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Case	e. 1.12-1110-02310-BTP DUC #. 123 FIRE		
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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO		
2	EASTERN DIVISION		
3	IN RE: FORD MOTOR CO. SPARK PLUG AND 3-VALVE ENGI		
4	PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATI		
5		1:38 o'clock p.m.	
6			
7	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS		
8	BEFORE THE HONORABLE BENITA Y. PEARSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE		
9	Γλ T DN	ECC HEADING	
10	FAIRNESS HEARING		
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12	APPEARANCES:		
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1	PROCEEDINGS
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3	LAW CLERK: The matter before the court is Case
4	Number 1:12-md-2316, In re: Ford Motor Company Spark Plug
13:38:20 5	and 3-Valve Engine Products Liability Litigation.
6	THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. You may all
7	retake your seats. Thank you for standing.
8	ALL: Good afternoon.
9	THE COURT: Counsel for plaintiffs, will you
13:38:30 10	introduce yourselves for the record?
11	MR. SHAH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. James Shah
12	on behalf of plaintiffs.
13	THE COURT: Welcome, Mr. Shah.
14	MR. SHAH: Thank you.
13:38:38 15	MR. GOLDENBERG: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Jeff
16	Goldenberg also on behalf of the plaintiffs in the
17	settlement class.
18	THE COURT: Welcome, Mr. Goldenberg.
19	On behalf of Ford, will you please introduce
13:38:46 20	yourselves for the record?
21	MS. WRIGHT: Elizabeth Wright on behalf of Ford
22	Motor Company. Thank you.
23	THE COURT: Welcome back, Ms. Wright.
24	MS. LENART: Krista Lenart on behalf of Ford Motor
13:38:55 25	Company, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Welcome to you both.

And I hope you don't mind me asking but it is pretty obvious that apart from counsel, there are two other people in the room.

Would you care to introduce yourselves for the record?

MR. HARRIS: I am Melvin Harris, the claimant.

THE COURT: Welcome, Mr. Harris. And with you,

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MS. HELM: My name is Reba Helm.

THE COURT: You are both welcome here.

This hearing has been scheduled to allow the court to determine whether the settlement agreement reached in this, I would say hotly litigated matter, but it's not quite been that. While it's been one of importance that's gained the attention of the court and both sides, it's certainly been one that's been deserving of that. So I will skip that descriptor, and just explain that my role here today primarily is to be as fully informed as possible, so that ultimately, I can decide whether or not the settlement agreement is one that's fair, reasonable, adequate and in the best interests of the members of the settlement class.

Counsel, I applaud you. You've given me probably everything I could have asked for timely, and in great detail. Despite that, I do have questions. And I'm sure

MARY L. UPHOLD, RDR, CRR

that Messrs. Goldenberg and Shah have things that you'd like to establish on the record. And then, at the appropriate time, I will certainly hear from Ms. Wright and Ms. Lenart, to the extent they have responses to questions that I might pose, or would just like to make sure that Ford's position is correctly and fully memorialized on the record we'll jointly create here today.

Mr. Shah or Mr. Goldenberg, would one of you care to start by summarizing the status of the settlement that was preliminarily approved by the court in June of last year?

MR. SHAH: Thank you, Your Honor.

As Your Honor noted, we are here today on a motion for final approval of the settlement that this court preliminarily approved on June 18th of 2015.

Pursuant to that preliminary approval, notice was disseminated by Renkim to the nearly 4 million class members. The response to that notice that was sent by direct mail has been overwhelmingly favorable.

THE COURT: Sir, can you tell me the date of the notice? I've tried to figure it out. According to my order, it had to have been by mid-December of last year. It was probably before October 16th.

MR. SHAH: I believe it was October 23rd?

MS. LENART: I believe -- Your Honor, I believe

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that all of the notices went out by October 18th, somewhere around in there. And I think we were presuming they had all gone out by October 23rd at the latest.

THE COURT: I would have believed in advance of October 16th, because at least one of your filings told me the toll-free phone line was active on the 16th. That led me to believe it was activated after notice. But it may be it was activated a couple of days before notice was issued?

MR. SHAH: I think that's correct, Your Honor. In terms of the parties conferring, it was our intention, and I think it actually worked out that way, to make sure that everything was up and running, from the settlement website standpoint and the toll-free number, as soon as the notices were to go out, so that there would be no downtime in between the receipt of notices by the members of the class and their ability to utilize the toll-free number and the settlement website.

THE COURT: Thank you both for your answers.

MR. SHAH: And as I was stating, Your Honor, so the reaction of the class has been overwhelmingly favorable. In fact, there have been only ten objections that were received, and 431 class members elected to opt out or exclude themselves from the settlement.

So in addition to the reaction of the class, an analysis of all the other factors that one looks at in terms

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of determining whether a settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable, all favor approval of this resolution.

By way of brief background regarding the history of the matter --

THE COURT: Can I ask you just to fill in one

other gap? I know that this was told to me at least as recently as the 21st of this month, that no Attorney General has objected. And we know there are several states, multiple states involved. And I'd just like to make sure.

I can assure you that we've checked my docket. That's still the case. But no phone calls, notices to you?

MR. SHAH: That's correct. In fact, I can represent that no state AG has asked any substantive question or expressed any concern about the settlement. And I was going to speak about this later in connection with notice, but since we're on the subject, Your Honor, I know that from my experience over the past five years, many of the AG offices have designated a specific person or persons to review the CAFA notices as they come in.

And whereas early on, after CAFA notice was required, it was rare to get an AG to have interest or involvement in a case. Over the past five years or so, it's not uncommon at all for class counsel and defense counsel, in settlements of this nature, to have a request from one or more state AGs to have a conference call, where there can be

a discussion about the litigation, the reasons for a settlement, any potential concerns that an AG may have about a settlement.

And that happens anymore more often than not; particularly in settlements of this scope, if there's any concern by AG. And there was never any such request made by any of the state AGs with respect to this settlement.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Shah.

MR. SHAH: This action was initially filed on behalf of three Ohio plaintiffs in March of 2010.

Subsequently, additional cases were filed around the country, which resulted in a proceeding between the -- before the JPML. And in February of 2012, that panel consolidated and transferred the spark plug actions to this court.

A month later, a master consolidated complaint was filed, asserting claims on behalf of plaintiffs' class representatives from 24 states.

