## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

IN RE: NUVARING PRODUCTS	)
LIABILITY LITIGATION	)
	)Case No. 4:08-MD-01964 RWS
	)

## MOTION AND STATUS HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE RODNEY W. SIPPEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE AUGUST 23, 2012

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(Appearanced continued on Page 2)

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## (PROCEEDINGS STARTED AT 10:37 AM.)

THE COURT: Good morning. We're here this morning in the case styled *In Re: NuvaRing Products Liability*Litigation, 4:08-MD-1964. Would counsel make their appearances, please?

MS. KRAFT: Kristine Kraft, Your Honor, representing the plaintiffs.

MR. SHKOLNIK: Morning, Your Honor. Hunter Shkolnik on behalf of plaintiffs.

MS. BRITTAIN: Good morning, Your Honor. Ashley Brittain for plaintiffs.

MR. BALL: Dan Ball for the defendants.

MR. STRAUSS: Steve Strauss for the defendants.

MS. GEIST: Morning, Your Honor. Melissa Geist for the defendants.

MR. YOO: Morning, Your Honor. Thomas Yoo for the defendants.

THE COURT: Very good. We're here today on a status conference.

So, Mr. Ball, what of the issues that were teed up for the Court today have been resolved?

MR. BALL: Number 2 on plaintiffs' agenda which involves the timing of filing responses to the <u>Daubert</u> briefs, the parties have agreed that both sides' responses to the Daubert briefs will now be filed on October 16, which is 14

days later than it would have been. That would make the reply briefs due November 6.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to do a flow of consciousness discussion then. One of the open issues is a schedule for motions for summary judgment.

MR. BALL: Yes. We've had discussions about that.

THE COURT: But you haven't reached a resolution of that or --

MR. BALL: Well, I think we've -- I've had discussions with Mr. Denton, and there's also been similar discussions going on in New Jersey. And in the New Jersey litigation at the suggestion of Judge Martinotti -- and I think the parties have agreed to this, that it made sense to deal with case-specific summary judgment motions first because that might narrow issues and narrow cases and help with the cases.

THE COURT: In the words of Judge Martinotti, "I'm not going to reach" -- but in New Jersey it's not <a href="Daubert">Daubert</a>.

It's a different word.

MR. BALL: Kemp.

THE COURT: Kemp. "I'm not going to reach Kemp motions until I resolve the summary judgment motions." Is that a fair Cliff Notes version of his?

MR. BALL: Yes. And I've had a similar discussion with Mr. Denton, and I will let Kris speak for him. I think

we are on the same page there. We need to deal with the timing issue, but I think we're on the same page that it makes sense to do summary judgment case specific first.

THE COURT: Mr. Yoo may not have been in New Jersey, but I heard his voice when Judge Martinotti told me that the defendants said, "Without a doubt, Judge, all of these cases are going to go out on summary judgment."

MR. BALL: He was in New Jersey.

MR. YOO: That was me, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, we have got our respective roles defined for us. And so his observation then was that we're going to deal with the summary judgment motions before we get to the Kemp/Daubert motions.

So having set a briefing schedule for the <u>Daubert</u> motion begs the question about the briefing schedule for the motions for summary judgment, and that may also beget other questions about bringing the discovery in those cases to closure, which I assume we have, but I'm sure there's always loose ends that need to be dealt with.

MR. BALL: We think discovery has been completed in all those cases, number one, and number two --

THE COURT: Well, you don't believe that in New Jersey, because there are two experts in New Jersey you're seeking more information about. Well, with "Dooling" or --

MR. BALL: Rosing and Lidegaard.

THE COURT: Rosing and Lidegaard. You're asking for more discovery on those individuals.

MR. BALL: Those are not designated experts. Those are people that have written articles --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BALL: -- that the plaintiffs are relying upon. And we're seeking discovery about the compensation and any relationships they have with the plaintiffs on that.

THE COURT: That's still discovery, however you want to define it; so it's not over.

MR. BALL: The case specific is over, is what I meant to say. So our proposal was that --

THE COURT: I didn't mean to make it more complicated, but obviously if we're going to have the same view, world view, that summary judgment needs to be addressed, I mean, let's suppose hypothetically that everybody goes out on statute of limitations issues for some reason or there are other issues that result in summary judgment. I think Judge Martinotti may be right that you don't borrow trouble. Why reach — and maybe the other parties wouldn't want us to reach the expert issues if their case really wasn't one that was going to withstand scrutiny in the first place.

So doing the <u>Daubert</u> -- the point is, doing the <u>Daubert</u> schedule, we need to do the summary judgment motions schedule. Are we in a position to have that discussion?

MR. BALL: We have proposed to the plaintiffs a tentative schedule, and this is what we've proposed. We've proposed that we file the case-specific summary judgment motions on the eight cases in the trial pool by October 31; that the plaintiffs file responses by December 15; and that we file our replies by January 7 so that they would be ripe with the court in January.

THE COURT: Then you're going to trial in New Jersey in February.

MR. BALL: Although there have been discussions among the parties that that may well slip.

THE COURT: I was looking forward to 2014 as a NuvaRing-free year, but that's why we're here, to figure out how we get there.

Ms. Kraft seems anxious. Mr. Shkolnik is more anxious.

MR. SHKOLNIK: Your Honor, I think there's a fundamental difference here with the defendants. As to the motions, we agree that summary judgment issues should be dealt with. We think that the <u>Daubert</u> and summary judgment can be done together.

THE COURT: I mean, that's possible. I just know that we don't need to have them totally -- that's why I need the summary judgment schedule. I mean, there's no reason to do them in isolation of each other. There may be overlap.

1 MR. SHKOLNIK: I think some of them this may be -- to 2 look at it as two different completely -- if it's statute of 3 limitations, we understand that's a separate issue. THE COURT: That's a discrete, unique. 4 5 MR. SHKOLNIK: But if we're talking about the 6 substance of the case and the experts, it's so intertwined, 7 and at this point there seems to be no reason not to file them 8 at the same time. 9 THE COURT: It's a little late for that, isn't it? 10 MR. SHKOLNIK: I think we could probably pick up the 11 schedule and do that. THE COURT: So you're suggesting that the motions 12 13 should be filed before October 31. 14 MR. SHKOLNIK: I think so, yeah. 15 MR. BALL: You just now requested more days to 16 respond to the Daubert motions that are out there. It seems a 17 little inconsistent here that we're pushing on one, pushing 18 back your obligations and moving up our obligations. 19 THE COURT: Well, let's define that. That's why I'm 20 We'll decide, and we'll figure it out. here. 21 Yes, sir? 22 MR. YOO: Your Honor, the summary judgment motions

MR. YOO: Your Honor, the summary judgment motions are due in New Jersey by September 24. That's pursuant to an order Judge Martinotti put in place months ago. So we have been working toward that. The issue of setting a briefing

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schedule for the summary judgment motions in the MDL has only recently come up. And we think, given everything that's going on, given the amount of time that's been allotted to both sides on the briefing that's already been ordered, we think the October deadline for summary judgment motions in the MDL case is reasonable.

THE COURT: What about case-specific <u>Daubert</u> motions? Right now we're dealing with generic -- "generic" is the wrong word -- global.

MR. BALL: We were having -- our proposal to the plaintiffs that we discussed was having those filed November 30, responses January 15, and replies by February 5. Again, this was -- this is done in some degree with our knowledge of the other things that we're having to brief, the other papers that have to be --

THE COURT: When are the <a href="Kemp-specific Daubert">Kemp-specific Daubert</a>
motions -- Kemp-specific motions in New Jersey due?

MR. BALL: They're due like next month.

THE COURT: So why can't we do case-specific motions on the same track? I mean, by pushing that reply brief off to February, I mean, honestly, you know, when I took the bench today --

MR. BALL: We can do that.

THE COURT: If Judge Martinotti was taking a case out in February and you all told him it will take a month to try,

and I told him he should have told you two weeks, like I did, but --

MR. SHKOLNIK: We like two weeks.

THE COURT: I mean, as I told you all before in the Vioxx cases, they tried a number of them, and they managed to get them down to about a two-week trial schedule. We'll have to see how the first couple go before we figure out where we can streamline the cases, but we don't want to spend eternity together either.

MR. BALL: We can do the case-specific <u>Daubert</u> on the same October 31 schedule as the summary judgment.

MR. YOO: Yeah.

THE COURT: But my point was, is that if you're going to go to trial in February, I don't expect you to get on a plane and come here and start a case the next week, but it would be within a month, you know, that we start going on a staggered schedule. I assume you all kind of had some thoughts on that.

MR. YOO: Your Honor, I think looking at the way things are shaping up both with the briefing schedule, Judge Martinotti's desire to do the summary judgment hearings before <a href="Memp">Kemp</a>, our belief that Your Honor and Judge Martinotti should still coordinate the <a href="Daubert/Kemp">Daubert/Kemp</a> issues in a joint proceeding, and further, some communications we've had recently with plaintiffs' counsel about the New Jersey trial

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date, I think that February date is going to slip. So if it slips by a month or two, that's something that we'll need to consider.

From my perspective, I think what's important in setting a schedule here is we get some dates in place for the filing of the summary judgment motions here. We believe those should be heard by Your Honor before we get to the generic <a href="Daubert/Kemp">Daubert/Kemp</a> issues, and the <a href="Daubert/Kemp">Daubert/Kemp</a> issues should be coordinated in the two proceedings.

So as to case-specific <u>Daubert</u> challenges as Mr. Ball indicated, we'd be able to file those concurrent with the deadline for summary judgment if that deadline is October 31.

MS. KRAFT: Thank you. Your Honor, if I may, I think that in the MDL proceedings we need to first set a trial date and then work backwards in terms of setting deadlines for summary judgment and case-specific Daubert motions and --

THE COURT: But that doesn't really work, because if
I said March, that means that everything would have to be
briefed before me before the first of December, and that's not
realistic for anybody.

MS. KRAFT: Right. We would propose April as a first trial date. We would like to get on the calendar three firm trial dates so that --

THE COURT: But do you disagree with Mr. Yoo that that February setting in New Jersey is in peril?

1 MR. SHKOLNIK: Your Honor, we don't think months, if that's the suggestion. 2 3 THE COURT: No. But you all have obviously talked 4 about how you're going to do this. Are you planning on trying 5 cases simultaneously in Missouri and New Jersey? 6 MR. BALL: We're not. 7 MR. SHKOLNIK: Your Honor, we're not saying simultaneously, but as the Court said, not the following day, 8 9 but we should be able to stagger these. 10 THE COURT: Let me tell you what I'm going to end up 11 doing today. I'm going to set a trial date in April, but understand that Judge Martinotti and I are not going to work 12 13 against each other, and if the February date moves, obviously 14 we're going to move, but I want to at least have a place to 15 work from. You know, here's our benchmark, and then here is 16 how if New Jersey moves, obviously Missouri moves, you know, 17 in coordination with whatever is worked out there. We're 18 going to work together. We're not going to work against each 19 other. 20 MR. BALL: May I? 21 THE COURT: But we're going to have a place saver, if 22 you will.

MR. BALL: May I speak to the April setting, Your

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Honor?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. BALL: I've told this -- everybody else in the room knows this. I'm undergoing some treatment now for cancer, and I had to move some trial settings that were scheduled for this year. One of them is a big case set in April that was supposed to be going on now. So I have told that to Mr. Denton. I have respectfully requested that the trial be set, the first trial here be set in June as a result of that because I had to --

THE COURT: But you forgot about me.

MR. BALL: I did. I did. I was just saying that that's what I suggested, was going to suggest to you, and that was the reason why April wouldn't work, in addition to the fact that we believe that there is a high likelihood that the New Jersey case will be moved to March, which would, you know, butting them right up against each other.

THE COURT: My instinct -- I mean, you know my mantra: Don't treat this case any different than you would any other case -- is to set it in April and let's see where we are. I mean, that creates anxiety on your part in some piece, but on the other hand, if we don't set and we don't move from there, then we'll talk about June. Then suddenly it will be August or September. I just need a place holder here. And if your case goes to trial -- who is it in front of?

