IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE:

: MDL NO. 13-2436

TYLENOL (ACETAMINOPHEN) TYLENOL (ACETAMINOPHEN) : MARKETING, SALES PRACTICE : Philadelphia, Pennsylvania AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY : April 22, 2015 LITIGATION

; 10:20 a.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE BEFORE THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE F. STENGEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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(The following was heard in open court at
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    10:20 a.m.)
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               THE COURT: Nice to see you all. Do we have
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    some people on the phone?
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              MR. BERMAN: We should, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
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              MR. BERMAN: I have received some e-mail
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    notices that people are able to hear.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Perfect. Okay. And Laura
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    has indicated who is present. Mr. Berman, Mr. Millig,
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    Mr. Buchanan and Ms. Jones, Ms. Jones, Mr. Swerigan
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    (ph), Mr. Abernathy, Ms. O'Neill (ph) and Ms. Sherry,
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    so good morning and welcome.
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               Thank you for submitting the agenda and less
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    of a thank you for submitting the deposition
    designations. But, I think what we will do is work
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    through the agenda and talk, first of all, about the
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    choice of law issue.
              And as I understand it we have general
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    agreement about the -- well, maybe we don't.
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              MS. C. JONES: Well, we may.
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               THE COURT: Right. We are talking about
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    Alabama law for the substantive products law, is that
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    right?
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Yes, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: And we agreed that Alabama law applies. Okay. All right. And I have been over the standard jury instructions for Alabama and doing some looking at their substantive product liability law. But, we have a dispute about New Jersey law as it applies to damages, is that right?

MS. C. JONES: The issue, Your Honor, is

MS. C. JONES: The issue, Your Honor, is frankly what law governs as to punitive damages, whether it is New Jersey or Alabama, and because the wrongful death statute in Alabama applies or provides only for punitive damages, whether or not New Jersey law should govern us to that as well.

THE COURT: Right. Okay.

MR. BERMAN: I don't know if you want me to respond as comments are made, Your Honor, but if I may?

THE COURT: Let me just hear your position on

the choice of law that dispute at this point.

MR. BERMAN: Okay. Our position on the choice of law, do you want my full discussion or just the comment to Ms. Jones' comment?

THE COURT: No, I want to hear your position about what applies.

MR. BERMAN: Okay. All right. Thank you.

All right. I guess, you know, where this sort of

originated was in preparation for the last conference

which was held on April 8.

And if Your Honor will recall for that conference one of the agenda items was a discussion of certain claims in plaintiffs' short form complaint and as to whether they might or might not be viable under Alabama law.

The parties met and conferred with respect to that and we had agreed that Alabama law will apply to the substantive claims, and as a result of that, in my discussions with Ms. Alyson Jones, we spoke about the willingness of plaintiffs to either dismiss or recharacterize some of the counts that were at issue that were the compensatory, substantive underlying claims.

During the discussion what was raised was that the defendants, however, were not agreeable that Alabama law should apply to the wrongful death claim and any punitive damages claim and asserted that New Jersey law would be the law to apply for those items of the case, and therein lies the sharp dispute that the parties have.

As a result of that, and we reported that to the Court, and Your Honor asked the parties to submit short five-page letter briefs on the issue, which they did, and they set out the respective positions that the

parties have.

Ms. Jones, in her opening comment, did make this appear as though it is a choice strictly between Alabama law or New Jersey law. And while the plaintiffs' position is that it is Alabama law for the wrongful death claim and that if the Court accepts Alabama law for the wrongful death claim, there would not be an independent claim for punitive damages because that essentially would be the equivalent of a double dipping.

Were the Court not to accept the plaintiffs' position for Alabama law for the wrongful death claim, that we think that under Pennsylvania choice of law principles, the choice really is more between Pennsylvania and Alabama and not New Jersey, and New Jersey, for this particular issue, is an outlier.

How I get there, Your Honor, is -- and let me back up a second. I do think the parties have both agreed in their letter briefs that it is Pennsylvania choice of law --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BERMAN: -- that will apply. So, I will not address that unless Your Honor has any particular questions about that.

That being the case, and as we had set forth

in our letter brief, there are several steps that the Pennsylvania choice of law approach adopts, but essentially it all boils down to which state has the most quantitative and qualitative contacts with the issues in the case, and therein lies a factual inquiry that we believe the Court would make.

In addition, the Court would look to determine whether the application of the law of one state versus another might frustrate the state's law which has the most significant contacts.

What the defendants argue mostly is that New Jersey law should apply and they rely on the argument that most of the contacts all occurred in New Jersey. They are New Jersey corporations and Judge Johnson in the Lyles case had ruled in their favor and that should be essentially binding on this Court.

To the contrary, the plaintiffs argue that all of the essential facts occurred in Alabama other than all of the corporate conduct which occurred in Pennsylvania, not in New Jersey, in Fort Washington, Pennsylvania.

And maybe just a very simple item to mention to the Court to emphasize one issue there is the repeated footnotes that appear on the agenda month after month after month wherein the defendants add to

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the agenda that further, "Johnson & Johnson submits that it does not design, manufacture, market, distribute or sell any products including any product alleged to be at issue in this MDL."

The plaintiffs don't really dispute that. I mean what is at issue here is the conduct of McNeil. Now, while McNeil is a New Jersey corporation, their principal activities occur in their Fort Washington, Pennsylvania facility.

And bringing Your Honor back a moment to one of the earlier documents we submitted back in February, Your Honor had asked the parties to submit witness guides, and it was submitted under seal, so I am not going to state anything that would be confidential.

But, in the witness guide we pointed out a key witness would be Anthony Temple. He is a McNeil or was a McNeil employee in Fort Washington. The second witness, Edward Cuffner (ph) who we are going to discuss today, Pennsylvania witness.

The third witness, Lynn Haluski (ph),
Pennsylvania witness. The fourth witness, Ashley
McEvoy, Pennsylvania witness. The next witness, Cathy
Fallon, Pennsylvania witness. Kenneth Quang (ph) was a
McNeil employee, although his tenure there was somewhat
short-lived. Edward Nelson, Pennsylvania McNeil

witness. Patricia Gussicks, Pennsylvania witness. Stephen Silver, Pennsylvania witness.

I won't bore Your Honor with this, but the point obviously being that this is a McNeil operation and although McNeil is incorporated in New Jersey, the activities here all occurred in Pennsylvania. So, throwing New Jersey's ideas, concepts into this dispute I think is sort of a red herring.

The difference between this case and Lyles might be, though, that in that case Judge Johnson had to apply the New Jersey choice of law principles and he was a New Jersey court, he was sitting as a New Jersey court.

Your Honor, as we have already agreed, is to apply Pennsylvania and you are sitting as a Pennsylvania court, this case having originated in the Court of Common Pleas before removal to the federal court and then the creation of this MDL.

Aside from all of the witnesses being at McNeil in Fort Washington is the document production. The documents are all housed in Pennsylvania. So, I guess to sum up this point, it is a red herring, in our view, to be thinking about New Jersey as having the significant qualitative and quantitative contacts with this case because this case is not Lyles.

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Now, the defendants suggest well, the plaintiffs made certain argument, plaintiffs' counsel made certain arguments in Lyles and, therefore, that should be binding against the Terry (ph) case.

Counsel advocate positions and they represent different parties and they do their advocacy based on the circumstances that they think might be best for the particular party.

I don't subscribe necessarily to what the defendants say about what was said in Lyles, but regardless of what may have been said in Lyles by plaintiffs' counsel, it is not binding on Ms. Terry. We were counsel in that case for one purpose. We are counsel in this case for another purpose.

And contrast that to the defendants, they are the same parties in both cases. And while they argued in New Jersey for the application of New Jersey law to Judge Johnson, in cases pending in Pennsylvania they have argued that under Pennsylvania choice of law principles the Court is to apply, even for punitive damages claims, the law of the home state of where the plaintiff was injured.

So, in our letter brief we include citation to the Wolf case decided by Judge DuBois in this court and that was McNeil arguments, the same McNeil that is

in this case.

The fact that it involved Motrin as compared to Tylenol really is a difference without any meaning. It is still a Fort Washington activity by McNeil, and the defendants there argued for the application of Maine law.

We cited to Your Honor the Maya (ph) case, which is a Court of Common Pleas case decided by Judge Quinones who is now an Eastern District of Pennsylvania judge, and in that case the defendants, McNeil, argued for the application of Tennessee law.

In that case the judge found that

Pennsylvania law should apply and ultimately whether

that would have been an error or not, it had no meaning

because the jury didn't find punitive damages under

whatever standard was applied. So, there was no harm

to the defendants.

But, the point being that in Maya the same McNeil argued for the application of the foreign state law, the Tennessee law, not Pennsylvania law, not New Jersey law.

And we think the difference being that when a party is making the argument, the same party, there is a concept of judicial estoppel that applies, because they should be estopped from making different arguments

just to suit their means in a particular case, and that's what is happening here.

It is a cherry picking to try to bootstrap into New Jersey based on Lyles, based on advocacy by plaintiff lawyers which is not binding on Ms. Terry, who is a completely different plaintiff.

Now, I noted that in their letter brief they mentioned the Risperdal case, a recent case decided by Judge Gnu (ph) in the Court of Common Pleas and applying New Jersey law, but McNeil was not in that case. That is a Janssen Pharmaceutical case and a Johnson & Johnson case.

And Judge Gnu, therefore, did not have to assess or analyze the question of McNeil's involvement, which is a Fort Washington, Pennsylvania defendant. I might add that, you know, Janssen is located in Horsham, PA, but the position that the defendants have taken in the Risperdal case is that the activities there are not that extensive, but I don't have to get into Risperdal, it is not at issue here.