The case then went through a substantial discovery period. And that discovery included hundreds of thousands of documents being produced and reviewed; the deposition of more than 50 class representative plaintiffs around the country; multiple depositions of Ford representatives; significant expert discovery and depositions; millions of lines of databases being produced, not only from Ford, but

also from Ford-authorized dealers by way of third-party discovery; significant third-party discovery with respect to Honeywell, the manufacturer of the engines; and, of course, class counsel's communication with thousands of class members, keeping them apprised of the status of the litigation, as well as their input regarding their experiences.

Ultimately, as the case proceeded towards summary judgment, the parties and the court reached an agreement on a bellwether framework, wherein six states were selected as bellwethers on summary judgment. Those motions were fully briefed. And ultimately, on July 30th of 2014, this court issued a summary judgment decision granting in part and denying in part Ford's motion for summary judgment.

At that stage, as the parties began to prepare for the class certification process, they agreed to go to private mediation, and engaged the services of one of the most well-respected mediators in the country, Professor Eric Green out of Boston. In-person mediation sessions were held with Professor Green on November 4th, 2014, and December 4th, 2014. Although the parties made progress towards a resolution, they did not reach a resolution.

There were continuing discussions for months thereafter, which resulted in the parties having a third in-person mediation session with Lewis Goldfarb, who is a

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northern Jersey attorney with extensive experience litigating automotive matters, both on the plaintiff's side, and he was in-house counsel for Chrysler for a number of years and understands these issues very well. That occurred in March of 2015 in New York City.

The parties still did not reach a final resolution. And it took additional negotiations, with the assistance of Mr. Goldfarb, following that March mediation to finally reach the settlement that was preliminarily approved by this court last year, and then submitted -- or presented to the class for consideration.

The court is certainly aware of the general parameters of the relief offered, but just briefly for the record, the settlement provides for reimbursement for spark plug expenses and replacements in excess of \$300 per eight spark plugs, or \$37.50 per individual spark plug.

There is no cap or ceiling as to Ford's obligations under the settlement. And expenses incurred between 300 and \$500 are reimbursed at 20 percent. Expenses between 500 and \$1,000 are reimbursed at 50 percent. And in excess of \$1,000, at 75 percent.

In addition, although the recommended maintenance by Ford for replacing spark plugs for the class vehicles was between 90- and 100,000 miles, a claimant can seek reimbursement for any replacement out to 120,000 miles. And

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if they can demonstrate that they were told by a Ford dealership not to have the spark plugs replaced, then they can actually get reimbursed for replacements occurring after 120,000 miles.

In addition, class members who would still like to have the replacement done can have the benefit of the protections afforded by the settlement framework, so long as they submit a claim by February 27th of 2017.

Lastly, Your Honor, the settlement, for those who are unable to prove up their claims by invoices or other documentation, permits the submission of a declaration to that effect, which permits recovery up to \$50.

Ford also agreed to pay all the notice costs and administration costs, as well as the attorneys' fees and expense amount of 5.25 million, and the service awards ranging from 2,000 to 7,500 for the representative plaintiffs. All of those payments are being paid separately by Ford and do not in any way or respect diminish the benefits available to the members of the class via the settlement.

I have already touched on notice. But again, the direct notice went out to approximately 4 million people.

CAFA notice was provided. And as Your Honor has already noted, there was an operating website with all of the key documentation, and through which class members can submit

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claims. Also, a toll-free number for any questions that might be asked.

And both Mr. Goldenberg's firm and my firm have dedicated, throughout this claims process, an attorney to answer any questions that class members may have. And I myself and Mr. Goldenberg, I know, have spoken to numerous class members, assisting them in submitting their claims and answering any questions that they have about the settlement, personally as our names appear quite readily if someone is looking for them.

The next component, and I think I can keep this relatively short, Your Honor, is just the propriety of certifying a settlement class. And those factors were already considered by the court in connection with preliminarily approving the settlement.

And the papers speak to why the Rule 23 elements are satisfied for purpose of a settlement class. I think it's notable that there was no objection as to the propriety of the settlement class, nor could there have been a valid one, given the realities of those factors.

So that takes me to why the settlement warrants final approval. And I'm just going to, if I may, go through the factors and have a discussion about those.

The first factor is the likelihood of success versus the form of relief that's made available under the

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settlement. So if the case had not resolved following the mediation efforts, the next step was, as Your Honor is aware, plaintiffs would have had to attempt to certify 24 separate state classes, applying 24 separate state laws. So plaintiffs were obviously prepared to go down that path. Certification in this day and age is by no means certain. And so there was risk associated with proceeding with certification.

The plaintiffs also would have had to establish the existence of a defect and Ford's knowledge. They also would have had to establish that Ford had a duty to disclose the defect, which implicated issues regarding the fact that there were no allegations of this being a safety defect.

And also relates to issues regarding the parties' different views as to when this defect manifested with respect to the durational aspects of the warranty.

Also, plaintiffs would have had to establish that this defect was covered under the various versions of Ford's warranties during the class period, had to establish classwide damages. And then, of course, there would have been a trial and the inevitable appeal.

Plaintiffs, I think as the record over six years reflects, believe strongly in the case, and continue to believe strongly in the case, but are well versed in understanding the risks of litigation, both from a

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certification perspective, and then ultimately, from a trial perspective.

And in light of the considerable benefits offered by -- cash benefits offered by the settlement, believed and strongly believe that this element -- this factor warrants approval of the settlement.

The second factor, Your Honor, is the complexity, expense and duration of the litigation. Certainly, had the case not settled, as I just went through, there would have been a lot of additional steps in the litigation. It would have continued for a number of years. And, again, that doesn't even factor in the inevitable appeal had we been successful.

And again, just to touch on the complexity.

Dealing with as many named plaintiffs as we had in this case, all the different state laws, and I think that from a fact-specific standpoint, the nature of the defect that was alleged here, again, it touched on issues that are — that often appear in these types of cases with respect to manifestation and duty to disclose, but there certainly were some unique fact circumstances specific to the defect at issue here that, again, made those very complicated legal issues, I think as evidenced by Your Honor's extensive opinion on summary judgment. There was a lot of different steps of analysis that were required to go through, both on

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the consumer statutory side, as well as on the warranty side here.

THE COURT: I would agree with that. And I would also add, if you don't mind, I think while few, by any statistical analysis, the ten objections, when you read through them, you can see how very different some of the circumstances could have been when viewed through different lenses.

MR. SHAH: Yeah.

THE COURT: I mean, I don't think -- perhaps save one that I hope you'll speak to me about was simply one that was just outside of the boundaries of the settlement agreement that was preliminarily approved.