MR. BALL: It's in Jefferson City, in state court.

THE COURT: Well, I set ten civil cases at a time on

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    the same docket. If I was afraid to do that, I would never
    get anything done; so we will just have to see. You're
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     assuming that that case will actually go in April. A lot
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    could change. Obviously, if at some point somebody's not
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     available, we'll have to deal with it, but the MDL is too big
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     to -- if I worked around everybody's schedule, I wouldn't get
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     anything done, you know. And April is a long, long way away.
     It's more than half a year. We'll figure it out.
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             MR. BALL: I've said my piece.
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              THE COURT: Yeah. I just have to start somewhere,
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     and we'll go --
             MR. BALL: Would you do May?
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             MR. SHKOLNIK: We understand Mr. Ball's situation.
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    If we keep the April, at least we slip the month in New Jersey
    we have the May. So we should be --
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              THE COURT: I'm going to have to clear out, I
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    understand, at least three to four weeks at a time, right?
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             MR. YOO: We think if the trial date in New Jersey
     slips to March, and it looks like it probably will --
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                         Then we're going to slip here for sure.
              THE COURT:
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              MR. YOO: But in terms of a place holder -- and I
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     appreciate Your Honor's desire to set a place holder date --
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     if we can set it in May or June, that would make a lot of
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     things more manageable for us.
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MR. SHKOLNIK: We don't think June is reasonable at

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all.

THE COURT: June is a train wreck for me, I'll just be honest. May, I will do a place holder in May, and we'll see where we are.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MS}}$  . KRAFT: We can do the first week of May or second week of May.

THE COURT: My other problem is, I assume Martinotti doesn't have this problem, but there are people who haven't committed crimes yet that will get indicted that will have a Speedy Trial Act issue. I always -- I take my -- the first week of the month is my criminal week, and I set all my criminal cases; so I just kind of compartmentalize them there. And then the last three weeks I leave open for civil.

That's the only issue I have, is if I run up against a Speedy Trial Act issue with a criminal case, I obviously got to deal with the criminal case, not that we can't manage it.

I mean, the chances -- the U.S. Attorney doesn't tend to indict people that -- they have a pretty good case against --

MR. BALL: Understand.

THE COURT: Although I just finished a week-long cocaine trial here this week. It's nice to talk to people who speak in English.

MS. KRAFT: If I may, while we're on trial settings?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. KRAFT: We believe it's very important to set an

additional two trial settings, particularly given even the discussion we're having right now about difficulty in scheduling and given the length of the trials.

THE COURT: Were you thinking that this was a four-month cycle? You know, when I set a case, say, May, that then I do another one in four months because in two months you're going to be back in New Jersey? Had you thought about the hopscotch effect, or how were you contemplating it?

MS. KRAFT: We would propose every other month in the MDL, and would like to see the MDL — with the first trial setting we had had state courts kind of around, you know, the country that are looking at when these trial settings are going to be set or we feel that they will be looking at when these trials are going to be set here and to sort of build around that. So we would propose if we are going —

THE COURT: What other states are in play other than Judge Martinotti's case?

MR. YOO: There's --

MR. STRAUSS: Your Honor, the real state in play is Illinois, Cook County, before Judge Flanagan.

MR. BALL: One case.

MR. STRAUSS: And that case is likely to be, based on the earlier discussions, would be a late summer window. So there can't be another case here in four months after May because that likely --

THE COURT: Then it will be three. That's okay. I mean --

MR. YOO: Your Honor --

MR. SHKOLNIK: I think that Mr. Denton has a different view on what's going to happen in Chicago, and I think the judge in Chicago will have a different view, but I don't want to talk for the judge or Mr. Denton on that one.

THE COURT: Well, you know, again it creates problems for you guys because I set these dates, but you've dealt with me enough to know that I am not going to force you to try two cases at the same time. And I have to figure out a way to work with these state judges because I assume you're going to use the same experts, it's largely going to be the same trial counsel, and I'm not going to create problems that can't be managed.

MR. YOO: Your Honor, I think as Your Honor observed, May is many months from now. We'll have many opportunities to talk about further trial settings. We've got the summary judgment motions that need to be heard, the <u>Daubert</u> challenges that need to be dealt with. I think Judge Martinotti hasn't set a second trial yet. I think setting a second trial there and a second trial here is something that will require some coordination.

But my point is, there are a lot of things that are going to need to happen in the interim, and we've got time to

deal with that; so I don't think that we should go through sort of an artificial exercise of laying out a bunch of place holders which then all may need to get moved.

THE COURT: I think the logical thing to do is, I will set the first case here for May 6. Give me some time to talk to Judge Martinotti and see if we can't include -- you let me know if there's anybody else we should be talking to, you know, and then let's get them so we can coordinate a trial schedule.

MR. BALL: So can we represent --

THE COURT: But next time we get together start plotting out so that -- you know, if you don't, it won't happen, which would be Ms. Kraft's point. And I agree with that, and everybody needs to be on notice.

MS. KRAFT: Right. The longer we wait, the longer or the more opportunity there is going to be for conflicts, so we would really --

THE COURT: My job is to try to manage those conflicts, though.

MS. KRAFT: Yeah.

MR. SHKOLNIK: Your Honor, we just -- just so you understand our perspective here, it's with the MDL taking the affirmative lead and saying these are going to be the trials, the states will slip into those months in between; so if we did --

THE COURT: Well, let me talk to the states. 1 2 MR. SHKOLNIK: I understand. 3 THE COURT: The Tenth Amendment, you know. 4 powers not specifically given to the federal government remain 5 with the states. 6 MR. SHKOLNIK: I don't see too many New Jersey trials 7 going into next summer. I don't think they have the same kind 8 of resources. We're prepared to just stack the cases. 9 THE COURT: Let me talk to Judge Martinotti, not let 10 me presume anything, not let me tell him anything. Let me 11 talk to him and we'll go from there. But you've got May, and 12 you know, in the next few months we'll do this. It's not like 1.3 I'm going to wait until January or February to talk about it. 14 Our next status conference one of the topics will be the 15 serial trial settings that follow. 16 MR. BALL: Okay. 17 MR. YOO: Thank you, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Yes, ma'am. 19 MS. KRAFT: I wonder --20 THE COURT: Let's step up to the podium. 21 MS. KRAFT: We kind of got off track a little bit. 22 We were talking about the deadlines for summary judgment 23

motions and case-specific Daubert briefing. What we would propose then is to come up with a mechanism by which we identify the first three cases to be set for trial in the MDL

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and brief those cases as opposed to at this particular point in time, you know, all --

THE COURT: Have you all discussed which -- that idea amongst yourselves?

MR. BALL: I had not. This is the first I had heard of that.

MS. KRAFT: Yeah. We just simply put it on our agenda to select three cases and to go through the process.

MR. BALL: But I didn't know we were going to limit the summary judgment --

MR. YOO: Yeah. We've had no such discussion, and we certainly have no such agreement. In New Jersey we were filing summary judgment motions in all of the bellwether cases. One of the objectives there is to see which case survives. And so to limit it to three preselected --

THE COURT: Because none will survive.

MR. YOO: None will survive. But to limit it to the three preselected cases, we don't think that that serves the case management objectives here. We think that we should proceed with an opportunity to file summary judgment in all eight cases, and those case-specific issues should be dealt with and resolved, and then we see what are the remaining issues, if any, for the rest of the bellwether pool.

THE COURT: Ms. Kraft, what are you thinking? Why did you make that recommendation?

MR. SHKOLNIK: Your Honor, I think one of the issues here is we don't have any agreement by the defendants to waive <a href="Lexecon">Lexecon</a> on all the cases. It appears that they are trying to make the motions across the board -- or nine cases, eight or nine cases, eight cases. They want to make the motions across the board, then they'll decide which ones they'll waive <a href="Lexecon">Lexecon</a> on, and then they'll pick the trial.

Let's have them -- right now I understand there's only <u>Lexecon</u> issue -- there are no <u>Lexecon</u> issues in some.

Defendants and plaintiffs picked a couple of cases together.

THE COURT: You picked Guthrie and Prather. You both picked those.

MR. SHKOLNIK: So why aren't we just focusing on those, unless defendants now are saying they're waiving <a href="Lexecon">Lexecon</a> across the board and they're not going to selectively decide which ones they'll waive after summary judgment motions, maybe knock out a couple. It really puts us in a really --

THE COURT: You know what's not really helpful, thinking globally, not about either party here, when you look at the eight — the two that you both picked are the only two of the eight that are not initially filed in New Jersey.

We're going to get a look at what a New Jersey jury does with one of these cases, more than one look perhaps. The Prather case initiated here, it's the easiest one obviously. The

other, the Guthrie case, was Alabama.

MR. BALL: Colorado. She lives in Alabama now, but it all happened in Colorado.

THE COURT: So the cause of action came out of District of Colorado?

MR. BALL: I don't know where --

MR. SHKOLNIK: No. I think it was filed --

MR. BALL: I don't know where it was initially filed.

THE COURT: But all the others I have on my list came out of New Jersey, you know; so when I think about the value of the bellwether trials, you know, trying a New Jersey case here isn't as helpful as trying a Missouri case, a Colorado/Alabama case, you know, where we're getting a look at what the outcomes are in these cases to give you any help in deciding how to go forward. But that train already left the station, though.

MR. SHKOLNIK: From our standpoint, Your Honor, it's just hard unless the defendants are going to waive <u>Lexecon</u> on all the eight cases. Otherwise, we should focus on the ones we are going to try, where there's going to either be a waiver or it's an original jurisdiction here, and we're not sitting back and waiting for the outcome of summary judgment and the defendant picks the cases that they want to try.

MR. BALL: The thing about this, Your Honor, just for a second, if we do it that way, let's just assume we pick

three cases. We file summary judgment. Let's assume we win those. Then we have to start all over on three more cases or five cases or whatever it is on summary judgment.

Our goal was to get all that sorted out because we think we have really -- you know, I'm sure everybody says this, but we think we have very strong summary judgment motions, and we might as well get that sorted out and see which of these eight, if any, are going to try.

THE COURT: When you think about your summary judgment motions, let's think about bellwether, do they fall in certain categories?

MR. BALL: Causation is a big deal in all of them.

THE COURT: So do you need to make that point in eight cases, I mean, to get a sense of how the court's going to rule? I mean, that would be the point. If that causation issue falls apart based on the facts of a case, why aren't we looking at cases that give us a signal? Because we're not going to do 900 summary judgment motions here. So why would we do eight if they're all the same?

MS. KRAFT: Right.

THE COURT: Do you follow me? I'm just trying to figure out my time, your resources, my resources.

MR. BALL: Understand. I was trying to address the issue.

THE COURT: Because I'm not going to, if the theme --

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    and I don't know enough because you guys live with this
    obviously a lot more than I do, but if the template for that
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     summary motion judgment on causation is consistent in eight
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    cases, you don't need to do it eight times to understand what
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     I'm going to do with the first one. But they may not be
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     sufficiently consistent for you to say that. I don't know.
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             MR. YOO: I think our general arguments are going to
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    be consistent: Warnings, causation.
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              THE COURT: You're going to have specific facts.
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              MR. YOO: But the testimony is going to be a little
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    bit different, and the applicable law may be a little bit
    different from case to case; so I don't think it's as easy as
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     getting one or two rulings and then --
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              THE COURT: But why don't we pick four?
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             MR. YOO: Well, I think --
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              THE COURT: Because all of them -- you've got --
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    they're from three different states. It is the Middle
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    District of Alabama, it's the Eastern District of Missouri,
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    and then the District of New Jersey. You know, why don't we
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    pick two New Jersey cases and the Alabama case and the
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    Missouri case and let's do those, and then you'll get an
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    understanding of where these are going?
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             MS. KRAFT:
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              THE COURT: Somebody will take a lot from whatever I
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say.