THE COURT: Right. So, your preference would be --

MR. BERMAN: It is clearly Alabama law, I want to get that on the record.

THE COURT: Right.

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THE COURT: All right.

separate punitive damages, because that measure of damages is the type of damages that is used to compensate a person who suffers a wrongful death under Alabama law. However a jury might award those damages, it

the wrongful death claim, there is no need to address

MR. BERMAN: And were Alabama law applied for

is that damages that occur and it is the totality of the damages that the -- that are awarded for the wrongful death decedent.

I didn't mean to interrupt Your Honor, I was afraid you might be jumping to the idea that I am advocating Pennsylvania, and I am not. I am advocating Alabama law, but clearly I think the dispute is between Alabama and Pennsylvania, not New Jersey law, and I think under the cases that we cited, Pennsylvania choice of law would point to the application of Alabama law and not Pennsylvania law.

And I mentioned Wolf and Maya. There is also the Knight case, the Beard case. They are all cited in our brief and they are all pharmaceutical cases where the court, this court has applied the law of the home state of where the injured person occurred.

> MR. BERMAN: I didn't know if you had a

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    question. I interrupted you.
              THE COURT: No, I think I understand your
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    position.
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              MR. BERMAN:
                            There is some sort of anecdotal
    comments in the defendant's letter I would address if
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    they are of interest to Your Honor. They mention the
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    question of standing. I don't think that's a real
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    problem there at capacities.
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              So, under Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules it
    relates back and I could provide the Court a number of
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    citations and I forget the other points that they
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    raised, but if there is other points in their letter
    that you would want me to address.
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              Mr. Millig wanted to supplement a few
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    comments, if I could defer to him, Your Honor?
              THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Millig?
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              MR. MILLIG: Good morning.
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              THE COURT: Good morning.
              MR. MILLIG:
                           I am sort of an outsider on this
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issue, but as I hear it, what the defendants are saying is we want to apply Alabama law to everything, but we really just don't like Alabama's wrongful death scheme because Alabama has a unique measure of compensatory damages that are, in essence, based on the conduct of the defendant. They don't like that, so let's not

apply that.

Just as a lawyer from Georgia, and my counterparts here are from Mississippi, we all practice in the State of Alabama, and I would be hard pressed if any of us have gone into an Alabama state court and said we shouldn't apply this Alabama law for this wrongful death case that I am either prosecuting or we're defending, because we just don't like it.

This is what Alabama law is. It is what it is and you know, in essence, as an outsider listen, the defense is trying to split the baby and say have it all Alabama, but because of the way that the legislative scheme works down there in every court in Alabama, don't apply it here. And that's what I think it boils down to. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Ms. Jones? Good morning.

MS. C. JONES: May I respond, Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes.

MS. C. JONES: Let me start first of all with what Mr. Millig just raised. We are not talking about splitting the baby at all, as indeed the Third Circuit recognized in the Berg Chilling decision, which is before the Court.

The choice of law provisions recognize a

principle called depecage that basically recognizes that the choice of law analysis provides for different state laws to govern different claims or different issues and, therefore, it is perfectly appropriate to recognize that Alabama state law governs on certain issues, but that as to punitive damages and on other issues another law is, in fact, applicable. So, it is part of the analysis in and of itself of the application note which was the law.

When I stood up earlier I said that the question before the Court actually is, and I believe it to be true, what state's law applies to determine whether and at what amount the plaintiff may recover punitive damages. That's really the only issue that is out here.

And that applies only because the Alabama wrongful death action is the only statute, so far as we know in the country, that clearly provides that the damages recoverable under that statute are punitive in nature.

And it is for that reason that we have taken the position that, and that a wrongful death statute does not apply, but is inconsistent with the New Jersey law and the principals admitted in fact New Jersey law has the greater interest here, certainly over Alabama.

What I would like to address first, and frankly a little bit out of order, is the plaintiff argues first that Pennsylvania law ought to apply, I have to say I am a little bit, more than a little bit surprised at that.

The Court asked for briefing on the applicable law and there is really no briefing on why Pennsylvania law should govern as to the issue of punitive damages in this case at all. And, indeed, it is inconsistent with four recent decisions of this court in the Eastern, not Your Honor, but four other judges here.

THE COURT: Right, but in this -- right.

MS. C. JONES: Who have all concluded that the principle place of business for McNeil is the State of New Jersey. And those are the cases that we cited to Your Honor. It is the Moore case, the Arm (ph) case, the Circuit case and the Brown case, all of which looked very specifically as to where the principle place of business is and, that is, indeed, Your Honor, consistent with the representations made and concessions made by plaintiffs' counsel in the Lyles case that all of the decisions applicable to the issue of punitive damages were made in the State of New Jersey.

It has never been briefed or suggested otherwise that they were made here in the State of Pennsylvania, and that would be inconsistent with several rulings, not only of this Court, but also Mr. Berman mentioned the In Re: Risperdal decision, and I would need to correct one point.

Janssen is a New Jersey corporation
headquartered with its principal place of business in
New Jersey, in fact, it is in Titusville, New Jersey,
and not -- I am sure it is just a simple mistake, but I
don't want the Court to think that that decision by
Judge Gnu was something different.

In fact, what Judge Gnu did was to look at the Pennsylvania choice of law rules, conclude that New Jersey punitive damages law applied and, therefore, that the plaintiffs filed here in Pennsylvania were not entitled to punitive damages.

At one other point that I think is worth making just briefly, and there was a suggestion that McNeil is taking different positions, attached is Exhibit A to the plaintiffs' position letter, is a brief that was filed by the defendants in the Wolf case.

And contrary to Mr. Berman's suggestions, it was argued there on page 11 very clearly that should

the court consider the place of the alleged punitive conduct and the location of the defendants to be (inaudible) in New Jersey law and not Pennsylvania law should be applied to plaintiffs' punitive damages phase, and then it goes on to discuss that. So, it is not an inconsistent position being taken here.

What is clear, Your Honor, is that although there are some cases that have gone both ways, frankly, in terms of looking to the place where the injury occurred is being the sight of punitive damages.

Clearly the Tripp (ph) and more cases recognized that the place where the corporate conduct that is alleged to be reprehensible, the source of the alleged punitive conduct governs here and that those states have the greater interest.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. C. JONES: And in that case that would be the State of New Jersey here. I think --

THE COURT: What about compensatory damages, though? What state's law would apply to that claim?

MS. C. JONES: Well, that is what gets confusing about this case.

THE COURT: Because Alabama doesn't have compensatory damages, right?

MS. C. JONES: That's right. Under normal

circumstances compensatory damages would be governed presumably by the substantive law of the state that is at issue.

In this case, the unique factor here is that the New Jersey -- I mean not the -- Alabama wrongful death statute provides only for punitive damages, which are unavailable in the State of New Jersey.

And it gets confusing, but I think ultimately that what you have to do is to reduce the issue to punitive damages and what would govern under punitive damages, and if the Court were to conclude that New Jersey law applies as to the issue of punitive damages and as to the wrongful death claim, then the compensatory or pecuniary damages, which New Jersey law provides in a case with a wrongful death action would apply.

So, in that case what you have here is you have New Jersey's law that recognizes as a matter of public policy which is a governmental interest clearly to be considered by the choice of law, in encouraging the production of pharmaceuticals and protecting pharmaceutical manufacturers in a situation where they have produced a product recognized as safe and effective and approved by the FDA as protected against the imposition of punitive damages.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. C. JONES: That's clearly a governmental interest. That would be completely abandoned if, in fact punitive damages of the Wrongful Death Act in Alabama were to be implemented.

THE COURT: Okay. Laura says we need you closer to the microphone.

MS. C. JONES: Oh, I apologize.

THE COURT: That's okay. Under Alabama law is there a standard of proof for those punitive damages? For example, in Pennsylvania products or negligence law we would have to have a finding of outrageous conduct.

MS. C. JONES: That's right, and that's part of -- that's part of the issue that frankly gets to almost a little bit beyond choice of law, but let me ask you this. There is no specific standard applicable to the wrongful death punitive damage claim.

There is no limitation, there are no standards, there is no preliminary finding, if you will, of negligent conduct or of a lesser standard.

Nor is there any requirement of outrageous conduct or proof by clear and convincing evidence, and because of that the constitutionality of that statute has been challenged.

Plaintiffs correctly point out that the
constitutionality was upheld I think in 1927, but don't
hold me to the date, by the U.S. Supreme Court and then
subsequently as recently as 2011 or 2012 by the Alabama
Supreme Court.

But. what has not been done is that the

But, what has not been done is that the Alabama law has not been considered by the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, since the pronouncement of the various punitive damage requirements under BMW versus Gillord (ph) and State Farm versus Campbell, a series of cases that provides what constitutional protections must be inherent in that.

And I think that is a little bit beyond the subject of the choice of law, but it is also prediction of some of the issues that we may face if, in fact, this Court were to implement the use of or permit the use of the wrongful death statute of Alabama.

THE COURT: Under case law in Alabama does the wrongful death -- do the wrongful death damages in Alabama, although they are characterized as punitive, do they include a compensatory element?

MS. C. JONES: They do not.

THE COURT: They do not. Okay.

MS. C. JONES: And my counsel here are trying to make sure that I am appropriately stating the law.