MR. SHAH: Right. I think that's right, Your Honor. And I'll speak to this as I speak to the objections.

But it is -- one of the challenges in negotiating a settlement that could impact 4 million class members is, inevitably, whether you have 25 class members or 4 million, you know, it is not uncommon that there's going to be a few outliers.

And so any resolution that we try to reach, you know, from the plaintiffs' perspective, tries to take into account as much as it possibly can given the realities and circumstances of litigation. And we try to capture that.

And it is -- the nice facet of a class option mechanism is

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there is always the opt-out ability, if you are a class member for whatever reason that just has a unique set of circumstances.

And I'll speak to that further, but I appreciate the court's point on that factor.

The third factor, Your Honor, is the stage of proceedings and the discovery completed. And I won't reiterate again all of the work that was done over the approximately six years of litigation. But I think it suffices to say that because of all the work that was done, all the document review, all the depositions, all the expert work that the parties, not just plaintiffs, but the parties were well situated to be able to take a look at potential resolution and assess the weaknesses of their case, the strengths of their case, as well as on the other side; and then take into account what was a fair resolution in light of those risks, in light of the realities of continued litigation.

And I think that this settlement is strong evidence of that, that the parties both had to give and recognize, you know, what their weaknesses were here. So I think --

THE COURT: And again, if you don't mind me adding in, and Ms. Wright may say more about this, although she need not, at no point did Ford concede liability. So that

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was probably one of your biggest hurdles.

MR. SHAH: Yes. As strongly as plaintiffs believed in their case, Ford believed, perhaps more strongly, in its position. So there is no question about that.

The fourth factor, Your Honor, is the judgment of experienced class counsel. And I would just like to say this about the team that Mr. Goldenberg and I were fortunate enough to assemble on the -- in particular on the Executive Committee. This is a team of attorneys that collectively has litigated on multiple occasions against every large and small automotive manufacturer that does business in this country, among all the other complex litigation that these very talented attorneys participate in. And including a lot of us on our team have previously litigated against Ford.

So we were I think very well suited, because of that experience, to understand both factually and legally what we were up against at every stage of the litigation, including being able to analyze all of the evidence and all the legal risks at the time that we finally went to mediation many years into the litigation.

And I will also note that defense counsel, you know, and this is just known in the industry, is a formidable group of attorneys. They have incredible experience defending these types of cases, and, quite

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candidly, have had a great deal of success in defending these cases around the country. So we are aware of that as well.

But I think that in terms of the settlement, when you are talking about judgment of experienced counsel, here we had experienced counsel on both sides, being able to frame the issues. And, you know, I think, obviously, without getting into any settlement privilege, it is helpful to know that the other side can tell you exactly what your argument would be, and you could do the same for them, because it does really help to be able to see it from the other side and understand the arguments. And I think we had the very real benefit of having that dynamic here.

The fifth factor is the nature of negotiations.

And, again, settlement discussions did not commence until many years into litigation, two different highly respected mediators, over many months. I think that speaks for itself. To say that there was no collusion here would be an understatement. These were hard fought, intense, lengthy negotiations.

As to the public interest, which is the sixth factor, it goes without saying that being able to resolve the case at this stage will conserve judicial resources going forward. There's a significant benefit from a public interest standpoint to resolving complex and uncertain

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claims and giving benefits to the class, immediate benefits to the class.

I will also note that from an MDL perspective, this was how the process is supposed to work. We were able to streamline numerous cases from around the country, put them before one court and Your Honor, and resolve the claims in a bundled fashion. So I think that from a public interest standpoint, this is evidence of that process working as well.

And the last factor, Your Honor, is the reaction of the class. And again, in having done these cases for at least the past 15 years, to only have ten objections, where we had direct mail notice to the number of class members that we had here, is truly remarkable. And I think it is a testament to the work that was done by counsel to achieve the result that was achieved here.

You know, and we cite these cases in the brief, but, you know, the Olden case, 79 objections out of a class of 11,000, and that was deemed to be not sufficient to disavow the settlement. Baily, 229 objections out of nearly 4,800 class members.

But I do want to address that, you know, really the -- well, and we'll get to the Kron objection last. But with respect to all the objections, really including Kron, the objections really are based on the premise that they

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just wish that the settlement had provided more. Right?

Which a settlement, by its very nature, is a compromise.

And in this case, I think it was a compromise that was -- I know it was a compromise that was based on a very specific understanding of the risks by both sides.

So the first kind of grouping of objections pertains to the 120,000 mile cutoff. And this was a very hard fought part of the settlement. Obviously, Ford's view was that if they recommended it be -- if the company recommended that it be done between 90- and 100,000, then anyone who is not maintaining their vehicle, that's problematic.

We were able to negotiate a deal that actually adds 20 percent, at a minimum 20 percent beyond the mileage for this recommended maintenance.

And, in addition, we were able to put in an additional provision that if people were told to wait by a Ford dealership, they could go beyond the 120,000 miles.

And we know that people who have contacted us are availing themselves of that settlement provision.

The bottom line is, for example, if we had drawn it at 150,000 miles, or in the case of Mr. Guthrie, at 191,000 miles, there is going to be, absent a lifetime warranty on this -- under this settlement, there is always going to be someone perhaps on the other side of that line.

And so this was very contested, hotly negotiated, and at the end of the day, I think a very fair provision given where we ended up.

And to the extent that someone isn't able to avail themselves of that, again, they always have the opt-out right if they want to preserve their claim.

The second category is kind of the flip side of that, and that is, individuals who have not yet obtained 100,000 miles and they haven't done their spark plug -- performed a spark plug replacement.

So I believe that the two objectors on that front, one has 86,000 and one has 74,000 miles. And they have, under the settlement, until February 27th of next year to submit a claim. And again, to explain the thought process that went into this, is that companies want to have a definitive end to a resolution as opposed to open-ended, and we understand that from the plaintiffs' side.

The class vehicles here, Your Honor, as you know, are 2004 to 2008. So at the time of February of next year, the latest models that were sold will have been on the road for nearly ten years. The earliest models, nearly 14 years. So there is nothing that prevents someone who hasn't achieved 100,000 miles from availing themselves of the settlement, even if they're short of 100,000, so long as they elect to do that and submit a claim before February of

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So they certainly have the ability to avail themselves of the benefits of the settlement and take advantage of it.

And I will note, as Your Honor had Mr. Harris stand up and introduce himself earlier, Mr. Harris is a class member from Toledo who took the trip over today. And Mr. Harris is an individual who has in the range of 70,000 miles --

MR. HARRIS: 70,000.