1 MR. YOO: Our preference, Your Honor, would be to have -- we're not talking about filing thirty motions. We're 2 3 talking about eight. We think that's manageable. THE COURT: How many are you doing in New Jersey? 4 5 MR. YOO: We are filing ten motions in New Jersey. MR. BALL: All ten trial pool cases. 6 7 MR. YOO: All ten trial pool cases. So those are all 8 going to be considered by Judge Martinotti around the same 9 time. 10 THE COURT: But will one decision begat the other 11 nine? 12 MR. YOO: Not necessarily. I can't say that across 13 the board. I think there will be some overlap, but our goal 14 is, and consistent with Judge Martinotti's view, is: I want 15 to see which cases survive, and so I want to take up your 16 case-specific dispositive challenges first, and then if I need 17 to get to Kemp, I'll get to Kemp. We think that rationale

THE COURT: If we can do four, why can't we do eight? MR. SHKOLNIK: Your Honor, let me just respond to what counsel just said. There is a fundamental difference between here and New Jersey. Judge Martinotti will try every case without a waiver of a Lexecon-type issue. Those cases are there for every -- for all purposes. They're not going anywhere.

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should apply here as well.

THE COURT: Right. You're going to kill Judge Martinotti.

MR. SHKOLNIK: Well, he's already -- the ten is after the last -- I don't know if you read the transcript, he's -- yeah, he's got quite a bit on his plate, to put it mildly.

But the difference here is, the defendants — it's the point I was trying to make. If you want to do more motions, waive <a href="Lexecon">Lexecon</a>. Tell us you're doing that. In New Jersey we don't have that problem. Whatever is left, the judge will try whatever is left.

Here they would like to see what's left on the table, if anything, or if everything, and then say, all right, we'll waive it in the two cases.

THE COURT: Have you waived  $\underline{\text{Lexecon}}$  for the trial pool cases?

MR. YOO: Your Honor, I'm not really following Mr. Shkolnik's argument. I don't see what one has to do with the other, but I will say this for the record. There is an order, a stipulation of the parties already in place before Your Honor that says -- I'm paraphrasing -- but that says the Prather case and two others will be tried here and the parties have agreed to waive <a href="Lexecon">Lexecon</a>. So essentially in the first three trials before Your Honor <a href="Lexecon">Lexecon</a> is waived.

THE COURT: We just don't know which those other two cases.

1 MR. YOO: We don't know. But the defendants, as they would be provided in any single case, need to have an 2 3 opportunity to make their dispositive challenge. And if, and 4 only if, the case survives our legal challenge based on the 5 undisputed facts in the case should there be a trial. So we 6 think that should be done across all eight cases, and then the 7 cases, if any, that deserve a trial will then be identified 8 through that process. And the first three trials will occur 9 here. 10

MR. SHKOLNIK: Your Honor, counsel still has not said -- we're still in the same -- they get to pick what two cases they decide to waive <a href="Lexecon">Lexecon</a> on. Tell us the cases today that across the board that anyone that's left.

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THE COURT: Are you prepared to waive <u>Lexecon</u> on all eight?

MR. YOO: Your Honor, we've waived <u>Lexecon</u> as to the first three trials.

THE COURT: I understand what you said, but let's suppose that they all withstand a motion for summary judgment. What's the process by which we pick the other two beyond Prather?

MR. BALL: We haven't decided that yet.

MS. KRAFT: Right. And that's what we wanted to propose and go through today, which is that we come up with a selection process for the first three cases, we select one

have jurisdiction.

Lexecon as to two others but --

case, the defendant selects one case. And then to the extent that these dual picked cases of Prather and Guthrie are left over, then, you know, one of those cases go.

THE COURT: Well, Prather is the only one in which I

MS. KRAFT: Right. And they've agreed to waive

THE COURT: Right. We don't know which two. That's why I just asked: Were they willing to waive it? Depending on what the outcome is, were they prepared to try any one of these eight cases, or are you going to hold in your back pocket this pocket veto that, well, they all survive, but we really don't want to try that one, that one, or that one; so here are the two we're willing to waive on?

MR. YOO: Your Honor, we've already waived <u>Lexecon</u> as to the first three trials.

THE COURT: I understand. But which of the -- MR. YOO: Right.

THE COURT: Three trials. But we have eight cases.

MR. YOO: Right. So the selection of what is an appropriate bellwether, we believe, is a separate discussion that should consider fairness to both sides, representativeness, what are the dispositive issues in that case, et cetera.

THE COURT: But what I heard from Ms. Kraft was,

1 Prather is going to be one of them because it's one we know I can try no matter what. There's another 14 out there that are 2 3 EDMO cases, but they're not in this pool. And after summary 4 judgment, the dust settles, whatever is still there, they pick 5 one and you pick one, but you don't have the veto over their 6 pick by refusing to waive Lexecon. That's kind of where we 7 are. That's what she's saying out loud, if I -- of these 8 9 eight. We're not asking as to any other group, but out of these eight, you won't use the failure to waive Lexecon as a 10 11 veto over their selection.

MR. BALL: We have committed to waive Lexecon on the two cases, whatever the next two are, by the case selection process.

THE COURT: And if they pick -- whichever one of these eight they pick, you're not going to -- because right now you have a veto power over them.

MR. SHKOLNIK: That's the problem.

MS. KRAFT: That's exactly --

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THE COURT: But if you're prepared to say you're not going to do it that way.

MR. YOO: I think if I'm understanding correctly, we're not going to do it that way.

THE COURT: Prather is going to be one.

MR. YOO: Prather should be --

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              THE COURT: You'll pick one, and they'll pick one,
    but you're not going to use the failure to waive Lexecon as a
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    veto over their selection.
             MR. YOO: That's correct.
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              THE COURT: Out of these eight.
             MR. YOO: That's correct.
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                         So we're in agreement.
              THE COURT:
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             MR. SHKOLNIK: That's a big agreement that just came
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    out of that.
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              THE COURT: But they're not conceding that the other
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    five they'll waive on, because they've only agreed to waive it
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    as to -- well, you don't need to waive it as to one of the
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    three.
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             MR. SHKOLNIK: Our concern was if we pick our trial
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    case, that all of a sudden, like you're saying, a pocket veto
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     saying, well --
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              THE COURT: But they've said no. But they've said
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         They'll waive as to the first three, but they're not
    going to use it as a shield amongst any one you pick.
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             MR. YOO: Right. So therefore, Your Honor, we think
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    that summary judgment should be allowed to be filed in all
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     eight.
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              THE COURT: I think that's where we are. I know it's
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    onerous, I know it's difficult, but nothing about this has
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been easy; so we are going to brief all eight.

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1 MS. KRAFT: Could I just make one point, because I've been trying to talk? 2 3 THE COURT: Yes, ma'am. MS. KRAFT: With respect to the eight, though, I 4 5 mean --6 THE COURT: You're such a weak person, that you're 7 failure to talk is just so obvious. 8 MS. KRAFT: I'm just not interrupting people. 9 THE COURT: Apparently, that's the point. 10 MS. KRAFT: I think "Ms. Kraft" has been "Hunter" on 11 the record about three times now, no offense. 12 All right. With respect to the summary judgment --13 THE COURT: Bless your little heart, as they would 14 say in the South. 15 MS. KRAFT: I want to go back to briefing the first 16 three cases that are selected for trial, and these other cases 17 can, in fact, be dealt with on a rolling basis, for example, 18 with respect to filing summary judgment motions in the case-specific Dauberts. 19 20 THE COURT: You're assuming an outcome in your favor 21 which we can't necessarily assume. 22 MS. KRAFT: No. I'm not assuming that, because we can come up with a rolling basis for filing the other summary 23 24 judgment motions and case-specific Daubert challenges and not 25 wait until, you know, May when the first trial occurs.

this will also help the Court because it could potentially slow down the system here because you're going to have a large number of briefs.

THE COURT: You'd feel better if you did four in October 31 and four the end of November?

MS. KRAFT: I'm proposing some sort of stair step to this process, yes. I mean that -- but I would propose more like October 1 or October 14 for summary judgment.

THE COURT: I'm not going to -- we're kind of headed to the end of October because you have nine due the end of September in New Jersey. If you can do nine, if you can do the nine the end of September in New Jersey and be ready to do four here the middle of October, then you can do all eight the end of October. So you got to tell me -- do you follow me?

As a practical response to that argument, if you're prepared to do nine summary judgment motions in New Jersey and you're ready to turn around and do several here in the middle of October, you can do all of it by the end of October.

So if you want to stair step them, I'm going to give everybody a month off of briefing before you have to file them here. The only issue is whether you can do all eight here after having done nine in New Jersey or you want four October 31 and four the end of November.

MR. YOO: The October 31 day we propose is for us to get our motions filed. Plaintiffs under our proposal would

have till middle of December to file oppositions. I would remind everyone that the bellwether cases are represented by different plaintiff firms, and so it's not like Ms. Kraft has to write eight oppositions herself.

Plus, I find this request inconsistent with their desire to get a trial date set, multiple trials set and move this along, to do this wait and see and maybe have to start all over process.

And as a final point, I go back to our view that to the extent possible, there should be coordination between Your Honor and Judge Martinotti. So if Judge Martinotti wants to see what cases survive and see which of the <a href="Kemp">Kemp</a> motions are actually ripe and relevant, I think Your Honor should be in the same position and not be wondering, well, we decided summary judgment on four, but I don't know as to the other four whether these <a href="Daubert">Daubert</a> issues are going to be dispositive of those cases or not. I think we should, to the extent possible, move in lock step in that regard.

MS. KRAFT: I mean, I don't think we're talking about a big difference in timing, and it's not going to affect the trial settings, you know, in May and whatever the Court decides thereafter. We have one firm here in the MDL that represents six of the plaintiffs, and that same firm represents almost all ten -- or I'm not sure. Mr. Shkolnik can --

MR. SHKOLNIK: Most.

MS. KRAFT: But the majority of them. And it's just simply just a bit of a stair step which I would think may help the Court as well in addressing the motions, but I've made my argument.

THE COURT: I'm going to go ahead and stick with all eight by October 31. Responses due December 15. Reply briefs due January 7. After having done the exercise in New Jersey, actually we'll benefit a little bit from that. You're not going to be surprised by the arguments. You'll be in a position to deal with this a lot better than if we were first out of the gate. So I'm not too concerned about the burden. All right.

MS. KRAFT: Thank you.

MR. SHKOLNIK: Thank you.

MR. BALL: Your Honor, on the case in Cook County which is being handled now by Judge Flanagan --

THE COURT: One case. Really. I mean, we're going to let that drive all this?

MR. BALL: Yeah. Can we ask her to -- could we ask her to expect a call from you or be in contact with you?

THE COURT: If you give me her information, I'm happy to call her.

MR. STRAUSS: Because earlier you said if there's anyone else for me to coordinate with or for us to coordinate

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    with, I will just tell you if you -- when you are speaking
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    with Judge Martinotti, we are going before Judge Flanagan on
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     September 6. So if she had some knowledge of the game plan,
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     that would at least let her know what the playing field is.
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              THE COURT: Well, I assume you've been giving her our
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    scheduling orders.
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              MR. STRAUSS: We have been updating her on everything
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    that goes on here and in New Jersey.
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              THE COURT: Well, give me her contact information,
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     and I'm happy to talk to her.
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              MR. STRAUSS: All right. Thank you.
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              THE COURT: I assume there's no objection to that on
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    behalf of the plaintiffs.
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              MR. SHKOLNIK: No, Your Honor.
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              MS. KRAFT: No, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: I would never call another judge in
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     another case without everybody agreeing, you understand that.
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              So we have the global Daubert motions, the
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    case-specific Daubert motions, the summary judgment motions.
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    Now, Judge Martinotti seemed to have formed the opinion, to
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     double-back a little bit, that you all told him that the
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     issues as to the authors of the articles upon which the
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    plaintiffs relied -- and their names escape me at the moment.
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              MR. BALL: Lidegaard and Rosing.
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THE COURT: That he formed the opinion that someone

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represented to him that those same motions were in front of me, but I couldn't find anything to that effect.

MR. YOO: Your Honor, we did not file that motion in this court. That dispute involves a rather unique set of circumstances.