I thought I did, but they pointed out that Alabama law does allow compensatory damages on other substantive claims, and if the New Jersey wrongful death action is applied you're still compensated, you just don't receive punitive damages. It is just a different standard for pecuniary loss, if you will, or what would be the standard type of loss in the case for heirs.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. C. JONES: So, it is not that damages would not otherwise be available, it is that the punitive damages would not be available.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. C. JONES: And I am perfectly willing -we set out -- you know, we did this in seven pages
which is relatively short, to set forth the arguments
and I am perfectly happy to go through them. I don't
think there is any question that there is a true
conflict between Alabama and New Jersey law.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. C. JONES: I don't think there is any real question that New Jersey law is the applicable law as to McNeil and the question is Alabama versus New Jersey.

I don't think that there is any question that New Jersey has a greater interest in seeing that its Ť

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citizens are protected in the furtherance of that public policy of being protected in the case of a drug manufacturer, one, so that they don't have punitive damages when they manufacture what has been approved as a state -- an effective drug, and two, that its citizens are not subjected to punitive damages in the absence of the constitutional protections inherent and either finding first a standard of negligent conduct, or having there be a higher burden of whatever. Clearly New Jersey has an interest in that. So, when you weigh the interest of the State of New Jersey versus the State of Alabama we believe that the State of Alabama, I mean the State of New Jersey's law clearly governs as to the issue of punitive damages and, therefore, also on the Alabama wrongful death action.

THE COURT: But, doesn't Alabama have an interest in the availability of remedies to its injured citizens?

MS. C. JONES: It does, Your Honor. There is no question that it does and there is a balancing.

But, I think one thing that is telling here on how Alabama itself measures or values its interest.

The Alabama wrongful death statute, which is 40 -- I can't remember these by number, but the Alabama

wrongful death statute specifically provides that cases for wrongful death -- here, the statute is 65410.

The language of the statute itself says "A personal representative may commence an action and recover such damages as the Court, they assess," and here is the key language, "in a court of competent jurisdiction within the State of Alabama where provided for in Subsection E," which is a venue statute on what counties, "and not elsewhere."

Now, I suggest to Your Honor that what that is saying is the State of Alabama has an interest in providing the wrongful death punitive damages action within the State of Alabama, but that where the Alabama citizen chooses a different forum, that the State of Alabama by the language of its statute has recognized that it has a lesser interest in ensuring that that same level of punitive damages is applicable.

I mean, I will say to Your Honor that I cannot represent to Your Honor that nobody in New Jersey has ever enforced a wrongful death action from Alabama, I can't, and I don't know the answer to that, I couldn't find it.

When I first read this statute it appeared to me on its face that it didn't provide for relief elsewhere, and I will say that there are states other

than New Jersey. I just don't know that New Jersey, which had said, well, they can't deprive them of a remedy elsewhere by saying you must file it here in the State of Alabama.

In other words, you can't dictate it, but I do think that what we have here is perhaps a little bit unusual where the state has very clearly said it is my interest to provide this when you file suit in the State of Alabama, and I think that is a very -- I think that's important to us in analyzing which state has a greater interest in the choice of law determination here.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. C. JONES: I mean, we have cited to Your Honor and there are many cases which have faced very similar issues. We cited to Your Honor the Kelly versus Ford case which was followed more recently by the Campbell versus Stauber (ph) case in which essentially the same issue was before the Court.

Those are cases against Ford and General

Motors where the Michigan law protected car

manufacturers against the imposition of punitive

damages and applying the Pennsylvania's choice of law

as the courts have consistently held that Michigan law
had a greater interest and, therefore, Michigan law

would be applied in those cases. You have a couple cases that are cited.

I would like to say to Your Honor, I mean Mr. Berman cited the Knight case and the Bearden (ph) case and I will acknowledge to Your Honor that certainly on face value they would appear to come to a different conclusion.

However, there is some distinguishing factors there, one of which is that neither of those cases involved the diametrically different and opposing laws such as Alabama and New Jersey and here, where the provision -- particularly where a statute contains a provision, much like the one in Alabama, and also where unlike in this case, Knight and I believe Bearden also involved claims of actions directly by sales representatives and so forth in the state where the plaintiff lived and the injury occurred, converted that there is no proof at all of any action directly in a past sales representative affecting any doctor, for example, and the State of Alabama in this case. So, there are some distinguishing factors.

The other issue that is mentioned prominently in the plaintiffs' letter brief, and I think Mr. Berman referred to is the interest of comity and where they cite Your Honor to the McConus (ph) case, which is a

case -- McConus versus the Bridge Commission, and it is a case where there is a bridge that actually connects

New Jersey and Pennsylvania and the Bridge Commission operated that. It was not funded by taxes on any state, but instead by toll road, and there was an accident involving a Pennsylvania resident on the Pennsylvania side of the bridge.

They sued the commission and the commission raised sovereign immunity that was provided under New Jersey law. And the Court looked at that and under the circumstances said Pennsylvania has the greatest context here and that the commission itself operated in the State of Pennsylvania. It did not include or refer at all to the issue of punitive damages.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. C. JONES: And the plaintiffs cite that for the purpose that basically let's look at delicti as the -- said there is an assumption or presumption that it would apply.

But, he is pretty clear and I think frankly even Your Honor has recognized in the Hanover, I think it is the Hanover Insurance Company case that under the Griffith case in Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abandoned that as being the sole presumptive factor and that, in fact, you look at the provisions,

the restatement and then the governmental interest provision.

We have gone through all of them. I believe if you would add all of those together you will find that clearly New Jersey law has the most connections and the greater governing interest on the issue of punitive damages.

THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. Let me take a look at those cases that you've cited and then we will get a decision to you. Mr. Berman?

MR. BERMAN: May I have an opportunity to reply, briefly, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. BERMAN: Thank you. You know, the premise of the argument by the defendants', though, is essentially putting a rabbit in a hat, continuously arguing that it is New Jersey that has all of the contacts.

And as Your Honor, I hope, has learned, and I am sorry that we have over-burdened you with all of the deposition transcripts, all of the relevant evidence, facts, documents, witnesses were based in Pennsylvania.

So, you know, I do think it is a rabbit in the hat argument to say well, simply because the defendants are incorporated in New Jersey that is a

reason to apply New Jersey law or that New Jersey law even is involved in the conflict analysis.

Ms. Jones spoke about the fact that, yes, the Alabama statute has survived constitutional challenges both in the United States Supreme Court and in Alabama, and that it actually survived an Alabama tort reform.

What I think she is really asking you to do, though, is to pass on the constitutionality of that statute through a choice of law mechanism argument. If that is the law and that is the manner by which Alabama has chosen to compensate its citizens who are injured in its state, it is not, I think, for this Court to not apply that law on the notion that it might not survive constitutional muster if challenged on a constitutional muster if challenged on a constitutional muster if challenged on a constitutional basis at some point in time.

If the defendants want to challenge the constitutionality of that, well then let's apply that law to this case and they will have their appellate issue that go to a court to determine whether that is still constitutional in light of the Gore and BMW case.

But, I don't think constitutionality is a reason why you don't apply the law of a state which has decided that that is the manner in which to compensate its citizens.

And I think it is also a misnomer to say it is a punitive damages statute. It is the measure of the damages that are awarded to a person who suffers an alleged wrongful death in Alabama.

So, Alabama doesn't really distinguish it between whether it is compensatory or it is punitive. What Alabama says is you look at the conduct of the defendant and you award damages based on the conduct of the defendant.

So, it is not a more traditional compensatory damages scheme where you look at pain and suffering.

THE COURT: But, that's clearly a punitive system, isn't it?

MR. BERMAN: But, it --

THE COURT: If it is a compensatory system you are looking at the loss to the plaintiff.

MR. BERMAN: It is, but it is the law of Alabama, and that is the way they chose to address wrongful death claims in their state.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BERMAN: The fact that it may be unique amongst other states, it is still their law and it still has the right to choose how to frame the issue for its citizens.

Ms. Jones mentioned the statute about whether

that law can be applied outside of the State of Alabama, and there is no cases to interpret that. To me I read that as strictly a venue issue, that you need to be in the appropriate venue in order to claim those damages if you are suing in Alabama.

But, I don't read that to be a preclusion of the application of Alabama law under choice of law principles when a case is brought in federal court. If this case had been initiated in Alabama and transferred here through the MDL that would have deprived that case from the application of the Alabama law on the issues. So, I think that's really a false argument as well.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Berman. Go ahead, Ms. Jones.

MS. C. JONES: Oh, I am sorry.

MR. MILLIG: I was just going to say one thing, Your Honor. I know I am jumping up, like we shouldn't do this. But, I just want to make sure that we talk about the concept of punitive damages.

As I have learned through my practice, and I think everybody here understands there is a first level of damages and then there is punitive damages. The scheme in Alabama is that for wrongful death damages the first level, which we in the country call compensatory damages, is the way their public policy is

- set up that the jury is to award damages based on the
- 2 defendants' conduct.
- But, it doesn't mean you get damages and it
- 4 doesn't mean you get outrageous damages. If a driver
- 5 is going through a stoplight and the driver sneezes and
- 6 kills somebody and there is a lawsuit, there may be no
- 7 damages awarded based on the conduct, because the jury
- 8 may find the conduct was not even worthy of causing a
- 9 wrongful death.
- But, that is the public policy of the State
- of Alabama and we respectfully ask the Court to uphold
- the public policy of the State of Alabama where these
- 13 plaintiffs are from in this particular case.
- And the second thing, I just have to say it
- 15 because I have been the one, as I think the Court has
- 16 noticed from the depositions and Mr. Teasey (ph) taking
- 17 these depositions.
- To hear Ms. Jones say there is no question
- 19 that New Jersey has a greater interest, every corporate
- 20 decision in this case, every document produced in this
- case, every witness with the exception of one in this
- 22 case, worked on the second floor in Fort Washington,
- 23 Pennsylvania.
- The product was manufactured in Fort
- 25 Washington, Pennsylvania. That's where the line is.