MR. SHAH: -- on his vehicle. He drives it part of the time. And so we've talked to Mr. Harris. He is observing the proceedings today. And as we said, we will meet after, and assuming that the settlement is able to go forward, work with him to figure out the best time for him to have that done for him and assist him in submitting a claim when he has the work done.

THE COURT: Good. I appreciate that. And certainly driving from Toledo to Youngstown is going to help with the mileage situation.

MR. HARRIS: I didn't drive it.

THE COURT: So close.

MR. SHAH: So again, so those people aren't precluded from the benefits of the settlement, by any stretch.

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The next category is the do-it-yourself category. And this was an objection lodged by Mr. Westfield, and I guess then essentially copied by Mr. Kron. But with respect to Mr. Westfield, he's simply wrong with respect to the do-it-yourselfers. If there are expenses that exceed the \$300 threshold, by definition of out-of-pocket expenses, which is in the notice, those expenses, for example, paid to a parts supplier, are part of the settlement.

I think it's notable, and we point this out in the papers, that Mr. Westfield was unable to demonstrate that he had even reached the \$300 threshold for spark plug costs and the like.

But I will also note that both -- for the record,
I have received and spoken -- phone calls from and spoken
with class members, as has Mr. Goldenberg, who were
do-it-yourselfers, and fully understood that they could
submit for their expenses, they were simply inquiring as to
whether or not they were also able to recover for the time
they spent in their garage or in their driveway performing
the work, and we, of course told them that the settlement
didn't provide for that.

So the fact that the one class member may have been confused about that, of course, we never want anyone to be confused about anything, but we know from our own experiences that this is a one-off situation by a class

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member who hasn't been able to even demonstrate that he would otherwise qualify for the \$300 threshold.

The next category is what I would call the full or complete relief or reimbursement category. And that is people that either think that all amounts above 300 should be reimbursed, or that all amounts all together should be reimbursed.

So I guess taking them in reverse order, obviously, this was a maintenance item on each of the class vehicles that was something that was recommended be done. It was something that people had to do in the normal course of maintaining their vehicle. So there was necessarily going to be a cost associated with spark plug replacements. The mere fact that people had to go out of pocket doesn't mean they were damaged.

As the court knows, there was extensive briefing and expert work wherein plaintiffs' own expert ultimately opined that \$300, roughly \$300 would be what a reasonable consumer would expect to pay for the class vehicles for a spark plug replacement.

So the notion of full reimbursement for all costs doesn't take into account in any way what the actual measure of potential damages would be, even had plaintiffs been successful through trial and on appeal.

And then with respect to simply wanting I guess

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what I would call a higher reimbursement schedule above \$300, that just falls into the category of, just wish that there was more relief under the settlement. And this was a negotiated compromise, again, with experienced counsel, taking into account the risks of litigation.

The final objection is by Mr. Kron. And I go on to start out first, before I get into the substance of Mr. Kron's objection, by just addressing two separate standing issues.

So the first standing issue with Mr. Kron is in his objection, Your Honor, he cites that he is a class member because he purportedly owns two vehicles, and he includes the VIN of each of those vehicles. We have included in our supplemental filings a declaration by a Ford engineer, Mr. James Engle, who indicates and points out that neither VIN referenced by Mr. Kron is a vehicle that would be a class vehicle, and therefore, Mr. Kron is not a class member as it relates to those two vehicles that he references.

In addition, Mr. Kron has attached to his objection a class notice that was sent to Kron Interiors as a currently suspended California corporation. Even assuming that Mr. Kron was the sole owner of this defunct company, he doesn't certainly assert that, nor does he attempt to prove or establish in any way what his affiliation, if any, is

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with Kron Interiors. It is well settled law, and we reference it in our paper, that he can't individually exercise the corporate rights. So --

THE COURT: Let me ask a question about that. And I hope it's one that perhaps even you're prepared for.

Because there are at least -- there are not class -- well, there are class members. In fact, there are class representatives who are among those suggested receive service awards, and at least two of them appear to be entities. And the settlement agreement allows payment to entities. At least one is easily recognizable I think as a named plaintiff, Buckeye Management Group.

MR. SHAH: That's correct.

THE COURT: East Poultry Texas Supply.

MR. SHAH: That's correct as well. Ohio and Texas plaintiffs respectively, yes.

THE COURT: So understanding that they're carved out, and you did a nice job of reminding the court of that in the ECF 108, which is plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees, expense reimbursement and class representative service awards, Footnote 28.

But if you hinge your argument, at least one of many, and I will tell you that losing one of many reasons for disagreeing with the objection by Mr. Kron certainly wouldn't be fatal to plaintiffs. But how is it the

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1 distinction between the corporation and the individual 2 differ from Mr. Kron than it is for those two named parties? 3 MR. SHAH: Sure, Your Honor. In the case of Poultry, and in the case of --4 14:14:45 THE COURT: Buckeye? MR. SHAH: -- Buckeye, they were named plaintiffs 6 7 in their corporate capacity. So the corporations themselves 8 were suing as class representatives. 9 Here, Mr. Kron did not bring the objection on behalf of -- again, assuming he's even affiliated with, he 14:15:02 10 11 did not bring the objection on behalf of Kron Interiors, he 12 brought it on behalf of himself. 13 So it's not our position that he may -- he may be 14 able to establish, if he so elected, he may have been able 14:15:23 15 to establish that he could object on behalf of -- or that 16 Kron Interiors could object as a class member. But he did 17 not do that here. He simply objected in his personal 18 capacity. Other than attaching the document, he didn't even 19 reference Kron Interiors. 14:15:40 20 THE COURT: What I suggest, and I appreciate the suggestions made in the proposed final order that's docketed 21

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and you've already written, that if Ms. Phillips submits what is necessary, then you'd consider that.

MR. SHAH: Yes.

THE COURT: Perhaps when Mr. Kron reads this, he'd say -- and he wouldn't have to read it in my order, he could read it in the pleading I alluded to earlier -- "Oh, I just submitted it under the wrong name."

So I just think that one reason is superfluous, not necessary, because it's the kind of reason, being as reasonable as you have been up to now, you might forgive and allow him to fix, if he otherwise fit the definition of class member. My strong suggestion is that one frailty cured is not going to change circumstances by much.

MR. SHAH: Understood. And as I understand Your Honor's statement, in terms of potentially striking that, that language from the proposed final approval order, I think that we can confer about that in short order after the conclusion of today's proceeding, or at a break.