THE COURT: These are folks who are experts in the Yaz litigation who also are --

MR. YOO: Folks in the Yaz litigation. And we know there's a financial relationship between those at researchers and the plaintiffs' firms that have -- in the NuvaRing litigation that also have Yaz cases.

THE COURT: But there's nothing for me to reach here because you haven't asked for --

MR. YOO: There's nothing for Your Honor. It also relates to a specific representation that New Jersey counsel made before Judge Martinotti in a prior hearing. Judge Martinotti issued an order saying: I want you to put that representation in writing. And so the motion was a motion to compel that further act to occur; so it was a New Jersey-specific issue on the procedural --

THE COURT: Judge Martinotti had formed the opinion that it was an issue that overlapped both he and I.

MR. BALL: There may come a time when, Your Honor, when that issue comes up again, but right now it's only pending in New Jersey.

1 THE COURT: All right. Because I thought that would 2 help us a little bit. 3 MR. SHKOLNIK: Your Honor, I think the issue is the 4 similar demands that were made in New Jersey that were the 5 subject of the motion were also made in the MDL, but no motion 6 was made on those responses here. I think, if I'm not 7 mistaken, that's what occurred. 8 THE COURT: It's possible it will be filed here, but 9 it hasn't. 10 MR. SHKOLNIK: Yeah. It hasn't gotten to you. 11 MR. YOO: There's no motion. THE COURT: That's the other mantra. You don't 12 1.3 borrow trouble. I have no trouble to borrow. Poor Judge 14 Martinotti has it. We still have this Mr. Suissa. Is that a 15 he or a she? 16 MR. YOO: It's a he. Dr. Samy Suissa. 17 THE COURT: Dr. Samy Suissa. Well, that's the way 18 Harry Carey would have pronounced it. Plaintiffs have a 19 motion to compel production of documents. 20 MS. KRAFT: Yes, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: It's really about -- tell me what it's 22 about. Let me hear the argument. I have a little bit of an 23 opinion, but let me hear where you are. 24 MS. KRAFT: Dr. Suissa is a retained expert witness

by defendants on epidemiology. He has a long history with

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Organon going back decades. He has done studies that Organon has funded over the course of the years and has done a reanalysis of a particular transnational study in approximately 1998 where the study originally concluded that third-generation progestin products similar to that used in NuvaRing did, in fact, have a higher risk for venous thrombotic events in comparison to second-generation products. He then — he participated in that study. He then received funding from Organon and did a reanalysis of that data and

He participated in a later study in 2000 that likewise found there was no difference in risk between the third- and second-generation products.

found that there was no risk.

Aside from his affiliation in terms of receiving funding and sort of a long history with Organon, he also has had affiliations with other pharmaceutical companies. At the time of his deposition as a retained expert witness in this case on epidemiology-related issues, we, in fact, served him with a subpoena duces tecum for the production of documents. We are no longer requesting his actual deposition, that he appear in person for a deposition, but we are, in fact, asking for a series of documents that he produce from his file that are, in fact, directly relevant to the issues in this case, his potential bias or inconsistent statements, you know, whatever there may be in this discovery that would be relevant

to us in the discovery phase to review.

And the nature of the request really can be broken down into a couple of different topics. There are a significant number of requests that relate directly to NuvaRing and Organon, you know, such as meeting minutes, e-mails, or other communications that he may have had with Organon over the course of these years about NuvaRing, as well as other hormonal contraceptives, you know, documents relating to any payments or studies that he's done and perhaps didn't complete over the course of the years in connection with his dealings with Organon-related companies.

He's also known to have given, you know, a series of presentations on hormonal contraceptives around the country.

We're seeking those types of presentations, PowerPoints,
things like that, all relevant to the issues in this case.

We're also seeking other categories of documents, including communications that he's had with ZEG and representatives of ZEG, which is the organization that is conducting the TASC study, which is the epidemiology study that Organon is conducting and has completed and will soon publish the results that pertain directly to NuvaRing.

So similarly as a retained expert in this case, it's our position that we're entitled to obtain discovery of those documents. In contrast, the defendants are taking a very narrow approach to the discovery and taking the position that

they're only obligated to disclose the categories of documents that fall under Rule 26 with respect to expert disclosures.

Discovery isn't limited to only those particular types of topics.

And similarly, I mean, you've received a copy of the request for documents. We're also asking that he produce other documents with other pharmaceutical companies regarding, you know, his work or discussions that he's had about hormonal contraceptives, documents that he's authored in that regard.

The defendants have presented an argument pertaining to confidentiality and privilege. If that's the case, they haven't provided a privilege log, which can, in fact, be a waiver of asserting privilege here. But aside from that, there's no way for us to really assess their claim of either privilege or confidentiality in that regard without at least requiring them to come forward and identify what they claim is confidential.

So for these reasons, it's a properly served subpoena. He is a Canadian citizen, but he was served in the United States in the District of New York pursuant to a properly issued subpoena. There is authority for that, that he was properly served. And so we are simply requesting that he respond to the subpoena for production of documents.

THE COURT: First of all, what time period are you dealing with here? Any time I read a request that says "any

and all e-mails" or "any and all minutes," I mean, I just -you already feel a sinking feeling that it's a little too
much.

MS. KRAFT: Well, we are asking for the period -- it says "unless otherwise indicated, the documents pertain to the period of 2001 to the present."

THE COURT: So ten years. All e-mails, all minutes, all correspondence.

MS. KRAFT: Yeah. I mean, unless -- and I mean again --

THE COURT: I'm just trying to figure out what exactly you're looking for so I can help you, but I'm hard put to tell them to get -- I mean, every e-mail for ten years, that's pretty oppressive to an individual.

MS. KRAFT: In each instance the topic, you know, pertaining to the e-mail, for example, is defined by communications with Organon-affiliated companies about hormonal contraceptives; so it is an isolated topic in each instance.

But the time period, I mean unless otherwise stated by the nature of the request, which can incorporate some of these earlier studies that Dr. Suissa was involved in, which again date back to the late 1990s, absent that, the request is from 2001 through the present; so that is generally the time frame that we're dealing with.

MR. YOO: Your Honor, this is a totally unjustified request, and it's nothing more than a pure attempt to harass one of our expert witnesses. Rule 26 governs. Furthermore, there's a stipulated order from Your Honor that says Rule 26 governs and here is what can and cannot be requested of a designated expert.

Dr. Suissa produced his files in this case pursuant to plaintiffs' document request for his deposition, submitted to a full day of deposition. The plaintiffs have not moved to compel based on their document request. Instead, at the conclusion of the deposition they handed him with a subpoena asking for essentially any and all documents, e-mails, PowerPoints, presentation notes, anything you've ever done related to hormone contraceptives unrelated to NuvaRing for anyone.

In the first instance, as a matter of principle, that completely contravenes Rule 26 and the stipulated order of this Court, and plaintiffs have no justification for it. Dr. Suissa was involved in a couple of peer-review studies published in '97 and 2000, I believe. It might have been '98. He testified clearly: I don't have any documents related to those studies from 15 years ago. He said that on the record, and we have presented that evidence in our opposition.

He says: I don't keep things related to studies beyond five years. That's always been the university policy,

and so I can tell you affirmatively I don't have anything related to those studies.

And those studies have been in the peer-review literature for over a decade. The plaintiffs' experts have them. They've opined on them. Those documents, to the extent they should be ordered produced, they don't exist; so that's a done issue.

The plaintiffs' subpoena is indicative of maybe what they're really after. Several of the specific requests say:

Give us all documents related to your consultation with Bayer relating to their hormone contraceptives. He was not a designated expert in Bayer. Apparently, he has some kind of a consulting relationship with Bayer. He testified very clearly that has nothing to do with NuvaRing; I'm bound by a confidentiality agreement with regard to their proprietary information; I'm not going to talk about anything related to my consultation with a totally different company relating to a totally different product.

If Ms. Kraft's office wants to do an end run around the Bayer procedures and seek Bayer documents, that's completely improper. They can seek Bayer documents from Bayer through the Bayer litigation. It has nothing to do with NuvaRing.

So as to the only documents that are arguably relevant to NuvaRing, Dr. Suissa's reanalyses done in the

'90s, he's already testified those documents do not exist. As to his litigation files that need to be produced pursuant to this Court's order in Rule 26, they have been produced.

So in terms of PowerPoints and notes and anything else relating to any hormone contraceptives for any work you've ever done in that general subject matter area, that's completely improper. There's no legal basis for it. And if that kind of discovery is permitted as to Dr. Suissa, then plaintiffs need to prepare for similar discovery as to any of their experts. And this isn't a threat. It's just —

THE COURT: Well, it is a threat.

MR. YOO: Well, it reflects what -- the lack of mutuality here. They are proposing to do something as to Dr. Suissa that they would never agree to do with respect to their other experts -- Parisian, Buncher, Levine. If we asked for all of their notes, peer-review materials, editorials that they've done, consultations they've done with regard to other hormone contraceptives, they would never allow it. And yet that's exactly what they're asking this Court to order as to Dr. Suissa, and they completely ignore the rules that have been in place from day one of expert discovery.

THE COURT: Ms. Kraft.

MR. SHKOLNIK: Your Honor, I just want to add one point, and then I'll give it over to Ms. Kraft. Number one, it's kind of interesting. The point the Court just asked

about before we went into this motion deals with a motion in New Jersey related to discovery requests served on counsel in New Jersey and here in the MDL for any communications with a Dr. Rosing, who aren't even our experts in the case, specifically asking us to produce anything we may have in our possession, meaning the lawyers, that we obtained in the Bayer — in the Yaz litigation. It's kind of ironic now that that counsel —

THE COURT: Well, that's why I asked about it because I thought we could resolve this globally. Whatever it was they were seeking about Yaz and you were seeking about Bayer, let's figure out a way to do this with some common sense.

MR. SHKOLNIK: Well, first of all, here we're not dealing with a service of a notice of discovery on a lawyer for their files, which is, I think, a clear difference. Here we're dealing with a witness who has lectured extensively, recently appeared before the FDA on a hearing focused on third-generation products. He was being paid for by Bayer at that conference at the FDA. Any of those notes as part of preparing for FDA proceedings have nothing to do with protected communications. This is this expert's opinions on a topic that's the center of this case, the safety of second-versus third-generation products.

So Dr. Suissa has lectured on this, on this very topic. Dr. Suissa appeared before FDA as a consultant on this

very topic. And statements of a expert witness on issues that they are giving opinions on in the case are germane. Whether or not he doesn't have something from the '90s may be one thing, but whether — it's completely different from whether or not he has any information in his possession over the conversations and presentations he's made no more than eight months ago in December, in Washington, D.C.

These are very -- this goes to the heart of his opinions, the safety of second- versus third-generation hormonal contraceptives.

I know defendants are taking the position, well, everything that Bayer did with this witness must be protected. That's fine. Then don't put a witness up who's given statements in public proceedings and has prepared PowerPoints or presentations or assessments on the very topics that you want him to testify here and then say, oh, no, we're not going to make him produce that from his files.

And if there is such things or such documents that he has that are privilege and protected, the law is clear.

Privilege log. That's something they should have done here.

Failure to do that is a waiver.

THE COURT: We're not going to make -- you understand -- I understand the argument, but we're not going to reach this on a failure to make a privilege log as a waiver question.

MR. YOO: Your Honor, what Mr. Shkolnik just said is completely untrue. Dr. Suissa did not present at the FDA advisory committee. He testified that he attended, sat in the audience, and observed. He gave no presentation to the FDA, number one. Number two, it's incorrect to say that that hearing had anything to do with second versus third generation. That hearing had everything to do with Yaz, a fourth-generation product. It had nothing to do with NuvaRing.

And this idea of a privilege log, they're not my documents. They're proprietary information described as such, I guess, by Bayer. I don't know anything about that. But the witness cannot be forced to breach his confidentiality contract with a third party. So I have a problem with just about everything Mr. Shkolnik just said.

THE COURT: At a minimum, I think I'd have to have his counsel here.

