               MR. McCORMICK: Your Honor, Brian McCormick
12
13
    from the Schell firm here in Philadelphia.
                                                 Lawrence
14
    Jones was here and had to leave to catch a plane, but
    he asked me -- he actually just called and asked me to
15
16
    give you a report on his case and find out if anything
17
    from GSK was needed, but he wanted to let you know he
    had been here this morning and had to run. He's a
18
    Kentucky lawyer.
19
20
              THE COURT: Is that the Richard Plap --
              MR. McCORMICK: His case is -- Richard
21
    Plaphert (ph) --
22
              THE COURT: -- Plaphert case?
23
24
              MR. McCORMICK: -- case, 114931.
              THE COURT: Yes.
25
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MR. McCORMICK: So he just wanted to give you
 1
    notification that he was here and if you needed
 2
    anything, GSK can let me know and I'll let him know.
 3
               THE COURT: And does GSK have any
 4
 5
    requirements in that case?
               MR. McCORMICK: I believe depositions have
 6
    been taken and records have been produced.
 7
8
              MS. GUSSACK: Additional depositions are
    being taken, Your Honor. I think we've addressed the
9
    problems that had existed.
10
               THE COURT:
11
                           Thank you.
              MR. McCORMICK:
                               Thank you.
12
               THE COURT:
                           Thank you, Mr. McCormick.
13
14
    going to welcome you back up here to the podium,
    counsel.
15
               (Pause in proceedings.)
16
              MR. DAMERON: Good afternoon again, Your
17
            Matthew Dameron from Stevie, Segal, Hanson in
18
    Kansas City on behalf of Stacy Loreno case, 12:3683.
19
    And, again, we believe that the -- we filed our amended
20
    complaint in November pursuant to the parties'
21
    stipulation. We anticipate a motion to dismiss from
22
    GSK and we will respond accordingly.
23
              THE COURT: Yes, that date comes by next week
24
```

unless extended. And this is a similar action to prior

25

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consumer class actions, correct?
 1
               MR. DAMERON: Correct, it's a one count class
 2
 3
    action filed under the Missouri Merchandising Practices
    Act, Your Honor.
 4
 5
               THE COURT: Okay.
                                  Thank you, counsel.
               MR. DAMERON:
                             Thank you.
 6
 7
               THE COURT: Anything else that GSK would like
    to add?
 8
 9
               MS. GUSSACK: No, Your Honor, except why
    counsel sounds like he should be on the radio instead
10
    of in this courtroom.
11
12
               MR. DAMERON: It's my cold voice, that's all,
    Your Honor.
13
14
               THE COURT: Very well. I'm sorry for that,
    but it sounds great.
15
16
              MR. DAMERON: No worries.
                                          Thank you.
               THE COURT: All right. Shall we get back to
17
    the agenda items and see if we can get through these?
18
               (Pause in proceedings.)
19
               THE COURT: Well, we understand that there is
20
    an extension agreed to in the third party payor cases
21
    on GSK's motion to amend the orders to certify for an
22
    interrogatory appeal. Is the briefing going to be
23
    completed on that issue quickly?
24
              MS. REZVANI: The idea --
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```
THE COURT: That's the one-week extension?
 1
 2
               MS. REZVANI: Correct. Right now, the
 3
    opposition is due December 13th with a one-week
    extension, and we're looking at the 20th.
 4
    that's not falling on a weekend. I don't think it is.
 5
 6
               THE COURT: No, it's --
 7
               MS. REZVANI: So --
 8
               THE COURT: -- a Friday.
 9
               MS. REZVANI: Okay. So we'll have an
    opposition on the 20th, and I believe GSK had wanted a
10
    reply brief, so I'm going to leave that to Tony.
11
12
              MS. GUSSACK: Your Honor, a brief reply may
    be warranted, in which case we would try to have it by,
13
    you know, early January so that we could have all of
14
    the briefing tied up for your consideration.
15
              THE COURT: That would be good considering
16
    the holidays --
17
              MS. GUSSACK: Right.
18
19
              THE COURT: -- and the intervening days that
20
    are missed by all of us.
21
              MS. GUSSACK: And I think as a result, Your
    Honor, I don't think -- I don't know whether we've
22
    discussed this with counsel. Forgive me if I'm
23
    repeating, but I think it would make sense to stay the
24
```