I will also note, just for the record, that we did serve Mr. Kron our papers that were filed last week, as well as the Columbus attorney that was listed as an attorney of record. So Mr. Kron and his attorney of record are aware of the argument that we make, or certainly at least have been served with the argument that we have made on the lack of standing.

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But I certainly understand where Your Honor is coming from on that and will talk with my colleagues about that.

So in any event, we believe that there's a lack of standing for that reason.

We also believe that there's a lack of standing for a second reason. And this second reason pertains to Mr. Kron's failure to abide by this court's preliminary approval order; and specifically, what information needs to be provided to the parties and to the settlement administrator and to the court to have a valid objection.

And as we know in the papers, and I'm not going to speak at length about it today, you know, Mr. Kron, by all appearances, is a professional objector. He's objected, to our knowledge, to at least three class settlements in the past two years, sometimes through his son in his son's individual capacity, sometimes through his son's law firm. His son has objected to other settlements. To our knowledge, no court has ever accepted his objections.

And I only point out that by way of background, because his history of objections explains, but frankly, does not excuse Mr. Kron's failure to comply with the court's requirement that he state the number of objections he's made to class action settlements in the past five years.

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He certainly was aware of that requirement, because he said -- specifically, he specifically addressed it in his objection, and so he simply just disregarded that requirement. We think that's an independent reason as to why Mr. Kron doesn't have standing.

Having said all that, I will now, as we do in our papers, point out that even if the court were to consider the objections, they're baseless and certainly don't provide a reason to not grant final approval to the settlement, Your Honor.

The first objection that he makes is he complains about the allocation of the settlement benefits, and he says that they're not fair. And he basically alleges that there's preferential treatment. Well, there is no preferential treatment here. The case he cites, Vassalle, V-a-s-s-a-l-l-e, in that case, the plaintiffs got certain debt exonerated under the settlement, which benefit wasn't made available to other class members. And there's nothing of that nature here. The same settlement benefits apply to all the class members.

And I also point out, it's notable in Vassalle that there was no question about the propriety of the service or incentive award being paid separately in the settlement. Vassalle was looking simply at the different types of benefits being made available under the substantive

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terms of the settlement itself. So there's no legal basis for that argument, certainly under the circumstances of the settlement here.

He next complains about the unreasonableness of a \$300 threshold. And I discussed that just a few minutes ago, and will leave my analysis at that.

He next argues, again, without really explaining any legal basis as to why, that no class representative paid less than \$300, and that somehow makes the settlement infirm. No class member paid less than \$300 for a spark plug replacement.

In connection with summary judgment, however, on the damages issue, Ford's briefing in this case, and we point specifically to the record and our papers reflect that at least four class members -- class plaintiffs are paid less than \$280 to replace their spark plugs.

He next argues, Mr. Kron does, that somehow
Mr. Perko is inadequate because he didn't own a class
vehicle. Again, without saying how that would make him
inadequate, it's neither here nor there, because Mr. Perko
did, in fact, own a class vehicle and is a class member.

Mr. Kron's next point is simply just evidence is a complete misunderstanding of the settlement. He says that the settlement didn't provide recovery for people who had replacements less than 100,000 miles. Not only could you

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recover if you had a replacement less than 100,000, if you previously went out of pocket, as, for example, in the case of Mr. Harris, those people going forward up through February 27th of next year, less than 100,000 miles, also can avail themselves of the benefits of the class.

He next indicates that he wants the settlement to permit reimbursement regardless of the mileage. So, basically, a warranty in perpetuity. And that was not something that was going to be achievable at any stage of the litigation; and just, again, fails to take into consideration any of the real world legal and factual realities of litigation.

He then picked up on Mr. Westfield's objection, so decided to basically cut and paste that argument, and I've already addressed that.

And lastly, he has some boilerplate language about attorneys' fees, and doesn't actually quibble with the amount, just says that, you know, those should be withheld until his proposed improvements can be implemented.

At the end of the day, these objections really speak to simply there being more relief available in the settlement.

And I do want to just quickly go back to

Ms. Phillips' objection. Unfortunately, as the court is

aware, her circumstances are very unique. Her husband

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passed away. He was the one who had visited the authorized dealer and potentially had the communications about the replacement. We have conferred with Ford. Class counsel, in the coming days, is going to reach out to Ms. Phillips and let her know that Ford has agreed to consider her claim from a goodwill perspective, and we are going to encourage her to submit a claim with that understanding.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. SHAH: So in sum, these few objections really just speak to the notion of, they just wish the settlement provided more relief. Plaintiffs' counsel always wishes that a settlement provides more relief. But it has to be viewed in context, the context of all the other factors that I just spoke about that courts analyze in terms of determining whether a settlement is adequate.

And when one looks at those factors, looks at the reality of the litigation, the history of the litigation, the parties involved, the risks involved, the individuals who were involved in working with the parties to resolve the matter, it is our belief, and we respectfully submit that this is an excellent settlement. It is just that, though, a settlement, a negotiated compromise. The 62,000-plus class members have already sought relief by submitting claims from, sought the benefits of that. That claims period runs for a number of additional months as well.

1 All in all, this is an excellent settlement. 2 was a product of a lot of really hard work, by a team of 3 attorneys that believed, and continue to believe, strongly in this issue. And we just don't believe that the 4 objections -- the few objections provide any basis to not 14:25:22 5 grant final approval. 6 7 If I may just make two more quick points and then 8 I'll be done, absent any questions that Your Honor might 9 have. 14:25:37 10 THE COURT: Two more quick points regarding the 11 settlement itself or shifting into fees and costs? 12 MR. SHAH: Sure. I was just going to make -- just talk about the service awards and fees and costs. 13 14 THE COURT: Good, I'd like you to. Can I forecast 14:25:52 15 a question that I hope you're probably already prepared to 16 answer for me? 17 MR. SHAH: Okay. 18 THE COURT: Again regarding service awards, and I 19 appreciate the footnote explaining the categorization of 14:26:05 20 plaintiffs named in the master consolidated complaint. 21 MR. SHAH: Right. 2.2 THE COURT: I'm still left wondering why it is 23 that Dennis White is categorized to receive the highest 24 amount, \$7,500. If there's a spouse and they both were 14:26:21 25 deposed, maybe that's the answer. And if so, I will accept