Nobody with the -- even Patricia Gusson who was president of (inaudible) way back in the 70s who then moved to Johnson & Johnson said I kept my office in Fort Washington, Pennsylvania.

Every decision was made in Fort Washington,
Pennsylvania. Even Ed Kuffner (ph), as we will see,
had to travel to New Jersey to go to the SATAC (ph)
meeting we are going to talk about today. He was based
in Pennsylvania.

And so, again, to hear this continual discussion of New Jersey being thrown into the mix as the lawyer who has been discovering the facts and where all of the decision-making was done and where the science people were or where the marketing people were, where the regulatory people were, and where the (inaudible) were, they all worked in Fort Washington, Pennsylvania.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.

MS. C. JONES: I want to clear up a couple things. First, responding to Mr. Millig first in reverse order. I would ask Your Honor to look at the opinion of Judge McLaughlin in the Moore case, a case involving Tylenol and McNeil of which there are three other judges who have reached identical decisions to that, that clearly look at the place of corporate

decision-making in McNeil and come to the place that
New Jersey and Skillman, New Jersey is clearly the
principal place of business where corporate decisions
are made at McNeil.

Two, I would point out to Your Honor that this morning is the first time that plaintiffs have ever taken the position that Pennsylvania law governs on these issues.

Three, I don't want to be misunderstood as I think perhaps Mr. Berman misunderstood. I did not mean to suggest to Your Honor that the constitutionality or lack of constitutionality of Alabama law was part and parcel with the choice of law issue.

In fact, I think it follows after the choice of law issue, that it just points to some of those issues that may be out there should the cause of the absence of guidelines and so forth, should that law be applied.

And finally, I think that -- and I think we have cited the cases to Your Honor, but if Your Honor would look at either the model jury instructions on wrongful death or the cases, there is no question that the Alabama Supreme Court states repeatedly these are punitive damages.

And so you really can't muddle it and suggest

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    that it is something else, it is punitive, and that's
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    what the Alabama court contends, and that's the basis
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     for the significant difference and the true conflict
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    between New Jersey law and Alabama law under these
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    circumstances.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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               MS. C. JONES: So, we would be happy to
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    supply Your Honor with other things --
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               THE COURT: Let me work with the --
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               MS. C. JONES: -- but I think you got the
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    citations here.
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               THE COURT: -- these letter briefs. I really
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    heard enough about this issue, but thank you, Mr.
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    Berman.
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               MR. BERMAN: Okay.
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               THE COURT: I would like to move to the
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    deposition designations, but I have, I guess, a basic
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    question --
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               MR. BERMAN: Your Honor, if I may interrupt
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    you one second.
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              THE COURT:
                          Yes.
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              MR. BERMAN: And I really apologize.
    Buchanan was here as the New Jersey liaison and he
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    didn't know whether you wanted to have a report about
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25
    that, and he has another meeting to attend shortly, and
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    I was hoping if you wanted information about that you
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    could entertain that.
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               THE COURT: We could certainly take that out
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    of order. Go ahead.
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               MR. BUCHANAN: I am sorry, Your Honor, I
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    didn't know whether you want an oral report or not.
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    You have our letters, and there is nothing really to
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    add beyond the letters.
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               If you had questions I wanted to, you know, I
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    was available. I certainly didn't want to lose the
    Court in terms of sequence, and I just have a 2:00
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    hearing in New York.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Melissa, do we have any
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    questions about -- okay. I think we are fine.
                                                      Thank
15
    you, very much.
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              MR. BERMAN: I apologize, Your Honor.
                                                       Thank
17
    you.
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              THE COURT:
                           Thank you, very much.
              MS. C. JONES: Your Honor?
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              THE COURT: I have been through the Kuffner
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    deposition from April 30th and May 1st of 2014, and
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    certainly the objections that are framed in these
    depositions I think can be put in certain categories,
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    and I think you have referred to the anticipated
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motions in limine regarding some of these issues.

What I would like to do is talk about these issues in the context of this deposition. I am sort of unsure of whether I want to go line-by-line or objection-by-objection and make a ruling at this point. I think I would like to open the discussion about the relevance of some of these issues and see where we go.

But, I have a more basic question. Is it the plaintiffs' intention in presenting your case during the bellwether trial to present your case through deposition designations?

MR. MILLIG: Yes, Your Honor, to a large extent. And I will tell you that I wanted to apologize, because it was also our intent to shorten the deposition designations because these are too long, but we intend to, as the case -- I think these MDL cases to present the corporate testimony through video and also to present treating physician testimony through video. There will be a significant amount of videos played to the jury.

THE COURT: Yes, I was afraid you were going to say that. I mean, my experience has been it is hard for a jury to stay with a case through a 60-minute, 90-minute doctor's deposition in a personal injury case.

I mean, to present your case in chief on the

8.

TV I think presents enormous challenges for the jury to follow it, frankly, and to pay attention to it. I mean, why not call these people live? You know what they are going to say.

MR. MILLIG: Well, many of these people -well, the framework was that these depositions would be
taken for all MDL cases, the generic cases. And as I
said before, it would be to take Dr. Kuffner just down
to -- right now we have provided Your Honor with far
more than we would ever play the material.

Cut Dr. Kuffner down to what we need and then we have our experts --

THE COURT: So, I am looking at deposition transcripts to make rulings on points of law on testimony that you may not even present? So, why am I wasting my time?

MR. MILLIG: I apologize. Certainly we did not mean to do that. However, what we did want to do, I think on both sides, with the length of this, is to make sure you had a full understanding of using Kuffner as to the issues that are going to be presented.

Once we understand your ruling, for example, and I think a great way to go through it would be to look at the repetitive objections to advisory committee meetings, FDA pronouncements to the federal register,

things of that nature, once we know those rulings then we will cut this down for our jury.

But, if we were just to play -- to provide Your Honor with 30 pages of Kuffner, we thought it was very difficult for Your Honor to understand how he fits into the plaintiffs' theme.

THE COURT: Well, when we talked about this a couple of months ago, and you were advocating that we get an early start on the discussion of the deposition designations and get some rulings, in advance of the anticipated onslaught of motions in limine I thought that made some sense.

But, it seems to me that these transcripts are over-inclusive and I am really not sure that I want to go point-by-point, when particularly, you know, I don't understand some of these questions that are put to these witnesses. It is very unclear, it is rambling, it is a lot of quibbling, and I really don't know where it gets you.

So, I am very happy to hear that you are going to pare them down. I would like the opportunity to make rulings on substantive objections once I know what you are going to present to the trier of fact.

I mean, I don't really get the point of the exercise of going through rulings on objections to

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argumentative questions, counsel interrupting the witness, foundation, assumes facts, just to pick out a typical objection.

I know there are substantive areas, and maybe this is a way to frame those substantive areas, but it seems to me that it is an awful -- there has got to be an awful lot of excess here, and I am really frankly not inclined to, you know, make rulings on portions of testimony that aren't ever going to be presented to a jury in a courtroom. Ms. Jones? Let me just hear from Ms. Jones.

MS. C. JONES: I was just going to make a suggestion, and I am doing it on the fly right now, but I think in a little bit we got the cart before the horse in that I think that if we, in fact, instead have rulings on various motions in limine to cover things like is the advisory committee (inaudible) coming in, that then the parties could probably meet and confer and strike a significant amount of testimony that the Court would never have to consider in this format, if that makes sense.

And so what I frankly would suggest, although Mr. Swerigan is here prepared to go line-by-line if Your Honor wants to is that perhaps what we ought to do is to set aside some time or day or whatever it is

after the Court has an opportunity to see and rule on the motions in limine, or at least hear the arguments on the motions in limine so that I think as to those substantive objections then it will make sense, and the parties may be able to help Your Honor by striking out a fair amount of the testimony because Your Honor has said this testimony is irrelevant and is not coming in.

I would suggest you might want to consider just postponing it until that time.

MR. MILLIG: And I guess, Your Honor, where I was coming out, I had never thought we were going to go line-by-line. My understanding was when you picked the Kuffner deposition it re-enforced something I think you had said before, you said by watching this I will have a feel for what the case is about. I can give you my gut reaction on where this case is heading in terms of the evidence.

And what I saw in the Kuffner deposition as I was looking through it in preparation for today, was repeated objections of the same caliber and us saying, if we did Dr. Temple first we incorporate, we incorporate, we incorporate.

So, I thought today -- I sort of came today thinking we were gong to have a discussion about the

big picture items that are raised throughout this deposition and every deposition so that we can have an understanding as a general proposition what this case kind of looks like and then we can start slicing.

That's how I understood what we were going to do today.

THE COURT: Right. Although, I mean the substantive objections here essentially all refer to

MR. MILLIG: Well, they all refer to a distinction between whether what is being discussed is notice to the company with an issue being how did the company react to it or whether the issue being discussed is somehow a hearsay document that should not come in.

If I would be so bold as to say I think every objection relates to a piece of evidence in which somebody is writing or talking about something negative about the therapeutic range of Tylenol.

And so that is really, if we -- I think they all relate to that.

THE COURT: Right. I mean I made an outline of just what appeared to me to be the major issues.

MR. MILLIG: Sure.

anticipated motions in limine, right?

THE COURT: The adverse event reports, the advisory committee documents, the advisory committee

meetings, the evidence of McNeil sales and financial information, the therapeutic and toxic ratio, right.

