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                       UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                        SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
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                            EASTERN DIVISION
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     IN RE: PORSCHE CARS NORTH
     AMERICA, INC., PLASTIC COOLANT ) CASE NO.: 2-11-MD-2233
 5
     TUBES PRODUCTS LIABILITY
                                         MARCH 10, 2014
                                     )
     LITIGATION
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               TRANSCRIPT OF FAIRNESS HEARING PROCEEDINGS
                  BEFORE THE HONORABLE GREGORY L. FROST
 8
                    MONDAY, MARCH 10, 2014; 9:00 A.M.
 9
                              COLUMBUS, OHIO
10
    APPEARANCES:
11
    FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:
                                   SHENNAN KAVANAGH, ESQUIRE
                                   GREGORY M. TRAVALIO, ESQUIRE
12
                                   MARK D. LANDES, ESQUIRE
                                   DANIEL A. SCHLANGER, ESQUIRE
                                   ERIC J. BUESCHER, ESQUIRE
13
                                   JOHN E. TANGREN, ESQUIRE
14
                                   MARK H. TROUTMAN, ESQUIRE
                                   WILLIAM H. HOESE, ESQUIRE
15
                                   PATRICK DONOVAN, ESQUIRE
                                   WILLIAM F. KINIRY, JR., ESQUIRE
16
    FOR THE DEFENDANT:
                                   MATTHEW A. GOLDBERG, ESQUIRE
17
                                   TERRANCE M. MILLER, ESQUIRE
                                   JEFFREY GATES, ESQUIRE
18
     INTERESTED PARTY:
                                  MARY ELLEN KALANGE, PRO SE
19
20
21
22
          Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript
     produced by computer.
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24
                 DENISE N. ERRETT, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
                             (614) 719-3029
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1
                          Monday Morning Session
 2
                              March 10, 2014
                                 9:00 a.m.
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 5
     IN OPEN COURT:
               THE COURT: Would you call the case, please?
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 7
               COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: The Court calls Case Number
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     2:11-MD-2233, In Re: Porsche Cars, North America,
     Incorporated, Plastic Coolant Tubes Product Liability
 9
10
     Litigation.
11
               THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Kepler, again.
12
               Let the record reflect that today's date is Monday,
13
     March 10, 2014. We are meeting today for an approval of the
14
     class-action settlement agreement pursuant to Civil Rule 23(a).
15
               I want to introduce for the record those who are here
16
     on behalf of the plaintiff and defendant.
17
               Mark Landes -- Mark decided to show up on the last
18
     day here, apparently. Mark Landes, Greg Travalio, Mark
19
     Troutman, Shennan Kavanagh, John Tangren, Eric Buescher, I
20
     think, Bill Hoese, Dan Schlanger and Patrick Donovan on behalf
21
     of the plaintiffs.
22
               Is that correct?
23
               MR. TRAVALIO: Yes, Your Honor.
24
               THE COURT: And could whoever is Eric Buescher -- I
25
     apologize.
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1
               MR. BUESCHER: Busher (phonetic), Your Honor.
 2
               THE COURT: I apologize. How is it?
               MR. BUESCHER: Busher (phonetic).
 3
               THE COURT: Buescher. All right.
 4
 5
               And Bill Hoese?
 6
               MR. HOESE: Hosee (phonetic), Your Honor.
 7
               THE COURT: Hoese.
               All right. I didn't get either of them right.
 8
 9
               On behalf of defendant, William Kiniry, Jr.; Matthew
10
     Goldberg; Terry Miller; and Jeffrey Gates are present.
11
               Is that correct?
12
               MR. KINIRY: That's correct, Your Honor.
13
               THE COURT: Thank you.
14
               I've got my former law clerk, Vlad, in the back, who
15
     apparently is just curious in this matter.
16
               MR. BELO: Good morning, Judge.
17
               THE COURT: Good morning, Vlad. How are you?
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               MR. BELO: All right.
               THE COURT: As I said, this is a hearing, a fairness
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20
     hearing, pursuant to Civil Rule 23(e). This is set to
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     preliminarily approve the proposed settlement agreement, to
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     insure the members of the class were given notice of the
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     proposed settlement agreement, and then to hold this hearing to
24
     determine whether the proposed settlement agreement is fair,
25
     reasonable, and adequate.
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fact. So, after the two years of litigation, the parties were fully apprized of the strengths and weaknesses of their respective claims and defenses.

23

24

The parties were then prepared to enter into informed settlement negotiations. And they spent several months in negotiations, which included four full-day mediation sessions before a mediator who is experienced in products liability class actions and who is reputable; and that was Thomas Rutter of ADR Options.

Settling the case now is very beneficial to the class, Your Honor. It avoids prolonged litigation. It avoids the risk the class members may receive nothing should they lose the litigation. Over time, we may lose class members as vehicles go off the road. It avoids increased costs.

The notice in this litigation was beneficial because many class members may not have been aware that there is a potential issue with their coolant pipes. So merely receiving notice of the issue is beneficial to class members who may want to do something about the coolant pipes.

And, in addition, this litigation ended up settling on a national basis. So, it includes all of the potentially affected vehicles and allows everybody who has replaced or wishes to replace the coolant pipes an opportunity to receive benefits.

The settlement has received overwhelming support,
Your Honor. The parties both support the settlement. The
mediator, who has provided a declaration in this case,
expressed his support for the settlement.

Notice was sent out, under the Class Action Fairness
Act, to 50 states' attorneys general; and not a single attorney
general took objection to the settlement.

And, most importantly, the class overwhelmingly supports the settlement, Your Honor. Of approximately 42,000 class vehicles that may be entitled to relief here, there was only four timely opt-outs, and I believe there may have just been one other request for an opt-out that was untimely. There was only 12 objections. And, in contrast, as of Friday, March 7th, there were 4,235 claims submitted. And the claims period remains open through December 12th, 2014. So it's likely there will continue to be claims coming in through that time. And, in addition the claims have not significantly petered off since notice went out.

We were reviewing a week-by-week submission of the claims coming in. And, even as of last week, the claims that were coming in were substantial, close to 100 per week, on average.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. KAVANAGH: In addition, as Your Honor knows, we have requested to modify the settlement agreement based on the ambiguity of the claims period. And, as part of that modification, we have requested to send additional notice out to class members to inform them of the deadline and their ability to make claims. So, it's very likely that, upon

receiving a second notice, class members who may have overlooked the first notice will be reminded of their opportunity to receive benefits, and it's likely to generate more claims in that regard.

The Court preliminarily approved the settlement on August 26, 2013, at which time the Court approved the form of notice agreed upon by the parties and the notice plan, as well as the claims form. The Court found then that the notice and the notice plan comport with due process requirements.

The administrator disseminated the notice according to the Court's preliminary approval order and has provided a detailed declaration on the record to explain all of the work it did in disseminating notice. It sent notices out to 167,544 current and former owners and lessees in order to ensure that it would capture everybody who at some point in time owned a class vehicle and to find the ones who actually made the replacement or currently own the vehicle so that they will be making the replacement.

So, the people who are entitled to benefits is about 42,000, which represents the class vehicles.

THE COURT: Just to clarify the record, 42,000 plus or minus are the potential owners of vehicles; but, because of the chain-of-title issues, 167,544 packets were sent out?

MS. KAVANAGH: Correct. So, it may be that somebody formerly owned a vehicle, sold it to someone else; that former

owner was not the one who replaced the pipes and is out of pocket for the replacement.

THE COURT: And this also included those that were not only purchased, but leased, also?

MS. KAVANAGH: Correct.

THE COURT: All right. Proceed.

MS. KAVANAGH: There was no formal objections to the notice, Your Honor.

I will note that one of the objectors, Steele, said in his objection that he takes issue with the language in the notice that said you may be eligible to receive partial or complete reimbursement for repairs, because he contends that not everybody is entitled to receive full reimbursement; but, as Your Honor can see, with the language, it's completely accurate.

There are some people that may be entitled to full reimbursement, and there are some people that may be entitled to partial. And the notice was sufficient so that each class member could look, based on his or her specific circumstances, and ascertain the benefit to which they would be entitled.

The Court also preliminarily approved the settlement class for settlement purposes. Nothing has changed since this Court's order on certification for settlement purposes, and nobody has objected to certification of the class for settlement purposes here.

The settlement relief is meaningful and beneficial to class members, Your Honor. It's directly tailored to the claims raised in plaintiffs' complaint, which is that the coolant pipes would prematurely degrade and fracture. It accounts for the uncertainties and risks of litigation at the same time.

As you know, Porsche, had the litigation proceeded, would have fought every single plaintiff's claim until the end in every aspect of that claim. And, given the uncertainties of law and fact in the case, tailoring the settlement as partial reimbursements is appropriate here.

The settlement relief provides the following, Your Honor: For class members who purchased or leased new or approved certified pre-owned vehicles, they would be reimbursed according to the chart set forth in the settlement. And the chart is calibrated based on mileage. The higher the mileage of the vehicle, the lower the percentage of the reimbursement will be.