35 1 it. 2 MR. SHAH: That is the answer, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Is it? 4 MR. SHAH: He had a spouse that was deposed as 14:26:32 5 well, so that's it. THE COURT: And is it typical that when that's --6 7 so the spouse was deposed, but the spouse is not a named 8 plaintiff? 9 MR. SHAH: That's correct. THE COURT: So that's a distinction? 14:26:41 10 11 MR. SHAH: Even though she had not signed a 12 retainer and agreed to participate in the litigation, that 13 was an additional factor that in terms of his service as a 14 class representative plaintiff, you know, was requested by 14:26:59 15 Ford, and he and his wife, his spouse, agreed to do it to 16 benefit the class and make sure there were no issues that 17 arose about his particular circumstance. 18 THE COURT: And then there were two others, both 19 of whom share the last name of Black, calling me to believe 14:27:15 20 they're spouses or related. You can tell me. That's Debra 21 and Larry Black. And I can't understand without help why it 2.2 is each of them, unless, of course, I take a moment to do 23 the math, they're both receiving \$3,750. And that's just 24 the split. So is there some reason you're giving separate

households, is it --

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	1	MR. SHAH: They were both named plaintiffs and	
	2	they were both deposed.	
	3	THE COURT: And	
	4	MR. SHAH: So	
14:27:47	5	THE COURT: Interesting. Is there any more reason	
	6	why Mr. Black is getting pardon me, Dennis White is	
	7	getting \$7,500, when his spouse was deposed, but she's not a	
	8	named plaintiff?	
	9	MR. SHAH: No.	
14:28:01	10	THE COURT: And that's the only one, I'm right,	
	11	isn't it?	
	12	MR. SHAH: That is the only reason, that's	
	13	correct.	
	14	THE COURT: Okay. What else would you like to say	
14:28:08	15	about service awards?	
	16	MR. SHAH: I would just like to say that, you	
	17	know, from plaintiffs' counsel's perspective, we can't move	
	18	forward with litigation unless we have representative	
	19	plaintiffs who are willing to commit to what in this case	
14:28:25	20	was approximately six years of litigation, where they are	
	21	called upon to assist us with the initial case	
	22	investigation, to provide us with all their documentation,	
	23	to be kept apprised of the developments in the case, both by	
	24	correspondence, phone calls with class counsel, meetings	
14:28:45	25	with attorneys to assist them in preparing for a deposition,	

sitting for their deposition, reviewing the transcript, making sure that everything was reported accurately. And then keeping to work -- working with class counsel all the way through settlement, so that we have an understanding as to what an appropriate framework would be, what they're looking for.

It is no small commitment. Also, in this day and age, where Google or a Yahoo search turns up, you know, names, you are necessarily putting yourself out there into the public eye when you serve in a plaintiffs' -- as a plaintiffs' class representative.

So the awards requested are in line with and, in fact, in many respects, less than awards in comparable cases, as we set forth in -- we had a lot of really great class representative plaintiffs who worked closely with plaintiffs' counsel and were instrumental in helping to achieve the result that was achieved.

So for the record, we just thank them for their participation and assistance in the litigation, and request that the court award those.

THE COURT: Can I ask one other question? And this is about the Blacks. Were they deposed individually?

MR. SHAH: Were they deposed --

MS. WRIGHT: Yes.

THE COURT: They were?

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1 MR. SHAH: Yes.

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\$7,500, they're each not awarded 5,000. It seems that they're getting a discounted allocation simply because they're related. But if it's also true they were deposed individually -- and unless you tell me that the spouse of White did as much work as, you know, Debra Black and/or Larry Black, it just doesn't make sense to me, how it is they share \$7,500 instead of \$5,000 each, if they were deposed individually.

Does that make sense to you?

MR. SHAH: Jeff, you were closer on that than I was.

MR. GOLDENBERG: Your Honor, if I may approach?

THE COURT: Certainly, please do.

MR. GOLDENBERG: I think the theory behind the numbers for the class representatives with respect to the incentive awards as to the married couples, is that it's not just the deposition and attending a deposition, it's also the time they spent reviewing the complaints and gathering their documents, some of which would have been a shared responsibility between the married couple.

And so instead of taking 5,000 and multiplying it by two and getting 10,000, we came across a number somewhere in between, because they were deposed, and they also did

these other duties and responsibilities, like getting the documents together. But they did that together as one. And so instead of 5,000 to 10,000, we kind of came in between.

The other part of this is the way that this -- if my recollection is correct about the mediation, there was a global number reached, which was around 235,000, and we then came up and allocated those numbers as plaintiffs' counsel in a way that we thought was fair between the different class representatives.

THE COURT: Well, even if -- there are so few of them, which makes sense. I mean, while it's not an insignificant case, 24 states, 4 million plaintiffs, at least in the class settlement, I mean, there are so few of them, it's not as if it's that difficult to really nail down exactly what each person did to deserve the award.

I mean, let's face it, these cases would never survive adjudication if you didn't have people willing to do all the things that Mr. Shah stated on the record that these plaintiffs did. So I'm not challenging that. I'm just asking you to reconsider -- do the Blacks know how this works out? I don't know if they do. And perhaps they do and they have no problem with it. That might help me to know.

MR. GOLDENBERG: Yeah, we communicated with all the class representatives, the named class representatives.

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THE COURT: Not just what they receive, but what they receive relative to others?

MR. GOLDENBERG: Yes. I mean, everybody knows -everybody received the settlement agreement. Whether, I
think -- I don't know exactly what the conversation was with
each class representative. Some I did talk to and made them
aware of what they were receiving as a contribution award,
assuming the court approves it. They were all aware that
the contribution awards are something that is subject to
court approval and may or may not happen. Even today that's
the case. But we did go over the numbers with them. They
were all appreciative of the numbers.

Another thing that came into our calculations when we set those numbers is looking at other awards in the Sixth Circuit, and making sure we come within that range. To a certain extent, for this type of case, you know, we thought comfortably 7,500 was a number that didn't raise the bar or go above that bar.