So, those are all ~- and it goes on. I mean that doesn't necessarily limit them. But, those are substantive issues that it seems to me you are going to want to brief, right?

MR. MILLIG: Either I think the defense is going to want to brief them. I think what the point of this was so that the Court understands the evidence and understands what an advisory committee is, understands how all of this evidence works.

And so the Court can give us whether they are rulings today or advanced rulings or even it is gut reaction, we can begin to then tailor this trial to that.

What happened last time was we ended up with a situation where we heard 56 motions on one day, and quite frankly, I am not sure that everybody in the courtroom, because it was new, really understood, for example, what is an advisory committee meeting, who participates.

You know, is McNeil even present. Was this document a document that was really discussed and to which people have actually agreed or disagreed and taken positions on.

It is a lot of information, so I think from the plaintiffs' perspective and I think from all perspectives, if you have thoughts on these issues as to whether you think they are coming in or not coming in, we would certainly like to know as far in advance as possible, and that was the genesis of the idea to begin to let you see the testimony and see how these witnesses respond to the questions and to the documents being presented.

THE COURT: And I think as a general principle I agreed with that. In the practical application of it, you know, even this Kuffner deposition is time consuming to read, understand, to consider the legal issues raised in the objections, and I think what you are asking to do today is to go through the sort of big picture, the adverse events reports or the relevance of the advisory committee process and to give you an advisory ruling, a preliminary ruling, that is preliminary to what, preliminary to my ruling on a fully briefed and argued motion in limine, which seems to me the more I look at these the proper context to make that decision.

So, I mean, I am trying to use your time and my time in the most efficient way and I am feeling frankly very not efficient in having to go through

these transcripts and coming up with rulings that are really shooting from the hip without a chance for you to brief those motions.

So, I fully appreciate the need and the desire to get these issues teed up before the motion in limine process, but it seems to me there is so much involved in the motions in limine that we may want to just get those filed, take a look at them, and if that pushes our trial back that pushes our trial back.

You know, I am getting that the problem with the motion in limine process is that it is on a tight schedule before trial and it is, I think the experience you had in New Jersey, from what I am gathering, was a lot of rulings in a short period of time and that created some issues for you, you meaning both sides, that could have been avoided if there was more time put into the discussion or argument of these various motions.

But, I mean if it means we push the trial back we push the trial back. It is not like we are inconveniencing any witnesses, right? They are all on tape.

MR. MILLIG: When I said they were all on tape that was --

THE COURT: Who is coming in live? I will

1 have dinner for them.

MR. MILLIG: What's that?

THE COURT: Who is coming in live? I will be thrilled to see them.

MR. MILLIG: Oh, all of the experts are coming in live.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MILLIG: From both sides. All of the lay witnesses are coming in live. Perhaps the treating doctor is coming in live. I suspect we may, one of the witnesses who have been deposed is local here, works at Children's Hospital.

We may call certain witnesses that are

Pennsylvania residents and close by who have been

deposed live during our case. So, it is not going

to be that way, however, I would say, and I am sure

Ms. Jones has seen this, the nature of these

pharmaceutical trials is there is a substantial amount

of video.

THE COURT: It sounds like it. But, I mean you have 58 pages of print that I can hardly read, and 75 pages in another day of print that is very hard to read, and issues, you know, that are framed in exchanges between counsel that, you know, it makes it very hard to make rulings on a number of these

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exchanges and areas of questioning and then to hear that, you know, half of it is not even going to be presented, I am not sure why I am spending my time doing that.
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I mean, do you disagree with that? I mean, it seems to me that we are looking at sort of a preliminary look at the motions in limine without the motions in limine.

I mean, I can tell you right now what I think of the advisory committee and the adverse events reports just from the research that Melissa has done, our discussions about these cases and my looking at these depositions and, you know, 25 years of trying products cases. I can give you a sense of where that might be going, but I think that it is probably -- if they are going to want to exclude some things, you might, right?

MS. C. JONES: Yes.

THE COURT: Then I think I owe it to the parties to look at your legal authority and hear the arguments.

MR. MILLIG: I can't disagree, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MILLIG: And I am certainly not going to disagree. We all came to a -- we had a discussion, we

thought that this was a good plan and quite frankly I do hope at some level Your Honor --

THE COURT: I mean, a designation to me suggests that there is a portion of this enormous deposition, a small portion, relevant, highly relevant to the issues that the jury is going to consider that you hope to play to the jury. Not two days of, you know, lawyers arguing over foundation and form and those kinds of things.

So, I mean, I understand there are substantive objections in here as well, but it is hard to pick them out. Let me talk to Melissa for a minute because I have gone way off script here.

(Pause in proceedings.)

of the best intentions of sort of getting these issues on the table in advance of the motions in limine, or more accurately well in advance of trial, I am concerned that since so many of these objections refer to motions in limine to exclude evidence, other motions in limine, that I am going to be making preliminary rulings on these transcripts that would be rulings that would be appropriately addressed to motions in limine, which at that time I hope would be fully briefed and argued.

And I don't see the efficiency in making comments on areas where I am not even sure that the testimony is going to be presented. So, I think we are going to have to adjust our approach to these. And, I mean, I simply don't have the time to give thorough consideration to so much deposition testimony.

I mean, I am happy to make a ruling in the trial context, but I am reminded of why it was such a good idea to become a judge and not take depositions for a living, but that's another story.

But, I really think -- I just don't see the point, and I am going to -- I think I am just going to wait until we see motions in limine on these issues.

MR. BERMAN: Your Honor, the genesis of this that I think came from the case management order 18A, where actually the date by which the parties were to identify the witnesses live and via deposition was Tuesday, May 26th and was actually the day before the in limine motions were to be filed.

And I think the idea was to try to present to the Court a context so that both we could -- so that the parties could both meet the in limine deadline date as well as the trial witness list date deadline.

THE COURT: Well, it seems to me by reading

through these objections that you have a pretty good idea of where the motions in limine are going to come in, right?

I mean. I think the plaintiffs' steering

I mean, I think the plaintiffs' steering committee suggested that we do this format and it seemed to me to be a good idea at the time. But, I am I guess rethinking that, and I just don't see the point in going through these issue-by-issue when I am going to revisit them again on a motion in limine.

So, do we need to adjust the motion in limine schedule? I mean I am happy to move the schedule forward a little bit to give us more time.

MS. C. JONES: Your Honor, I think we will be guided by whatever Your Honor wants to do. We do have a series -- I think we chose that date because you have got a series of Daubert motions and dispositive motions --

THE COURT: Before that.

 $\mbox{MS. C. JONES: } \mbox{--} \mbox{that will come right before }$ that and I $\mbox{--}$

MR. MILLIG: I think we were back filling dates based on the trial date, Your Honor, and then it sort of squeezed.

MS. C. JONES: I think the truth of the matter is, we ended up with a much more squeezed,

compressed schedule than perhaps any one of us would have liked, just by the way it fell out.

But, I think frankly the real lawyers that do the real work putting together these briefs and all would prefer not to move the motion date, the motions in limine --

THE COURT: Forward.

MS. C. JONES: -- forward, if we can avoid it just because there will be some pretty extensive

Daubert motions and some dispositive motions and I know that just yesterday at a deposition the plaintiffs indicated, I am told by one of my partners, that they intended to file a supplemental report on an expert that has already been deposed and he would have to be deposed again, and Your Honor has already given some leeway on the filing of those Daubert motions. So, we will certainly do whatever the Court asks.

THE COURT: Well, are we on too ambitious of a schedule to get this tried beginning June 22nd with all of the motions practice? I mean we are really talking about making substantial trial rulings pretrial, which is what happens frequently in civil cases.

But, I am just -- I am questioning, I guess, whether we are on too ambitious a schedule to pick a

jury on June 22nd given the Daubert motions, the dispositive motions, and then the motions in limine, which really involve an in-depth discussion of trial issues pretrial.

So, I don't want to get into a point where we are compressing all of that just to meet a trial date that we have chosen. We can choose another one, frankly.

MS. C. JONES: I think Your Honor, in large part, that is dependent upon Your Honor's preferences and I think you are going to have -- there is a point in time which we don't get the work done and then unfortunately you are going to have a series of that and it will be a -- I think it will be a full month between the filing of the motions and getting all of those things accomplished.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. C. JONES: And from my standpoint we will do whatever Your Honor wishes, but I think there will be a substantial amount of time that's involved if we are going to go through an argument like that.

THE COURT: Right. And I want to do the right thing by all of these motions, and that's --

MR. MILLIG: Your Honor, obviously it is your call. I was just going to throw out, and I don't know

if this is something that Ms. Jones would be agreeable to, but in terms of preparing the testimony and some of the major issues and as Your Honor has noted, the repetitive nature of the motions in limine, I am wondering if it is not possible for us to identify the evidentiary issues, forgetting about the experts, Dauberts and dispositive motions, but they are going to be evident.

The defendants are going to move to keep out any discussion of an advisory committee. The defendants are going to move to keep out any discussion of, essentially, as we have seen, and I don't want to overstate it, but if there is something negative there may be a motion attached, something negative that came out about Tylenol, there may be a motion to try to exclude it.

The question is whether -- the real question, the big question, Your Honor addressed it at the last conference when you said isn't the issue what was being discussed and how you reacted to it, can we get those motions in, which may already be done from the previous case, and ruled on at an earlier junction before we get to the Daubert motions, and so then we have an evidentiary framework for what this case is going to look like and what, if anything, the Court would

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exclude on evidentiary grounds.
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That being said, coming back to a trial date and moving the schedule we can meet and confer, we can talk to Your Honor, but that is completely your call.

THE COURT: Well, how many motions in limine do we expect?