For purchasers of used vehicles without an approved certified pre-owned warranty, they're entitled to 25 percent of the invoice price paid up to a maximum of \$450 for past replacement and a maximum of \$375 towards a future replacement. And those class members are capped at 120,000 miles.

It's worth noting, Your Honor, that the 120,000 mile is -- there is no limit on the mileage for those who purchased

new vehicles. And that's a particularly substantial benefit as well.

In addition to the reimbursement costs, class members are entitled to, upon showing that they suffered any collateral damage to their vehicles because of the coolant pipe, to receive up to \$500 for collateral damage.

There were 12 pro se objections to the settlement,

Your Honor. And certainly that number weighs heavily in favor

of final approval. The Court should overrule all of the

objections. None of them is sufficient to deprive class

members of the benefits that they wish to receive here.

The categories of objections and the respective objectors that fall within the categories are as follows, Your Honor: Some objectors objected that they're not receiving full compensation under the settlement, and that would be the Johnsons and Kalange.

And I'm going to apologize up front, because there is going to be some names I will surely mispronounce here.

THE COURT: I understand.

MS. KAVANAGH: K-a-l-a-n-g-e.

Probably the largest number of objections, Your

Honor, was based on the calibration for reimbursement

differentiating between new and used vehicles. Those objectors

include O'Quinn, Giammalvo, Levert, Roy, DeCoste, Lucas,

Steele, and Short.

Others objected to the calibration of the mileage for the reimbursement relief. And those two were Fox and Steele.

One objected to the requirement that class members get their repairs done at an authorized Porsche dealership.

And that's Nagler.

Before I address these objections, Your Honor, I do want to point out that nobody objected to the release here, which does not release personal injury claims and which is appropriately limited to the claims in plaintiffs' complaint. And nobody offered a formal objection to the attorneys' fees costs or named plaintiffs' service payments.

One objector objected to what he believed was a limitation on his ability to recover attorneys' fees if his objection prevailed. However, he didn't say that he had an attorney representing him; and, as far as I understand, none of the objectors has an attorney representing them. So, that objection is not relevant here.

Turning to the compensation issues, Your Honor, with respect to the objection that the settlement doesn't provide full compensation, those objections just don't recognize that this is a settlement of disputed claims and that, when you enter into a settlement, you have to compromise in order to reach a resolution that is fair, reasonable, and adequate; and not providing for full compensation to class members which they may have only been entitled to had plaintiffs won at trial is

not a requirement for fairness for a class-action settlement.

The calibration that some of the objectors complained about relating to the new versus used vehicles is also not an objection — should be overruled. Calibrating class members' benefits based on the strengths and weaknesses of their respective claims is entirely appropriate here. They don't consider that, factually, the longer that you drive your vehicle, the more likely it is that there are going to be issues that have arisen that could have contributed to the degradation of the coolant pipes. And, legally, when Porsche is not the direct seller of the vehicle to a class member, that renders the legal claims against Porsche much more uncertain. It's uncertain what could have transpired between Porsche's release of the goods and all of the subsequent holders of those goods.

In addition, Your Honor, I would like to point out that there have been a few recent vehicle class-action settlements very similar to the one before Your Honor that have received final approval for settlements very similar to the one here where they calibrated relief both on new versus used and also on mileage. And one was before the District of New Jersey in 2010. That's Careccio, et al., versus BMW. And the Court held there that, quote, unquote, the settlement is fair and reasonable even though not every member of the class received full compensation. That was a 2010 case.

More recently, in the Northern District of California in 2012, Milligan, et al., versus Toyota Motor, the Court recognized that the settlement involved some line drawing and full compensation is not a prerequisite for a fair settlement.

In Re: Nissan Radiator Transmission Cooler

Litigation, that's from the Southern District of New York in

2013. This was where some of the class members had to

contribute money, themselves, in the form of copayments,

towards the costs of repair. And the Court recognized that

having to submit copayments reflects a reasonable compromise

between the risks of further litigation and benefit of

providing immediate relief to class members who would not

otherwise have received anything absent winning the litigation.

That court also found that tiered relief is not a basis for

rejecting a settlement.

And the last one that I just want to talk about briefly, Your Honor, is Henderson, et al., versus Volvo, and that's a District of New Jersey case in 2013 as well. That court found that the court's role is to determine whether the proposed relief is fair, reasonable, and adequate, not whether some other relief would be more lucrative to the class. A settlement is, after all, not full relief, but an acceptable compromise.

So, like these cases, Your Honor, the one before your court falls right within the range of reasonableness and

1 provides a significant benefit to class members.

2 Unless Your Honor has any other questions, we would ask Your Honor today -- and, as you know, Mr. Travalio will be 3 presenting the plaintiffs' application for fees, costs and any 4 5 plaintiffs' service payments; but we request that the Court 6 overrule the objections, enter the parties' proposed form of 7 final approval order. And, as a housekeeping matter, as well, 8 I believe the stipulation to modify the settlement to clarify 9 the claims deadline is still before Your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Kavanagh, let me congratulate you, because you hit all the points that I wanted to make sure you hit. So, thank you. You're welcome back any time.

MS. KAVANAGH: No problem, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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Mr. Kiniry, do you wish to respond on the settlement agreement?

MR. KINIRY: Your Honor, I hope my comments will garner the same statement from the Court.

THE COURT: I'm sure they will.

MR. KINIRY: I have no comment.

THE COURT: You're welcome back all the time.

Thank you, Mr. Kiniry.

Well, I think that moves us on -- well, yeah. That

moves us on to Mr. Travalio to speak on behalf of plaintiffs'

counsel and plaintiffs' class with regard to attorneys' fees

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     and costs.
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               Mr. Travalio?
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               MR. TRAVALIO: Well, Your Honor, I brought some
     reading material along.
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 5
               THE COURT: Wait a minute. We have --
 6
               Yes, ma'am?
 7
               MS. KALANGE: Mary Ann Kalange, from Boise, Idaho.
 8
               I filed an objection pro se, though I am licensed in
     the State of Wisconsin and the State of Idaho, and I'm licensed
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10
     in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and Ninth Circuit Court
     of Appeals. However, a few years ago, I clerked for a federal
11
12
     judge as a career law clerk.
13
               THE COURT: You poor thing, you.
14
               MS. KALANGE: Pardon me?
               THE COURT: You poor thing you.
15
16
               MS. KALANGE: Yeah. I lived through it. I was with
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     him for seven years, and then I went to the Ninth Circuit Court
18
     of Appeals and had the honor of working with Judge Thomas
     Nelson in the Ninth Circuit. Then I had two sons and realized
19
20
     I couldn't do it all. So, I've been home, raising children.
     But I did file an objection in this case.
21
22
               THE COURT: Ma'am, would you identify yourself --
23
     first of all, why don't you come on up.
24
               MS. KALANGE:
                             Okay.
25
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THE COURT: I apologize. I did not notice you back

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1
     there. So, I --
 2
               MS. KALANGE: I tried to blend in.
 3
               THE COURT: Your name is, again?
               MS. KALANGE: Mary Ellen. And the last name is
 4
 5
     Kalange, K-a-l-a-n-g-e.
 6
               THE COURT: K-a-l-a-n --
 7
               MS. KALANGE: -- q-e.
 8
               THE COURT: Kalange.
 9
              MS. KALANGE: I'm quite nervous, because I've never
10
     been on this side of the bench.
11
               THE COURT: You're kidding me!
12
              MS. KALANGE: No.
13
               THE COURT: Don't be nervous at all.
14
              MS. KALANGE: Okay. I'll try not to be.
15
               THE COURT: We did receive your pro se objection.
16
     And I apologize for not including you before. [I'm glad you]
17
     showed up from Boise, Idaho.
18
              MS. KALANGE: I did.
19
               THE COURT: Why don't you voice what your objection
20
     is for the purposes of the record.
21
               MS. KALANGE: Okay. I've prepared some comments.
22
     May I follow those?
23
               THE COURT: Of course.
24
               MS. KALANGE: Do I have unlimited time? The Federal
25
     Judicial Center says that if an objector shows up, which is
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highly unlikely, you should sort of give them the floor.
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 2
               THE COURT: I am giving you the floor.
               MS. KALANGE: Right, I know, but could I go until two
 3
     o'clock?
 4
 5
               THE COURT: Two o'clock? No.
              MS. KALANGE: I'm joking. Okay. No.
 6
 7
               THE COURT: I didn't know how to take that, ma'am.
              MS. KALANGE: I'm joking.
 8
 9
               THE COURT: I'll give you as much time as you
10
     deserve.
11
               MS. KALANGE: Okay. Thank you. That's a good
12
     answer.
13
               I just came from Philadelphia. I went from Boise to
14
     Philadelphia, Philadelphia to Columbus.
15
               THE COURT: You don't know geography, then.
16
               MS. KALANGE: I know. I have a very good friend
17
     there. And, when I saw this hearing was set today, I
18
     coordinated the trip to Philli.
19
               THE COURT: Okay. Good.
20
               MS. KALANGE: Anyway, I made it to the Independence
     Hall and Liberty Bell. And no one was there, because everyone
21
22
     was at the flower show in Philadelphia, which was impressive in
23
     itself. But etched in the wall of Independence Hall was a
24
     quote from James Madison, and that quote said: "If men were
25
     angels, there would be no need for government." And that quote
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stopped me in my tracks.