But, yeah, every -- each of the class representatives was aware of their particular contribution award, and we did discuss what that basis was for coming up with those numbers with them. None of them objected to the contribution awards that were assigned to them.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir. I don't know if Mr. Shah had anything more to add on that point. Do you,

41 1 sir? 2 MR. SHAH: Nothing more on that point, Your Honor, 3 no. 4 THE COURT: Let me ask this last question about it Does the settlement agreement establish a family cap 14:34:43 5 of \$7,500, or just the information provided regarding if 6 7 both husband and wife were deposed, then 7,500 is the 8 payout? 9 MR. SHAH: I believe the agreement just sets forth for each plaintiff the amount that is attributable to them. 14:35:02 10 11 MR. GOLDENBERG: The settlement agreement, I 12 believe, just includes a number for all of contribution 13 awards of \$235,000, and then we, the plaintiffs' counsel, 14 were to propose a mechanism to the court allocating that 14:35:25 15 235,000 among the various class representatives from the 24 16 states. 17 THE COURT: All right. Thank you both. 18 Mr. Shah, you had you said two other points. I'm 19 hoping that part of what you have left to say is going to 14:35:41 20 regard what's been submitted, and I think is meant to be Exhibit A to the settlement -- I mean, to the final order, 21 2.2 pardon me. And I am looking at the supplement filed by 23 Linda Webster at ECF 119, that gives some updated 24 information regarding exclusions. 14:36:05 25 And the question I'm left with generally is, what

updates do you have for all of the final numbers regarding fees and costs? And if the 502 persons included in the exclusions includes the one that filed or submitted it late, at least according to the postmark date. It looks like it was postmarked after the 22nd of 2015. And Ms. Webster says there are 502 including that.

And I guess my question is, is that person excluded, or is that person a class member?

MR. SHAH: The person is -- the person requested exclusion. And even though it was untimely, the parties met and conferred, and Ford has agreed to allow that person to be considered excluded. So that person will not be subject to the settlement.

MS. WRIGHT: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. WRIGHT: It's 431 persons and 502 vehicles.

THE COURT: Yes. Oh, thank you.

MS. WRIGHT: Not 502 persons.

THE COURT: You're right, and that's what it says.

Thank you for the clarification.

I am looking now at the supplemental filing made by -- it's not a supplemental filing, but rather styled as an amended declaration by you, Mr. Goldenberg.

MR. GOLDENBERG: Yes.

THE COURT: In support of your motion for fees,

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1 reimbursement and service awards. And the second part of my 2 question regarding updating the numbers. It said here, on 3 the 18th of January, seven days passed now, and, of course, I imagine there have been some expense incurred just 4 indulging the court in this hearing. But you were at 14:37:52 \$417,000 for expenses, with a total investment in the case 6 7 now being at 8 million 1. Any updates to be provided today? 8 MR. GOLDENBERG: We don't have any further 9 There's been some expenses incurred, Mr. Shah flying in, and then I drove up, rental car, things like 14:38:15 10 11 that, that are hotel-related, but nothing that is really 12 worthy, you know, to resubmit to the court. At least from 13 our perspective, we are willing to submit on the data the 14 court has based on that supplemental declaration relative to 14:38:35 15 the expenses and the fee. 16 I would add one thing, Your Honor. You did ask 17 about the settlement agreement. I actually misspoke. The 18 settlement agreement does specifically lay out the 19 contribution awards for each of the named plaintiffs, and 14:38:47 20 that's at page 20 of the settlement agreement, which was 21 previously filed under Docket Number 95-1. 2.2 THE COURT: Sure. I have it right here, if you --23 page 20, service award for named plaintiffs. 24 MR. GOLDENBERG: Right. The reason I was confused 14:39:06 25 is, prior to the settlement agreement, there was another

document called the memorandum of understanding, which was signed by the parties soon after final agreement was reached.

The MOU did not contain the breakdown for each class representative, but rather, contained an overall number for contribution awards. These numbers that appear in the settlement agreement were derived by plaintiffs' counsel, of course approved by Ford. But that's the process that we went through.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

Let me ask, is there anything more that plaintiffs' counsel would like to offer at this time? If I've heard you fully, then I'd like to give defense counsel an opportunity to say anything at all that the defense would like on the record.

MR. SHAH: I think we're good.

MR. GOLDENBERG: I had one thing to add, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. GOLDENBERG: Just to clarify. This was your first question, I think, as we began about class notice. And the declaration of Linda Webster, the first one, at paragraph 11, class notice was mailed on October 16, 2015, and it was mailed to 3,946,315 class members. That's Docket Number 107-7.

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And then also, per that same declaration from Ms. Webster, the website and the toll-free number were operational on or before October 16th, 2015. And that's paragraphs 12 and 13 of her declaration.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

MR. SHAH: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you both.

Ms. Wright, certainly.

MS. WRIGHT: Thank you, Your Honor. Just very briefly, I think what you said at the outset was absolutely accurate. This has been hotly contested from the very beginning. And quite frankly, if we were not here today, it would continue to be hotly contested, because Ford continues to believe strongly there is no liability here.

I think that the record will show from the outset that's the position we've taken through motions to dismiss, then the motion for summary judgment. And as Your Honor noted, that was only for six states. You wrote an opinion that was more than 100 pages long. And you actually granted some of Ford's claims in part, and denied some. And we still had 18 more states to go, with varying laws in all of those states.

And with respect to the claims where we did not receive summary judgment, we obviously still had appeal rights we could have pursued.

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With respect to class certification, as Mr. Shah pointed out, there would have been 24 states with different laws. And I believe, quite frankly, Your Honor, your summary judgment opinion would have made it very difficult to have those classes certified, simply because, as you note, some people had claims granted and some had denied, state by state varied, and the degree of their ownership varied. So I think that would have been very difficult.

And, quite frankly, the objectors, as you noted, have differing positions for their objections, again showing differences among the class members. And obviously, we would have had appeal rights immediately had a class in part or in whole been certified.

Had we gone to trial, which Ford was completely prepared, ready and willing to do, had there been an adverse ruling, we would have had appeal rights. So I think we would still be here another four years from now, quite frankly, between class certification, further summary judgment, trials and appeals.

I would also say with respect to the settlement agreement itself, it was three long mediations, many negotiations in between, and every term that Mr. Shah discussed with you, from the mileage, the threshold of \$300, the percentages, the documentation, the service awards, the attorneys' fees, every term was very hotly contested during

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those negotiations.

For Ford, the time, the expense, the finality and our customer satisfaction led us to this. But in no way was there ever a suggestion that there was any liability.

I would like to point out on the record two things. One, that the plaintiffs' counsel here have been the utmost professionals, and it has been, while a hotly contested litigation, a very pleasant litigation. They did an excellent job for their clients. But in all respects, they were very professional.

And then finally, with respect to people who have had their spark plugs removed either in the past or in the future, there is no suggestion and Ford does not believe that many of those will ever even reach the \$300 threshold, as those spark plugs can and most often are today removed with no breakage and for less than \$300.

So we would agree with your plaintiffs, Your Honor, and request that you approve the settlement as submitted to you in June and again last week with the final approval. Thank you.