MR. MILLIG: Not too many from us.

THE COURT: I am not worried about you.

MR. MILLIG: I know.

MS. C. JONES: Your Honor, I think that we submitted like two months ago, I hadn't counted on that, but we got what we submitted to Your Honor as kind of an outline of what we knew would be included.

(Pause in proceedings.)

MS. C. JONES: I think there are about 50 different issues, 30 different motions, but some would be combined. I mean, that was the preliminary stuff when we put it together probably at the time we were talking about this, and I have got -- I mean, I have got a copy I would give.

We have 30 and they have 15. We have 30, the plaintiffs listed 15.

THE COURT: So, we are looking at 45 motions

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    in limine?
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              MR. MILLIG: Your Honor, we had 15 the last
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           The plaintiff, the young girl, had a lot of
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    psychiatric issues which are not applicable in this
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           That's why I said I believe it dropped
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    dramatically.
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              THE COURT: Okay. So, you think you will
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    still have around 30? Is that what you did in New
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    Jersey? You had about 30 motions, and the same kind of
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    evidence, essentially?
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              MS. C. JONES: Generally, Your Honor, yes,
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              THE COURT: All right. Okay. So, your
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    number won't be 15, but it might be --
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              MR. MILLIG: Mr. Berman tells me I may have
15
    misspoken.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
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              MR. BERMAN: We had previously provided an
18
    anticipated list and I haven't counted it. I have it
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    with me here.
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              THE COURT: Okay. I don't have it in front
    of me.
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              MR. BERMAN: I don't want to be held to 15 or
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not, but it certainly would be less than the number the defendants would submit.

THE COURT: Right. Okay. Melissa, what's

anyway.

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    the deadline for the motions, is it the 22nd of May?
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               MS. A. JONES: Motions in limine is May 27th.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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               (Pause in proceedings.)
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               THE COURT: That's the filing deadline.
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    What's the responsive?
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               MS. A. JONES:
                              June 10th.
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               THE COURT: June 10th. Okay.
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               (Pause in proceedings.)
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               THE COURT: All right. I think it is
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    unlikely that we will try this case June 22nd for
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    planning purposes. I am spending the week in
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    Washington around that June -- I think it is that week
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    of June 10th at the judicial conference committee
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    meetings and then I am just not sure that I can do 45
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    motions in limine in a week and do it any justice.
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              So, I guess we won't know in terms of the
    length of the trial until dispositive motions, Daubert
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    motions and motions in limine are ruled on, right?
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    we could be looking at two weeks, we could be looking
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    at four weeks.
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              MS. C. JONES: Your Honor, I think we said
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    earlier two and the plaintiffs perhaps said three, but
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    I would think we would get it done within three weeks
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THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let me think about that. I just don't -- I don't see in two weeks being able to address 45 of those motions and do the right thing. So, let me talk to Melissa, look at our calendar and we will have to talk about a trial date with all of you some time in the next couple of weeks.

All right. Dispute over the 30(b)(6) depositions. Tell me what is going on there.

MR. MILLIG: Your Honor, earlier on in the year I was not part of this initial notice. We -- may I approach, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MILLIG: We served an admittedly overly broad 30(b)(6) deposition designation for issues that we thought we needed to finish up before this next trial that we did not finish before the Lyles trial.

Subsequent to that I reached out to counsel for the defendant and I said -- well, specifically a gentleman named Mr. Mayes (ph), and I said, "Mr. Mayes, I realize that our 30(b)(6) is overly broad and I would like to cut to the chase of exactly what it is I want to understand from a corporate standpoint and be able to articulate for the jury."

And it boiled down to two areas that we

- 1 discussed in the tutorial. The first area that I want
- 2 to talk to a corporate representative on, Your Honor,
- 3 and this is a lengthy document, but the categories, the
- 4 matters for examination are on page four.
- 5 The first category that I want to talk to
- 6 corporate designee on concerns physicians use and
- 7 recommendations and prescriptions for Tylenol at four
- 8 grams, which is the maximum daily dose.
- 9 And as we talked about in the tutorial, our
- 10 case is that the defendants have known for a long time
- that there is evidence that at four grams this or close
- 12 to it this can be dangerous.
- And so I said that's the first area that I
- want to talk to you about because your slogan is the
- 15 number one recommended by doctors, yet we see documents
- in your files that indicate that you have done surveys
- where only 27 percent of doctors are recommending
- 18 Tylenol at the maximum recommended dose, and to the
- 19 plaintiff that means that doctors indicate this may be
- 20 dangerous, and that is notice, we believe.
- 21 The second category is the manner in which
- 22 McNeil communicates about literature in the -- that is
- 23 published to doctors, and we have multiple memoranda
- going to sales force, for example, and I have given
- 25 Your Honor a copy of one from January, 2002, about

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Tylenol and at the end of this memo after it is explained to the sales force what the article is about it says do not initiate conversations with physicians.

So, I had two categories and what I ended up doing is when I went back to draft the notice I just made it -- I noticed that there were three specific documents that I wanted to -- types of documents that I wanted to discuss that were related to category one.

So, as to physician usage there is a category about what are called physician attitude and use of surveys. And so this is an example of a summary of one and it is attached to your packet.

And we want to explore with the defendant all physician and attitude surveys that they have done, what do they show, why were they done, and specifically what do they show about what physicians think about Tylenol at four grams which is where we say the product is dangerous.

Then, I realized that there is a second category which is the same topic, but there is a -- in 2004 internally a marketing campaign began that was called Tylenol safety and efficacy at four grams per I have attached that document.

That is the document in which in a marketing meeting the research found that physicians state the

- four grams a day is close to an unsafe dose and
- 2 recommend two and a half grams. So, I want to know why
- was this done, what was the purpose, what was done once
- 4 you knew to do this.
- 5 And then the third document was what is
- 6 called protocol 85055 in which this document talks
- 7 about a pervasive problem that less than half of
- 8 healthcare providers recommend Tylenol at the maximum
- 9 recommended dose.
- So, I just broke my first category into three
- 11 categories, and they all deal with what do doctors
- 12 generally think about our product at the four gram
- 13 maximum daily dose.
- 14 And then the second category is how do we
- 15 talk to sales professionals about our -- and do we tell
- 16 doctors -- talk to doctors about adverse literature or
- do we instruct our sales representatives not to
- 18 initiate discussions.
- 19 I had a conversation with the defense and the
- 20 defense has agreed to produce a witness only on the
- 21 attitude and usage study, and the attitude and usage
- 22 studies and on the manner in which we talk to
- 23 salespeople, but they have said they will not produce a
- 24 witness on this Tylenol safety and efficacy campaign at
- 25 four grams, which is the same topic.

Nor will they produce a witness on protocol 98-055 which talks about how physicians are not prescribing at four grams, which talks about the financial impact and which talks about what we need to do as a company is to create some safety research for these doctors.

I think that this is a little bit -- I am not really sure how we got to this point other than I was told we are just not going to do these other two categories, Clay.

I said well, there are two categories, I just broke them into four very short categories. I could take each of these depositions in two and a half hours. I just want to know who was involved, what were they thinking, why did they do it, what were the results.

And then for each category, these four, I have asked the defendants, Your Honor, to please produce the relevant documents and the reason the PSC asked for them to produce the relevant documents is because the documents in this case, as the Court knows, were produced electronically, and if I search our database for a physician attitude and usage I might get seven thousand documents, but I am not going to get them and they are sitting in McNeil's

headquarters.

And so I was told by the defense I am not producing the documents, it has been over 30 days and you are not getting any documents, even though you have sent us a valid document request with 30 days notice.

And so bottom line is I have agreed to two of these categories, they are very short and distinct categories. I have sent exemplar documents so they knew exactly what the categories were.

I simply want to know about each one of these documents because they relate to physicians attitudes about four grams, why was it done, what were the results, what were the years that it was done, what did you do about it? Did you tell anybody about it, what was your thinking about it and I have only been given two of these categories on May 19th.

And I would ask the Court, because this obviously goes to one of the hearts of our case, which is that if physicians believe that four grams a day is even close to an unsafe dose, we are going to suggest to the jury that that is something the consumer should know, because that is part of the risk profile of this drug and that is something that consumers should be able to take into account when they decide how much

- 1 they want to use.
- 2 If they know that -- and so if McNeil knows
- 3 and has known for years that doctors are not giving the
- 4 maximum recommended daily dose, I want to explore it.
- ⁵ I can do it quickly and we just ask the Court to allow
- 6 us to have the last two categories.
- 7 THE COURT: So, what is the relevance of that
- 8 in the case?
- 9 MR. MILLIG: Oh, it is notice.
- THE COURT: It is notice to McNeil.
- MR. MILLIG: Notice to McNeil that the
- medical profession at large, doctors across the country
- 13 are not giving patients four grams a day because they
- 14 as doctors believe that four grams a day puts those
- patients at potential risk and that the maximum they
- are giving is two and a half per day.
- 17 THE COURT: So, it is notice to McNeil of
- what?
- MR. MILLIG: Notice to McNeil that there may
- 20 be a risk, or it is an additional line of evidence that
- points to a signal that there may be a risk to
- 22 consumers at or near four grams if doctors across the
- 23 country are routinely telling you we don't give four
- 24 grams.
- Therefore, number one, we have to put that in

with all of our other evidence and decide what are we going to do about it, should we investigate it, do we correlate that data with what we see in our adverse events with what other outside organizations are saying?

Number two, it is do we inform consumers.

Number three, do we consider lowering the dose to be more in line with what physicians feel is comfortable or do we try and bring physicians to us.