I went back, and I looked at it again. And I thought: Wow! That really hits me, because I tend to be a conservative person and like to believe there's not a lot of need for regulation, a lot of need for government intervention, especially at the federal level; that hopefully the states can control things. However, this case, Your Honor, illustrates exactly why there is a need for regulations and why there is a need for corporations to give credence and follow those regulations.

In this case, Your Honor, the thing that struck me most about the settlement agreement that was put together by counsel was that Porsche AG, the manufacturer who, as far as I can tell, is still a party to this case, has never been dismissed from this case, is still in.

So, Counsel is welcome to comment at this point if they'd like to in that -- and it might save me a lot of time.

My reading of it, procedurally, would be the case would go forward with the class members against Porsche AG because it's not binding on Porsche AG.

THE COURT: I'm not quite sure I understand where you're going, but let me set the stage here a little bit.

You are a Porsche owner?

MS. KALANGE: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's get the facts down.

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               MS. KALANGE: Right.
 2
               THE COURT: You own what year, make, and model?
               MS. KALANGE: A 2005 Cayenne Turbo purchased new for
 3
 4
     approximately $110,000.
 5
               THE COURT: Okay. Purchased new when?
               MS. KALANGE: On September 1st, 2005, in Beaverton,
 6
 7
     Oregon.
 8
               THE COURT: Okay. And you have been the sole owner
 9
     of that vehicle?
10
               MS. KALANGE: Yes, sir.
11
               THE COURT: Okay. And have you had any cooling tubes
12
     issues up 'til now?
13
               MS. KALANGE: One week prior to the 131-page decision
14
     you entered in this case, --
15
               THE COURT: Right.
16
               MS. KALANGE: -- my husband and son were traveling
17
     from Boise to Salt Lake City for the annual Porsche parade.
18
               THE COURT: Okay.
19
               MS. KALANGE: And on the way -- they were pulling a
20
     trailer carrying a 911SC that had been restored. And, on the
     way, 249 miles outside of Boise, the lights came on. Classic
21
22
     situation. And, within minutes, the -- they pulled to the
23
     side, and it was done.
24
               We paid $600 to have the Porsche, and the trailer
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with the Porsche, towed to Salt Lake. And my husband and son,

1 Matthew, went to the Porsche parade and won first place and had 2 their picture taken with one of the Porsches that was there; Ferdinand, I think. Anyway, I have that here with me. 3 THE COURT: You mean one of the family members? 4 5 MS. KALANGE: Yes, uh-huh. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MS. KALANGE: And my husband -- I said, Did you talk 8 to him about that? 9 And he said, No, because -- actually, we didn't 10 understand what had happened. And we hoped to resolve it with 11 Porsche because we have a long relationship with Porsche. 12 And, as it turned out, it was very disheartening for 13 us to learn that there was a class action pending. And if we 14 had only known, we would have had the update kit installed. 15 THE COURT: Okay. MS. KALANGE: But the key thing, Your Honor, is that 16 17 our car had just come from the dealer, the authorized service 18 dealer. It had been in service for 16 days. We picked it up on the Friday before, and nothing was said. 19 20 They knew we were going to tow a trailer, the thing. 21 There were record temperatures in Boise. We had towed the 22 trailer to two other events, one in Portland and one in 23 Colorado, and never had any trouble. So, we had no reason to 24 think --

THE COURT: You mean with the same vehicle?

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               MS. KALANGE: Yes. Same trailer. Same everything.
 2
               THE COURT: All right.
              MS. KALANGE: And we had no reason to think there
 3
     would be a problem.
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 5
               So, to learn that -- our car had just been in the
     authorized service dealer, and they didn't mention anything
 6
 7
     about it, and then learn there was a class action, it was a
 8
     very well known problem, devastated us.
 9
               THE COURT: Let me refocus you a little bit.
10
               MS. KALANGE: Uh-huh.
11
               THE COURT: The vehicle and the trailer were towed to
12
     Salt Lake?
13
               MS. KALANGE: Correct -- no. No, not -- the vehicle
14
     was towing a trailer with a 911. It's like a show car.
15
               THE COURT: Yeah. I'm familiar.
16
              MS. KALANGE: Okay.
               THE COURT: Okay. But, because of the breakdown, you
17
     had to have it towed, the vehicle --
18
19
               MS. KALANGE: Right.
20
               THE COURT: -- and the trailer --
21
               MS. KALANGE: Yep.
22
               THE COURT: -- that was pulling another vehicle?
23
               MS. KALANGE: That's correct.
24
               THE COURT: You had to have it towed to Salt Lake?
25
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MS. KALANGE: Uh-huh.

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1
               THE COURT: And there, at Salt Lake, through an
 2
     authorized dealer of some sort, or mechanic, it was repaired?
               MS. KALANGE: No.
 3
               THE COURT: It was not repaired?
 4
 5
               MS. KALANGE: No. That mechanic told us that the
     engine was fried --
 6
 7
               THE COURT: Oh, oh, oh.
 8
               MS. KALANGE: -- because of all the conditions.
 9
               THE COURT: All right. I didn't catch that.
10
               So, what you're saying is, you believe -- well, the
11
     vehicle broke down and was inoperable as a result of whatever
12
     caused the breakdown?
13
               MS. KALANGE: Uh-huh.
14
               THE COURT: Now, are you claiming that it was the
15
     cooling tubes that caused the breakdown? That's where I'm
16
     getting to.
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               MS. KALANGE: Oh, I'm sorry. Yeah.
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               THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, you kind of glossed over a
19
     few important points.
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               MS. KALANGE: I know. That's my main problem, --
21
               THE COURT: That's all right.
22
               MS. KALANGE: -- one of them.
23
               But, yes, it's -- in fact, I have the invoice where,
24
     the diagnosis at Strong Porsche in Salt Lake, it says:
                                                             "Due to
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fractured coolant tubes."

1 And that mechanic and service adviser explained to us 2 that this class action was pending and that we might want to 3 join it. 4 And we said: Oh, no, we wouldn't want to sue 5 Porsche. We love Porsche. 6 So, we went back to Boise and tried to work out a 7 deal with our dealer, who we learned -- who kept repeating: 8 But you didn't buy it here. You bought it in Oregon. And it was crazy, because we said: Well, we've 9 10 bought seven cars from you, and we tried to buy it from you, 11 but it was a \$20,000 differential on the trade-in of our BMW, 12 which had towed the trailer before, and this Cayenne. 13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MS. KALANGE: So --15 THE COURT: I got it. Now I understand what you're 16 saying. 17 MS. KALANGE: Uh-huh. 18 THE COURT: All right. So, then you filed this 19 objection? 20 MS. KALANGE: Right, on behalf of myself and other 21 Porsche owners that either haven't experienced catastrophic 22 engine failure yet but very likely will, because, in our case, 23 our coolant light had never come on before; and it was 24 instantaneous.

And Porsche will dispute that, because, actually, in

- 1 September of 2013, I tried to resolve it directly with Porsche.
- 2 First I made the mistake of thinking, if I put together a
- 3 thorough enough law-clerk-like care package, the attorneys for
- 4 Lyle Pearson would see the light and would help resolve this
- 5 matter based on the negligent service provided by the dealer.
- 6 But then I learned that this was forwarded -- not all of it,
- 7 but a large part of it was forwarded to PCNA in Atlanta. And I
- 8 | spoke with a gentleman there. And I have his name here
- 9 somewhere. But he told me, Well, we told the dealers not to
- 10 say anything to our customers unless they said the blue coolant
- 11 light came on.
- 12 And, when I heard that, I thought, everything happens
- 13 | for a reason; and, for some reason, this happened to us. And I
- 14 | happen to have a background in law, and I'm going to go make my
- 15 case to the court.
- And, so, here I am, --
- 17 THE COURT: Good.
- 18 MS. KALANGE: -- much to the chagrin of these fine
- 19 attorneys, who I know have worked hard to resolve this. And I
- 20 | admire the purpose and the intent behind class actions; but,
- 21 Your Honor, you stand in a very unique position here, because
- 22 | you can put the teeth back in it.
- 23 You know. They, Counsel for Plaintiffs, did a great
- 24 job summarizing everything.
- 25 THE COURT: They did.