THE COURT: Let me ask this, Ms. Wright. Right now, what's Ford's best estimate as what your costs will be?

MS. WRIGHT: Your Honor, we have no idea. And that is the absolute truth. We have 62,000 claim forms that have been submitted. We don't know how many of those are

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going to be valid. Obviously, the settlement hasn't been approved yet. We don't know between now and August how many people will have submitted for work already done, or between now and next February.

So as much as we would like to have an idea of what it's going to cost us, we truly do not know what it will cost us.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. WRIGHT: Thank you.

THE COURT: Counselors, I'd like to point out just some minor edits to what was submitted to me as a proposed final order and judgments granting approval of class action settlement.

I think this is just more stylistic than substantive, or even grammatically correct. But on the second page, just before the language "Now, therefore, it is hereby ordered that," the language above it, which ends "set forth in the Settlement Agreement," ends with a semicolon.

In my writing, I would make it a full stop, a period, not a semicolon.

The footnote at the bottom of page 6, this is at paragraph number 17, it indicates that there is no ECF number for Mr. Chalup's objection, but I think we all know that now there is because counsel filed it. He didn't file it as he was required to, but counsel did file it. And for

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ease of finding it in the future, the ECF Number is 107-5.

So I think that should be inserted, because it is now available to us. And when you go there, what you'd see is Exhibit C to Mr. Shah's declaration, which attaches the Chalup objection, "Chalup" objection is probably the better pronunciation.

The only suggested resolutions of objections as detailed in this document pretty closely match what I would have written had I penned it myself. Page 8, there is an article missing. The second -- the first full paragraph, the one that begins "Mr. Westfield's objection," and then if you go down to -- six lines, after the period, begins a sentence with "'Out-of-Pocket Expenses'" are defined," and I would put in, "in 'the' Settlement Agreement." I think it is pretty British of the scrivener not to have put in "the." Perhaps a Downton Abbey influence.

Now, the one last one that's probably of more significance is at page 10. And this is regarding Mr. Kron. And I've listened to what you said, Mr. Shah, about -- or in response to my question about his perhaps allegation that he's representing a vehicle owned by a corporation.

So what I had the greatest problem with starts with the sentence that begins "Furthermore, although Mr. Kron's objection attached a copy of a notice that was mailed to Kron Interiors, Mr. Kron has not provided any

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evidence that he is authorized to object on behalf of Kron Interiors." And then I think the law and the parenthetical is fine. "Therefore, in the absence of any proof that the Settlement has any impact upon Mr. Kron, or that he is bound by its terms, the Court finds he has no standing."

Reading this again, after hearing your argument, I like it better than I did when I read it alone. So I won't urge the removal of that. But if I've caused you to reconsider and think it should come out, please tell me. Have I?

MR. SHAH: Your Honor, I think given what we understand the state of the law to be from the corporate entity versus the individual, I think from the plaintiffs' perspective, we understand Your Honor's point, but I think we're comfortable having it remain as is.

MS. WRIGHT: As are we, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And given your oral representation today, I am happy to leave that in the suggested language.

Those were the only notes that I made in advance to bring to your attention. And as you can remark, out of a 21-page document, that's pretty few. So I compliment you on your drafting. It's not only been in accordance with what I anticipated when I preliminarily approved the settlement, which is presumptive. It's not a given, but it is presumptive. It matched what I've heard here today, and

indeed, what, at least through the representations of counsel, has occurred.

Counsel, have I heard you fully then?

MR. SHAH: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: On behalf of plaintiffs?

MR. SHAH: Yes, Your Honor. Other than I would just like to echo Ms. Wright's statements. This is -- as Your Honor is very familiar, litigation can be a difficult business. And it is a pleasure to work with very skilled people on their side, but still be able to do so in a civil and cordial way. And this is the way litigation should work. I wish it did so more often.

And I appreciate the court's time and attention in this matter as well.

THE COURT: Certainly. And I appreciate what you've both said about opposing counsel. I don't hear it nearly as often as I'd like to, so I am really pleased that that's been your experience. And I hope it's mimicked not only when you face one another as opponents, but in other circumstances where your opposing counsel is different than those represented in court here today.

Counsel, based upon all that's been said, and I have given this great attention, not only today during this hearing, but in advance of today. And as I stated, the purpose of this hearing, at least primarily, was ultimately

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to decide whether or not the settlement agreement is fair, reasonable and adequate and in the best interest of the class members.

I do so make that finding, and will articulate that in writing using substantially that which has been drafted as proposed by the parties, some of which I've discussed with you here on the record.

And additionally, when it comes to the compensation, not only for the attorneys and the reimbursement of costs, but also an allocation made to the class representatives, I find that what you've written by way of explanation satisfies me.

And when I consider how far we've come, given this litigation, and as Ms. Wright rightfully explained on the record, what was likely to happen had this hotly contested litigation not been resolved by the parties, I find that this case has been efficiently and expeditiously, by many measures, litigated. That counsel has been competent, and also respectful, not only of the court, but of opposing counsel.

Of the amounts listed, that they are reasonable, that being both the fees and the hours spent adjudicating this matter. And when I look at all of the numbers that have been given to the court in support of the fees request, I find that it is fair and reasonable, that the number of

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hours expended are well explained, and also reasonable. That the ask is far less than the lodestar amount. I won't say an explicit number today, because I am going to give counsel the time to get back to your offices and submit what's the ultimate number based upon your work done in court here today, including the expenses, some of which Mr. Goldenberg just recited for the court.

But it is my intention, believing that there's not going to be some great change that's not sufficiently explained, if there is, but not expecting a great change, that I'll be able to grant both motions that are pending on the court's docket, and those motions are pending at ECF Number 107, the final approval of settlement, and 108, the approval of fees, costs and allocation of service awards.

With that, I believe that I can adjourn this hearing.

And thank you, Mr. Harris, for appearing. As you can see that while you're in good hands, it's still nice to know that the system worked, meaning the notices did go out as intended, they were received understood, and that you found yourself to the easternmost courthouse in the Northern District of Ohio. And I hope you've been satisfied by what you've heard. And I know plaintiffs' counsel intends to continue to speak with you.

This hearing is adjourned.

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                 ALL: Thank you, Your Honor.
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                  LAW CLERK: All rise.
             (Proceedings concluded at 2:53 p.m.)
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C E R T I F I C A T EI certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. /s/ Mary L. Uphold February 9, 2016 Mary L. Uphold, RDR, CRR Date