requirement to answer any of the complaints until after

```
the court has had an opportunity to address the 1292.
 1
               MS. REZVANI: Yes, we discussed it before the
 2
    hearing and we agree with that.
 3
               THE COURT: All right. Could you propose a
 4
    stipulated order, please, to that effect?
 5
 6
              MS. REZVANI: Absolutely.
 7
               THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
 8
              MS. REZVANI: And we'll work with GSK to make
    sure that the schedule for the reply doesn't hit the
 9
    holidays, so we're --
10
11
              THE COURT: Well, I would suggest January 6
    because that's when I'll be back to read it.
12
13
              MS. REZVANI: Very good.
14
              MS. GUSSACK: Was it last year, Your Honor,
    that you had occasion to join us earlier in January
15
    for -- I can't -- it seems like --
16
              THE COURT: No, it was years --
17
              MS. GUSSACK: It's blurred.
18
              THE COURT: -- before. I have been known to
19
    work on a holiday. It wasn't January 1st, but January
20
    2nd, my anniversary, that I came in to meet with
21
    counsel and Mr. Juno and my law clerk. So, yes, that's
22
    happening, but not this year.
23
              Okay. Thank you. All right. We've already
24
    dealt -- I'm in Roman numeral V. I think we're done
25
```

with all of those and we're onto Roman Numeral VI, the Loston (ph) Bork, Jr. versus GSK case, and I think there was reference to an upcoming schedule for motions in that matter. Right?

MS. GUSSACK: Yes, Your Honor, and I believe Mr. Bruehl is on the phone with respect to the <u>Bork</u> case. We discussed earlier this morning, and I think we will be reaching out to Mr. Bruehl directly to talk about whether he wants to seek additional time to supplement his expert reports or whether we will stick to the original schedule.

It is our intention to advance a request for Daubert hearings on this sudden cardiac death injury case. And I think you had asked that we confer with the special master on a schedule that makes sense.

THE COURT: I have asked and I do confirm that request. Mr. Bruehl, is it? Are you on the phone still?

MR. BRUEHL: Yes, ma'am. Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Did you want to ask the Court of anything of concern or are you on track and did you hear us earlier when I referred future discussions on a schedule to Master Merenstein? Were you able to hear that?

MR. BRUEHL: Your Honor, unfortunately, I've

been unable to really hear what counsel has said or what you just said. I think we're having some technical difficulties. But I'm happy to defer to Mr. Kiesel as far as what the coordination of Daubert schedule needs to be, but I don't have any questions. If there's a specific question that I can answer, I'm happy to do so.

THE COURT: All right. The discussion earlier, this is the Judge, surrounded the need to deal with the issue of the readjudication of the record study, and giving plaintiffs an opportunity to have their expert report supplemented and in what time frame if they chose.

We haven't ruled on the exact parameters, but we think that that would be fair. It is very possible, if not probable, that the defense here will be seeking additional Daubert proceedings, whether they be labeled general or specific to your case.

So we are in the process of reorganizing the plaintiffs' ability, that is the plaintiff steering committee ability, to respond on a general level to general Daubert inquiries. That is a problematic one for the MDL, but we have to deal with it.

But as far as individual cases are concerned, we are happy to grant each and every individual

plaintiff an opportunity to supplement their expert report. Does that help you understand what we had talked about?

MR. BRUEHL: Yes, Your Honor, from what I can hear, I think I have an understanding. I guess my only issue would be as far as in the <u>Bork</u> case specifically, our specific causation expert is Dr. Skorsky (ph), who is also a general liability expert, and his deposition is coming up.

And to the extent that he needs to be prepared to be deposed upon the generic liability aspect of it and the readjudication of the record study, I think that needs to be done in a coordinated fashion along with -- along track with what the initial discussion this morning was in reference to.

THE COURT: Well, that is a logical question. What happens to the scheduled deposition if we're in the throes of deciding how to deal with in a fair way to both sides the additional information that is now available?