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MS. KALANGE: And I don't take that away from her. And the CAFA notice did comply. I went to the AG's office, and I checked it out. I have a copy of it. I also have the one from Eisen, the other case that settled. I don't take that away from Counsel. I didn't argue with the amount of attorney fees awarded. And I didn't argue with the \$5,000 per named plaintiff. THE COURT: Right. MS. KALANGE: I think that's relatively fair. What I do take issue with, Your Honor, is the claim that substantial benefit has been conferred upon the class. And when you look at the original prayer for relief in this case, that's not what was prayed for, not even close. When you consider these vehicles cost from 45,000 to 110,000 new, it's de minimis in terms if you look at the chart. Now, we fall under -- we only have 54,000 miles. So, we fall under the highest level of recovery. And I'm here to say that, if I felt Porsche AG and PCNA had operated in a reasonable way once they knew of this problem and the implications of it, this would probably be fair; but that's not what happened. In fact, going on NHTSA's website -- and I really hope I'm proved wrong on this -- I couldn't even find Porsche AG registered as a foreign manufacturer. They're registered

with respect to the importation of other Porsches, other

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         models, other model years, but not Porsche Cayenne. They have
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    2
         PCNA listed.
                   PCNA is not a manufacturer, Your Honor. It's a
     3
         distributor.
     4
     5
                   THE COURT: Therein lies one of the big legal issues
         in this case, ma'am, -- I've got to tell you that right now --
    6
    7
         one that has been argued strenuously by defendants in this
         matter, with regard to even jurisdictional issues over
    8
    9
         Porsche -- I'm sorry -- Porsche -- I call it Porsche Germany.
   10
                   MS. KALANGE: Yeah.
   11
                   THE COURT: You can -- you probably can -- you,
   12
         better than anyone, can probably understand the legal
   13
         infighting that's been going on with regard to several of those
   14
         issues.
   15
                   MS. KALANGE: Uh-huh.
   16
                   THE COURT: And they have been -- they have been at
   17
         the cutting edge of some of the issues that, actually, I've
   18
         been watching with regard to Supreme Court decisions and so
   19
         forth.
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20 MS. KALANGE: Me, too.

21

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23

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THE COURT: Yeah, I bet you have. Yeah.

MS. KALANGE: Goodyear and -- there is another one.

THE COURT: You've got it. You've got it.

MS. KALANGE: But what I would --

THE COURT: It's not a well defined area, is what I'm

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1
     trying to say.
 2
               MS. KALANGE: I understand that, Your Honor. But
     I'll tell you why it's more clear cut than it looks, --
 3
               THE COURT: Okay.
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 5
               MS. KALANGE: -- because I've lost a lot of sleep
 6
     over this.
 7
               THE COURT: Okay.
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               MS. KALANGE: In this case -- I realize
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     jurisdictional issues are tricky sometimes. And part of the
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     reason I'm here is because Porsche AG has fought jurisdiction
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     so hard -- I understand that -- as an advocate, as advocates
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     for Porsche AG.
13
               Are there lawyers for Porsche AG here?
14
               THE COURT: Yes.
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              MS. KALANGE: Okay. That's -- they're doing their
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     job.
17
               THE COURT: Sure.
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               MS. KALANGE: But here is the deal: The NHTSA
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     unequivocally requires all foreign manufacturers that import
20
     more than 5,000 cars per year to register as a foreign
21
    manufacturer. Period. It's clear. They haven't.
22
               THE COURT: Okay. Let's assume they have not. Let's
23
     just assume that for a moment.
24
               MS. KALANGE: Uh-huh.
25
               THE COURT: Where does that get you?
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2.8
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               MS. KALANGE: Well, where it gets me is that,
     technically, they've been importing illegally. They've -- PCNA
 2
 3
     has been sort of their front man and --
 4
               THE COURT: Which, I guess what you're telling me is,
 5
     puts them in a bad light, but doesn't help you with damages; is
 6
     that what --
 7
               MS. KALANGE: Well, I guess I'm here because, under
 8
     the Federal Judicial Center -- I don't know --
 9
               THE COURT: The class action that's --
10
               MS. KALANGE: No, the primer that's for courts to
11
     look at.
12
               THE COURT: Right. Very familiar with it.
13
              MS. KALANGE: It's very well done.
14
               THE COURT: It's helpful. Yeah.
15
               MS. KALANGE: It's stellar. But one of the things it
16
     says is that objectors should bring things to the Court's
17
     attention that it might not otherwise know.
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               THE COURT: I see. Okay.
19
               MS. KALANGE: And this is something I think is
20
     significant, because the CAFA notice, the fact that no AGs'
21
     offices or that the Attorney General for the United States
22
     hasn't objected should not let you think, let you assume, that
23
     that means they think this is a good settlement.
24
               The AG I spoke with said they get five or six notices
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a week; they simply do not have the resources to look into

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    1
         them. And, to be honest, people that can buy Porsches are not
    2
         a sympathetic class.
                   THE COURT: Well --
    3
                   MS. KALANGE: It's true. I mean, if it
    4
    5
         was a mini van, it might be a different deal. But the average
         income of a Porsche buyer is 700,000 a year.
    6
                   I don't meet that, trust me. Otherwise, maybe I
    7
        would just, you know, eat it and move on. But this was a
    8
    9
         vehicle that we intended to have, you know, forever. And, so,
   10
        we made the investment in it.
   11
                   THE COURT: Could I ask you one other thing --
   12
                  MS. KALANGE: Uh-huh.
   13
                   THE COURT: -- just to finish up on what we were
   14
         talking about earlier?
   15
                  MS. KALANGE: Yes.
   16
                   THE COURT: The vehicle was found to be inoperable.
   17
        And what is the end result? What's the end result, now, of
   18
         that vehicle? Was it sold? Was it sold for -- what's going
   19
         on? Just explain that to me.
   20
                   MS. KALANGE: I would love to, Your Honor. Thank you
         for giving me the opportunity to do that.
   21
   22
                   The vehicle was towed back to Boise. Our dealer, in
   23
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Boise, because we're small -- there's about a million people in

24 the entire state --

25

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. KALANGE: We only have one authorized Porsche dealer. That dealer, also, is the only authorized dealer for Mercedes, Jaguar, Volvo, Accura, Range Rover, and -- I think that's it. Yeah, that's it. And then Porsche.

Anyway, that dealer -- so, they, you know, pretty much have the run of things in the luxury automotive industry in our area.

We met with the owner of the dealership, and he knows that we purchased seven cars. He actually is the son-in-law of the former owner, who had died just like two weeks before our car went in. Figures. But, anyway, he initially told us: I don't know what you're talking about. I don't know anything about coolant issues, and your husband drove the car too fast and in the heat, and it's your problem.

That was the first response.

Then, after I looked into it and realized, oh, no, you had to have known about it, and tracked down their former service adviser, who then worked at Audi -- small town; he is now in Montana, but I talked to him.

He said, Oh, yeah, we knew about it. He said, We changed a lot of those, but, he said, we didn't change them until the customer said they were losing coolant.

And I am like: But, Scott, how could that be, because, many times, you don't have time to even -- like, in our circumstance, it was the perfect storm: on a highway, you

- 1 know, pulling a trailer, which is what the Cayenne was marketed 2 to be able to do; and we had no idea about this hidden defect;
- and yet our \$110,000 investment is done. So, the car has been
- 4 sitting at Lyle Pearson since July 19th, 2012.
- 5 Lyle Pearson is the dealer.
- 6 THE COURT: Okay.
- 7 MS. KALANGE: They've sent us bills for storage.
- 8 Ironically, their attorney, well, lives on my street.
- 9 I called him, because he owned a Cayenne, and I said: Hey,
- 10 Brad, did you know that your Cayenne has bad coolant pipes?
- 11 He also has a Carrera.
- 12 He said: No, I didn't.
- I said: Well, Google it.
- Within a week, he was driving -- his wife was driving
- 15 a Mercedes SUV.
- So, I tried, Your Honor. I tried to -- I didn't know
- 17 he was their lawyer. He told me -- he's like: I happen to
- 18 represent Lyle Pearson.
- 19 I'm like, Ah, small town. But -- and I sent him this
- 20 | package as well. And then I tried to work with Porsche Cars of
- 21 North America. And it fell on deaf ears.
- 22 And part of the reason I'm here is not only for
- 23 | myself, Your Honor, but for those poor souls that are going to
- 24 | submit claims and that are going to be told: Oh, no, you don't
- 25 qualify, because you abused your Porsche, or whatever, when

- 1 it's clear that it was the defect, the coolant pipe defect,
- 2 that causes their engine loss. And it's only going to get
- 3 worse, because now we're ten years out from 2003, 11 years.
- 4 And, in our case, we had no notice that there was a problem, no
- 5 lights, nothing. It was just like one light, the other light,
- 6 and then the engine shut down.
- 7 So, I really think that the safety issue is going to
- 8 escalate. It's already a safety issue. You acknowledged that
- 9 | in your motion to dismiss order from July of 2012. That was
- 10 part of why I was willing to fly here, because that was an
- 11 excellent decision.
- 12 I'm assuming the law clerk in the back wrote it for
- 13 you, helped you write it.
- 14 THE COURT: We didn't let him touch this case. Oh,
- 15 no.
- 16 MS. KALANGE: Okay. Well -- oh, there you go.
- 17 Excellent work! Yeah.
- But I noted that you recognized enough was pled for
- 19 unconscionability. And I absolutely agree. And it truly
- 20 disheartens me to admit it because I hold Porsche in such high
- 21 regard.
- 22 They do make great vehicles. I believe that their
- 23 engineers were saddled with the task of designing a car that
- 24 | would beat BMW's X5, the Volvo, the Mercedes and Range Rover.
- 25 And, in doing it, they took some weight off by putting the

plastic pipes so it would go faster, be more efficient, be the sports car SUV that stood out. And that ultimately has made Porsche the most profitable car manufacturer in the world, in the world, Judge; and yet they don't register with the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration, which is amazing to me; and they continue to import Cayennes and sell like crazy in

But guess what else?

the United States.