MR. SHKOLNIK: Exactly, Your Honor. But that's the problem with Merck's counsel making the argument for this witness who's not done what's appropriate here and contested the subpoena and put forward a privilege log if there is any documents relevant. That's exactly it.

MR. YOO: This is completely opposite of what the stipulated order and Rule 26 provided at the outset of expert discovery.

MS. KRAFT: Your Honor, if I may, in certain respects I think we are losing track of the focus of one of the primary focuses of this subpoena, and that relates to NuvaRing and Organon. The overwhelmingly majority of the requests goes to that topic. And again, Dr. Suissa is somewhat of a unique witness here because he has been this long-time consultant over the decades focusing on second- and third-generation products. You know, in that regard I just don't know how one can argue it's not relevant to have this information.

You know, compensation that Organon has paid to him perhaps over the years, we're entitled to know that, whether it relates to NuvaRing or other hormonal contraceptives.

Agreements that perhaps he has had with respect to Organon regarding publications of studies, you know, the PowerPoints and summaries of presentations he's given over the course of the years regarding NuvaRing and other hormonal contraceptives, I mean, these are all things that directly relate to NuvaRing, not to mention the documents pertaining to TASC, which again is the epidemiology study that will be published this year.

I mean, if they have retained in this case an expert witness who has had, you know, communications or input or whatever it might be pertaining to TASC or the representatives of TASC, we're entitled to know whether those documents exist.

And there's been a lot of focus on these documents

regarding Bayer. There's two requests that even address that topic, and it's Request Nos. 3 and 7. Number 7 asks for information regarding employment by Bayer, and No. 3 -- this is a paraphrase, but No. 3 asks for meeting minutes and e-mails regarding communications with Bayer.

And certainly at a minimum the documents he authored that would fall under that category that, you know, relate to hormonal contraceptives would be relevant. The other sort of general category of documents would be money or perks that has been paid to him by any pharmaceutical company, and that's Request Nos. 24 and 25.

So, I mean, these document requests are really directly relevant to the issues here, and I think we're entitled to see whether or not they exist. Certainly his background that he's had in hormonal contraceptives over the years is a basis on which they're going to claim he's qualified and has knowledge and experience, you know, in this area; so it directly relates to that issue as well, which is, you know, referenced in Rule 26.

MR. YOO: Your Honor, I have a big problem with these kinds of efforts to just ignore the rules that have been put in place. We have rules for precisely this kind of reason. We have not only Rule 26, but the parties' interpretation and stipulation regarding Rule 26, and the Court ordered the parties to conduct themselves as such. This goes completely

outside of that agreement.

And, you know, by Ms. Kraft's rationale then, we'll need to redo expert discovery as to a bunch of experts, including Dr. Buncher who testified for Ms. Kraft against Ortho-Evra. That involved a hormone contraceptive. Are they going to produce all of his files and notes and communications and everything else?

What about Dr. Parisian, who shows up in multiple litigations including on other hormone contraceptives? Why have they singled out Dr. Suissa? They don't have any justification for doing that.

As to documents relating to NuvaRing, Dr. Suissa's testimony is clear. He said: I wasn't involved with TASC. I wasn't involved with the EURAS addendum. I don't communicate with ZEG. Here are my documents related to my work on the NuvaRing matter. I'm producing them to you.

He sat through a full day of deposition regarding

NuvaRing issues. And then now he's handed a separate subpoena
that says: Give us everything related to any work on hormone
contraceptives for any pharmaceutical companies. This is
completely improper.

THE COURT: How far back did you produce compensation records between Organon or a successor and Dr. Suissa? How much information do they have about compensation?

MR. YOO: Well, they've received information about

Case: 4:08-mg 0106712Wg 56; #NygaRingleBroducto Liability di bigati 9130171 1 his compensation for work on NuvaRing, okay? So they have that information. 2 3 MR. BALL: Everything. MR. YOO: Everything. 4 5 THE COURT: But not Organon, but NuvaRing only? 6 MR. YOO: He testified: I have sat on a scientific 7 8

advisory board from time to time when requested by different companies, including Organon at times, but it had nothing to do with NuvaRing, had nothing to do with hormone contraceptives.

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THE COURT: But Organon's putting him on as an expert, and did they ask him how much he's been compensated by Organon for a discrete period of time, and he refused to answer that question or referred to other documents?

MR. YOO: No. I don't think -- I don't know that they asked that in deposition.

THE COURT: Here's where I'm going to end up, Ms. Kraft, and it may take a little bit of work, but I'm going to deny the motion to compel as it exists. However, I'm concerned about compensation between Dr. Suissa and the defendant, however that's defined.

But I want to see what you asked him in the deposition, and to the extent he referenced documents in the deposition he hadn't produced or otherwise referenced them, I want to see from you a renewed motion to establish how he used or referenced any documents he may not have produced.

Otherwise, do you disagree with Mr. Yoo that he would have otherwise produced everything required by Rule 26?

MS. KRAFT: Yes.

THE COURT: So here's what I want from you, a very specific: Here's what Rule 26 requires; here's what he didn't do; here's where he talked about a document but didn't produce it; and here's where he was asked about compensation, but we don't know the answer to that question for whatever reason specific as to the nature of the testimony.

It's going to take a little bit of work by somebody, but I don't want just: He's brought any and all e-mails for a ten-year period between you and the defendant. It's just too much. But you would have asked -- taken a good deposition, and so to the extent that there are documents referenced by him that were not produced to the extent inquiries about his compensation were made but not answered or referred to in other documents, or deficiencies in his compliance with Rule 26, file that within ten days.

MS. KRAFT: Yes, we can do that.

THE COURT: Response ten days. And I'll take it from there.

MS. KRAFT: Your Honor, may I ask, can we also include in this renewed motion the scope of documentation going back, you know, in time to consulting work that he has

done with Organon over the course of the years and --

THE COURT: I mean, did you inquire about that at the deposition? I assume if it was important enough to know, you asked him the question.

MS. KRAFT: I don't know offhand. I'd hate to say.

THE COURT: I'm going to leave it the way it is.

Just go through the deposition, and if there — like I would in any other case. If this expert talks about a document that he didn't produce, he needs to get it for you. If there's open questions about compensation, he needs to fill in the gaps. And if he didn't comply with Rule 26, he needs to comply with Rule 26.

MR. SHKOLNIK: Your Honor, if I can just follow up on one of those points.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. SHKOLNIK: Here the deposition was focusing on him as the expert, and we did ask about background information. The question here is, defendants have provided absolutely zero to us about their past relationships with this witness and his work in terms of how much was he paid as a consultant for birth control-related products. We don't have that.

THE COURT: I'll let you open the -- I'll let you ask the question in your amended motion to compel as to how much he's been paid by the defendant.

1 MR. SHKOLNIK: And if there's any statements about 2 these other birth controls, we think those are things we're 3 looking for. 4 THE COURT: By the defendant. I wasn't limiting it 5 to any particular drug or birth control device. 6 MR. SHKOLNIK: Thank you, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: The jury is entitled to know if he has a bias, and that bias could be in the form of compensation. As 8 9 you would with anyone else. 10 Mr. Yoo, the good news is, you get to respond and 11 say, well, the period of time they want is too broad, you know, but --12 13 MR. YOO: Your Honor, I would request that that 14 obligation, if there's an obligation there, be reciprocal. We 15 want that information as to all of their experts. 16 MR. BALL: We obeyed --17 THE COURT: Come on. One at a time. And you got to 18 be at the podium. 19 MR. YOO: They can't have it as a one-way street 20 here. It's convenient for them to --

THE COURT: I mean, understand it's a persuasive argument that if this is what you ask for from this witness for whatever period of time and -- but you're going to get a chance to respond, and I haven't ruled -- that you're going to set a template here. I'm not going to treat different experts

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differently. I wouldn't do that. So understand the scope of 1 your requests, it's good for everybody, wherever we end up. 2 3 MR. SHKOLNIK: Your Honor, we understand that, but 4 there is a little bit of a difference here. These experts are 5 not hired by any of our clients to do studies, to do research. 6 THE COURT: But if you've hired them, if you've hired 7 them or a similarly situated counsel with you have hired them, that's the same bias issue as if Organon hired them. 8 9 MR. SHKOLNIK: Well, I think they asked them 10 extensively about each one of -- they've done that. 11 THE COURT: I'll treat everybody the same. I have no 12 problem with that. 13 MR. SHKOLNIK: And the witnesses have responded. THE COURT: Everybody's got -- whatever it is, 14 15 whatever the rule is, that's the rule, but we haven't finished 16 it yet. You will both get to weigh in on this and see where 17 we end up. 18 MR. YOO: Thank you, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Everyone understands you're going back to 20 the deposition that was taken. We are not reinventing 21 anything here. 22 MR. YOO: Absolutely. 23 MS. GEIST: Yes, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Except for the issue as to compensation.

I don't know what was asked in the deposition.

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56 1 So what we have left is the motion to file under 2 seal. Anything else that's compelling? 3 MS. GEIST: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Do you want to take a five-minute break, 4 5 or do you want to go? MS. GEIST: I'm fine, Your Honor. Are you guys okay? 6 7 MS. KRAFT: Yes. 8 MS. GEIST: I actually snuck out, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: I saw that. No wonder you're okay. 10 MS. GEIST: Your Honor, it's actually my hope that we 11 will be able to resolve this motion fairly quickly, so maybe it will take less than five minutes. 12 13 Your Honor, this motion pertains to the six Daubert 14 challenges that have been filed by the defendants. Your 15 Honor, as we just discussed before, the topic was the 16 agreements between the parties, and I think here again we need 17 to start from that place, did we have an agreement concerning 18 motions to file concerning documents under seal? 19 And, Your Honor, I refer the Court to the protective 20 order between the parties which I think is very clear. 21 Paragraph 32 of the protective order, which governs the 22 exchange of confidential information between the parties up to

the time of trial, so all pretrial discovery, all proceedings

up to the time of trial is governed by the clear terms of the

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protective order.

Paragraph 32 says very clearly: "A party may not file in the public record in this proceeding any confidential information. If a party seeks to file any confidential information that has been exchanged pursuant to the protective order, such filing shall" -- and it's not permissive, it's directive -- "such filing shall be done" --

THE COURT: You should know that in the Eighth
Circuit "should" also means "shall." That's well-established
case law.

MS. GEIST: Yes. But, Your Honor, my point in referring to the protective order is that it is simply clear. Confidential information has been exchanged between the parties pursuant to this order, signed by all. It governs until the time of trial. Both parties have followed this procedure consistently up until this moment where we have a dispute now.

Plaintiffs have filed documents under seal that have been marked as confidential, and defendants have filed documents under seal. We have proceeded based on the parties' course of conduct in this proceeding.

Your Honor, the documents that appear to now be in dispute are documents that were attached as exhibits to our <a href="Daubert">Daubert</a> challenges. For the most part, Your Honor, and I will be fairly general -- for the most part we're talking about plaintiffs' expert reports and then their testimony from

plaintiffs' experts at their depositions.

Our position, Your Honor, is that -- and it's set forth clearly in our <u>Daubert</u> motion -- that the opinions concerning NuvaRing reached by these experts are not reliable based on a number of reasons, including qualifications and lack of scientific sound methodology.

Your Honor, if these opinions which have been reached and set forth in these reports, which are attached to our motions, are filed and disseminated to the public, then under those circumstances, Your Honor, then the defendants could potentially be harmed. The reason for that, Your Honor, is, I think, pretty obvious. NuvaRing is a currently marketed product. Merck certainly has a business interest in the product, and we're talking about what we would consider fairly inflammatory statements about that product.

This is a product that has not been removed from the market by FDA, there have been no concerns raised by regulatory authorities about this product, and we have a business interest in the product. Yet we're dealing with experts whom we've challenged who have looked at, you know, we argue, a very, very small set of information before rendering their opinions about the product.