I would suggest that along with Master

Merenstein's charge here to work out a schedule, that
those depositions be included in them, because I think
it is a very valid question to be asking right this
moment. It doesn't seem to me that you could go

```
forward on the deposition without redoing it.
 1
              So perhaps counsel will all agree to briefly
2
    postpone that until at least there's a decision made as
3
    to whether or not there will be a plaintiffs'
4
    supplemental expert report. I'm getting nods here from
5
    GSK.
6
              MS. GUSSACK: Yes, Your Honor.
7
              THE COURT: Yes? Okay. So I hope you can
8
    hear that, Mr. Bruehl, but maybe offline you can
9
    discuss this with Mr. Merenstein and GSK. All right?
10
              MR. BRUEHL: All right, Your Honor.
11
    you.
12
              THE COURT: Thank you. Is there anything
13
    else you needed to have addressed, sir?
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              MR. BRUEHL: No, ma'am, unless there is
15
    something that the Court needs from me.
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              THE COURT: No, thank you, sir.
17
              MR. BRUEHL: Thank you.
18
              THE COURT: All right. Now, I think we did
19
    deal with the remaining discovery group cases initially
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    in your status report, Ms. Gussack?
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              MS. GUSSACK: Yes, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: And so we've covered 6B, and the
23
    request for extension of discovery in certain cases,
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and GSK is requesting a 60-day extension. And that's

for general purposes, is it not?

MS. GUSSACK: For fact discovery that has been difficult to obtain, yes.

THE COURT: Well, I would rather extend your discovery period, case-specific discovery than have you forced into filing multiple motions to dismiss, which then causes further delay. So I'll grant that extension if you would propose an order.

MS. GUSSACK: Thank you, Your Honor.

(Pause in proceedings.)

THE COURT: And I know that Mr. Merenstein already agrees with that extension because he said so in this report, status report.

All right. Is there any other matter other than one that we glossed over earlier concerning the rule to show cause?

MS. GUSSACK: I think that's the remaining issue, Your Honor, the rule to show cause in the --

THE COURT: Statute of limitations issues.

MS. GUSSACK: -- on the statute of limitations, correct. And while we just received plaintiffs' brief and opposition and haven't had an opportunity to respond, and I certainly don't intend to make this an occasion for oral argument. I think the question that was raised was why, you know, and I think

you heard from plaintiff's counsel that there was opposition because this was, you know, the procedure is burden shifting.

I just want to make clear that the complaints that we received that are the subject of this order to show cause do not identify the injury, the date of Avandia use, the date of the alleged injury.

And in light of the fact that they were filed five years after this Court has already said in its opinion that one reasonably should have been on notice as of 2007, it seemed to us an efficient and expedient way for this MDL Court to say it's time for the plaintiffs to bear the burden of demonstrating that by providing that information and a showing that they are not barred by the statute. And if they can make that showing, obviously it's our burden to challenge that. But it is the extraordinary circumstances here of these very, very late filings in the absence of any information that would suggest that they shouldn't, on their face, be presumed to be time barred.

THE COURT: You know, I would think that this is an appropriate request at various times on a case management level, and certainly if you did receive a complaint that indicated usage and dates of usage, you would then have enough information to ask the next

question. But a plaintiff's fact sheet at a minimum has to show that.

MS. GUSSACK: Yes.

THE COURT: As I recall the plaintiff's fact sheet. So is the problem partially resolved if the feet are held to the fire of these late filing plaintiffs to give you a fact sheet?

MS. GUSSACK: Your Honor, I think if the fact sheets were being provided in a timely manner in which we could evaluate that, I don't think we would be asking for the order to show cause.

But at this point, where Your Honor can see that six to nine months of wrangling in order to get basic information, which is at an enormous cost to the defendant, is really simply unfair.

Now, just looking at filings that are five years after what was a seminal event and that this Court has concluded at least in several jurisdictions should have been sufficient to put any plaintiff on notice, it seems unreasonable to require GSK to engage in the six to nine-month battle to get fact sheets and basic information in order to test the simple concept of whether the cases should be barred.

And in order for this Court not to become the dumping ground of all stray filings these many years

later, we are seeking innovative ways to assure prompt attention to this issue.

THE COURT: I saw that as an effort to assist the MDL in managing the new cases, the influx of new cases. I also know that many of -- well, I think all of your motions for an order to show cause are relative to cases that are subject to a motion to remand decision.

MS. GUSSACK: No, these are the excluded cases.

THE COURT: No?