I looked at, internationally, what, you know, safety provisions are out there. There are special -- which is back in my bag back there -- the EVS. It's the -- I can't think of what the acronym is for, but it is a European vehicle safety organization. They have meetings every year, with the NHTSA orchestrating aspects of it, and then different safety organizations from the Federal Republic of Germany, from different European governments. It's so impressive.

If you look up EVS and ISO, which is the International Safety Organization, both of those are dedicated to safety. And, ironically, one of the big meetings in 2009 was held in Stuttgart, Germany.

Porsche is not oblivious to its role, or its dominance, in the American market. I don't know how they've gotten away without registering, but I bring it up because, as you know, Judge, our federal government is practicing austerity measures. It's struggling. And I called every number on the

1 NHTSA website, and I got an answering machine from a different

2 person in every number, and I didn't bother them because I was

3 just trying to pin down what happened to one of the complaints

4 about the Porsche Cayennes that was filed back in 2005. It was

5 just a consumer complaint, but I couldn't find it.

But what I did find, Judge, is that the NHTSA relies -- this is key, Judge -- relies on self reporting by manufacturers and distributors. Either one can report. One report fulfills the obligation of the other, but they're supposed to report within five days of any report of a problem, including problems with engine cooling systems. That's specifically on their list.

didn't report it. I'm pretty sure I know why Porsche AG didn't report it: because they didn't think they were on the radar.

And, yet, all of these issues have, you know, just continued to grow. And now we're at a point where some people can get a hundred bucks or they can go to the dealer, the same dealer that they may have been taking their Porsche to for ten years who never told them that there was this latent defect, who never mentioned it even though they might have taken it on summer vacations or whatever.

I am here, Judge, to ask -- I know you can't -- it's not your role to design the settlement. I get that, but you get to influence, Judge. You get to influence what these

- 1 lawyers do. And I can also appreciate, having read some of
- 2 your orders about discovery, that you want this case to go
- 3 away. I don't blame you.
- 4 THE COURT: I want every case to go away.
- 5 MS. KALANGE: I know you do. I remember that whole
- 6 reporting thing and how many closures and -- so, I get it.
- 7 But, Judge, please don't approve this settlement.
- 8 I'm not objecting to the attorneys' fees. I'm not
- 9 objecting to the payments.
- 10 THE COURT: I understand. I understand.
- 11 MS. KALANGE: I just really believe that Porsche
- 12 AG -- and I know they're out there even -- they haven't been
- dismissed. And if you want to, you know, not deal with them, I
- 14 | really believe Porsche Cars North America had the obligation,
- 15 the duty, to notify the NHTSA as a distributor. And they
- 16 didn't.
- 17 THE COURT: Let me ask one last question here.
- MS. KALANGE: Yeah.
- 19 THE COURT: I'm trying to pronounce your name.
- 20 Kalange?
- MS. KALANGE: Kalange.
- 22 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Kalange, what is it you would
- 23 want me to do?
- MS. KALANGE: That's a really good question, Judge.
- 25 THE COURT: That's why we are here.

1 MS. KALANGE: Yeah. I grappled with that.

For one thing, I thought, besides Porsche AG not being part of it, which was really strange, because Paragraph 17 and 18 --

THE COURT: I'm going to have to focus you real quick. What is it you want me to do?

MS. KALANGE: Create a subclass of people like myself that sustained catastrophic engine failure, perhaps, under the circumstances like we had where our car was just in for service and yet the dealer, operating under the auspices of Porsche Cars North America and at the direction of Porsche AG, did not tell us anything, and pursue relief that way. That would be one option. So, there would be a subclass, and that would go on separate from this other action. And then I believe punitive damages can be proven.

The reason I feel that is, the conduct in this case is egregious. It is unconscionable. And Porsche AG, as the most profitable manufacturer in the world, needs to be punished. There needs to be something.

You know, it was in the '70s that the exploding Pinto gas tank case came out. I can't think of what that's called.

But it astounds me that we're even here today. I can't believe it. And I really believe a lot of Americans would flip out if they realized this happened, that a company that is so profitable can put a car on the road and know about these

- 1 defects and not report it to the NHTSA.
- 2 And, Your Honor, the NHTSA, bless them, because they
- 3 have more work than they can handle as it is; but, Your Honor,
- 4 they only are as successful at keeping people safe as
- 5 manufacturers and distributors are willing to let them know
- 6 about problems.
- 7 THE COURT: Self reporting.
- 8 MS. KALANGE: Yeah. That's what they rely on. And
- 9 they have to, because they don't have the resources to do it
- 10 any other way.
- 11 THE COURT: I understand.
- MS. KALANGE: So, Your Honor, I'm just asking you to
- 13 hold them accountable.
- 14 If corporations were angels or if they were just -- I
- 15 | don't expect them to be infallible, Your Honor. I don't think
- 16 that's the standard.
- 17 The guy that I spoke to from Porsche said: Well,
- 18 | everything fails eventually. You know. Your alternator would
- 19 fail. Would you want your repairman to tell you "Have a new
- 20 | alternator because that might fail"?
- 21 And I said, There's not a class action about
- 22 | alternators.
- 23 THE COURT: I understand.
- MS. KALANGE: So, thank you, Your Honor.
- 25 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Kalange.

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THE COURT:

Thank you.

I'm going to give counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for the defendant an opportunity to respond, but I had way too much coffee this morning, so I've got to take about a two-minute break. MS. KALANGE: Your Honor, before you do that, could I point out two other things I forgot? THE COURT: Quickly. MS. KALANGE: Actually, I need to go, too. Can I do it when I come back? THE COURT: No, no. Tell me now. MS. KALANGE: That's a good move. Number one, there is a specific tool at the disposal of all Porsche service technicians for checking coolant leaks. It's a little tool in their repertoire of tools that Porsche provides for them, #1. THE COURT: Right. MS. KALANGE: And, #2, there's a checklist that Porsche has for repairing Cayennes specifically. And it's supposed to be done at the end of any service of any type on a Cayenne. And it includes all those systems and checking coolant leaks and so forth. So, I would contend that it's also incumbent on them to advise customers of Porsche that there's a preventative maintenance issue that should be addressed.

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               MS. KALANGE:
                             Thank you.
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               THE COURT: Let's take just a short break, seven
     minutes, seven or eight minutes.
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 4
               Thank you.
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               (Whereupon, a recess was taken at 9:53 a.m., and the
 6
     proceedings reconvened at 10:05 a.m.)
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     IN OPEN COURT:
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               THE COURT: Thank you.
               Counsel for the plaintiff, Ms. Kavanagh, do you wish
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10
     to respond to the objector's arguments?
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               MS. KAVANAGH: Yes, briefly, Your Honor, if I may.
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               THE COURT: Of course.
               MS. KAVANAGH: First of all, Your Honor, you know --
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14
     and this is on behalf of the whole plaintiffs' team -- we're
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     very sympathetic to the experience that Ms. Kalange had.
16
     certainly did not sound like something somebody would want to
17
     experience, and it's very unfortunate. However, what she has
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     described here highlights exactly why this settlement is fair
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     and reasonable, because it addresses -- it's a compromise of
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     highly disputed claims.
               So, what Mrs. Kalange has described here becomes very
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22
     individualized. She explains that, on her trip, there were
23
     record temperatures; that the Porsche dealership that she took
24
     the car into claimed that she may have been driving too fast.
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These are exactly the type of factual defenses that

litigation.

Porsche has raised in the litigation as being the cause of the premature fracture and degrading of the coolant pipe. And, certainly, for class certification purposes, it would have made class certification more uncertain to have to look into all of these individualized issues that Porsche had raised and certainly would have continued to raise throughout the

In addition, the motion to dismiss decision that Your Honor authored was a very detailed decision, and certain of plaintiffs' claims survived; but, for Ms. Kalange, a motion to dismiss decision is simply that the plaintiffs had adequately pled their claims. It doesn't — it's not an opinion on the actual merits of their claims or whether they would be in a position to prove their claims.

The Court should also consider, and it's plaintiffs' request, that Ms. Kalange's objection be overruled, that there is over 42,000 class members, and counting, who are entrusted and receiving their benefits in this case. And, absent the settlement, should the objection not be overruled, these 42,000, which is likely to rise, will be deprived of the benefits that they want in the case.

And for Ms. Kalange in particular, as she pointed out, she is at the highest reimbursement level that's possible here. So, there's many people that are satisfied with receiving less and, in some cases, substantially less than

Mrs. Kalange; and they would like to be paid.

With respect to receiving notice from Porsche about this potential issue, that's exactly why the class—action settlement here is beneficial to class members. As Mr. Kiniry will point out, Porsche doesn't believe it did anything wrong here. It believes it has many defenses, and it believes it would have succeeded had the case gone to trial. Settling the case now gave the opportunity to send notice out to all potential class members so they could do something and could have the opportunity to benefit where, absent the settlement, that would not have happened for many years if at all. So, many people might have just replaced their pipes having no idea that they had potential legal claims and could benefit from the settlement.