It's our position, Your Honor, that in connection with the court's gatekeeper role that's required under Daubert, that such opinions need to be considered first by the

court in order to determine whether or not they are reliable.

disagrees with our <u>Daubert</u> challenges, then those opinions will be put into evidence at trial. But if Your Honor at the end of the day agrees with our arguments that the opinions rendered in those reports are not based on sound methodology and that the experts do not even have the qualifications to make those opinions but the reports are out in the public realm, well, then, you know, there's a number of analogies I could speak to, Your Honor. The bell cannot be unrung. The cat is out of the bag. The horse is out of the barn.

THE COURT: You can't put the toothpaste back in the tube, yeah.

MS. GEIST: We can't undo the harm. So until Your
Honor has had a chance to review those motions and make Your
Honor's own determination as to whether those opinions will be
admissible at trial because they're reliable, we think it is
premature to unseal those opinions relating to this product.

THE COURT: But how does the public have confidence that I reached the right decision if they don't know what I considered? Remember at the end of the day what we do is public. Anyone can come in right now and listen. And no one suggested to me that the trial has to have the doors locked and people can't come. And in fact, you concede now and in your papers that if I find they meet the standards, that it

will all come out.

And I understand the business interest. I also am a great believer in the free market of ideas. If you're crazy, you just show people they're crazy and eventually they'll go away. Hopefully. Not always.

MS. GEIST: You know, Your Honor, at the end of the day, you are going to review our <u>Daubert</u> challenges, and you're going to make a decision, and presumably that will be --

THE COURT: But where is the public confidence in my decision if they don't know what I decided?

MS. GEIST: Well, Your Honor, you're presumably going to render a written opinion.

THE COURT: Will I unseal it then?

MS. GEIST: If Your Honor determines that these reports and these opinions that we're talking about are based on sound scientific methodology, good science, and they should be admitted at trial, well, then, Your Honor, we would have no argument that anything maintained is maintained —

THE COURT: But I want to turn it upside down.

There's a group of people also who if I say it's not sound scientific methodology and it's an opinion that should not be given any weight in a courtroom, how does the public have any confidence in that decision if they don't know what I saw, relied upon, or considered?

MS. GEIST: Well, presumably, Your Honor, the opinion will say, maybe not with great specificity, but will say what the Court relied on in reaching your determination. And, of course --

THE COURT: But they'll never know what the question was. They'll only know the solution to a problem they never knew existed because it's all sealed. What did the judge do? How did he get there? What did he consider? What did he know when he made this decision? Where can the public have confidence in the outcome if they don't know what the question was?

MS. GEIST: Your Honor, I think we're anticipating that Your Honor's opinion will go through those steps and allow the public to see what exactly the Court did in order to reach that decision at the end of the day.

And our concern, Your Honor, is, we're very confident in these motions. We wouldn't have filed them if we weren't otherwise confident. We think Your Honor is going to find in our favor and agree that these are opinions that are very inflammatory and they were reached based on a very limited review of documents and not reached based on sound scientific methodology.

And if Your Honor agrees with us at the end of the day, then those opinions will never be before the jury or the public at trial because they are not reliable. And that's the

point, Your Honor. If they're let out now and thereafter Your Honor concludes that they're not reliable, they should not be put into evidence, they would confuse the public and the jury, well, then, where are we? Because they're already out in the public.

MR. YOO: Your Honor, if I can add a couple of thoughts. I understand Your Honor's desire to strike a balance, but if everything supporting the Court's pretrial rulings is up for public consumption, then confidentiality would only be observed in the breach. It would go beyond the experts' reports.

What about our internal company documents that we would file under seal in support of our position? There is just no way to, in the interest of allowing the public access to what the Court's rationale was and what evidence the Court had before it, allow full dissemination of this type of information. There will be an appellate record, of course; so if plaintiffs want to challenge Your Honor's pretrial rulings, there will be another tribunal that will have access to all of this information.

We think, you know, going back to the goose/gander scenario we talked about earlier, if the Court were to make rulings based on plaintiffs' medical records, you know, the interest in protecting privacy there would still have to be observed even though the Court would likewise have an interest

in allowing the public to see what the Court considered in making its rulings.

THE COURT: Well, typically with medical records, I mean, obviously they're going to come in at trial, and I still don't hear that the courtroom is going to have to be sealed for a trial.

MS. GEIST: No, Your Honor. And that's why in a way what we're seeking is sort of an interim step, if you would. At the end of the day, Your Honor, again if Your Honor rules that the opinions of the experts that we have challenged are reliable and should go to the jury, well, then we have no argument that anything remains under seal. All we're asking Your Honor is, let's get to that stage first, let Your Honor perform his gatekeeping function, look and determine whether or not there's reliable opinions, determine what should go before the jury and into evidence, and if Your Honor disagrees with us, well, then everything comes out.

THE COURT: Ms. Kraft?

MS. KRAFT: Thank you, Your Honor. On that last point, I mean, exactly right. We are not going to seal the courtroom here, and we're not going to seal the courtroom I would not suspect any more so with respect to the <u>Daubert</u> hearing or the argument on the <u>Daubert</u> hearings that — or motions that will occur.

What defendants are seeking to do is something for

which there's just no authority. They are seeking to mix --

THE COURT: Well, let's give her piece of her argument its due, that if something is marked confidential, they have a duty not to file as a matter of public record.

And that goes both ways. Whether it's your clients' medical records or any documents they have marked confidential, we do have an agreement that it won't be filed without a hearing, right? That's why we've done what we've done so far.

MS. KRAFT: Right. And I didn't mean that aspect of it. I mean, at this point in time if we want to back up to sort of the procedural history here, what we have in place is the protective order, and so the documents were filed under seal.

I strongly dispute the interpretation of the protective order as the defendants interpreted, which I hear them to be saying that the unsealing of documents cannot even be addressed until during the time of trial, and that's just simply not what the order says.

I mean, it contemplates clearly that at a later point in time the parties can, in fact, raise issues to the Court in order to unseal documents, and that's the stage that we're at.

The protective order, while we're on that, I do want to point out that the defendants have waived their right to designate the deposition transcripts of our experts and the reports as confidential.

Paragraph 13 of the protective order on page 5, I will read it to you verbatim, but it explicitly states that the parties have to designate deposition testimony as confidential either on the record at the time that the deposition is taken or within 30 days thereafter by sending a letter asking the court reporter to keep it confidential, and that wasn't done here.

Paragraph 13 says -- and I'm going to read it with respect to the relevant portion, but it says, quote:

Information disclosed at a deposition taken in connection with this proceeding or other related proceedings may be designated as confidential by (A) designating testimony as confidential on the record during the taking of the deposition; and/or (B) designating the portions of the transcript that are confidential in a letter to be served on the court reporter and opposing counsel within 30 calendar days of the supplying party's receipt of the transcript of the deposition.

I'm not aware of any such action being taken pursuant to the protective order.

Aside from that, what I want to point out that now that we're at the stage where the defendants are seeking to keep these documents under seal and we're seeking disclosure of the documents, they're mixing two standards. They're attempting to put in place the <u>Daubert</u> standard that needs to come first and foremost before the analysis that the Court is

to do here, and that concerns the right of public -- of the right of the public to have information about the civil court system, the recognition of the right of the public to inspect, and the disclosure of information about cases.

And there's a strong public interest here to have information about this proceeding just as in any other case. It's one of the functions of the court is to address that issue. The defendants haven't — the standard for the defendants is to present a compelling justification for nondisclosure, and that doesn't exist here. The standard rule is disclosure. It's not the exception.

We've got a large pharmaceutical company who has put a product out on the market that is defective and has affected millions of women, and they have a right to know information about the litigation and the information that is the subject of the current motion. So we would request that the Court allow the documents at issue to be unsealed.

MS. GEIST: Your Honor, I think if it wasn't clear before, it's abundantly clear now what plaintiffs intend to do and why they're arguing so strenuously that these expert reports be filed in the public docket. I think that Rule 26 and the Eighth Circuit case law is very, very clear that courts can protect documents from disclosure where there is a concern that the documents may become a vehicle for improper purposes.

And I would suggest, Your Honor, that that is probably what is going on here. We have proceeded. Again, both parties have proceeded in keeping all of these materials exchanged pursuant to the confidentiality agreement between the parties. None of the depositions have been filed in the court. When they have, both parties have filed them under seal. Suddenly everything is changing.

I would suspect, Your Honor, that if these are filed or unsealed and open to the public, that they will be disseminated to the media. We have a concern, Your Honor, that indeed at a minimum if this would not damage the defendant's business interest in its currently marketed product, then it would certainly at a minimum have the potential to taint the jury pool. We are about six or seven months away from a jury trial, as we've been talking about.

Plaintiffs are arguing very strongly that these documents be open to the public, and again, Your Honor, our position is that these are very inflammatory statements regarding the product. But more importantly, Your Honor, they're based on unreliable methodology. There is very little factual support in these reports to support what the opinions of the experts are.

And I think the case law, you know, contrary to what Ms. Kraft said, you know, the courts -- the public access is not absolute. The courts are permitted to maintain documents

under seal if they would damage a party's business or property. It's very clear under the rules, Your Honor, and that's our argument here.

We think there is a compelling reason why at a minimum, until Your Honor takes a look at these opinions and makes that assessment under <u>Daubert</u>, there is no harm to anyone in maintaining them under seal now during this interim step.

Again, Your Honor, at the end of the day, I would not be standing here arguing that they maintain that these documents are maintained under seal if at the end of the day Your Honor concludes that the opinions are reliable and should be put forward to the jury. The argument goes away.

But what is the harm in the meantime in maintaining these documents under seal? The only reason that plaintiffs want them, want the seal lifted, Your Honor, I think is patently obvious.

THE COURT: Well, don't go anywhere. Oh, Mr. Shkolnik has something to say. Come on. You know my bad habit. Everybody gets to talk.

MR. SHKOLNIK: Your Honor, I think the problem that defendant faces here is, we're not talking about a dispute over discovery items which is -- I think there's a diminished sense of -- or diminished right to an open court to the public where we're fighting over whether or not a deposition should

go forward or a document should be produced.

Here we're talking about a stage in the litigation whereby counsel's own representations earlier -- and I think we all agreed discovery for these cases has come to an end -- they're at a point where they're making dispositive motions.

These <u>Daubert</u> motions by their own representations, the <u>Daubert</u> motions are dispositive. They are of the opinion that our case is going to be thrown out of court because these experts do not meet the proper standard.

When you're reaching -- when you're at a point where you're making dispositive motions, there is a -- I think the proper word is a qualified right of access to the public to everything. As the Court was saying earlier, there are many cases that look at this in terms of what stage in the litigation we are. As the Court pointed out, the <u>Daubert</u> motion may ultimately strike experts' opinions in this case, and the public has a right to know that.

And the case law at this stage says the defendants don't get to say, protect our product and hide it from the public, the documents. That's not the standard. And I think they keep going back to, well, will it hurt to wait? It does hurt to wait. By definition, closing the courthouse hurts to wait.

These documents were filed by the defendant. They are subject to disclosure. There is nothing protecting them.

And that's really what it comes down to. The case law is clear. When you're at a dispositive stage, they should be released.

MS. GEIST: Your Honor, the only -- this is a one-sided argument. The only one it hurts to wait -- the only one it would hurt to wait is one side here. The plaintiffs -- there is no harm to plaintiffs in waiting until the judge performs the role that the judge needs to perform under Daubert. There is absolutely no harm to plaintiffs.

Most of the information that has been exchanged in the litigation the public is unaware of. This is the normal course of litigation pursuant to the confidentiality agreement.

But we, Your Honor, in balancing the interests, our potential injury here is clear. The reports are unsealed, perhaps the media picks them up, perhaps on their own, perhaps by encouragement of the parties, and suddenly we have out there in the public realm opinions that we are arguing very strenuously are unreliable, should not be disseminated to the public because they are not sound because they are based on very limited — I mean, you know, Your Honor, I'm not going to stand here and argue our <u>Daubert</u> motions, but I think if the Court reviews those motions even briefly, you'll get a sense of what we're talking about. And where is the fairness in that?