MS. GUSSACK: The order to show cause is as to the Illinois cases, in which remand was rejected by --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. GUSSACK: -- the transferor court, and that's why we seek it. And, of course, I think GSK has some significant concern that the plaintiff's failure to scrutinize these cases before filing has been a perennial problem.

But to compound that problem at this late date, these many years later, without any evidence of when the injury occurred, makes the cases suspect. And we're looking for the most cost effective way consistent with the Court's rules and procedures.

And Judge Weinstein, in an MDL facing similar circumstances, entered the kind of order that we are seeking here I think in an effort to deal with a very similar practical problem.

THE COURT: The cases that we discussed earlier with Ms. Beasely -- on those cases out of Illinois that are not subject to remand because that was denied --

MS. GUSSACK: Right.

THE COURT: -- there, didn't we reach a partial agreement?

MS. GUSSACK: Yes, those are the ones where she is working to provide Lone Pine certifications.

THE COURT: So she's pass -- these are not those cases because --

MS. GUSSACK: This is the same -- this is the same category of cases. And so what we will have -- sorry, I mean we're really trying to short circuit what is -- if we had nothing more than dates of injury and dates of use, even before we have to wait 60, 90 days in order to get the Lone Pine certifications, we would have a pretty good idea whether we were saying 50 percent of these are barred by the statute, 75 percent of them, so we would know what we were dealing with. But these are the same cases I think that the Court

provided counsel 60 days to provide Lone Pine certifications.

THE COURT: So the motion for an order to show cause couldn't shorten that time period? That would be in favor since --

MS. GUSSACK: Well, not against the back drop of what occurred this morning.

THE COURT: So perhaps this is premature. We can hold it until -- we just agreed 30 and 60 days, didn't we?

(Pause in proceedings.)

MS. GUSSACK: I think, Your Honor, the murmuring amongst counsel is the simple -- the Lone Pine certification obviously requires medical certification and medical records and the like. This is a prima facia showing of date of injury and date of use so that in an even earlier time the ability to evaluate whether the case is barred.

THE COURT: Which to me comes with the initial filing of the plaintiffs' fact sheet, that's what it comes with because that's how you identify who you're dealing with in what category.

MS. GUSSACK: Typically, you would expect to see it in the complaint.

THE COURT: Well, in these mass filed

complaints, I don't think that happens.

MS. GUSSACK: That's -- that has been our experience.

THE COURT: So let me think about how to time that. I do want to know myself what kind of cases and how many cases we have to deal with.

MS. GUSSACK: Well, and I appreciate, Your Honor, at least as to the agreement that was reached, and I certainly don't want to put Ms. Beasely in a position where she asked for the 60 days and the Court gave it, but I think this is an issue that we are going to be extremely vigilant about raising with respect to the 3,000 other cases here, which is why are we being forced to invest resources against a batch of cases that may not, on their face, even withstand the most mild scrutiny as to their timeliness, even before we get to basic fact sheets and medical records and the like.

THE COURT: I understand the request, I do.

I will take that matter under advisement and figure out how to fairly do this in an expeditious way that doesn't exactly turn the burden of proof on its head, and I don't think that's what you intended. I look upon this not as a legal issue, but one of case management.

MS. GUSSACK: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So I think that gives me the right to impose here. Is there anything else we should be addressing. Mr. Merenstein?

MR. MERENSTEIN: I don't want to detain everyone, Your Honor. I would just note, as I think you did a few hours ago, that in the Santa Clara case that --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MERENSTEIN: -- I just recently a few days ago submitted an R and R with an agreement upon case management order --

THE COURT: Your 23rd R and R.

MR. MERENSTEIN: Yes. And it's a very simple CMO. I commend the parties for working cooperatively to come to an agreement on this. It, essentially, sets forth the conclusion of fact discovery in the Santa Clara case over the next three and a half, four months, and then the scheduling of expert discovery.

THE COURT: And I imagine that this stipulated and very reasonable case management order in that case would go even more smoothly if the Court could efficiently and expeditiously enter a ruling on the scope of the discovery as it relates to the ruling before us.

THE COURT: Happy holidays.

ALL: Same to you, Your Honor.

COUNSEL: I would actually say it would be essential to prepare the expert reports that are scheduled for April 1st that that happens, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So we will. We will address that. And I see no reason why we shouldn't adopt and impose this case management order number one to guide the parties in their ongoing progression of discovery.

COUNSEL: I agree. And my thanks to the special master because this came down to one single word and the special master got that resolved, so I thank all of the parties.

THE COURT: Well, he is known to do the impossible. Thank you. Is there anything else to address? All right. I think it's time. The clock says 1:30. We've been at this for hours with a few minor breaks.

I've enjoyed today. I always enjoy seeing counsel and having the opportunity to participate together in what is a long struggle. But I see accomplishment, and I thank you all.

MR. KIESEL: Thank you, Your Honor.

MS. GUSSACK: Thank you.

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(Recording was turned off from 1:26:12 to
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    1:26:17)
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              THE COURT: And what case are you here on?
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              MR. SUTTER: It's Bauerman (ph) case.
4
    an illegal (inaudible) case arising under state law
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    from Arkansas. It's sort of a stepchild of this
6
    proceeding, but I've been here and I just wanted to --
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    if I missed the call, your call on my case, I'm sorry.
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              THE COURT: Well, I think our callers in have
9
    difficulty hearing us. And what would you like to
10
    report to us, counsel?
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              MR. SUTTER: Yes, ma'am. There is a motion
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    to dismiss my complaint for failure to stay the claim
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    and that issue has been certified out of another MDL
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    court, the Western District of Louisiana, the Arkansas
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    Supreme Court, and it's pending acceptance by the
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    Arkansas Supreme Court this week actually. And the
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    Arkansas Supreme Courts -- the complaints are virtually
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    identical, and the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision on
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    this issue will likely decide the legal issues for this
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            So that's all I had to say, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Yes, and I believe you gave us a
22
    status report on that?
23
              MR. SUTTER: Yes, ma'am, I did.
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THE COURT: Yes, and I have read that.

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would there be anything that the defendant would like
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    to add to that report?
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              MS. GUSSACK: Well, Your Honor, I'm a little
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    confused. The plaintiff has admitted that his claim is
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    moot here. We have a motion to dismiss in light of our
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    resolution, both with the State of Arkansas, but
6
    because he has acknowledged that it's moot, I'm not
7
    sure what counsel is asserting here, but we don't think
8
    that there's a live viable cause of action.
9
              THE COURT: Would you explain the mootness
10
    issue, Ms. Gussack? I don't know where he's admitted
11
    it's moot.
12
              MS. GUSSACK: Perhaps counsel I think is
13
    address the fact that he's now raising his issues in
14
    another court.
15
              THE COURT: The Arkansas Supreme Court?
16
              MS. GUSSACK: Yes.
17
              THE COURT: Okay. I am a little confused
18
    about this. The plaintiff, Mr. Bauerman, has sued
19
    Tecada Pharmaceuticals in Arkansas, and I think
20
    that's --
21
              MR. SUTTER: Yes, Ma'am.
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              THE COURT: -- what's before the court there,
23
    right?
24
              MR. SUTTER: Yes, ma'am.
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THE COURT: And that is Actos? Are you involved in Mr. Bauerman's case in Actos?

MR. SUTTER: Yes, yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: The Actos MDL. But --

MR. SUTTER: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: But how does that make this case moot in the Avandia MDL?

MS. GUSSACK: My --

MR. SUTTER: Well, it doesn't make it moot,
Your Honor. It just addresses the precise legal issue
raised by the defendants in this case. The pending
motion to dismiss raises various legal arguments that
are going to be addressed by the Arkansas Supreme Court
because of the unique nature of the claim brought.

Mr. Bauerman is bringing this as a taxpayer of the State of Arkansas, not as an individual. And the precise question is whether or not the complaint states a claim under our Arkansas constitution. And if the Arkansas Supreme Court rules in the Actos case that it does not state a claim, then my complaint doesn't state a claim in this case either.

THE COURT: So it's possible moot depending on what Arkansas does, meaning that you would withdraw this complaint or agree that if you lost in the Tecada case, you would similarly lose here but --

MR. SUTTER: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: -- not necessarily. So I don't know if "moot" is the word.

MS. GUSSACK: Well, I think, Your Honor, from our perspective, and our motion has been pending I think for awhile, the multi-state resolution that GSK achieved, including with the State of Arkansas, we believe extinguishes a claim that this lawyer is seeking to bring, and that is the subject of our motion.

I think that we have also received indication that if that counsel recognizes that his claim is moot in light of that resolution, quite apart from whatever legal just -- determination is made in the Actos litigation.

But I don't think any action is required now and I think counsel is suggesting that he wants to hear what the Court does in the Actos.

THE COURT: And GSK does not agree we should delay our ruling?

MS. GUSSACK: I don't think we're bound by that and I think that our motion is well-framed.

THE COURT: Well, we are not bound by that, although the State Supreme Court of Arkansas would be an important judicial body to rule on such an issue.

It is not necessarily dispositive to this Court. 1 But I will review again, it has been awhile 2 3 since I looked at those pleadings. Although this was filed in 2012, I think the motion was filed fairly 4 5 quickly after its filing. We will look at that because it does 6 implicate some of the very same issues that we heard 7 8 argument on today concerning the County of Santa Clara and the state attorney general's action there. 9 So I will look forward to reviewing that and 10 ruling on it, or I'll notify counsel that I would 11 prefer to delay and see what the Arizona Supreme Court 12 says, but I'm not sure that that is my resolution. 13 I'll just give you a heads up on that, okay? 14 Yes, ma'am, thank you. MR. SUTTER: 15 THE COURT: 16

Thank you, Mr. Sutter. Is there

anything else? 17

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Your Honor? MR. THORN:

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. THORN: I apologize. This is Jeffrey Thorn for (inaudible). I also -- it's been very difficult for me to hear anything that's being said in the conference. I just wanted to make sure that you didn't need any further status updates from Grossman, which is the case that was transferred to your court

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145
    late August or early September of this year.
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                                                      The
2
              THE COURT: Let me just see, counsel.
    Grossman case --
3
                          It's Grossman, it's 13-CV-11770.
4
              MR. THORN:
5
    And we provided a status update --
              THE COURT: Which I don't seem to have here.
6
    But in any event, are there any requirements that have
7
8
    not yet been met in this matter?
              MR. THORN: We filed a fact sheet or served a
9
    fact sheet on the defendant, Your Honor, and they
10
    contacted us I believe the day before yesterday, but
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    we've had no substantive communication with them as to
12
    additional discovery they might want.
13
              THE COURT: I'm getting a nod from Ms.
14
    Gussack that things are moving along in fine shape,
15
    sir.
          Thank you.
16
                            No issues.
              MS. GUSSACK:
17
                          I apologize.
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              MR. THORN:
                          I'm sorry about the acoustics.
              THE COURT:
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    This is something I can't control. I don't know how to
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    make the sound system better for the telephoning
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    attorneys and participants.
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              But I hope that all of the orders that we
23
    enter pursuant to our discussions here today will be
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    reviewed online in the docket. I hope that will be
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satisfactory.
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              MR. THORN: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Thank you.
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              MR. SUTTER: Thank you, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Is there anyone else on the
    telephone that would like to address the Court?
6
              MR. ROBERTS: Well, this is Gary Roberts and
7
    my case is Linda Rico, but I've suffered from the same
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            I can hear everybody on the telephone, but I
9
    cannot hear what's going on in the courtroom. I can
10
    pick up occasional words, most of the words from Your
11
    Honor, but that's limited. I don't think there's
12
    anything of importance that needs to be addressed in my
13
    case, but I'm here.
14
                          Thank you, Mr. Roberts. Is there
              THE COURT:
15
    anything in the Linda Rico case that is wanting as far
16
    as the defense is concerned?
17
              MS. GUSSACK: Not that I'm aware of, Your
18
            No, not within plaintiff's control. I think
19
    we're dealing with the challenges of scheduling
20
    depositions.
21
                          Thank you. I hope depositions
              THE COURT:
22
    will be scheduled expeditiously. Thank you, Mr.
23
    Roberts.
24
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Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. ROBERTS:

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                THE COURT: Is there anyone else on the
    telephone?
 2
                (No response heard.)
 3
                THE COURT: All right, I think that may be
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          Success. Now we're adjourned.
 5
    it.
 6
               ALL: Thank you.
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                (Proceedings adjourned, 1:36 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATION

I, Michael Keating, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript from the electronic sound recordings of the proceedings in the above-captioned matter.

1/10/14 Date

Michael Keating