The settlement adequately protects class members' rights, Your Honor, because it also provides an opportunity to opt out. Okay? So, in the instance where somebody feels that their injury had exceeded what might be available under the settlement, they have the opportunity to opt out and proceed with their own case at their own cost and expense and risk.

With respect to the safety issue that Mrs. Kalange raises, the private litigants don't have the authority to go to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and request a recall. And there is an exclusion to the release for any personal injury claims, as well, that further protects class

1 members; but, again, this is an instance where Porsche does not 2 believe that the product was defective and they were outside the written warranty period. So, the settlement of these 3 claims was appropriate under these uncertain circumstances. 4 5 Thank you. 6 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Kavanagh. Mr. Kiniry, do you wish to respond? 7 MR. KINIRY: Thank you, Your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: Sure. 10 MR. KINIRY: Earlier, Your Honor, when you asked me 11 to comment following Ms. Kavanagh's presentation, one of the 12 things I had on my note pad that was not mentioned but I 13 decided not to mention it in the interest of the Court's time 14 was the simple fact that every class vehicle involved in this 15 settlement is beyond the warranty, four-year or 50,0000-mile 16 warranty, every single one. 17 Every penny in this settlement can, I believe, be 18 considered found money. Our belief is that there is no 19 obligation on the part of the company beyond that warranty; and 20 every one of these cars, including the car of Ms. Kalange, and her car in particular, is well beyond the warranty. I believe 21 22 she said she had a 2005 Cayenne Turbo. Maybe she said 2006. 23 I'm not sure.

I will say this: that we did receive her notice -her objection, and none of that information is in her

24

objection. So, we're hearing — both sides, I think, are hearing all of that information today for the first time.

With respect to the safety issue, Ms. Kalange did not state a safety issue. In fact, no one has stated a safety issue. The closest we got to it was this Court deciding that plaintiffs' complaint maybe had enough to get past 9(b) muster on that point. But, out of 42,000 cars out on the highway with the model years at issue, being 2003 through 2006, there hasn't been a safety issue yet.

So, the business about I love the company but I think
I should get punitive damages because of some unconscionable
behavior, because what? Because we honored all of our
warranties? Because the car has performed well past that?
Because there hasn't been a safety issue?

And my dealer didn't tell me what was going on — every dealer — and I think it's in the pleadings, so it's in the record — every dealer for Porsche Cars is an independent business, Your Honor. None of them are owned or operated by Porsche Cars North America, Porsche AG. They're independent businesses.

Ms. Kavanagh made a very good point. This is a putative class action. This case is being resolved as a class action. What we heard today was a story which screams for individual inquiry, which would, obviously, be very detrimental to the business of being able to resolve this matter as a class

1 action and, therefore, is antithetical to the class.

timely.

I believe that the objector told us that she is a

lawyer. We did not see anywhere in her filing with this Court

the points that she made today, nor did we see a request to opt

out, which certainly was her entitlement to do had she done it

The objector, today, complains that Porsche AG is not covered in this settlement. And, of course, that's not correct. Paragraph 18 of the settlement agreement covers that.

And, as far as this business about who is the importer of the car, the cars are imported to the United States by Porsche Cars North America, registered with NHTSA.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Kiniry.

MR. KINIRY: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, in light of the objection, the Court will take the settlement agreement, proposed settlement agreement, under advisement; and the parties will be notified accordingly.

All right. Let's go on with, then, the attorneys' fees and cost matter.

Mr. Travalio, you may speak to that if you wish.

MR. TRAVALIO: Thank you, Your Honor.

And consistent with the Court's advice in the telephone conference, I will try to be brief, despite my professorial --

THE COURT: Your proclivity?

MR. TRAVALIO: -- proclivities to the contrary.

Your Honor, plaintiffs have submitted an unopposed fee petition in the amount of \$4,500,000, costs of \$131,299, and service payments of \$5,000 each to our named plaintiffs. Plaintiffs believe each of these requests is fully justified.

Let me first talk about the fee request. And, initially, Your Honor, I want to highlight two related facts that I would ask Your Honor to keep in mind in evaluating the fee request.

First, Your Honor, this is not a case in which the Court should be concerned that plaintiffs' counsel somehow traded the class's interests off for a fee.

As you know, I believe, the fee agreement between plaintiff and defendant in this case was reached only after relief to the class was fully and finally determined. There was no discussion — there's no negotiation of fees before the settlement was concluded.

Plaintiffs and the defendant were fully prepared to litigate fees. In fact, Your Honor, we had fully prepared a contested fee petition that we were getting ready to file with the Court when Mr. Kiniry and the plaintiffs decided to give mediation one last chance to resolve the fee issue. So, the class relief was not influenced by the requested fees. And, given the course of events, it couldn't have been influenced by

the request for fees.

Second, Your Honor, this is not a case where the defendants simply agreed to create a single pot of money; the defendants are asking for a piece of it; and the defendant or -- excuse me -- the plaintiffs are asking for a piece of it; and the defendants are indifferent as to where the money goes. Again, the defendants have agreed to pay the fees separate and independent of the relief that you heard Ms. Kavanagh talk about to the class. I ask Your Honor to keep those two things in mind, overarching, as we discuss the request for fees.

As Your Honor is aware, courts have broad discretion in determining attorney fee awards. You have the discretion to determine the most appropriate methodology in deciding whether or not a fee request is fair and reasonable. And courts, as you know, have adopted two general approaches: the lodestar and the common fund approach.

Moreover, as Judge Beckwith, of this district, recognized in Bower vs. MetLife, quote: "Negotiated and agreed upon attorneys' fees as part of a class-action settlement are encouraged as an ideal toward which the parties should strive."

And, as I just mentioned, this was an agreed attorney fee petition, agreed in the sense that Mr. Kiniry is not opposing it; and it was only arrived at after strenuous negotiation and a day-long mediation. Having said all of that, the touchstone, of course, is that the requested fee be

reasonable. And, as explained in our motion, we believe the lodestar approach is preferable in this case; but the fee, we think, is clearly reasonable under the lodestar approach, under a common-fund approach, or under a cross-check, vice versa.

We've already filed with the Court our declarations and our detailed summaries supporting the requested fees. With the additional time since the filing of the petition, plaintiffs' attorneys have now spent over 8,000 hours on this case and 132,000, roughly, in costs, which at all times, Your Honor, was at risk. In this case, until we reached the settlement, even today, because Your Honor still has to approve the settlement, plaintiffs' investment of time and plaintiffs' investment of money has always been at risk in this case.

Your Honor's fully aware of the complexity of the case involving difficult jurisdictional issues, involving novel theories, involving undecided questions of law, some of which Your Honor decided. Just the 12(b)(6) motion and the response and the reply occupied over 400 pages of briefing, involved intensive research and analysis. And, consistent with Your Honor's order, plaintiffs' counsel periodically reviewed the hours and the time put in by plaintiffs' counsel to ensure that the case was being efficiently prosecuted, to ensure that it was streamlined in the way in which we approached all of the aspects of the case. And we've done that all along, Your Honor.

With respect to the rates that are on plaintiffs' lodestar request, although the hourly rates differ to some degree, as I'm sure Your Honor is aware, it's plainly appropriate in multi-district litigation to review counsels' hourly rates in relation to the venues where their case originated.

As you know, Your Honor, this is an MDL case, and it consolidated cases from a variety of jurisdictions where my co-counsel had originally filed their cases. They had no control over whether the case got MDL'd, and they had no control over where it got MDL'd. It got MDL'd in Ohio. I'm glad about that, but the fact is that, in evaluating the reasonableness of the fees, reasonableness of the rates, it makes sense to consider the fact that these cases were filed in California or filed in New York; not all of them were filed in Ohio; but that's where they ended up. And, so, it's appropriate to view the rates from the jurisdictions, from the venues in which they originated.

And, in fact, Judge Dlott, in Lowther vs. AK Steel, a recent case, held, and I quote: "The reasonable hourly rate is determined by reference to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community. In ascertaining the proper community, district courts may look to national markets, an area of specialization, or any other market they believe is appropriate to fairly compensate attorneys in individual cases."

In MDL cases, as I explained, Your Honor, I think the appropriate market to fairly compensate the attorneys is the market in which they filed the original cases.

In the Lonardo case, which we cited in our petition, the Court approved rates up to \$825, per hour, for out-of-state attorneys based -- and I'll quote -- on this Court's knowledge of attorneys' fees in complex civil litigation and multi-district litigation.

Plaintiffs have requested in this case, Your Honor, a modest multiplier of 1.29. Actually, the multiplier is now 1.21 and may even be lower given the work the various counsel have done between January 16th and February 28th, including the preparation of the motion for final approval and the preparation for this hearing.

Your Honor, I've got an exhibit that I mentioned on Thursday in the conference that we would be giving to the Court which outlined the hours between January 16th and February 28th. And, as I said, it actually results in a multiplier of 1.29. Our -- excuse me, 1.21.