The cases we have talked about is the -- the plaintiffs' position is that Tylenol is a risk -- the defective nature is only when this product is taken at four grams. You take it for a headache all day long.

We showed the Court the tutorial, the data going back to the 1970s and the medical articles and the FDA's analysis and the databases all saying four grams in some individuals on some days can result in damage to your liver.

Now, as I have pointed out when you market your product as the one most recommended by doctors, but behind the scenes you know that at four grams doctors aren't recommending your products, we would suggest that is not being candid --

THE COURT: Is that notice of a defect or is that notice -- or is that just some sort of marketing

issue?

MR. MILLIG: Oh, it is through their notice. It is in essence a form of pharmacovigilance. It is understanding in the real world what is happening with your product. And in the real world the gentlemen with the white coats are saying we are not comfortable giving four grams.

experts possibly more than individual article where a doctor writes about a case, if doctors generally across the country are unwilling to give four grams, only 27 percent, and McNeil is aware of that, the question is what have they done with that information in terms of analyzing in terms of the risk profile of their drug. And then how have they communicated that to consumers. In this case they continue to communicate to consumers it is the number one most recommended.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Abernathy?

MR. ABERNATHY: Your Honor, Mr. Millig
suggested a moment ago that he didn't understand how we
got to this point in terms of a dispute over the four
topics. Let me tell you exactly how we got to this
point.

This specific notice of these topics were the subject of a meet and confer between Mr. Millig and Mr.

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Mayes. And the outcome of that meet and confer was documented by Mr. Millig. It is in the e-mail which is document number 198-2 on the docket. It is Exhibit 2 to your agenda.

It covers two topics. And the two topics are on the notice. They are topics one and topic four. My point being very simple, there was a meet and confer and an agreement.

Mr. Millig told you a lot about, you know, expanding this topic or that topic, we are not clarifying or expanding topics. We made a deal and he is retrading the deal. And, Your Honor, that just doesn't work.

There are a lot of discovery issues in these cases. Your Honor expects the parties to meet and confer and try to make agreements and that's exactly what we did in this case.

If we get to retrade the deal after we make the deal it just doesn't work and we can't resolve things. And I know Mr. Millig, he wants to get up. He wants to get up right now. Your Honor, just read the e-mail and read topics one and four. Those are the topics. That was what was agreed on.

THE COURT: Do I have that e-mail in these papers?

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MR. MILLIG: You do, Your Honor.

MR. ABERNATHY: It is Exhibit 2 to the agenda, Your Honor. It was docketed as 198-2. one is "McNeil surveys of physician attitudes and uses of acetaminophen the company or outside consultants perform."

THE COURT: Yes. I don't have it. Do you have a copy of it?

MR. MILLIG: I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. ABERNATHY: And that is topic one on the notice which I think Mr. Millig gave you a minute ago and I think was attached to the agenda. McNeil's direction to its professional sales force regarding how to discuss or if to discuss literature on acetaminophen with physicians.

That is item number two on his e-mail, that is topic number four on the notice. Those are the two topics. We agreed to produce witnesses on those topics. The notice as to topics that weren't agreed to and weren't documented as agreed to in the e-mail, and it is really as simple as that. But, there is a little more context to this.

This is not a new topic, Your Honor, the marketing and public relations and related topics.

- Your Honor will remember that we spent a lot of time
- ² discussing these subjects at earlier case management
- 3 conferences and there was a very broad notice early in
- 4 the case.
- We had a fairly extensive debate about that
- 6 subject early in 2014 and ultimately the scope of that
- 7 notice was narrowed, but earlier in the case we agreed
- 8 to produce I believe it was six witnesses covering the
- 9 five primary subjects in the original notice on
- marketing, public relations and related issues.
- So, what ultimately happened is that the
- 12 plaintiffs took one of those witnesses, Ms. Fallon, for
- two days, and they didn't take the rest of the
- witnesses on the rest of the topics.
- Now, at that time Your Honor will remember
- that there was a trial coming up in New Jersey, the
- 17 Lyles trial and there was a lot of pressure on the
- 18 parties. That trial wound up getting pushed back and
- 19 ultimately that case got settled in September, 2014.
- But, that is seven, eight months ago. And
- 21 none of the rest of this got done in the meantime. So,
- 22 now we are revisiting the subject of marketing related
- 23 depositions at the eleventh hour in this Bellwether
- 24 case where we also have to deal with Daubert motions
- 25 and expert depositions and all of this other stuff.

So, we reach an agreement on two topics and now the two topics become four topics. Mr. Millig told you a minute ago these topics go to the heart of their case. If this is the heart of their case I am not really sure why none of this was getting done in the many months that have been passing when this deposition could have been taken.

The two related -- the two added topics, the ones that weren't part of our deal and are added in the notice, one is described as -- let me look at the notice, "Defendants' safe and effective at G campaign."

We did not have a safe and effective at G marketing campaign.

The other added topic was the entirety of protocol 98-055. Protocol 98-055 doesn't relate to a marketing effort or activity. It was a dosing study relating to acetaminophen. It is a whole different topic than marketing or public relations. And by the way it has not been unexplored in discovery.

The vice president, former vice president of medical affairs at McNeil, Dr. Temple, who is the person you would ask about that sort of thing, has been asked about that sort of thing. He was just deposed on it at length in his deposition, I think, last month.

So, the only other point I wanted to address,

- 1 Your Honor was --
- THE COURT: Was Dr. Temple asked about this
- 3 protocol 98-055?
- 4 MR. ABERNATHY: Yes, he was deposed March. I
- 5 think it was March 20th. In his depositions starting
- at page 232, there is a number of pages of questions
- 7 about this study. 2014, sorry.
- 8 THE COURT: Right.
- 9 MR. ABERNATHY: It was not last month, it was
- 10 2014. I had my months wrong. But, that study was the
- subject of deposition testimony and it could have been
- the subject presumably of a 30(b)(6) notice at any time
- since then if that was something that the plaintiffs
- 14 felt they needed to do.
- The only other topic that I want to address
- is the documents. Your Honor, a 30(b)(6) notice is not
- a do over on document production that has already
- occurred and it is not a mechanism by which one party
- can say you've produced a bunch of documents on these
- 20 topics but you now have to go search for me the
- 21 documents that you have already produced to me to find
- 22 the documents that I am going to want to use at
- 23 deposition. That is not how it works.
- 24 When we produce documents if you want to
- 25 depose my witnesses about those documents then get the

 documents out of the production, review them, figure out what you want to ask about it and then ask about it. So, certainly we can't be required to not only produce a 30(b)(6) witness, but also do their document preparation for the deposition for them.

Again, Your Honor, to me the fundamental point here, read the notice, read Mr. Millig's e-mail. I know he has already argued and he is now going to get up and argue a second time that it is not a change of the deal, it is a change of the deal.

And if this is how we are going to proceed, I can make an agreement with you on a meet and confer, here are my two topics, and now I am going to change my mind to do four, if that is how we have to proceed that's how we have to proceed, but I don't know how we are going to get anything resolved by agreement if that is how we have to proceed.

30(b)(6) people, I mean for these four topics?

MR. ABERNATHY: I don't know whether it would be a different individual, but the point is that we negotiated and reached agreement on the topics that would be covered and we are prepared to produce

THE COURT: But, would they be different

witnesses on those topics that we agreed to.

THE COURT: Mr. Millig?

MR. MILLIG: Your Honor, I was on the phone call and respectfully counsel was not. And I wrote the e-mail and I did. I stand by the e-mail. But, when I went to grab the notice, because I want to talk about research that McNeil or outside consultants has done regarding physicians use at four grams the documents that I had in front of me naturally, Your Honor, concerned research.

One that I was talking to Mr. Mayes about, one is consider attitudes. Here is research that says "Market research indicates physicians use four grams a day" -- "Market research and field observations state four grams a day is close to an unsafe dose, currently recommend 2.5 dose a day." That's the same topic.

And this protocol 98-055, there is a study in the back, study 103, Your Honor may have seen it, but I don't believe, and I may be wrong, but I took Dr.

Temple, that this protocol 98-055, which is also research on physician usage page one, a pervasive problem, less than half of healthcare providers recommend the maximum daily dose.

All I did was, Your Honor, as I am drafting the notice I thought it would be easier to put it into four categories. If we want to have them in two categories, all three of these documents fall under

- 1 category one. And that is why I was surprised when I
- ² was told that I couldn't take the depositions.
- THE COURT: All right. Who --
- MR. ABERNATHY: And just to be clear, Your
- ⁵ Honor, I was not on the phone call. It was Mr. Mayes.
- 6 THE COURT: Okay.
- 7 MR. ABERNATHY: Mr. Mayes wrote a detailed
- 8 letter to Mr. Millig addressing these same issues. So,
- 9 I think Mr. Millig is trying to suggest to you well,
- Mr. Abernathy doesn't really know because he wasn't on
- 11 the call.
- What I am communicating to you is exactly
- what Mr. Mayes has already communicated to Mr. Millig,
- what the agreement was in their meet and confer.
- THE COURT: Right. Do we know who the
- 16 30(b)(6) person would be to talk about these?
- MR. MILLIG: The defendants have identified a
- gentleman to talk about -- his name escapes me, to talk
- 19 about McNeil's correspondence and instructions to its
- 20 sales force as its sales force goes out to discuss
- 21 literature, and McNeil has identified a woman, I
- believe, to talk about -- or maybe I have got them
- 23 backwards, their Tylenol attitude and usage studies.
- 24 And so I don't know if it would be a
- 25 different person. All I did was I had these documents

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in front of me and they all to me talked about research, about physicians usage at four grams. when I wrote the notice I thought it would just be easier and more simple to talk about them separately.