At the end of the day say Your Honor unseals these reports and they are picked up by the media, they're out there, there's headlines, and in a couple months from now Your Honor concludes and agrees with us that these opinions are not going to be submitted into evidence because they are unreliable. Well, then, Your Honor, I go back to my original point. At that stage, you know, the bell can't be unrung. We've already been harmed. So what is the harm to plaintiffs in waiting?

THE COURT: You agree that I'm going to unseal everything at some point regardless, or are you arguing that if I rule in your favor, that none of this ever sees the light of day?

MS. GEIST: Your Honor, obviously if Your Honor denies our motion, then everything becomes open to the public.

THE COURT: I'm contemplating your best-case scenario. I grant your motions. The experts are excluded. Wouldn't I still unseal everything at that point? Or are you suggesting this should forever be sealed if I rule in your favor?

MS. GEIST: Your Honor, I'd have to think about that for a moment, to be honest with you. I think if Your Honor grants our motions, and the opinion is quite clear that the opinions in those reports are not sound, and unreliable, then I think that obviously we would be able to hold up Your

Case: 4 Honor's decision against some of those unreliable opinions. 1 2 THE COURT: So at some point I unseal it regardless? 3 MR. YOO: Your Honor --THE COURT: I'm trying to understand where we end up. 4 5 MR. YOO: Yeah, yeah. I think it's hard for us to --6 I mean, when we make a representation in court, we want to 7 make sure it's something that's accurate and we can live by; 8 so we're struggling a little bit to think of the various 9 scenarios. As a general matter, we do contemplate that for 10 purposes of having a trial once evidentiary rulings are 11 done --12 THE COURT: Yeah, I'm not going to close the 13 courtroom. 14 MR. YOO: That's right. That's right. Now, whether 15 there are some feasible carve-out exceptions when we get to 16 trade secret technology information, perhaps, but --17 THE COURT: That's what I don't know. And perhaps 18 you don't have the 15 pages to educate me, but my simple 19 science mind would have concluded that it wouldn't be too hard 20 to reverse-engineer the NuvaRing. 21 MR. YOO: I think those are things that we would need 22 to consider if we actually --

THE COURT: Because that's the issue when it comes to

a trade secret. You know, classic Missouri case law, it's

only protectable for as long as it would take you to

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reverse-engineer the product.

MR. YOO: Right, right. I think it all goes to what is the context for dissemination either in the courtroom or more broadly of this type of information; so if it's in the context of the Court has excluded this evidence as not meeting the scientific standards and information as disseminated accordingly, that's one context, but we're talking about a temporary sealing of this information until we get judicial rulings on the admissibility of this evidence. There's no harm to anyone in continuing to temporarily keep this under seal. If I could cite a certain federal judge, why borrow trouble, right?

THE COURT: Well, sometimes trouble finds you no matter what you want to do.

MR. YOO: Understood, Your Honor. But to Ms. Geist's point about unnecessarily risking tainting of the jury pool, I just --

argument. We can select a jury and isolate anyone who's had problems. I mean, we've had far more notorious cases here than — I mean, that's manageable. We've tried antitrust cases against the National Football League, you know. Michael Crichton had to come here and defend his authorship of the movie Twister, you know.

MR. YOO: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: We can manage jury selection.

MR. YOO: We already have some of those issues to deal with. I don't think that this temporary request we're making -- there's no reason to add to that burden.

As Your Honor knows, contraception is a very hot topic. We get stories about contraception and abortion and things like that in the media all too frequently. We're concerned that --

THE COURT: Sometimes it's Shark Week, you know, and you just can't help it. Nobody cares that you got bit by a shark, but this week it's the hot story.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$  YOO: We think the balance should be struck in favor of continuing to seal it.

THE COURT: We need to hear from Ms. Kraft before she falls apart over here.

MS. KRAFT: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: She's going to fall out before my very eyes.

MS. KRAFT: I mean, this is just contrary to the authority on this issue. I mean, they're asking for a special exception here. It doesn't apply. That's why documents and information about the cases are unsealed every day before a case goes to trial.

I mean, we are at the appropriate stage. Their entire argument is based on speculation and again trying to

create an additional standard or prerequisite here of making a decision on <a href="Daubert">Daubert</a> before making a decision with respect to unsealing these documents. I mean, the public has an interest in civil proceedings and this litigation.

And with respect to jurors potentially being prejudiced --

THE COURT: We can manage that.

MS. KRAFT: That's why we have voir dire. I think it's clear --

THE COURT: Actually, you know, Mr. Yoo, I hadn't thought about it. It's a good thing we're not trying these cases until next year. It would be really hard to try these cases right now in terms of jury selection just given the heat that this topic generates at the moment. I'm thinking for both sides, you know. It's just good that the dust is going to settle, particularly in this district that includes Congressman Akin's congressional district.

So I'm loathe to have this conversation; however, I am equally loathe to unseal the exhibits to the motions. I want to ask that middle ground question that perhaps you've thought about. Is there a way to redact the motions and unseal a redacted version so at least the public knows what the issue is before --

MS. GEIST: Your Honor, I apologize if it wasn't clear in our papers. We did proceed in filing the entirety of

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    the motions under seal. We are only seeking to maintain
    certain exhibits under seal.
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              THE COURT: Well, I did read the list.
             MS. GEIST: The motions themselves, Your Honor, may
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    be --
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              THE COURT: You're prepared to unseal the motions
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    themselves?
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             MS. GEIST: Yes, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: And just retain sealing of those specific
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     exhibits that you listed in your papers?
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             MS. GEIST: Yes, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: So let's narrow the inquiry because I was
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    loathe to do anything that didn't put the public on notice of
     the debate before the court.
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             MR. SHKOLNIK: Your Honor, giving us half a loaf on
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     this one from the defense standpoint --
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              THE COURT: I understand.
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             MR. SHKOLNIK: -- sometimes half is good.
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              THE COURT: It's always better than nothing.
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             MR. SHKOLNIK:
                            It is better than nothing. But, Your
    Honor, here we're dealing with an issue that I think -- we
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     couldn't find an Eighth Circuit case on point, but the Second
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     Circuit was very clear, Joy v. North.
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              THE COURT: At least it's not the Fourth or the
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    Ninth. That's good.
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MR. SHKOLNIK: We have a Fourth also.

THE COURT: Well, but, see, if you're going to have a Fourth, you got to have a Ninth so we can balance it out somewhere.

MR. SHKOLNIK: We actually have a Ninth too. We have a Second, Fourth, and Ninth on this one.

THE COURT: Okay. Then the Second wins.

MR. SHKOLNIK: Documents used by parties moving for or opposing summary judgment should not remain under seal absent most compelling reasons. Rushford v. New York

Magazine, Fourth Circuit. If a case goes to trial and documents were submitted to the court as evidence, such documents would have been revealed to the public, dispositive documents in any litigation into the public record notwithstanding any earlier agreement. Ninth Circuit same thing. We have --

THE COURT: Who wrote the decisions, do you know, in each of those circuits?

MR. SHKOLNIK: I don't know who the judges were who wrote them, Your Honor. I just have my notes.

THE COURT: I know you'll find it interesting, maybe confusing, but it does matter to me who the authors are.

MR. SHKOLNIK: I'm sure. But it's been pretty consistent across the board where it's been addressed. As long as they're not discovery motions. And that's where I

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agree with the defendant. These things shouldn't be bandied
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     about as exhibits, should not be disclosed if it's discovery.
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     But now we're at dispositive issues. And to say the public
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     can see the motion but not see what it's relying -- what the
 5
    motion is based upon, it's nice to argue that the defendants
 6
    want just to keep it quiet for a little bit longer, keep it
 7
     sealed for a little bit longer, but that's not the standard.
     It's not.
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 9
              And allowing half of it or -- they're agreeing to
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    half doesn't serve the ultimate purpose of open disclosure in
11
     the courts.
12
              MS. KRAFT: Right. And what I would point out, by
13
    allowing their Daubert motions to be in the public domain is
14
     extremely one sided.
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              THE COURT: But your responses will be in the public
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     domain too, so it's not a one-sided discussion.
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              MS. KRAFT: Well, I mean, our expert reports and
18
     deposition transcripts is a central part --
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              THE COURT: Right. But you're going to defend them.
              MS. KRAFT:
20
                         Right, but --
21
              MR. SHKOLNIK: If I can respond to that, Your Honor.
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     So what counsel would -- I assume if we just verbatim include
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     in our --
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THE COURT: Well, no. Let's not be disingenuous because then we'd have a different debate.

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1 MR. SHKOLNIK: But that's what it leads to, the 2 quotes. 3 THE COURT: No. That takes us into silly land, all 4 right? You're going to defeat the Court's ruling by calling 5 it something that it isn't by taking a report and calling it a motion, I mean, then that's a distinction without a 6 7 distinction. We're back to square one. We won't go there. MR. SHKOLNIK: But the point being defendants in 8 9 their papers have identified certain paragraphs almost 10 verbatim from witnesses that they are attacking. It's 11 allowing --THE COURT: You're going to identify, you're going to 12 13 use the same technique. MR. SHKOLNIK: We certainly will, Your Honor, but 14 15 it's unfair to have only bits and pieces put out in separate 16 documents. 17 THE COURT: Do you want me to wait to do anything 18 until you file your response and I take a look at both of 19 them? 20 MR. SHKOLNIK: No. We'd like a decision on it, Your 21 Honor. We really would. We think this is an important issue 22 on this, on opening the courthouse for those motions.

MS. GEIST: Your Honor, can I just make one last

THE COURT: It won't be, but that's fine.

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point?

MS. GEIST: I agree with Mr. Shkolnik's line of cases, Your Honor, but those are summary judgment motions.

They are different. In summary judgment motions, you're putting before the court the evidence on which the court needs to rely in order to make that dispositive --

THE COURT: You know, the problem here, of course, is those are going to get filed before this is over.

MS. GEIST: But, Your Honor, the difference is those opinions that are in those reports don't go into evidence until Your Honor makes the determination about whether they are reliable or not and they should go before the jury.

The case law that Mr. Shkolnik was referring to is completely different. I don't disagree, but these are not summary judgment motions.

THE COURT: Well, here's where we end up because of what I know and what I don't know. We're going to unseal the motions. You'll get a chance to respond. I have not -- I have to be honest, unless you guys have a different suggestion for me -- read the exhibits that they've listed that they want to remain sealed. I think I have a duty to read them.

My instinct is to unseal everything but those exhibits until I've read them, and I'll issue my opinion, and those exhibits, unless you think doing it that way has some unintended consequence to the plaintiff that I'm not appreciating by saying that out loud.

MR. SHKOLNIK: It makes sense, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So that's what we're going to do. We're going to unseal the motions --

MS. GEIST: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- and the exhibits except for those exhibits that were identified in the papers filed by the defendant. And I'm going to read those exhibits and then make a ruling on what should happen to those. I think I have to read them word for word, line for line before I can make a decision on the argument.

I mean, you've made a very -- you understand you've made a very generalized trade secret argument that leaves me a little bit at sea. I had a trade secret case once where they wouldn't tell me what the trade secret was, but they wanted me to find that the other side had infringed on it, and it was really hard, and obviously they lost because if you won't tell me what it is, I can't find it.

MS. GEIST: And I understand the challenge, Your
Honor, so perhaps after Your Honor has reviewed the exhibits,
perhaps it would be appropriate for us to further discuss
either in person or by a conference call --

THE COURT: Because I'll be candid, your trade secret argument is your most compelling. That's where you would find the compelling justification, is if there is a legitimate trade secret. I hate the word "legitimate" these days, but

you know what I mean.

MS. GEIST: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: We all think we have secrets. Some are trade secrets, some are not. That kind of goes to the reverse engineering question I asked you. If you can reverse-engineer NuvaRing in an afternoon, the trade secret has -- I assume you have a patent, right?

MS. GEIST: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So you probably have recognized you were better to patent it than just keep it as a trade secret, you know, because -- for obvious reasons. You opted on intellectual property one path over another since the trade secret, in theory, would have no time period on it.

MS. GEIST: I think that's fine, Your Honor. I'm just suggesting to the Court if Your Honor would find it helpful to discuss further --

THE COURT: I appreciate it. And maybe.

Ms. Kraft?

MS. KRAFT: One last thing, if I can.

THE COURT: Sure. You too, one last thing.

MS. KRAFT: Just remind the Court --

THE COURT: You'll know you've lost me in a trial when you get up in front of the jury and say, "One last thing," and I'll say, "Be careful what you promise," and the jury will all laugh when I say that.

MS. KRAFT: I'll remember that most definitely. 1 2 THE COURT: We've all seen it, right? Just one more 3 question and it's always five, but go ahead. 4 MS. KRAFT: I just want to point out a case that we 5 cited on this trade secret issue in our pleading, Document No. 6 1292 at page 6. In re: Iowa Freedom of Information Council, 7 724 F.2d at 663 to 664. Quote: We do not wish to be 8 understood as announcing a rule that the presence of the trade 9 secret will in every case, and at all events, justify the 10 closure of a hearing. 11 THE COURT: We're not going to close the hearing, we 12 know that. We're not closing the courtroom. I think we've 13 all agreed. 14 MS. GEIST: We agree, Your Honor. 15 MS. KRAFT: Right. 16 THE COURT: But the trade secret issue is when you go 17 through the hierarchy of compelling reasons, trade secret is 18 pretty far up there in terms of, you know, you can't use the 19 court process to unwind a trade secret of a business entity or 20 a person. 21 MS. KRAFT: That's right. And I'm just pointing out

it's not an absolute rule.

Right. THE COURT:

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MR. SHKOLNIK: This is not a one more, Your Honor. Do these have a deadline for when the unsealed documents are refiled in the court, the ones that are agreed upon?

THE COURT: I thought we'd unseal them. I just got to be real careful, so you guys watch. In case I make a mistake, you call me, and it will be on me, not anybody else in this building, if I unseal the wrong thing.

MS. GEIST: I would think, Your Honor --

THE COURT: If you'd leave me a --

MS. GEIST: There's a memorandum --

THE COURT: There is. You have a list in your papers that says what you're worried about.

MR. SHKOLNIK: I thought it would be easier to just put in the documents so that you don't have to worry about it.

THE COURT: We'll unseal it here because we're going to unseal the motion itself, and then I have to look back at the specific exhibits.

## (OFF THE RECORD.)

THE COURT: So what should we do with the plaintiffs'

<u>Daubert</u> motions? Yours are under seal as well. I don't know if you realize that.

MS. KRAFT: Then I would propose that they also be unsealed as well.

THE COURT: Are there anything in those -- have you looked at those and thought about that reverse side of the question? Do I need to give you a couple days to look at it?

MS. GEIST: I would ask the Court's indulgence for us

to just take a look at the --

THE COURT: Here's what would make me feel better.

By the close of business Monday you let me know your position on unsealing the plaintiffs' <u>Daubert</u> motions and then the list of those exhibits to your <u>Daubert</u> motions that you're continuing to assert should not be unsealed, with a list of those that should be unsealed so that I'm not making — it will keep me from making a mistake.

MS. GEIST: I think that's a great suggestion, Your Honor. We'll do that.

MS. KRAFT: By the close of business on Monday they are to provide --

THE COURT: Monday. They're going to say if they have any objection to unsealing your motions in toto. If they do, they'll tell me which exhibits they don't want unsealed. They'll give me a list of the exhibits they are prepared to unseal attached to their motions and a list of those they want to remain sealed until I read them.

MR. SHKOLNIK: That works for us, Your Honor.

MS. GEIST: That's fine, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'll do the same thing to yours as well.

MR. SHKOLNIK: It works both ways.

THE COURT: Right. I'll give you until the end of business Tuesday to tell me if you disagree.

MR. SHKOLNIK: Yes.

THE COURT: And then Wednesday will be --1 MS. GEIST: That sounds fine, Your Honor. Thank you. 2 3 THE COURT: Major League Baseball always suspends 4 guys on Wednesday, apparently, so that will be then. 5 would be Mr. Yoo's part of the country. A little further 6 north, but last Wednesday we lost a player in San Francisco. 7 This Wednesday we lost a player in Oakland. So next Wednesday 8 is NuvaRing unsealing day. 9 MR. YOO: I won't defend the Ninth Circuit, I won't 10 defend the --11 THE COURT: You can't defend the Ninth Circuit since they were all in Maui last week. They've ruined it for 12 13 everybody. 14 Anything further? We need to pick a time to get back 15 together. I'm sure we'll have issues. I've got a lot of work 16 to do, obviously, you've got a lot of work to do, but when 17 should we get together again, just out of an abundance of 18 caution? What do you think? 19 MR. BALL: Late September? 20 THE COURT: That's what I was thinking, five to six 21 weeks. 22 MS. GEIST: We're with Judge Martinotti --23 THE COURT: We should go after that after. Do you

want to go back to back, or do you want to let a week go, or what do you want to do?

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1 MR. BALL: We ought to have a few days in between. 2 What day of the week is the 27th? 3 MS. GEIST: It's a Thursday. THE COURT: I hear a bid on October 3 or 4. 4 5 MR. BALL: The 4th is fine. MS. KRAFT: That should be fine. 6 7 THE COURT: Does 10:30 work? I will have to move a 8 sentencing, but that's not a big deal. 10:30, October 4 the 9 next status conference, here in person. I think the rest of 10 these are going to be in person until we get this done. 11 (OFF THE RECORD) 12 THE COURT: If it's wrong, let me know, and we can 1.3 move it. I don't know. 14 MS. KRAFT: Your Honor, if I may? 15 THE COURT: See, you weren't really done. 16 MS. KRAFT: No. Well, a couple of things. One item 17 was left off our agenda that I wanted to address, but on this 18 unsealing issue I would propose that the unsealing be on both 19 sides of the fence be done like at the same time or --20 THE COURT: Correct. 21 MS. KRAFT: -- roughly at the same time. Is that 22 what we're talking about? Because they're being now given 23 some opportunities to make -- to state their position on 24 unsealing our motions till Monday. So I would propose that 25 all that be done roughly at the same time.

THE COURT: It's a good point. Do you want to state your position on unsealing on Monday and everybody respond to on Tuesday, and then Wednesday I -- all they're really going to do is look at the exhibits to your motion to make sure they're not the same exhibits, I take it, that they wanted to keep sealed on their motion so that we don't end up doing something we hadn't planned on doing in the first instance.

I just was trying to make sure I didn't seal something here and unseal it over there and then end up not doing what I had planned to do, and that was to read the exhibit before I unsealed it. I was trying to avoid my mistake, more than put anything on you guys.

MS. KRAFT: Okay, thanks. The last item that we had is listed as Item No. 4 on our agenda, and we are seeking here an order from the Court setting forth deadlines for supplemental production of documents. We'd like to have an order in place by the Court that requires supplemental production every 30 days.

There's, you know, current issues going on with respect to potential label changes, things like that, that the supplementation of custodian files, while there has been production in the past, we feel that it's very important as we head towards preparation of the trial that we have a firm order in place requiring production every 30 days as opposed

to there being just --

THE COURT: Any objection?

MS. KRAFT: -- uncertainty as to when that is going to occur. And I think we're at the stage now where we need to have all responsive documents that are supplementation to the discovery requests that we have served in the past supplemented on a routine and rolling basis as a firm deadline that we can go to the court and address issues to the extent applicable.

MS. GEIST: Your Honor, Ms. Kraft raised this request with me, and I responded to her by e-mail that it was not possible nor feasible to do rolling productions on an every-thirty-day basis. It's simply not practical, Your Honor.

There's a number of steps that need to be completed. Vendors need to go in, you need to arrange time with the custodians, and then it goes through processing. And I don't want to bore the Court with the details, but 30 days is absolutely impossible. You know, normal course in large litigation such as this is every six months. We have been abiding by every six months. We have been abiding by every six months.

THE COURT: We can't do six months because that takes us into a trial. So what do we do?

MS. GEIST: Your Honor, we're on schedule right now

per our prior agreement as to every six months as we're rolling out a bunch more supplemental documents in September.

Then we're doing — the next sweeps are in play.

Then those would — I would say let Ms. Kraft and I agree on what date after September we do the next supplemental production. I'm happy to consider whether that's less than six months, but, Your Honor, you know, we're talking about the large custodian sweeps. What we're not talking about is the data and the documents that we have been providing plaintiffs on a much, much more expedited routine fashion.

Every time there's been an update, an interim report on the TASC data that the Court has heard so much about, we provide that to the plaintiffs. When the plaintiffs asked us to provide any documents relating to the FDA-sponsored Kaiser study that was released in October of last year, we responded to that discovery and gave them all of those documents, Your Honor.

So in terms of everything being up to date, before we did our three company expert witnesses in New York, we swept from all of those folks and represented to the plaintiffs that at the time they took those three expert witness depositions, they had, you know, up-to-date, real time, the latest and the greatest documents from those custodians.

So, Your Honor, when there is a need and an issue such as a new interim report to FDA, we're turning it around

real time. But in terms of the process and going forward and going in and sweeping and using vendors and doing that, Your Honor, I would suggest that our every-six-month update has been reasonable. The next deadline to roll out those documents is September.

Ms. Kraft in her e-mail had made a special request for Giselle Rose's documents. She's one of the key regulatory persons in the company who had been deposed. Her documents will be rolled out. They were provided six months ago, and they're going to be rolled out now the end of next week. So we're pretty much up to date, Your Honor.

If we start to become a little bit concerned in terms of getting documents updated prior to trial, I think we should talk about what sounds reasonable. So maybe instead of six months from September, we can agree on four months or something, but this is something I would like to discuss with Ms. Kraft.

MR. SHKOLNIK: Your Honor, if I can just respond to this. I'm always in agreement for discussions to try to work things out, but -- and I always hate to point at other cases, but across the river when we got towards the end in Yaz, they were 30 day. What was originally a four month and five months and six months, because we were getting in the push to trial and a lot happening in that case with potential label changes, it was required to have a 30-day turnaround on documents from

key custodians. No one's talking about every custodian in the 1 2 company. We're seeing more and more of the documents coming 3 from the same sources. 4 Maybe the option is as to certain important key 5 witnesses that it's a 30-day turnaround, and if they want a little bit longer on the others, that's a possibility. But 6 7 we're getting ready for trial, and there is a lot happening with FDA right now, and we need this information. 8 9 MS. GEIST: Well, Your Honor, that's the first time 10 I'm hearing about that. That sounds perfectly reasonable to 11 I suggest we talk about it and we isolate which custodians. 12 13 THE COURT: Well, do your production in September. 14 We'll see you on October 4. And it's all possible. Just be prepared to -- but try to work it out. If not, I'll decide 15 16 and we'll move forward. 17 MR. SHKOLNIK: Thank you. 18 MS. GEIST: Thank you. 19 THE COURT: I do understand you've submitted your 20 reports. This is sealed going forward. (A PORTION OF THE HEARING WAS ORDERED SEALED BY THE COURT, AND 21 THE PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED AS FOLLOWS:) 22 23 THE COURT: Anything further?

MR. YOO: Nothing further, Your Honor.

MR. SHKOLNIK: Nothing.

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                THE COURT: See you October 4. Thank you.
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                MS. GEIST: Thank you, Your Honor.
                MS. KRAFT: Thank you, Your Honor.
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                    (PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 12:45 PM.)
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## CERTIFICATE

I, Shannon L. White, Registered Merit Reporter and
Certified Realtime Reporter, hereby certify that I am a duly
appointed Official Court Reporter of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.

I further certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript of the proceedings held in the above-entitled case and that said transcript is a true and correct transcription of my stenographic notes.

I further certify that this transcript contains pages 1 through 94 inclusive and that this reporter takes no responsibility for missing or damaged pages of this transcript when same transcript is copied by any party other than this reporter.

Dated at St. Louis, Missouri, this 6th day of September, 2012.

/s/Shannon L. White Shannon L. White, RMR, CRR, CCR, CSR Official Court Reporter