THE COURT: Let me be sure that the record is correct, or at least is understandable with regard to this multiplier.

MR. TRAVALIO: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: In order to keep everyone under the cap -- that is, the \$4.5 million cap -- it was necessary to

- 1 lower the multiplier because of additional hours that have been
- 2 incurred since the initial filing, correct?
- MR. TRAVALIO: That's exactly right, Your Honor.
- 4 This has absolutely no impact on increasing or decreasing the
- 5 \$4,500,000.
- 6 THE COURT: Right.
- 7 MR. TRAVALIO: It's simply, as Your Honor is aware,
- 8 the case law in this district takes a look to see if any
- 9 multiplier is reasonable. And we just wanted to make sure that
- 10 Your Honor is aware of sort of where the multiplier now stands.
- 11 THE COURT: Right.
- MR. TRAVALIO: So, I do have --
- 13 Mr. Kiniry, I'll give you guys a couple of these.
- MR. KINIRY: Thank you, Greq.
- 15 MR. TRAVALIO: This brings us up to February 28th.
- 16 Give this to Judge Frost, please.
- 17 THE COURT: Thank you.
- MR. TRAVALIO: Now, Your Honor, to slightly
- 19 | complicate the matter, but I don't want to dwell on this, we
- 20 | received, this morning, an additional affidavit from Wolf
- 21 | Haldenstein from a Mr. Krasner. We had already received an
- 22 affidavit, which is included as the first affidavit in the
- 23 exhibit, from Mr. Krasner. And then we received the second
- 24 one.
- 25 What the difference between these two affidavits is

is that the second affidavit uses the figure of \$810, per hour,

as Mr. Levitt's time.

Excuse me. Let me -- \$850 an hour. I'm sorry.

If you look at the first affidavit, the first affidavit uses Mr. Levitt's 850. That's the one we received today. The one we received earlier has Mr. Levitt at \$710 an hour.

THE COURT: I see. Okay.

MR. TRAVALIO: What the second affidavit does is raise Mr. Levitt's hourly rate to the hourly rate that Mr. Levitt is now receiving as opposed to the hourly rate that he received at the time that he was at Wolf Haldenstein.

THE COURT: All right. And is no longer there now?

MR. TRAVALIO: And is no longer there now. That's correct, Your Honor.

I again emphasize -- and I know it's a little bit confusing with these various affidavits. I again emphasize, Your Honor, none of this has anything to do with changing our requested fee. It only impacts the total amount of the lodestar and the eventual multiplier. So, whether or not the Court wants to use the original affidavit with Mr. Levitt's time at \$710 an hour or the second affidavit, which we just received this morning, at \$850 an hour, it does not impact the amount that plaintiff is requesting. It simply influences, and only then to a modest degree, the multiplier that plaintiffs

are requesting.

2 And I'm sorry for that sort of digression, Your 3 Honor.

THE COURT: No. I understand completely.

MR. TRAVALIO: The multiplier that we're requesting is well within those that have been approved by courts in the Sixth Circuit in the past four years, and far below some that have been allowed. And most of these cases, Your Honor, we've cited in our petition. And I'm certainly not going to go through them all again.

I would just say that the recent case, Sixth Circuit case, of Van Horn vs. Nationwide Property & Casualty, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the award of a lodestar multiplier virtually identical to the one requested here, the 1.21, even though the case involved, and I quote, a relatively insignificant claim and involved no novel issues. I, frankly, don't think that's the case in this case.

As the Court knows, in determining the appropriate multiplier, this Court has, in fact, applied the Ramey factors. We've analyzed each of those factors in our petition. I'm not going to repeat that analysis; but I will say, this Court stated and, I think, logic and reason demand that the most important factor is the result that we've obtained for the class given this case.

Your Honor is aware of the settlement. This isn't a

coupon settlement. It is not a settlement that provides some
nominal cash amount. It's not a settlement that requires
navigating imposing procedural hoops in order to achieve some

4 marginal amount of money or some marginal recovery.

Given the difficulties faced by plaintiffs' counsel in this case, this is an excellent settlement. It gives real money, significant amounts of real money, to real people. And, at this point, well over 4,000 claims have already been filed. And, as Your Honor knows, there is still a lot of time left in which to file claims, and claims keep coming in on a regular basis.

As I mentioned earlier, Your Honor, all of plaintiffs' hours and expenses were incurred entirely at counsels' risk. As Your Honor has recognized in the Kritzer case, some courts consider the risk of non-recovery as the most important factor in a fee determination. Plaintiffs' counsel — and Mr. Kiniry and I have disagreed on this from day one. Plaintiffs' counsel has always believed that its case was sound in law and fact; but, at the same time, we were cognizant of the many hurdles and avenues of attack that Mr. Kiniry had, some of which were successful in the 12(b)(6) motion and others of which I'm sure he was just itching to assert against the plaintiffs.

This was a difficult case. And, viewed in this light, I think the result that we achieved was an exceptional

- 1 | result. And the fact is, I think, Your Honor, viewed in this
- 2 light, plaintiffs' lodestar and multiplier, unopposed by
- 3 defendants, is imminently reasonable.
- And even though -- we talked about a cross-check a
- 5 little earlier, Your Honor. Even though a cross-check is not
- 6 mandatory, when cross-checked using a common-fund analysis --
- 7 THE COURT: I've already done that.
- 8 MR. TRAVALIO: Okay. And then Your Honor understands
- 9 | that it's a very reasonable percentage using a cross-check in
- 10 | this case, and I won't belabor it.
- 11 THE COURT: Did you wish to speak to the cost issue
- 12 at all?
- MR. TRAVALIO: Yes, Your Honor.
- 14 THE COURT: Okay. I just wanted to make sure.
- MR. TRAVALIO: Just briefly.
- 16 The next thing I want to -- two things I want to
- 17 | mention, finally, with respect to the fee. And then we'll talk
- 18 about, very briefly, about the service payments and talk about
- 19 the cost issue.
- THE COURT: Okay.
- 21 MR. TRAVALIO: I think it is important -- and I
- 22 quoted from Judge Dlott earlier -- that plaintiffs' request is
- 23 | not opposed by the defendant. This has to be considered in
- 24 evaluating the reasonability of the request.
- I think it's safe to say, although Mr. Kiniry can

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contest this if he likes, that Mr. Kiniry's unlikely to be
 1
 2
     unduly sympathetic to plaintiffs' fee request.
               Bill, is that a fair statement?
 3
               THE COURT: That's probably --
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 5
               MR. KINIRY: (Nodding affirmatively.)
               THE COURT: Probably a statement that he won't have a
 6
 7
     lot of problems with.
 8
               MR. KINIRY: I'm making real progress in my anger
 9
     management courses. I'll say nothing.
10
               THE COURT: Well, there is that problem with eating
11
     the Porsche, but --
12
               MR. KINIRY: We'll address that later.
13
               THE COURT: Okay.
14
               MR. TRAVALIO: Your Honor, this fee agreement was
15
     arrived at only after a period of what I would call intense
16
     negotiation and a difficult and contentious mediation.
17
               And again, as I mentioned the Lowther case, the Court
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     said in the Lowther case that the length between -- or excuse
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     me -- a fee agreement that had been negotiated at arms' length
20
     between sophisticated counsel weighed strongly in terms of
21
     approving a requested fee application.
22
               Finally, Your Honor, it's, I think, testament to the
23
     reasonability of the plaintiffs' request that, of the tens of
24
     thousands of class members, the plaintiffs' fee request didn't
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garner a single objection. And as Judge Dlott observed, the

1 lack of objections is strong evidence of the acceptability of a
2 fee request.

I think, as my colleague, Ms. Kavanagh, has already pointed out, the total number of objections is tiny; and, of that tiny number, none have complained about the attorneys' fee request.

And, finally, Your Honor, I would just — even though we haven't attempted to evaluate it, haven't attempted to summarize it, there has been a lot of work done, even after February 28th, getting ready for this hearing. And that time which would add to the lodestar, and even decrease the multiplier further, is not accounted for anywhere, just to mention it. It's not going to have a significant impact on it, but I do want to emphasize it as further evidence of the reasonableness of the multiplier that we're asking for.

THE COURT: Mr. Travalio, do you intend to file something to update us on that period of time?

MR. TRAVALIO: If the Court so desires.

THE COURT: No. It's up to you. They're your fees.

It's going to either increase the amount of fees and decrease the multiplier or --

MR. TRAVALIO: Your Honor, I can consult with my co-counsel, but my own feeling is that those additional hours are not going to have a sufficient effect. If a multiplier of 1.29 --

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THE COURT: 1.21.
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 2
               MR. TRAVALIO: -- or 1.21 is okay, a multiplier of
     1.17, you know, four hundredths of -- five hundredths is not
 3
     going to make that much difference.
 4
 5
               THE COURT: I agree.
               MR. TRAVALIO: I just simply want to draw the Court's
 6
     attention to the fact that there has been a significant amount
 7
 8
     of work that's occurred between February 28th and March 10th,
 9
     the date of this hearing.
10
               THE COURT: Okay.
11
               MR. TRAVALIO: Well, Your Honor, I do want to talk --
12
     and I will be very brief -- about the service payments to the
13
     plaintiffs' named counsel.
14
               We've requested --
15
               THE COURT: Plaintiffs' named counsel?
16
               MR. TRAVALIO: Excuse me. Counsels' named
17
     plaintiffs. Cases' named plaintiffs.
18
               I'm sorry.
19
               THE COURT: That's all right.
20
               MR. TRAVALIO: You know, when you get older, words
21
     get confused.
22
               THE COURT: I've noticed that with you.
23
               MR. TRAVALIO: You've noticed it in me, Your Honor,
24
     or you've noticed it in yourself?
25
               THE COURT: Yeah.
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I knew you couldn't help yourself. You'd have to come back.

Proceed. On the service payment, proceed.

MR. TRAVALIO: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

We're asking for service payments of \$5,000, each, to the named plaintiffs.

District Courts in the Sixth Circuit have regularly approved service payments to named plaintiffs. The amounts requested are reasonable given the services rendered. The named plaintiffs came forward with their cases. They've reviewed and discussed the allegations in the complaint. They compiled documents and provided other information necessary for the initial disclosures. They assisted in responding to requests for production and interrogatories related to jurisdiction. They corresponded regularly with counsel on developments in the case. And, in some cases, they preserved and even mailed various engine parts to the plaintiffs' counsel in the case. And, of course, they ultimately read, considered, and approved the settlement in the case.

As I said, courts in the Sixth Circuit have recognized that reasonable service payments are a necessary incentive. The \$5,000 service payment requested in this case is keeping with that permitted in other cases in the Sixth Circuit.

The Lonardo case, which I mentioned, similar in some

ways in complexity and similar in terms of the plaintiffs' contributions, the named plaintiffs' contributions, approved precisely the equivalent \$5,000 service payment requested in this case.

The payments to the named plaintiffs will not reduce payments to the settlement class. No objections have been filed, again, to the amount of service payments requested. And again, finally, in assessing the reasonability of service payments, courts generally and courts in this circuit have said that it's important that they be evaluated in relation to the quality of the settlement class to make sure that the service payments to the named plaintiffs aren't unduly disproportionate to the settlement given to the settlement class.

Well, as I said and as Ms. Kavanagh has explained in detail, this is a great settlement. And the settlement payments, or -- excuse me -- the service payments that we're asking for are certainly not disproportionate.

And as to the costs, Your Honor, I don't have anything to add to our motion. However, as we discussed in the phone conference with Your Honor last Thursday, plaintiffs request that the Court approve a supplemental request, or approve the filing of a supplemental request, within the next seven days. That will update all costs incurred subsequent to January 15th, including the credit that Mr. Kiniry has agreed to give the plaintiffs for the supplemental mailing to the

class.

THE COURT: Oh, yeah.

MR. TRAVALIO: We ask that you give us that seven days to file that. As we represented -- as I represented to the Court during that phone conference, the supplemental request will not result in seeking any costs beyond the \$250,000 that we've placed in the notice and that we have agreed with Mr. Kiniry is the cap on plaintiffs' costs.

Your Honor, we ask that you approve plaintiffs' unopposed application for fees, costs, and service payments.

And I'm available for any questions, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No. I have no questions, but I did want to congratulate both counsel, both sides, in this regard. This reminder notice, I think, is a great idea. I really do. I — I'll have to admit, I don't think I've run across it before, and it may be — it may not be that unusual in cases, but it was to me, and I thought that was a good idea. I was surprised about the cost of a reminder, but I think it's a great idea in this case.

MR. TRAVALIO: Your Honor, I -- I mean, in that regard, if I could just say one thing.

I mean, as Your Honor knows, the relationship between counsel at the onset of this case was difficult. And I certainly want to convey my appreciation to Mr. Kiniry on that particular issue and on other issues that arose subsequent to

courtroom here. I had to look a couple of times.

THE COURT: You did look at it -- it does look a bit like him, doesn't it?

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No. We chose not to. But, yeah, after we got rid of him, things started to smooth out a little bit. But go ahead, Mr. Kiniry.

MR. KINIRY: I want to make sure that the record is clear. I think Greg covered this; but, with respect to the additional cost on the reminder notice, the expense of which is really driven by the U.S. Postal Service and the amount of

- 1 postage and the number of notices that we are sending out, but
- 2 the agreement is that class counsel is paying half of that cost
- 3 even if that half runs past the credit.
- 4 THE COURT: Yeah. My quick calculations last week
- 5 indicated that it might go above the cap of costs, but I wanted
- 6 to make it clear last week and I want to make it clear today on
- 7 the record that, if it exceeds the cap, they eat it.
- 8 MR. TRAVALIO: Your Honor, that's correct.
- 9 THE COURT: Yeah. Okay.
- 10 MR. KINIRY: That's the only point I wanted to
- 11 clarify on the record.
- 12 THE COURT: I don't blame you.
- 13 MR. KINIRY: Thank you, Your Honor.
- 14 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Kiniry.
- Well, gentlemen and ladies, first of all, with regard
- 16 | to the order, I've signed that, and it will be filed
- 17 | immediately after this hearing.
- 18 With regard to clarifying the dates issue that arose
- 19 just recently, that will be taken care of.
- I do want to say one thing to Ms. Kalange.
- 21 And it's easy, Ms. Kalange, I'll have to tell you, to
- 22 | come in here and make these allegations. And I agree with
- 23 | plaintiffs' counsel that you have one of the worst scenarios, I
- 24 | think, that's been presented to the Court, at least from what I
- 25 know. And I don't know as much as plaintiffs' counsel does.

1 But I just wanted to make sure you understand that this has

2 been hard fought. This hasn't even -- this has not been an

3 easy case at all. And I want to make sure that you understand,

leaving here, that Mr. Kiniry has not conceded one point in

5 this matter.

And if the Court were to proceed, we're talking about years of litigation, involving hundreds of thousands of hours of attorneys' fees, involving -- and I don't think we got to that point -- involving depositions of German members of Porsche AG. We were going to get there, and it was going to be by video, I believe; and we were going to have the translators and all that involved. But everybody woke up at one point in time, I guess, and said, Well, maybe there is a way that we could resolve this. But, short of resolution, as this matter has evolved in my mind, we were in for another four or five years of litigation in this case. It was obvious to me. It was obvious. I have good counsel on both sides, and they weren't willing to give one point.

And, so, I congratulate you for working out a procedure to arrive at this settlement. I didn't even think you could agree with regard to the procedure, let alone a settlement.

That's not to say, Ms. Kalange, that your objection will not be taken into consideration when I review the final settlement agreement and decide what to do in this matter. I'm

- 1 trying not to telegraph what I'm going to do, because it would
- 2 be unfair to everyone for me to have made up my mind this
- 3 quickly anyway. I will take it all under advisement.
- 4 Mr. Travalio, please file your supplemental costs
- 5 within seven days.
- 6 Mr. Kiniry, you know, if you anticipate, although --
- 7 no. You don't anticipate any objection to that supplement,
- 8 | because we're still capped, I suppose?
- 9 MR. KINIRY: We are, Your Honor.
- 10 THE COURT: If, after you've had a chance to look it
- 11 over, you think that there is a need for you to file something,
- 12 call us immediately.
- MR. KINIRY: Yes, sir.
- 14 THE COURT: Call us immediately so that we can hold
- off on any more consideration of the case until we receive a
- 16 submission.
- 17 MR. KINIRY: Yes, sir.
- 18 THE COURT: All right.
- 19 Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for your --
- 20 MR. KINIRY: Your Honor, before you close the record,
- 21 | the other point is that we do have to work out the language on
- 22 the reminder notice.
- MR. TRAVALIO: Right.
- 24 MR. KINIRY: There is a little more work to be done
- 25 | there. I don't know that -- if we can agree to that, do we

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need to get that back in front of the Court for approval before
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 2
     it goes out?
 3
               THE COURT: I would feel better if I had a chance to
     review it. Okay? It would probably be a quick review; but,
 4
 5
     yes, please get it before me.
 6
               MR. KINIRY: Well, if your order is, as we
 7
     anticipated, an April 10 date for that to go out, is there a
 8
     time when the Court would like to see that in advance?
 9
               THE COURT: If you can just get it to me two or three
10
     days in advance, that's fine.
11
               MR. KINIRY: Thank you, Your Honor.
12
               THE COURT: That's fine. Thanks for reminding me on
13
     that point.
14
               All right. We are adjourned. Thank you.
15
               (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 9:47)
16
     a.m.)
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CERTIFICATE United States of America Southern District of Ohio I, Denise N. Errett, Official Court Reporter of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, do hereby certify that the foregoing 65 pages constitute a true and complete transcription of my stenographic notes taken of the proceedings held in the afore-captioned matter on the 10th day of March, 2014. In testimony whereof, I hereunto set my hand on the 2nd day of May, 2014. /S/Denise N. Errett, FCRR Denise N. Errett, FCRR Official Court Reporter Southern District of Ohio