But, three of the documents are category one and one is category two.

THE COURT: It seems to me the scope of the deposition is pretty focused, right?

MR. MILLIG: That's what I was trying to do, make it very focused and tight. I said we could do --

THE COURT: And so it -- how long do you need with these people?

MR. MILLIG: We are going to do two of them easily in one day and I could easily do the other two in two days. These are who, what, when, where, why depositions. What did you do with this information, why were you concerned, what did you think about it, who was involved in the analysis, what was the impact from a pharmacovigilance standpoint when you learned.

We have documents, we have one document back to 1989 where doctors were not prescribing four grams. Why have you continued to market this as the one recommended by doctors, number one recommended by doctors when you know doctors generally from your own research may not be comfortable with your maximum

recommended dose.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ABERNATHY: Your Honor, we designated a witness named Christina Tonielli (ph) to testify on topic one of Mr. Millig's notice exactly as he wrote it.

I think it cannot fairly be said that, for example, the issue of the entirety of protocol 98-055 falls within topic one, that is just wrong. And I cannot tell you that that witness is going to be able to address that topic in full. They are just not the same thing at all.

We designated a gentleman named John Duke to testify on the second item, which is topic four in the notice. He will be produced and testify to topic four in the notice, but in our view the other topics are not subsumed within the two that are agreed to, and so you know, maybe Mr. Millig is thinking these are exactly the same and so these witnesses will have to be prepared to testify on all four topics, but that is just not so.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ABERNATHY: There is no reference at all to protocol 98-055 or the subject of that protocol in Mr. Millig's e-mail to Mr. Mayes, and there is no

reference to the other topic in his e-mail to Mr. Mayes.

So, the decisions that were made on which witnesses to produce and on what basis were based on those two topics that were agreed to and described in the e-mail.

MR. MILLIG: But, respectfully, Mr.

Abernathy, I also said I was going to send documents to help you and number two, there is research right on the second page of protocol 98-055 that says "A pervasive fact, less than half of healthcare providers recommend the maximum daily dose and McNeil found out that only 23 percent of hospital residents would give it and 33 percent of office based physicians."

And so that is what we were talking about, was discovering from the company as a general proposition what did they want, what did they learn, what did they think, what did they do when they found out that doctors across the country would not give the maximum recommended dose, which we say can cause in some cases hepatotoxity (ph).

A couple of other things, Your Honor, and I know this is going on too long. First of all, the e-mail -- this began back in January, the meet and confer was in February, I have been offered a witness

May 19th.

And third it has been throughout this litigation we have worked with Ms. Alyson Jones from time-to-time when we said Ms. Jones, we have ten million documents in a computer database that we cannot see.

Can you identify or help us identify certain Bates ranges so we can be sure we go in to depose somebody on a specific issue that we have, for example, all of the attitude and usage studies, because if we type in attitude and usage studies to the database we might get 50,000 hits that we would have to look at individually in a web browser. And they have bene very cooperative with us, that's why I sent the request for documents, again, for efficiency.

So, we can just really quickly talk about these two issues which I broke into four after looking at the documents.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. A. JONES: Your Honor, just to clear the record, I have never pointed out specific deposition -- specific exhibits to be used at a deposition, certainly on the context of a 30(b)(6).

THE COURT: I think his point was you helped in a document search.

MS. A. JONES: I have always tried to be helpful with document searches.

> THE COURT: Right. I would hope so, yes. MS. A. JONES: But, not in the context of a

deposition.

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THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. ABERNATHY: These are broad document demands covering broad subject areas in the deposition notice. I mean, you know, these are pretty broad categories and the notice purports to impose upon us an affirmative obligation to produce all documents within the scope of those descriptions and I don't think that that is a reasonable use of a 30(b)(6) notice when the documents have been produced. It is not a tool to require the other party to cull the already produced documents for you on a specific subject you want to question about.

Obviously, we are happy to talk to them about specific document issues and be as helpful if we can, but I don't think they are entitled to enforce a broad document demand that duplicates documents already produced in the case.

THE COURT: All right. Well, it looks to me like the objection -- essentially there is a misunderstanding or a lack of understanding about what

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was agreed to.

There is the e-mail of February 24, 2015.

There is the notice of deposition filed subsequent to that and the defendants' position seems to be there was an agreement and now the deposition notice expands on that agreement.

It looks to me from a review of these documents, while counsel are arguing, that there is some -- there is certainly some relevance to the documents and to the issues in the case.

And it does appear that the subject matter of these 30(b)(6) depositions would be focused on those specific issues. I am concerned about the request for production of documents.

I think the defendant has a good point, that that is perhaps a broader request than these documents that you showed me that you want to question the witness about.

I mean are these -- the documents you are requesting in Exhibit B pertinent to these documents you handed up?

MR. MILLIG: All right. So, if for example if the Court was to look at the memo, the one-page memo summarizing -- that starts in 2003 the Tylenol brand.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MILLIG: So, that -- the bottom line is I just want to make sure, Your Honor, before I take this deposition that when I walk in I have all of the consumer attitudes. If they are done at 15 years then I would like to make sure that I have the 15 consumer attitude uses studies that I have.

It is very difficult with ten million documents in a hypothetical electronic database to locate those attitude and usage studies. We know that they have more because it says that this work was the latest in a series of attitude and usage studies that was once conducted on a bi-annual basis. Unfortunately there was a five-year hiatus since the last one was fielded.

All I am asking for is assistance and if they would work with us as they have in the past to help us either through the company, not the lawyers, the search terms that would get us the attitude and usage surveys, that's fantastic.

That's all. I just want to make sure that we have what we need and it is very difficult when we get to this narrow of a point, as you said, I am trying to make this very efficient, to make sure I have the documents and so we can just click through them.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. ABERNATHY: Well, I understand the
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    problem, Your Honor, but when you take discovery that
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    spans decades and you ask for and get millions and
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    millions of documents and then you say gee, it is
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    really hard for me to be sure I have everything, am I
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    now supposed to be responsible for making sure that he
    found everything he wanted for his deposition because
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    it is a lot of work for him to find it in the document
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    production? I don't think we can be made responsible
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    for that.
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              I am not sure where we are, Your Honor, on
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    the scope of the deposition topics, but I am concerned
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    that, you know, Mr. Millig's view is oh, these are all
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    the same two topics, just elaborated on and expanded,
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    we don't think they are and I am concerned that we are
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    now going to go take the deposition and we are going to
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    wind up with issues about whether the witness is fully
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    responding to the scope, because if his interpretation
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    is two and three are just part of one and four, well we
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    are going to produce witnesses on one and four.
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              But, if he actually covers everything in two
    and three, I think he is going to be asking a lot of
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    questions that those witnesses weren't designated for
    and weren't prepared for.
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              THE COURT: All right.
                                       I will permit the
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deposition on the four categories contained in matters for examination. I will encourage the parties to cooperate on the narrowing the search for the documents that would be pertinent to these four exhibits. It does seem reasonably focused.

I think we should probably get that deposition done before May 19th. You are saying that that is when the witness was offered?

MR. MILLIG: That's the date it was provided, yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ABERNATHY: I don't know anything, to be candid, about the witness's situations and availability because Mr. Mayes was involved in that and I was not.

So, I don't really know why the date was chosen.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Would these depositions impact the dispositive motions or motions in limine? Probably not the dispositive motions.

MR. MILLIG: Probably not the dispositive motions. The defense may want to argue to keep this information out. We have agreed, Your Honor, that these depositions all, right now, are all going to be taken at the Drinker Biddle office here in Philadelphia. It has all been set.

When I saw May 19th I just thought I would

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    raise that it is kind of late, but in candor we are
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    taking experts throughout May 8. So, I am fine with
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    the date.
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               THE COURT: Work together on the date then.
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    If May 19th is the best you can do it is the best you
 6
    can do.
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              MR. MILLIG: Okay.
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               THE COURT: But, I will permit the 30(b)(6)
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    depositions on these four categories. Okay. We are
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    going to wrap it up at this point. And as I said, I
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    will confer with Melissa and we will give some thought
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    to whether we need to adjust the trial schedule.
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              Do we have another conference? What is the
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    date? Do we know? Do we know the date of the next
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    conference?
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              MR. BERMAN: I will look, Your Honor.
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    thought it was maybe May?
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              MS. A. JONES: It is May 20th.
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              THE COURT: Okay. I think we should have a
20
    telephone conference maybe in a week and talk about
21
    scheduling issues. Okay.
                               So, let me look at my
22
    schedule and then I will ask Melissa to be in touch
23
    with you as to when we can get together on the phone.
24
    Okay?
25
              MR. MILLIG:
                           This may be premature, but there
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was one more thing on the agenda. I just wanted to know -- this is more from I think from both sides, we had talked -- our respective paralegals had put together an exhibit list last year for Lyles, and we didn't know if there was somebody either in you alls office or in the courthouse generally that they could work with to find out how you like the exhibit list, and to the extent there is a way to use some of the format that was already generated. This is more of a paralegal request that we talked about. I don't know who to bring that to.

MS. A. JONES: I think we can talk about this on the telephone conference if that suits Your Honor.

THE COURT: I am happy to do that.

MR. MILLIG: That would be great.

THE COURT: That's fine. Okay. Thank you.

All right. With that we are adjourned.

ALL: Thank you, Your Honor.

(Proceedings adjourned at 12:22 p.m.)

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CERTIFICATION

I, Brad Anders, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript from the electronic sound recordings of the proceedings in the above-captioned matter.

De Brad Ande: